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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the legitimacy of the current Australian Financial 
Services licensee-authorised representative licensing model [also referred to as the AFSL-AR or 
licensee-adviser licensing model]. This research makes specific reference to the issue of conflict 
of interest from association and independence in relation to the Commonwealth Corporations 
Act 2001 [the Act]. Negative media attention, unsubstantiated personal assertions and hearsay 
by lobby groups in practice, troubled the longstanding debate around licensing advisers through 
third-party product-conflicted commercially oriented licensees. Surprising, this matter has not 
yet received any scholarly attention. Looking at the existing literature, the absence of a normative 
theoretical framework within the financial planning discipline, limited the formulation of 
empirically testable models to properly define, measure and examine legitimacy to collect 
substantiated evidence. To address some of the existing challenges and provide both theoretical 
and empirical analysis, this research examines the extent to which the current individual advisers’ 
licensing through third-party licensees is problematic. To this end, the study assessed the 
legitimacy of the current AFSL-AR licensing model using principal-agent theory in conjunction 
with four identified objectives of the Act. Further, the researchers applied the legitimacy types 
conceptualised within financial planning theory by adopting, extending and applying the 
legitimacy theoretical framework Suchman (1995) developed. Finally, this investigation studied 
the independent professional individual self-regulation mechanism, based on the regulatory 
regimes of other well-establish professions, to determine how financial planning adviser 
regulation compares. 
Within the current regulatory structure, Australian financial advisers face a dual-agency role 
when licensed via third-party product-conflicted commercially oriented licensees. While 
considering the need for regulatory compliance and viability of commercial activities, advisers 
serving both the commercial interest of licensees and the best interests of clients simultaneously, 
leads to conflict of interest from association. Thus, the current licensee-adviser licensing 
structure raises serious doubts in its consistencies to achieve four identified objectives of the Act. 
Consequently, these inconsistencies delegitimise the current licensee-adviser licensing model 
when tested against Suchman’s legitimacy criteria. Furthermore, if the claim of illegitimacy is 
true, then a strong argument exists to replace the current, institutional licensing via multiple 
licensees with individual licensing via a single independent body, like other professions, such as 
doctors, lawyers and accountants.  
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While noting the existing licensing model could be a potential source of lack of public confidence 
and trust in financial services delivery, the analysis focussed on four key objectives when 
examining the legitimacy of the current licensing model.  First, the research investigated  to what 
extent advisers perceive a dual-agency role arising from licensing advisers through third-party 
licensees, as specified in the Act, where they service both the interests of licensees and their 
clients simultaneously, leading to conflict of interest from association. Second, the investigation 
examined the extent to which advisers perceive licensing authorised representatives via third-
party licensees is inconsistent with four identified objectives of the Act. Third, the extent advisers 
perceive the current licensee-adviser licensing model as legitimate based on Suchman’s (1995) 
legitimacy academic framework applied to financial planning theory was assessed. Fourth, the 
extent financial advisers perceive individual licensing through an independent professional 
standards body, like other professions, is a worthy replacement alternative for consideration was 
considered. 
Initially, a critical literature review of the principal-agent theory, regulatory obligations, 
legitimacy theory and expected standards of an accredited true professional to develop the 
theoretical underpinnings of an acceptable licensing model was undertaken. To achieve the 
abovementioned research objectives, a post-positivist research paradigm formed the basis for the 
choice of research strategies, methodology and research design. Using mixed methods 
methodology, the researchers conducted an empirical survey of 4,000 authorised representatives 
selected from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission [ASIC] Adviser Register 
via a probability random sampling approach. Utilising a parallel convergent design, both 
quantitative and qualitative data was collected simultaneously to integrate together into the 
overall interpretation of the results. Data collection involved emailing participants across 
Australia an online, semi-structured survey questionnaire of open-ended and closed-ended 
questions developed and hosted on the Qualtrics server. Structural equation modelling [SEM] 
technique empirically analysed the quantitative data, while identifying causative pathways. In 
undertaking the qualitative data analysis, the investigators applied constant comparative 
technique with a focus on content analysis of the specific words written by respondents. To 
generate common concepts, categories, patterns and themes the researcher sorted and analysed 
the data in terms of frequency, meanings, and associations of words quoted by survey informants. 
During analysis these commonalities were integrated into the the overall interpretation of the 
results of the quantitative data.  
VI 
 
Empirical results revealed advisers felt licensing via third-party product-aligned commercially 
oriented licensees turns them into dual agents facing conflict of interest from association. For 
different reasons, the regulator ASIC, AFS licensees, their advisers and clients face caveat 
emptor, when advisers serve the commercial interest of licensees and best interests of clients 
simultaneously. For example, ASIC, licensees and their advisers risk their reputations. While 
their clients risk suffering financial losses when receiving recommendations biased by conflicted 
licensees’ in-house products and commercial interest. In support of the dual-agency role findings, 
empirically clear from the perspective of advisers, this structure of licensing displays 
inconsistencies with four identified objectives of the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001.  In 
the presence of minority counter claims, survey respondents pointed out three top drivers leading 
to these illegitimacy tendencies. Ranked from most significant to least, they included: (1) 
unintentional [and intentional] breaches of the statutory best interest duty, (2) practices 
misaligning adviser-client interests, and (3) licensees’ commercial interests compromising the 
best interest duty. These potential contraventions of statutory compliance requirements can 
encourage class action.  Evidence also established even highly qualified and professional advisers 
lack professional autonomy and power to stop AFS licensees from controlling their professional 
ethics with key performance indicators, sales targets and threats of job and remuneration losses 
to promote a product sales culture. Accordingly, these results strengthened arguments for 
individual licensing through a single independent professional body, like other professions. Thus, 
the findings support the notion to turn financial advisers into recognised accredited professionals, 
who are subject to the same legal professional, educational, ethical and entry standards as other 
true professionals. In the presence of minority critics, survey respondents make known a 
preference for licensing via such a single independent body. However, they fear losing the 
subsidised support services offered by their licensees, such as software, training, professional 
indemnity, research, compliance, business, legal and back office support. Furthermore, another 
major concern for advisers, should they move to individual licensing, would be the cost 
implications of individual licensing. Additionally, qualitative evidence determined numerous 
unresolved issues around licensing consist of: practicality, professional indemnity, approved 
product lists, buyer of last resort agreements, ‘white’ and ‘private’ label products, and vertical 
integration. In addition, advisers expressed, no matter what licensing regime was in operation, 
AFS licensees would always find ways to incentivise advisers to distribute their products. These 
concerns and unresolved issues requires further investigation in future research. 
VII 
 
When considering the findings, licensing advisers via product-conflicted commercially oriented 
third-party licensees threatens independence, a key characteristic of a profession. Additionally, 
when attention to any conflict of interest is critical to a professional, this manner of licensing 
results in conflict of interest from association. As part of policy recommendations, the legislated 
Financial Adviser Standards and Ethics Authority [FASEA] tasked with professional standards, 
education and ethics could evolve to also appoint, register, regulate, discipline and cease 
individual advisers to practise their craft as recognised accredited professionals.  Since the 
financial planning profession is growing rapidly, this single body should accredit financial 
advisers to practice their skill. In support of Kingsford Smith’s (2014) views, this single 
monopoly body is the most effective way to regulate the future financial planning profession. In 
comparison, multiple independent professional bodies covering multiple designations often 
accredited other professions, resulting in consequently multiple challenges. Moreover, the 
empirical results show, independently licensed advisers promote improvement in public trust and 
confidence. Most importantly, disconnecting individual advisers from AFS licensees will further 
the cause of professionalising the emerging financial planning industry into a recognised 
accredited profession. Another likely benefit of individual licensing encompasses incentivising 
university graduate talent to enter the financial advisory sector, because recognised professions 
have status. Based on the findings, all financial planning stakeholders should work together 
towards an individual licensing model, by drawing on the experience of other true professions. 
Like other empirical studies, this research has several limitations. A balanced view of the current 
licensing model was difficult to present given the lack of scholarly attention and harmful 
commentary to this matter. It was not the intention to examine legitimacy at the micro- or tactical 
level. Instead, empirical validity of legitimacy happened at the macro- or strategic level because 
not many academics addressed this issue before.  On that account, researchers should broaden 
the legitimacy criteria in time as more information becomes available. Industry superannuation 
licensees were excluded from the study because, unlike corporate retail superannuation who pay 
profits to their shareholders, they plough back any profits to benefit their members. Given the 
sensitive and controversial nature of the topic, the self-report design could have resulted in 
common method bias.  However, researchers reported results to both include and exclude the 
evidence of common method bias to better identify the common direction of the relationships 
between the legitimacy criteria items. 
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Agent Financial adviser or authorised representative. 
Conflict of interest 
by or from 
association 
Conflict advisers face by being directly or indirectly associated with, 
owned by or affiliated to licensees who distribute, issue, and/or 
manufacture in-house financial products. 
Dual-agency role Licensee-adviser-client role. 
Independent or 
independence 
Refers to the definition of s923A of the Act. 
Licensing 
Includes appointing, authorising and regulating individual financial 
advisers. 
Principal Client or Licensee. 
True professional 
In the context of this thesis refers to professionals who are formally 
recognised and accredited under the Professional Standards legislation 
and schemes. 
caveat emptor  Let the buyer beware. 
etc. Et cetera. 
ex Without. 
cum With. 
inter alia Among other things. 
vice versa In the opposite direction from the way, it was previously stated. 
vis-à-vis In relation to or about. 
viz Videlicet, namely. 
Dual [a1] Advisers are dual agents. 
Simult [a2] Simultaneously serving licensee and client. 
BestRev [a3] Generating revenue for licensees and serving clients best interests. 
AlignAct [a5] Aligning adviser-client interests is difficult. 
CoIAct [a6] Unavoidable conflicts of interest present. 
FiducAct [a7] Greater risk of breaching best interest duty. 
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CompAct [a8] Advisers limited from competing fairly. 
Regulative [a9] 
Regulative illegitimacy - Risk of unintentional Act compliance 
breaches. 
Consequential [a10] 
Consequential illegitimacy - Licensee commercial interests 
compromising adviser best interest duty. 
Procedural [a11] 
Procedural illegitimacy - Sales policies, procedures & practices 
window dressed to appear to comply with the Act. 
Structural [a4] Structural illegitimacy - conflicts of interest from association. 
Personal [a13] 
Personal illegitimacy - individual leaders of aligned licensees aim to 
protect their product distribution channels when lobbying government. 
Cognitive [a14] 
Cultural-cognitive illegitimacy - public cannot clearly distinguish 
s923A independent advisers from those advisers who are not. 
Trust [a16] 
Individual adviser licensing will improve public trust and confidence 
in advisers. 
Independence [a17] 
Individual adviser licensing will promote independence from product-
biased licensees. 
EliminateCoI [a18] 
Individual licence should be in line with other professions, such as 
accounting, legal and medical. 
IPFPSB [a19] 
Advisers prefer individual licence through a single independent 
registration, competency, education, conduct, standards and 
disciplinary board. 
EliminateCoI [a21] 
Individual licensing through a single independent professional 
standards board will eliminate conflict of interest from association. 
Old Structural 
(deleted) [a12] 
When advisers leave their licensee, unless they sign up with another 
licensee, they lose their ability to work. 
Defend (deleted) 
[a15] 
Media exposure of scandals has resulted in financial advisers 
defending their relationship/association/affiliation with their licensee 
to clients. 
Takeover (deleted) 
[a20] 
Accountants are taking over strategic independent advice by 
redefining and repositioning financial planning within their self-
regulatory model. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research investigates the legitimacy of the current Australian Financial Services licensee-
authorised representative licensing model, as specified in the Commonwealth Corporations Act 
2001. 
A longstanding debate in the media and practice initiated examining the legitimacy of 
appointing, authorising and regulating [henceforth, licensing] individual financial advisers 
through third party, institutional product-conflicted commercially oriented, licensees. 
Unsupported damaging statements, personal assertions and hearsay seem evident in most 
mainstream commentaries in the media and in practice. A sticking point is the lack of a 
theoretical framework within financial planning theory to define, model and measure 
legitimacy required to obtain substantiated evidence.  
This thesis rectifies the deficiency in scholarly attention to this matter by developing a new 
conceptualised notional framework for the financial planning discipline. It does so by 
considering theories in agency, legislation, legitimacy and the independent individual 
regulatory regimes in other professions, applied to financial planning theory to examine the 
legitimacy of the current Australian Financial Services licensee-authorised representative 
licensing model [henceforth, AFSL-AR or licensee-adviser licensing model]. 
Understanding the underlying problem of licensing authorised representatives [ARs] via third-
party licensees starts with a brief historical background discussion on the legislative framework 
of the AFSL-AR licensing model. A simple description of the licensee-adviser licensing 
structure continues the discussion. Then the trends in licensing advisers in the United States 
and United Kingdom compared to Australia is deliberated.  Against this brief backdrop, this 
chapter develops the normative conceptual model to clarify the nature of the problem further. 
Afterwards, to narrow the scope of this complex study, the primary and secondary research 
objectives shadow the conversation. Then this introductory chapter outlines the methodology 
used to conduct the investigation. Subsequently, the chapter highlights the importance of 
examining the legitimacy of the existing licensee-adviser licensing model. In the closing 
statements, this introductory chapter presents the plan of the study. 
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1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
1.2.1 Legislative background to the AFSL-AR licensing model 
The start of the licensing debate, in and outside of the Australian Parliament, has roots dating 
back to 1996. The Wallis Financial Systems Inquiry recommendations published in 1997 and 
the implementation of the subsequent Corporate Law Economic Reform Program [CLERP] 
(Corbett 1999; Overland 2007) led to the implementation of the Commonwealth Financial 
Services Reform Act 2001 [FSRA] (Hutson & Vonnessen 2003; Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2014). FSRA repealed the old licencing 
system of multiple licences regulating the activities of insurance agencies, brokers, securities 
dealers, accountants and solicitors (Pearson 2006b). Chapter 7 in the new Commonwealth 
Corporations Act 2001 replaced the old corporation’s legislation. From early 2002 (Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission 2016j), a single licensing system (Banister et al. 2013), 
namely the Australian Financial Services License [AFSL], enforced by the regulator Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission [ASIC], authorised financial institutions [licensees] 
and their authorised representatives to offer financial products and services to the public 
(Hutson & Vonnessen 2003; Pearson 2006b).  
Then the 2008 Global Financial Crisis happened, which was followed by subsequent corporate 
scandal exposures of licensees’ and their advisers’ unethical behaviour. These scandals 
damaged public trust and confidence in the financial advice industry (Ap 2011; Taylor, Juchau 
& Houterman 2013). To deal with the unethical behaviour triggered by conflicts of interest 
(Alexander 2011) from product sales (Burke & Hung 2015), the Australian Government 
responded with the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
(2009b) [Ripoll Inquiry] (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services 2009b; Australian Government The Treasury 2014). This inquiry led to the enactment 
of the Future of Financial Advice [FOFA] legislation (Australian Government The Treasury 
2014). One of  FOFA’s intentions included improving public trust and confidence in advisers 
(Ap 2011). Thus, began a legal process of professionalising the financial advice sector away 
from a sales-driven distribution network (Burke & Hung 2015). Although Ripoll 
(Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009b) recommended 
individual licensing and an independent industry standards board, the Government decided to 
start with consumer credit legislation to regulate conflicts of interest relating to advice on loan 
products (Banister et al. 2013). From mid-2010 the enforcement of an Australian Credit 
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Licence [ACL] as specified in the National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010 
(Holley Nethercoate Commercial & Financial Services Lawyers 2014a) happened. 
Subsequently, additional regulation moved FOFA away from single licensing back to multiple 
overlapping ACLs, AFSLs and limited AFSLs (Banister et al. 2013).  
More financial corporate scandals ensued, specifically the well-known Trio Capital and Storm 
Financial debacles (Commonwealth of Australia 2016c). Further confirming critics’ misgivings 
of FOFA, vis-à-vis: FOFA proposals did not prevent licensees’ and their advisers’ unethical 
behaviour (West 2009; Hartnett 2010). Subsequently, three tranches of FOFA legislation were 
implemented to amend specific clauses of the Act (Kell 2013). Operative mid-2012, with 
mandatory compliance commencing mid-2013 (Burke & Hung 2015), the Corporations 
Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Act 2012 [first tranche] and Corporations 
Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) 2012 [second tranche] were 
enacted as separate yet related FOFA regulations (North 2015). Initially ASIC took a 
facilitative approach to compliance. Thereafter, all AFSL licensees had to comply (Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission 2016g). The Corporations Amendment (Streamlining 
of Future of Financial Advice) Act 2014 [third tranche] was mooted on 19 November 2014 
(Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016g). The Australian Senate reversed 
the law back to the initial regulations before their implementation (Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2016g). In addition, the Corporations (Statements of Advice) Repeal 
Regulation 2014 revoked, on 16 December 2014, the Corporations Amendment (Statements of 
Advice) Regulation 20141. Afterwards, the Government worked on foundations of these 
disallowed regulations. The Corporations Amendment (Revising Future of Financial Advice) 
Regulation 2014 and the Corporations Amendment (Financial Advice) Regulation 20142 
reinstated a few provisions in the disallowed legislation. These three tranches and successive 
regulations, unambiguously covered increasing ASIC’s powers, client’s best interest duty, 
annual fee disclosure statements, renewal notices where clients would opt in every two years 
to continue ongoing fee payments, as well as banning conflicted remuneration (Burke & Hung 
2015; Corones & Irving 2016).  
                                                 
1 Corporations Amendment (Statements of Advice) Regulation Select Legislative Instrument No. 134, 2014 
<https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2014L01199>. 
2 Corporations (Statements of Advice) Repeal Regulation Select Legislative Instrument No. 210, 2014 
<https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2014L01704>. 
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In addition to the above regulatory changes, amendments were made to the previous 
accountants’ FSRA AFSL licensing exemptions clauses (Banister et al. 2013). Until mid-2016, 
accountant’s Regulation 7.1.29A exemption (Halsey & Halsey 2014) applied, allowing 
accountants to advise on certain financial products and services, inter alia self-managed 
superannuation funds [SMSFs] without an AFSL (Adams 2002). Since then, this exemption 
was repealed3. Now accountants must hold a full, limited AFSL or become ARs under another 
licensee’s AFSL when making any recommendation relating to financial products and services, 
such as SMSFs (Global Accounting Alliance, Chartered Accountants Worldwide & 
charteredaccountantsanz.com 2016).  
With FOFA reforms taking hold, opponents asserted the reforms were reactive (Valentine 
2013), unnecessarily complex, a burden and reduced advice availability to the public by 
increasing advice costs (Mennen 2014). Accordingly, towards the end of 2013 the Australian 
Government announced a Financial System Inquiry [Murray Inquiry] reviewing the financial 
services industry’s overall strength (Commonwealth of Australia 2014a). Together with 
recommendations to simplify the system’s overall complexity, provide certainty, reduced 
compliance costs and lower administrative burdens (North 2015), Murray endorsed lifting 
professional, ethical and education standards among advisers (Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Corporations and Financial Services 2014). Murray’s inquiry concluded with the 
implementation of the Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial 
Advisers) Act 20174, which was suspected, will influence the future licensing of individual 
financial advisers. Notable, during the Murray review’s consultation phase a brief dialogue in 
the Australian Senate explored a single individual financial licence for each financial adviser, 
rather than advisers being licensed via multiple institutional licensees (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2014e). Surprisingly, the final Murray report made no recommendations regarding 
individual licensing (Commonwealth of Australia 2014a). Instead, his report concluded the 
existing regulatory framework of product design, product distribution, disclosure and financial 
advice was insufficient to deliver reasonable adviser conduct to clients (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2014a).  However, maybe this recent legislation is a first phase “policy nudge” 
(Ariely, Amir & Lobel 2008, p. 2098) from the Australian Government to advance the process 
                                                 
3 Corporations Amendment Regulation 2013 (No 3) F2013L00905 <http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2013 
L00905> 
4 Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017 <https://www.legislation. 
gov.au/Details/C2017A00007/Download> 
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of professionalising financial advisers. In this regard, this “policy nudge” (Ariely, Amir & 
Lobel 2008, p. 2098) was followed by “coercive measures” (Ariely, Amir & Lobel 2008, p. 
2098) with the establishment of an independent standard setting body5, the Financial Adviser 
Standards and Ethics Authority (O'Dwyer 2017). Accordingly, this research explores advisers’ 
views of an independent body of this nature about individual licensing in terms of its potential 
consequential impact on the legitimacy of the current licensee-adviser licensing model. 
1.2.2 The current Australian licensee-adviser licensing model 
Supported by the Corporations Regulations 2001, Schedule 2 and 3 in the Corporations 
Amendment Regulations 2013 (No 3), Explanatory Memoranda and ASIC Regulatory Guides 
(Global Accounting Alliance, Chartered Accountants Worldwide & 
charteredaccountantsanz.com 2016), Part 7 Division 5 forms key parts in the Act relating to 
licensing financial institutions and their ARs (Jones 2012; Banister et al. 2013). Discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 2, with a few exceptions, the Corporations legislation6 permits  three 
licensing options: 1) limited license; 2) full license (Teale 2008); or 3) authorised representative 
of an AFSL licensee.  For example, under a limited AFSL, licensees may allow their ARs to 
advise on SMSFs, superannuation products, securities, simple managed investment schemes, 
general and life insurance, plus basic deposit products. Alternatively, licensees can obtain a full 
licence offering comprehensive ‘holistic’ personal advice7. Individual ARs do not require a 
licence as specified in section 911A of the Act, unless they deliver financial advice without 
appointment, supervision and training via an AFSL licensee (Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Corporations and Financial Services 2009b, p. 23). 
Insufficiently addressed in scholarly literature, s923A of the Act carefully distinguishes 
between two categories, identities, roles and/or definitions of licensees, advisers and/or advice. 
Namely, licensees and their advisers are either truly “independent” [“non-aligned”, “non-
institutionally owned”, “independently owned”, “unbiased” and “impartial”], otherwise they 
are product or remuneration conflicted (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
2017a). Legally those who meet the strict independence requirements of section 923A of the 
Act are permitted to use the terms “independent”, “impartial”, “unbiased” or any related terms. 
Specifically, s923A compliant licensees and advisers have no direct or indirect ownership, 
                                                 
5 Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017 <https://www.legislation. 
gov.au/Details/C2017A00007/Download>. 
6 Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017C00328/Html/ 
Volume_1#primary-nav>. 
7 Regulatory Guide 244: Giving information, general advice and scaled advice. 
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affiliation or association links to product issuers. With a few exceptions, they charge no 
commissions or asset-based fees. On the contrary, those who are product- or remuneration 
conflicted cannot legally refer to their services as “independent”, “impartial” or “unbiased”. 
Nor are they permitted to refer to themselves as “non-institutionally owned”, “independently 
owned” and “non-aligned”. In addition to the categories of licensees and advisers, North (2015) 
confirmed, the licensing regulations permitted the development of a range of business models 
among licensees and advisers covering a broad range of different structures and sizes.  
ASIC enforces a legal process to appoint, authorise and regulate individual advisers through 
third-party licensees (Beal & McKeown 2009) prescribed in the Act8. Fundamentally, licensees 
provide legitimacy for the actions of their financial advisers, both internally and externally, on 
behalf of ASIC, the Act’s enforcer. To do so licensees comply with the selection process 
(Bender 2011) and compliance system of authorising advisers as prescribed in the legislation 
(Bennett 2000). Additionally, from 31 March 2015, ARs must be registered on the ASIC 
Financial Adviser Register, which is publicly accessible. Consequently, a review of non-
scholarly literature, which was apparent in practice and lacking in scholarly works (Holley 
Nethercoate Commercial & Financial Services Lawyers 2014a; Power 2015; Global 
Accounting Alliance, Chartered Accountants Worldwide & charteredaccountantsanz.com 
2016), suggested outwardly ARs can only practise their craft when they are either: (1) self-
employed and independent with their own AFSL, thus taking on the legal and financial 
accountability of the AFSL; (2) self-employed by becoming contracted/franchised via 
institutional licensees and using the licensees support services without taking on the legal and 
financial accountability of the AFSL; or (3) employees of institutional licensees with AFSLs 
whereby the legal and financial accountability of the AFSL lies with the licensee.  
1.2.3 International trends of professional adviser licensing 
Numerous writers (see for example conversations by Brean, Kryzanowski & Roberts 2011; 
Adamson 2012; Inderst & Ottaviani 2012e; Walker 2012; McMeel 2013; Bateman & Kingston 
2014; Deloitte & Financial Services Council 2014) documented international interest in 
regulating individual financial advisers operating in the retail financial services sector. Like in 
Australian, policymakers in the United States [US] (Stolz 2009a; Trone 2009; Laby 2010; 
Kaissar 2016) and the United Kingdom [UK] (Reichman 2013) focus much of their regulations 
                                                 
8 Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001: <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details /C2017C00328/Html/ 
Volume_1#primary-nav>. 
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on lowering the risk to the public when dealing with financial services providers (Valentine 
2008; Hartnett 2010; Bruce 2012; Kwon 2013). Apparent in these three specific countries, 
principal institutions or third-party affiliates9 appoint financial advisers to work as their agents10 
to deliver financial and/or product sales recommendations on their behalf  (Zabel 2010; 
Bateman & Kingston 2014; Burke & Hung 2015; Financial Conduct Authority 2015). These 
third-party affiliates and their advisers must register with their respective regulator11 (Zabel 
2010; Bateman & Kingston 2014; Burke & Hung 2015; Financial Conduct Authority 2015).   
In an article, Arman and Shackman (2012) discussed the ability of the Australian public to 
distinguish between the different designations in the medical, legal and accounting professions. 
Yet, they found the public could not distinguish between the different designations of financial 
advisers, vis-à-vis differentiate between independent and conflicted advisers. Bhargava (2009) 
and  Finke, Huston and Waller (2009b) concurred, the US public faces a similar situation where 
they also find it challenging to distinguish between conflicted broker-dealer registered 
representatives licensed to sell securities or insurance products and independent registered 
investment advisers regulated to offer investment advice. According to Finke, Huston and 
Waller (2009b) both types of representatives were perceived to deliver similar services.  
However, in contrast to the approach by the United States, the United Kingdom has dropped 
the idea of a clear distinction between sales and advice, settling instead for independent advice 
and restricted advice (McMeel 2013). In Australia whether institutions are product-aligned or 
independent, they all have statutory fiduciary duty obligations as well as legal obligations to 
disclose all conflicts of interest (Bateman & Kingston 2012). After 10 April 2010, all US 
financial advisers, whether affiliated to product advisory institutions or truly independent 
institutions, are fiduciaries required to comply with statutory best interest duties and conflicts 
of interest requirements (United States Department of Labour 2017). Although the UK 
Government has disregarded a specific fiduciary duty requirement for UK financial advisers, it 
has imposed a duty of care, which is of a comparable standard to the Australian statutory 
fiduciary duty (Deloitte & Financial Services Council 2014).  
                                                 
9  US financial advisory institutions, US broker-dealer institutions, ‘UK restricted’ advice institutions, UK 
independent advice institutions and Australian Financial Services licensees. 
10  US independent registered investment advisers, US broker-dealer registered representatives, UK independent 
appointed representatives, UK ‘restricted’ appointed representatives and Australian s923A independent 
authorised representatives and Australian product-aligned authorised representatives. 
11  US Securities and Exchange Commission, US Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, UK Financial Conduct 
Authority and Australian Securities and Investments Commission. 
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Documented by McDermott (2016), the UK Retail Distribution Review [RDR] aims to promote 
adviser personal accountability. If there are lessons the UK can teach the US and Australia 
(Bateman & Kingston 2014; Salka 2015), then questionable is how financial advisers in any of 
these nations achieve personal accountability under their current licensing regimes. Especially, 
if advisers are licensed, regulated and authorised at the institutional level, rather than at the 
individual level like other true accredited professionals. Considnine and Ali Afzal (2011) noted 
when things go wrong in some situations it results in accountabilities sharing between 
institutions and their agents in indistinguishable proportions. This makes it difficult to 
retrospectively identify who [institution, agent or both] were responsible for any legal 
infringements and in what proportions. Notable, true professionals have independence 
(Carnegie & O'Connell 2012) and autonomy within their job role (Rubin 2015). It is argued, 
based on numerous scholars’ writings (Bamber & Iyer 2002; Horsley & Thomas 2003; Breakey 
2017; Breakey & Sampford 2017), this independence and autonomy puts them in a stronger 
position to avoid conflicts of interest. Although the literature survey showed some scholarly 
writings from the UK and US reflecting on the issue of ‘independent advisers’ and ‘independent 
advice’ (Gough 2005; Zabel 2010; Bender 2011; Chaston 2013; Bateman & Kingston 2014; 
Burke & Hung 2015), in drawing a comparison, a void was observed in the existing Australian 
literature on these issues. Furthermore, unlike the UK and Australia12, the United States has not 
yet established minimum professional standards, education and ethics for advisers to improve 
the quality of advice (Valentine 2013; Burke & Hung 2015). Most importantly, compelling 
evidence is absent in financial planning theory, and empirically, to confirm the approach of 
regulating advisers via multiple third parties is desired, suitable and a fitting approach to protect 
the public and encourage professionalism.  
1.3 CONCEPTUALISED FRAMEWORK OF LICENSING ADVISERS 
Against this setting, the prototype theoretical model to explain, model and measure the 
legitimacy of the current AFSL-AR licensing model by abstracting the reality was developed.  
Emerging from the literature review, with reference to Figure 1.1 below, licensing individual 
advisers via third-party commercial product-aligned licensees, as specified in the 
Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001, creates a dual-agency role. This licensee-adviser-client 
                                                 
12 Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017 <https://www.legislation. 
gov.au/Details/C2017A00007/Download> 
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role leads to conflicts of interest, specifically from association, because advisers serve 
licensees’ commercial interests and clients’ best interests simultaneously. 
Figure 1.1 Conceptualised framework of the legitimacy of the AFSL-AR licensing model 
Consequently, licensing advisers via third-party licensees is inconsistent with four identified 
objectives of the Act. Therefore, the current licensee-adviser licensing model is delegitimised, 
based on the criteria of Suchman’s legitimacy theoretical framework applied to financial 
planning theory. Accordingly, any threats to AFSL-AR licensing legitimacy strengthens 
arguments for an individual professional licensing model, like other professions.  Let us look 
at the theoretical basis for this argument. 
1.3.1 Dual-agency role of financial advisers 
Chapter 7 of the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 defines the licensee as the principal 
who appoints, registers and regulates authorised representatives to act on their behalf 
(McKeown, Kerry & Olynyk 2014). This model forms the licensee-adviser [principal-agent] 
contractual legislated agency (Gor 2005) relationship (Eisenhardt 1989; Smith & Walter 2001). 
Prominent in academic financial planning textbooks (McKeown, Kerry & Olynyk 2014; Taylor 
& Juchau 2017) and scholarly literature (Harvey 2002), yet inadequately defined in the Act, the 
second principal-agent contractual relationship between the client [the principal] and the 
financial adviser [the agent] (Corones & Galloway 2013) completes the dual-agency role of 
advisers. 
Thus, strengthens arguments for independent professional individual licensing, 
 evident in other professions 
Results in threatening the legitimacy of the current AFSL-AR licensing model 
This manner of licensing is inconsistent with four objectives of the Act 
Licensing advisers via third-party AFS licensees  
creates a dual-agency role, which 
 leads to conflict of interest from association 
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Clearly, under the current legislation, advisers serve two principals, the licensee and the client, 
simultaneously (Kingston & Weng 2014). Kingston and Weng (2014) noted when an agent 
tries to serve two principals simultaneously it creates a conflict of interest. This research 
specifically focus on the financial planning academic neglect of conflict of interest from 
association, because Valentine (2008) emphasised the need to place conflict of interest from 
association at the head of further research. Especially in the presence of allegations the majority 
of financial advisers are licensed via product-conflicted third-party licensees to act as their 
product distribution pipeline (Starke 2013a). For purposes of this investigation, conflict of 
interest by association, ownership or affiliation is defined as the conflicts advisers face by being 
directly or indirectly associated with, or owned by or affiliated to, licensees who distribute, 
issue, and/or manufacture in-house financial products.  
From the perspective of Corones and Galloway (2013), conflict of interest from association 
challenges advisers’ statutory fiduciary duty obligation. Statutory fiduciary duty according to 
Corones and Irving (2016) is clearly specified in the Act and in common law. Notably, while 
licensees direct their agents to act in the best interests of clients, simultaneously the profit 
motive drives them (Lewis 2013). The literature remarks on the tension between the 
commercial interests of the licensee and the best interests of the clients (Perkins & Monahan 
2011). An issue yet not critically evaluated and verified empirically. Therefore, an important 
part of conflicted association involves investigating this profit motive. As a further explanation, 
both the adviser’s loyalty to the client, and their occupational contractual loyalty as an 
authorised representative to their licensees influences conflict of interest from association. 
Hiller, Mahlendorf and Weber (2014) emphasised, institutional-professional conflict is evident 
when individuals, who lack independence, confront the issues of loyalty to their institution and 
loyalty to their profession. Therefore, from a structural, operational, ethical (Arnold & 
McCartney 2008) and legal point of view, advisers under the current licensing regime are in 
some way hindered to act as true professionals, who characteristically should be independent 
(Murphy & Watts 2009; Smith, Clarke & Rogers 2017). Consequently, making it problematic 
for them to perform in accordance with the objectives of the Act, which is introduced in the 
next section. 
1.3.2 Four objectives of the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 
Explained above, the Australian Government, and so the regulator ASIC, aims to protect retail 
financial consumers by means of a complex set of rules (Corones & Irving 2016), including 
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regulating ARs through third-party Australian Financial Services licensees via the Act13. For 
purposes of this thesis, four identified objectives of the Act underlie this main social aim 
(Simes, Harper & Green 2008) when it comes to regulating advisers. These objectives include: 
(1) encouraging alignment of advisers’ interests with their clients’ best interest; (2) managing, 
controlling or avoiding conflicts of interest; (3) ensuring compliance with the statutory 
fiduciary duty; and 4) promoting competitive behaviour between financial service providers 
(Bora & Lewis 1997; Corbett 1999; Mutton 2001; Collier 2003; Serpell 2008; Jones 2009; 
Alexander 2011; Ap 2011; Ireland & Gray 2011; Kell 2012). They are vital to this study, 
because until now a discussion nor critical evaluation from the perspective of the legitimacy of 
the current AFSL-AR licensing model has not occurred. Therefore, the thesis highlights how 
licensing advisers via third-party licensees with a product bias is inconsistent with the intent 
and purpose of four of the objectives of the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001. Licensing 
advisers via third-parties, potentially threatens the legitimacy the current licensee-authorised 
representative licensing model, because Bender (2011) determined legitimacy is threatened by 
conflicts of interest while Kury (2007) noted, complementary to agency theory. 
1.3.3 Integrating Suchman’s theoretic legitimacy framework to AFSL-AR 
licensing 
Despite international empirical work in legitimacy theory (Gualini 2004; Díez-Martín, Prado-
Roman & Blanco-González 2013) covering various sectors (Low 2010; Sonpar, Pazzaglia & 
Kornijenko 2010; Pellegrino & Lodhia 2012) and professions, namely accounting (Fisher, 
Swanson & Schmidt 2007; Andon, Free & Sivabalan 2014) and law (Rogers, Smith & Chellew 
2017), notional and empirical deficiencies applying legitimacy theories in financial planning 
literature exists. This gap is addressed in detail in Chapter 3 by specifically applying all the 
criteria in Suchman’s (1995) complete legitimacy theoretic framework to the current licensing 
model. This approach differs to common legitimacy empirical research practice, noted by Doh 
et al. (2010) of only examining one or two legitimacy criteria at a time.   
In this regard Suchman (1995, p. 574) defined legitimacy as a “generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” Implicit in this definition 
is the understanding, the legitimacy of ASIC licensing ARs through third-party AFSLs as 
                                                 
13 Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 is available at this link: <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/ 
C2017C00328/Html/Volume_1#primary-nav>. 
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specified in Chapter 7 of the Act14, should be perceived as “desirable, proper or appropriate” 
(Suchman 1995, p. 574), when operating within the financial advisory industry’s “socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995, p. 574).  
Understanding the legitimacy of the AFSL-AR licensing model is dependent on examining 
Suchman’s (1995) three broad, yet specific, types of legitimacy: (1) pragmatic [regulative]; (2) 
normative [moral]; and (3) cultural-cognitive [cognitive]. Importantly, Scott (2014) noted, 
entities exhibiting regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive legitimacy increases their 
survival rates.  
Starting with pragmatic legitimacy, Suchman (1995) outlined this legitimacy; as the 
perception of the social support for an entity’s activities operating within some socially 
acceptable system. Based on existing literature, regulative legitimacy, derived from pragmatic 
legitimacy (see, Rao 2004; Chen & Roberts 2010), occurred when regulatory entities use laws 
to create perceptions of trust and confidence in society (Kostova & Zaheer 1999) by regulating 
behaviour (Scott 2013, p. 59). Notional (see, Scott 2014) and empirical legitimacy studies (for 
example, Bitektine 2011; Chelli, Durocher & Richard 2014) indicated entities gain and 
maintain regulative legitimacy in the presence of the perception of compliance with the 
legislation. On these grounds, determining empirically licensing’s regulative legitimacy 
involves examining the presence of perceptions that licensing advisers through third-party 
aligned licensees risks them from unintentionally breaching regulatory compliance of the Act, 
because of their licensees’ affiliations to product issuers.  
With normative [moral] legitimacy attention focuses on specific morals, values or ethics  
(Chen & Roberts 2010; Chua & Rahman 2011) of an entity’s outcomes, goals, activities, and/or 
structures, within a socially accepted (Johnson & Holub 2003) and constructed value system 
(Bitektine 2011). Consequently, understanding the licensing model’s normative [moral] 
legitimacy requires assessing Suchman’s (1995) (1) consequential; (2) procedural; (3) 
structural; and (4) personal legitimacies. 
Consequential moral legitimacy considers an entity’s socially valued outcomes from an 
ethical perspective (Suchman 1995, p. 579). In the literature, specifically aligned-licensees 
allegedly perform as “commercial businesses using advisers as a sales force” (Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2014, p. 24) to support shareholder 
                                                 
14 Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 is available at this link: <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details 
/C2017 C00328/Html/Volume_1#primary-nav>. 
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theory15 (Griffiths 2007, p. 231; Lindorff & Peck 2010; Kofman & Murawski 2015). This focus 
on shareholder wealth maximisation is contrary to developing social capital16 (Lindorff & Peck 
2010) by supporting stakeholders’ interests, instead of shareholders’ interests. However, ASIC 
expects licensees and their ARs, when managing conflicts of interest, to always put their 
client’s best interests first, even when not in the licensees’ or the licensees’ shareholders’ best 
interests (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016i). Debatably, conflicts of 
interest can be managed through disclosures (Serpell 2008) while complying with the best 
interests duty. However, Bruhn and Miller (2014) concluded, disclosures was done 
ineffectively. The scandals of Commonwealth Bank of Australia (Ferguson, Masters & 
Christodoulou 2014; Ferrier 2015; Wilkins 2015; Henderson & Conifer 2016) serves as 
examples of tension between licensees’ commercial interests and their clients’ best interests, 
which is briefly introduced above when discussing the advisers’ dual-agency role. Also 
confirmed by Smith’s (2009) mixed methods study, employee financial advisers face conflicts 
between their professional obligations to provide appropriate advice to clients and their 
commercial obligations of business profit and time pressures.  Maclean and Behnam (2010) 
claimed, critical to ensure legitimacy, institutions should resolve their struggle to manage their 
regulatory compliance, especially when the legal requirements compromise their commercial 
activities. Therefore, whether [or not] licensing advisers through third-party aligned licensees 
creates tension between the licensees’ commercial interests and their clients’ best interest 
should determine the existence of the licensing model’s consequential moral legitimacy.  
Procedural moral legitimacy considers the moral perspective of an entity’s socially 
acceptable practices, standards and procedures  (Suchman 1995, p. 579). In legitimacy theory, 
decoupling (Cole & Salimath 2013) occurs where formal policies, processes and rules for 
legislative compliance differ from actual practice (Carruthers 1995) and behaviour (Scott 
2014). Unconfirmed allegations suggest licensees implement legislated practices, standards and 
procedures reinforcing the advisers’ product distribution role (Ferguson, Masters & 
Christodoulou 2014; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
2014, p. 24). In this way, Sampson (2010) noted, sometimes done without detection, they 
decouple legislative compliance from practice. Newnham (2012) agreed adding licensees are 
adept at keeping in place distribution channels masquerading as sources of advice. Except for 
the inductive qualitative analysis by Maclean and Behnam (2010) of a US financial services 
                                                 
15 Shareholder wealth maximisation and/or profit maximisation. 
16 Goodwill, reputation and/or sustainability. 
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organisation where widespread deceptive sales practices occurred, a deficiency exists in 
Australian inquiry empirically validating or verifying the above claims. Therefore, to address 
this deficiency and examine licensing’s procedural moral legitimacy, requires testing the 
existence of perceptions licensing advisers through third-party aligned licensees result in 
deceptive sales procedures, standards and practices to reinforce product distribution, while 
giving the appearance [window dressing] of satisfying regulatory requirements. Should this not 
be the case, then the licensee-adviser licensing model demonstrates procedural legitimacy. 
Suchman (1995) defined structural moral legitimacy as the moral evaluation of adopting 
formal structures acceptable to society. Presently under the existing licensing regime, a 
licensee, particularly those with strong product affiliations whether by ownership, affiliation or 
association, appoints, authorises and regulates multiple representatives (Australian 
Government The Treasury 2014). Licensees control advisers as quasi-employees (Pokrajac 
2014), rather than as true professionals. Consequently, this “cohabitation” (Money 
Management 2014) when product manufacturers, distributors and advisers toil together as co-
workers servicing clients’ needs leads to conflict of interest from association. 
The available evidence seems to suggest even highly qualified and professional advisers lack 
professional autonomy (Smith, Armstrong & Francis 2009) to practise their craft like other 
professionals under the present licensing regime. In principle, the Australian financial advisory 
industry is buying into a formal structure of conflict of interest from association to product-
aligned licensees without critical assessment or evaluation. Consequently, empirically 
evaluating the licensing model’s structural moral legitimacy requires investigating whether 
licensing financial advisers through third-party licensees leads to conflict of interest from 
association. On these grounds, if it does not, then licensing advisers in this way shows structural 
legitimacy.  
To achieve personal moral legitimacy requires the moral and social evaluations of charismatic 
individual’s roles (Carnegie & O'Connell 2012; Goretzki, Strauss & Weber 2013) who exert 
their personal influence to dismantle or create new entities (Suchman 1995). Young and Thyil 
(2014) suggested financial institutional leaders’ have a duty and moral obligation to all 
stakeholders, not only shareholders, to be doing the right thing to obtain their implicit or explicit 
consent to operate. Therefore, if individual leaders of aligned licensees’ contributions to the 
debate surrounding the licensing of advisers does not have the objective of protecting their 
product distribution channels, then the licensing model displays personal legitimacy. 
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Additionally, cultural-cognitive legitimacy occurs in the presence of a perception of shared 
understanding, activities, norms and beliefs (Santana 2012) with the aim to perpetuate an 
institutional order (Kury 2007) based on cognition or awareness (Meyer 2007). Put simply, 
with legislation, clients and their advisers should have, a shared understanding as to (1) who 
advisers are [identity] (Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002, p. 420), (2) what is expected of them [role] 
(Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002, p. 420) and (3) how effective they are [performance] (Scott 2014). 
For the same reason, clients and their advisers should have a shared understanding of the 
adviser’s identity and role, so the objectives of the Act can be achieved [performance].  
Considering this previous dialog, cultural-cognitive legitimacy of the licensing model exists, if 
the Australian public can clearly distinguish between independent financial advice [s923A 
independent advisers] and conflicted financial advice [aligned advisers], which subsequently 
should lead to achieving the objectives of the Act. 
To the contrary, if all the above criteria are unfulfilled, then the licensing model lacks 
legitimacy. Illegitimacy strengthens arguments for a move from the rhetoric in the media and 
in practice of an alternative solution [individual licensing] (Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services 2009b, 2014; Vickovich 2014c; Vickovich & Garber 
2014; Hoyle 2017a, 2017c, 2017d, 2017b, 2017e; Professional Planner 2017b; Reddacliff 
2017) to implementation. 
1.3.4 Individual licensing as an alternative solution 
Balasubramnian, Brisker and Gradisher (2014) found, trust counts as one of two most vital 
determining factors to influence a member of the public to seek financial advice or not.  Cost 
they noted is the other, which is outside the scope of this study and a topic for future research. 
Widely publicised exists a climate of instability and lack of confidence in financial planning 
(Hely 2012; Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2013a; Taylor, Juchau & 
Houterman 2013). Therefore, this research assesses whether individual licensing, rather than 
licensee-adviser licensing, will improve public trust and confidence. 
Important to note, retail clients receive financial recommendations from trusted ‘natural 
persons’ [individuals], not institutions or in other words licensees. Sanders and Roberts (2015, 
p. 18) highlighted in a white paper, the business models within the financial advisory sector, 
together with the licensee-adviser licensing model favours the institutional commercial licensee 
over the individual professional adviser. They acknowledged, despite the “legitimate legislative 
basis for this” (Sanders & Roberts 2015, p. 18), it is contrary to the approach of accredited 
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professions. Although arguably advisers can self-license, both corporation, including registered 
entities, management investment schemes and institutional licensees, (Australian Government 
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee 2012) and ‘natural persons’ [such as individual 
financial advisers who self-license] are subject to the same licensing regime. Questionable is 
whether corporate institutions and supposedly professional ‘natural persons’ should be grouped 
together under the same corporate regulations. Particularly undecided, which this research 
explore, is whether the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001, to achieve its intent and 
purpose, is a suitable legislative vehicle to license individual financial advisers through 
multiple third-party licensees.  
Many authors agreed (see for example, North 2015; Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2017a; Smith, Clarke & Rogers 2017; Vickovich 2017a), professional 
independence is a key controversial issue facing the advisory sector. Outstanding, many of the 
financial services transgressions were at the institutional level, for instance, Great Southern 
Limited, Storm Financial, TimberCorp Group and Commonwealth Bank of Australia are four 
illustrative cases, where the focus included narrow sales recommendations and culturally 
endorsed unethical adviser behaviour (Australian Government Corporations and Markets 
Advisory Committee 2012; North 2015). Arguably, licensing financial advisers through third-
parties in this way is seemingly a direct threat to independence, which North (2015) confirmed 
also results in unethical behaviour. 
Recent developments in behavioural theory (Dolan et al. 2012) pointed out, making even subtle 
changes to contexts, environment or choice architecture can have a powerful effect on 
behaviour. Therefore, as advised in a paper by Steen, McGrath and Wong (2016), removing the 
connection between product issuers and individual advisers may lead to a culture shift in the 
financial advisory sector to consequently reduce risks to the public of more financial scandals. 
Therefore, this research considers whether advisers want disconnection from appointment, 
licensing, regulation and authorisation by multiple AFSL institutions. If so, then should 
individual licensing via a single body replace the current licensing model? This idea legal 
scholars, O'Brien and Gilligan (2014) support, when Murray briefly put individual licensing 
for financial advisers on the table during the consultation phase of his inquiry (Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2014). They expect professional 
obligations should be framed by considering the empirical evidence around the failure of the 
prevalent codes of conduct, together with the risks associated with the existing institutional 
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licensing regime. Especially when principally this system of institutional licensing is absent in 
other true professions. 
Surprisingly, the Australian financial planning emerging profession is likened to other 
professions in the literature (Ap 2011; Bruce 2012; Knutsen & Cameron 2012; Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission 2014f; Burke et al. 2015). Yet upon closer inspection, 
the way the Act, as ASIC enforces, structurally licenses individual advisers makes these 
proclamations of similarity misleading. Doctors may prescribe certain pharmaceutical products 
they favour (Everingham 2014), otherwise they are “contracted to practices, to a chain of 
medical centres, to health providers, or to corporations” (Breakey & Sampford 2017, p. 262), 
but they are not licensed to practise their craft through these third-parties.  Lawyers, doctors 
and accountants work for large corporate commercial institutions, but they retain autonomy and 
control within their job role (Rubin 2015; Breakey & Sampford 2017). When accountants 
(Bamber & Iyer 2002; Institute of Chartered Accountants of Australia 2012), lawyers (Arteta 
2016; Australian Bar Association 2016) and doctors (Medical Board of Australia 2012) leave 
their workplace they retain their professional status (Evetts 2011), their licence to practise and 
ability to work without needing to transfer to other corporate institutions.  
Furthermore, among many others, Bearden (2002) and Cheetham and Chivers (2005) set out 
numerous characteristics of  traditional professions, which they believe provide professions 
legitimacy. Fundamentally, through their independent bodies, Tom (1995, p. 3) noted, each 
new entrant into these professions must meet their specific entrance and ongoing membership 
requirements and standards of ethics, education and performance on a continual basis (Breakey 
& Sampford 2017). In contrast to the attributes of other true professionals, Australian financial 
advisers are not self-regulatory, collegial, independent, structured, hierarchical and only client-
focused (Riaz, Buchanan & Bapuji 2011). Nor do they operate within a recognised professional 
body with status (Evetts 2011) within society (Riaz, Buchanan & Bapuji 2011). Nor do they 
control their specialised knowledge and skills observed in other professionals (Schuchardt et 
al. 2007). Evetts (2011) found professionals, for instance doctors and academics, employed in 
public services organisations [hospitals and universities], were closed to being controlled 
through managerial interventions and institutional controls. He claimed these professional 
groups have autonomy over their work practices, is accompanied by high status, while holding 
both power and authority. In comparison, even highly qualified and professional financial 
advisers do not have professional autonomy (Smith, Armstrong & Francis 2009), power and 
authority. Reinforced by a substantial body of literature (see for example, Rogers 2004; Watts 
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& Murphy 2009; Frumento & Korenman 2013; Rogers, Smith & Chellew 2017) contemporary 
professions are constantly developing to address new challenges. This development is around 
professional ethics (Breakey 2017) autonomy, power and authority as a result of corporatisation 
of professions and professionals (Evetts 2011; Breakey & Sampford 2017; Rogers, Smith & 
Chellew 2017), notwithstanding the influence of technological changes (Greenleaf 2017). 
These issues incorporates problems created by large corporate professional services institutions 
employing them, which results in corporatising professions and professionals (Evetts 2011; 
Breakey & Sampford 2017; Rogers, Smith & Chellew 2017). Add to this, the challenges 
technology advances are creating for professions and professionals (Rogers, Smith & Chellew 
2017; Smith, Clarke & Rogers 2017), which financial planning cannot escape either. Especially 
when it comes to opportunities of cost reduction and efficiency savings financial technology 
[Fintech] offers those who want their firms to survive in the future (Morgan Stanley 2018). 
Like other professions, seemingly advisers face a struggle for autonomy, power and authority 
around professional ethics too (Smith, Armstrong & Francis 2009). However, arguably it is for 
completely different reasons than other professions. This research considers one of the reasons 
for advisers’ struggle to achieve autonomy, power and authority, namely licensing via multiple 
third-party licensees. Consequently, Steen, McGrath and Wong (2016) may be right when they 
contend the emerging financial planning profession has some way to go before it can be 
considered a true profession. 
Unsurprisingly, since the Ripoll Inquiry in 2009 (Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services 2009b), government support for professionalising 
financial planning via industry self-regulatory approaches is obvious. However, no 
commitment from them, until the passing of the Corporations Amendment (Professional 
Standards of Financial Advisers) Bill 2017 and the setting up of the Financial Adviser 
Standards and Ethics Authority discussed above (Newnham 2017) has occurred. Although the 
regulator ASIC has not been in favour of a self-regulatory model (Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2012a), they do acknowledge the potential benefit of such an 
approach, namely making employee advisers more visible to everyone (Vickovich 2014c). 
Omarova (2010) argued, like professional self-regulation evident in law and medicine, industry 
self-regulation, is critical to the proper functioning of the financial services industry. Mainly 
he reasoned, because private profit-seeking institutions are not trustworthy enough to regulate 
their own activities in the best interests of the public. Self-regulation in the advice sector is 
supported by the Professional Standards Authority (Professional Standards Councils 2014; 
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Sanders & Roberts 2015). Furthermore, Tuch (2005, p. 38) maintained complying by managing 
the conflict, not necessarily avoiding or eliminating it, may leave an institution and their 
advisers in breach of their fiduciary duty. In rebuttal, Angel and McCabe (2013) asserted, 
society tolerates conflicts of interest as inescapable.  Therefore, with this lack of consensus on 
some of the issues around conflicts of interest, this study considers the extent licensing advisers 
with an individual licence via a single independent professional body eliminates this conflict.  
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTION 
As already noted, licensing individual advisers via multiple third-party licensees with 
commercial interests and a product bias is inadequately addressed by scholars, yet evident in 
debates in practice and the media.  Therefore, guided by the normative theories in agency, 
legislation, legitimacy and professions, integrated into financial planning theory, the primary 
research objective of this work is to examine the extent to which the current Australian 
Financial Services licensee-authorised representative licensing model is legitimate. Positive 
theories will reveal the answer to this fundamental objective, by investigating four secondary 
research objectives.   
The first key point for investigation is the extent licensing advisers through third-party licensees 
creates a dual-agency role, leading to a conflict of interest from association. The second key 
issue analysed is the degree to which a conflict of interest from association, by licensing 
advisers through third-party licensees, is inconsistent with the objectives of the Act.  The third 
key issue examined involves a critical empirical evaluation of the level the current licensee-
adviser licensing model is legitimate based on an academic framework. This framework is 
based on Suchman’s (1995) legitimacy theoretical model. The conceptualised theoretical 
framework of this study finishes with the epistemological fourth key issue, namely an enquiry 
into the degree individual licensing through an independent professional standards board, like 
other professions, is a worthy alternative to consider. 
1.5 STATEMENT OF IMPORTANCE 
An intensive search of national and international textbooks, journals, reports, including 
mainstream and professional media reports, government documents and white papers occurred. 
This literature exploration included the lists and abstracts of Australian theses using the 
National Library of Australia’s Trove service, as well as the library theses search engines at 
Central Queensland, Flinders and RMIT University. This secondary data search showed the 
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topic to be under-researched and under-reported in Australia and further afield. Further 
searches and review of the literature over the duration of this research project revealed its 
distinctiveness and importance. Hence, the need for deeper scholarly attention was evident. 
From the above deliberation, conflict of interest from affiliation to third-party institutions is a 
subject Australia, United Kingdom and the United States (McMeel 2013; Bateman & Kingston 
2014) all confront. Consequently, the findings of this investigation will highlight some of the 
important issues surrounding licensing, while providing policymakers, domestically and 
internationally, with initial data and preliminary evidence of some of the problems and possible 
solutions to licensing individual advisers. Thus, this information could potentially influence the 
role of the regulators, the professional associations, licensees and advisers. 
Well documented, besides legislators, focusing on the inherent conflicted remuneration of 
financial services17 (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2013b; Batten & 
Pearson 2013; Bird & Gilligan 2015a); they too have concentrated on professional, education 
and ethical standards18, to address advisers’ wrongdoings. Merely concentrating on these issues 
to improve the conduct of financial advisers, is misguided. Clearly, many recognised (Valentine 
2008; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009b; Kennedy 
2012; Banister et al. 2013, p. 1436; Johnston 2014; Pokrajac 2014; Vickovich & Garber 2014; 
Hoyle 2017a), conflicts between advisers and their clients also arose from ownership, 
affiliations or association structures between particularly conflicted licensees and their 
authorised representatives who distribute product. Yet, conspicuously neglected in peer-
reviewed scholarly financial planning and legal writings is this issue, which this investigation 
attempts to resolve. 
Clearly illustrated in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 below, for most advisers commonly found are 
affiliations to product producers. Particularly, from Table 1.1 less than one per cent (33/4,351) 
of licensees regulate 50.6 per cent of all ASIC registered advisers (Professional Planner 2017a). 
Prominent in Table 1.2 below, it appears none of these 33 licensee groups employing more than 
250 ARs listed in Table 1.1 meets the s923A independence definition as specified in the 
Commonwealth Corporations Act. This data confirms the findings during the literature review 
(Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009b; Smith, 
Armstrong & Francis 2009; Sandlant 2011; Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards 
                                                 
17 Regulatory Guide 246: Conflicted remuneration. 
18 Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017 <https://www.legislation. 
gov.au/Details/C2017A00007/Download>. 
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Board Limited 2012; Australian Government The Treasury 2014; North 2015; Spits 2015a), 
explicitly most advisers in Australia are directly or indirectly associated with product issuers 
and corporates who have a legal shareholder wealth maximisation obligation.  
Table 1.1 Total number of licensees and advisers registered on the ASIC Adviser 
Register on 5 April 2017 
                           Licensee Adviser 
Category Frequency Per cent Frequency Per cent 
250+ ARs 33 0.8% 12,312 50.6% 
50-249 ARs 56 1.3% 5,114 21.0% 
20-49 ARs 75 1.7% 2,204 9.1% 
5-19 ARs 3,133 72.0% 2,617 10.8% 
2-4 ARs 608 14.0% 1,642 6.7% 
1 AR 446 10.3% 446 1.8% 
Total 4,351 100.0% 24,335 100.0% 
 Source:  (Professional Planner 2017a, citing Adviser Ratings and ASIC) 
In addition, although Power (2017) reported a total of 85 well-known, truly independent 
advisers affiliated to 45 licensees exist, it is unclear how many advisers in Australia satisfy 
s923A independence definition of the Act. A clear imbalance between the number of product 
biased and independent advisers in Australia, notwithstanding a shortage in independent 
advisers is apparent. Together with the review of the existing literature, under-representation 
of independent licensees and advisers is undesirable, because the Australian public claimed 
they trust independent over conflicted advice more (Egan 2008; Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2010b). Adding to this independence debate, the public should be 
able to clearly differentiate advisers who provide s923A independent advice of the Act19 from 
those who may provide conflicted advice (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services 2009b; Boutique Financial Planners 2014). Arman and Shackman (2012) 
pointed out, which a Roy Morgan survey (Morris 2013) further supported, this is not the case. 
Thus, making the issue of independence an important consideration in this study. 
To add to the discussion, the accounting profession incorporated ethical standards for 
accountants providing financial services into their APES 230 standards (Accounting 
                                                 
19 Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 is available at this link: <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017 
C00328/Html/Volume_1#primary-nav>. 
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Professional & Ethical Standards Board Limited 2013). Then the Certified Practicing 
Accountants [CPA] formed CPA Australia Advice to successful apply for their own AFSL and 
ACL in 2016. Therefore, CPA members who want to avoid the responsibilities of self-licensing 
are in a position to apply for authorised representative status to deliver independent financial 
advice through CPA Advice (Certified Practicing Accountants 2015; King, Cowling & Liew 
2016). Accountants repositioning financial planning within their profession, according to 
Brown (2008) sets the expectations of the accounting profession and the public, as well as what 
financial advisers should be doing for their clients in the future. In turn, Lambert (2013) 
suggested, this redefinition should significantly influence the future of financial planning. 
Specifically, when it comes to the issue of professionalising financial planning. 
Scholars contended the FOFA legislation and current licensing model was unsuccessful in 
bringing tangible benefits to the public (Pearson 2006b; Kingsford Smith 2011; Mennen 2014; 
Bird & Gilligan 2015a; Commonwealth of Australia 2015; Coorey & Eyers 2015; North 2015; 
Commonwealth of Australia 2016d, 2016b; Ferguson 2016; Henderson & Conifer 2016; 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2017c). Investigating the legitimacy of 
AFSL-AR licensing is imperative, particularly politically, given Burke and Hung (2015) 
documented evidence of scant research on the impacts of FOFA.   
During the study, ASIC Report 515: Financial advice: Review of how large institutions oversee 
their advisers released in March 2017 (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
2017e) indicated the top five licensees in Table 1.1 were failing on many levels when 
overseeing their authorised representatives. This is further supported by empirical research 
conducted by Bird et al. (2016) on the number of enforceable undertakings accepted by ASIC 
for reasons of misconduct by financial advisers and licensees. Specifically they identified three 
common issues of misconduct: 1) promotion, marketing, advertising and sales of financial 
products and services infringements; 2) contraventions around specific financial and product 
advice provided; and 3) governance of financial advisory or financial product and services 
businesses in terms of supervision, training and monitoring of ARs for compliance. 
It is argued, the licensing model could be a potential source of the lack in public confidence 
and trust (Taylor, Juchau & Houterman 2013), notwithstanding possible class action (Corones 
& Irving 2016) under various regulations (Bird & Gilligan 2015a). In terms of this argument, 
inquiry in this area will highlight the extent the current licensing model is responsible for and 
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adds to the contraventions by advisers licensed via licensees with product bias and commercial 
interests leading to lack of public trust and confidence.  
Table 1.2 Frequency of the top licensee groups and their advisers registered on the 
ASIC Adviser Register on 5 April 2017 
  Advisers 
Licensees with more than 250 Authorised Representatives Frequency Per cent 
AMP Limited 2,870 11.8% 
Commonwealth Bank Limited 1,719 7.1% 
National Australia Bank Limited 1,667 6.9% 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited 1,151 4.7% 
Westpac Banking Corporation Limited 1,136 4.7% 
IOOF Holdings Limited 860 3.5% 
SMSF Advisers Network Pty Ltd 715 2.9% 
Morgans Financial Limited 468 1.9% 
Centrepoint Wealth Pty Ltd 380 1.6% 
Synchronised Business Services Pty Ltd 424 1.7% 
Dover Financial Advisers Pty Ltd 366 1.5% 
Bell Potter Securities Limited 280 1.2% 
GPS Wealth Limited 276 1.1% 
Total 12,312 50.6% 
Source: (Professional Planner 2017a, citing Adviser Ratings and ASIC) 
The feasibility of implementing individual adviser licensing to promote independence was only 
briefly considered during the Ripoll Inquiry (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations 
and Financial Services 2009b), although never implemented. During the consultation phase of 
the Murray Inquiry the appropriateness of outsourcing adviser licensing to third-party aligned 
licensees was questioned (Commonwealth of Australia 2014a; O'Brien & Gilligan 2014; 
Vickovich & Garber 2014). Many conflicting submissions were presented during the Murray 
Inquiry consultation phase about the matter (see for example, Financial Rights Legal Centre, 
Choice & Consumer Action Law Centre 2016; Koh 2016). Although uncommitted to individual 
licensing at the time of the Murray Review, the Australian Government demonstrated continued 
interest in individual licensing (Commonwealth of Australia 2014a) by inferring they are 
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keeping it on the negotiating table (Commonwealth of Australia 2014e).  Therefore, this 
research is important for the future of licensing advisers in Australia. 
Furthermore, this thesis will further contribute to other projects such as the work undertaken 
by the Professional Standards Councils in partnership with the University of New South Wales 
about professions, professional obligations and regulation in the 21st century (Breakey 2017; 
Greenleaf 2017; Morgan & Hanrahan 2017; Rogers, Smith & Chellew 2017; Smith, Clarke & 
Rogers 2017). Its focus is on financial planning as a profession, professional obligations of 
advisers and their regulation during this century. Moreover, it adds to the work undertaken by 
the Centre for International Finance and Regulation in partnership with the University of 
Melbourne concerning enforceable undertakings and penalties (Bird & Gilligan 2015b; 
Gilligan et al. 2015a; Gilligan et al. 2015b; Bird et al. 2016; Gilligan et al. 2017).  
The lack of enough peer reviewed financial planning literature supported by epistemologically 
sound definitions, principles, models, norms and decision rubrics (Paulo 2003) to define, 
model, measure, test and challenge the legitimacy of the licensing model, is because the 
conceptual construct is difficult to define and quantify. However, research in the Australian 
financial planning discipline has no sanctioned methodological or concrete research 
frameworks (Wiseman & Anderson 2013) adequately developed for such a challenge. Thus, 
the development of a conceptualised theoretical framework to examine the legitimacy of the 
current Australian Financial Services licensee-authorised representative licensing model is 
important. The proposed rectification of this deficiency is embedding agency theory further 
into financial planning theory, while integrating legitimacy theory into financial planning 
theory within the context of legislation governing licensing of financial advisers as true 
professionals. Not only will this research advance financial planning theory, but will also raise 
questions for further empirical investigation. 
Equally, the evidence is important information to make further contributions in shaping the 
future policy of licensing individual financial advisers in Australia. Particularly when the key 
agenda for policymakers is professionalisation of this emerging profession to operate with the 
same standards and ethics as other professions. Correspondingly, the evidence aims to find 
better solutions to protect the public, while restoring public trust and confidence in financial 
advisers. 
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1.6 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis comprises eight chapters. Chapter 1 provides the standard introduction found in 
most theses and evident in the foregoing. Then a secondary study in Chapter 2 serves to discuss 
the background to licensing advisers in Australia, together with the licensing models in the US 
and the UK.  Based on an extensive literature review, Chapter 3 will develop the conceptualised 
theoretical framework for examining the legitimacy of the current AFSL-AR licensing model. 
Chapter 4 presents the questions and hypotheses, the decision behind using a post-positivist 
research paradigm, mixed methods methodology and the research strategy. Details of the 
empirical survey and method of quantitative and qualitative analyses closes Chapter 4. Chapter 
5 explains the scope, difficulties encountered and results of the study. In Chapter 6, the 
discussion focusses on the main findings. Chapter 7 has a duplicate purpose. Firstly, a summary 
of the key issues, policy implications, plus practical application around licensing. Secondly, 
Chapter 7 also serves as a standalone paper to distribution to survey respondents who provided 
their email contact details expressing an interest to receive a copy of the findings. The study 
will close with concluding remarks in Chapter 8. This final chapter includes major 
contributions; limitations of the study; and commendations for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2: INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN FINANCIAL 
ADVISER REGULATION 
 2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Before examining the legitimacy of the current AFSL-AR licensing model, the purpose of this 
chapter is to set the stage by providing a detailed contextual background account of the 
licensing topic. The conversation begins here with a detailed discussion of the historical 
background on licensing financial advisers within the Australian regulatory framework. A 
further explanation of the current Australia licensee-adviser licensing structure by building on 
the introduction in Chapter 1 follows. The evolution of the US adviser model succeeds the later 
discussion. Then a similar discussion of the implementation of the United Kingdom’s Retail 
Distribution Reform commences. In closing, the Australian licensing of advisers is discussed 
in conjunction with the regulatory trends and challenges taking place in the US and UK.  This 
chapter serves as a basis for Chapter 3 where the researchers develop the conceptualised 
theoretical model of the research for the inquiry. 
2.2 AUSTRALIA 
2.2.1 Legislative background to Australian adviser regulation 
Illustrated in Figure 2.1, the beginnings of the current AFSL-AR licensing model began with 
the Wallis Inquiry in 1996 and the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Corbett 1999; 
Cooper 2006; Haigh 2006; Overland 2007). The Australian Government appointed Wallis to 
conduct a Financial Systems Inquiry into the efficiency, competitiveness, consumer interests 
and regulatory framework of the financial system (Bora & Lewis 1997; Edwards & Valentine 
1998; Australian Banking & Finance 1999). Although present at the time was little evidence of 
financial problems within the Australian setting requiring regulatory changes, the old regime 
was considered an obstructive constraint  (Bakir 2003). Therefore, CLERP 6, the sixth policy 
reform, formed part of an improvement suite modifying the old Corporations Law of Australia 
(Den-Toll 2001). Subsequently, the Wallis Inquiry and CLERP led to the implementation of 
the Commonwealth Financial Services Reform Act 200120 on 11 March 2001 (Hutson & 
                                                 
20 For more information on the Commonwealth Financial Services Reform Act 2001 please go to <https://www. 
legislation.gov.au/Details/C2004A00891>; Note FSRA was subsequently superseded by the Commonwealth 
Financial Services Reform Amendment Act 2003 <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2004A01226> as 
well as amended by Financial Services Reform (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 and Financial Services 
Reform (Consequential Provisions) Act 2002. 
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Vonnessen 2003).  The main aim of this specific legislation was to protect consumers whenever 
they dealt with financial institutions and their agents (Harvey 2002; Overland 2007; Serpell 
2008; Sinodinos 2013d; Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2014a). Here the 
government imposed higher standards on financial services providers by implementing more 
consistent uniform regulations for all financial instruments at the institutional level (Knutsen 
& Cameron 2012).  
 
Figure 2.1 Background to the licensee-adviser licensing model 
Prior to FSRA, the Australian Financial System comprised several market participants, who all 
operated within numerous overlapping financial institutions and markets, with licences issued 
by various entities and regulators (Bora & Lewis 1997). Bennett (2000) informed, one of the 
features of the CLERP regulatory framework was considerations around the most appropriate 
mechanism for licensing financial institutions and their advisers. Consequently, one of Wallis’s 
recommendations published in 1997 included changing the licensing regime for financial sales, 
advice and dealing (Hanratty 1997). Depending on the classes of financial products and services 
offered, the old licensing system of multiple licences for financial services providers as 
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specified in Chapter 7 and 8 of the old Commonwealth Corporations Act 198921 was repealed 
and replaced by a new Chapter 7 of the new Commonwealth Corporations Act 200122 (Harding 
2001; Pearson 2006b). This came into force on 15 July 2001 (Harding 2001). All the old 
existing range of licences, approvals and permits across the financial services industry, which 
regulated the activities of insurance agencies, brokers and licensed securities dealers, 
accountants, and all solicitors, disappeared (Cotter & Von Nessen 2001). From 11 March 2002, 
the focus was on a single licensing system (Clayton Utz Financial Services Reform Group 
2002; Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2009; Banister et al. 2013; Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission 2014b) in the form of an Australian Financial Services 
Licence (Pearson 2006b) for financial institutional licensees and their authorised 
representatives. Henceforth, licences issued to provide one or more specific classes of financial 
products or services under the Corporations Act 2001 (Davis 2002; Hutson & Vonnessen 2003; 
Pearson 2006b).  The new legislation unified a disjointed legislated environment (Clayton Utz 
Financial Services Reform Group 2002) by consolidating many different laws into one key 
piece of legislation for the financial services industry23 (Parliament of Australia 2001; Haigh 
2006; Overland 2007). In this way, FSRA systematically changed the financial services 
regulatory environment of Australia for licensees and their advisers (Adams 2002; Clayton Utz 
Financial Services Reform Group 2002; Overland 2007; Bruce 2012).  
Then in 2008 the Global Financial Crisis, and significant financial losses suffered by clients 
associated with the high-profile corporate scandals (Ellis 2010), by Opes Prime in 2008 (Julian 
2009; Ap 2011; Lewis 2013), Westpoint Corporation (Valentine 2008; Beal & McKeown 2009; 
Fitzpatrick 2011) and FinCorp  (Valentine 2008; Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2013a) caused a climate of instability and lack of confidence in the financial 
services sector (Taylor, Juchau & Houterman 2013). Most of  the headlines pointed to unethical 
behaviour as one of the leading reasons for this loss in public trust and confidence in financial 
advice (Ap 2011; Taylor, Juchau & Houterman 2013). The Australian Government responded 
with the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (2009b) 
Inquiry into financial products and services in Australia, well-known in Australia as the Ripoll 
                                                 
21 For more information on the Commonwealth Corporations Act 1989, which is no longer in force please go to 
<https://www.legislation.gov.au/Series/C2004A03857>; Note FSRA was subsequently superseded by the 
Commonwealth Financial Services Reform Amendment Act 2003 <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/ 
C2004A01226> as well as amended by Financial Services Reform (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 and 
Financial Services Reform (Consequential Provisions) Act 2002. 
22 For more information on the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001, go <https://www.legislation.gov.au/ 
Details/C2017C00328>. 
23 Financial Services Reform Act 2001. 
29 
 
Inquiry (Australian Government The Treasury 2014). Ripoll’s recommendations 
(Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009b) resulted in 
Future of Financial Advice reforms (Australian Government The Treasury 2014) to deal with 
conflicts of interest (Alexander 2011) from remuneration and product sales (Burke & Hung 
2015). Furthermore, the government suggested the need for better quality of advice and greater 
access to advice for Australian retail clients (Corones & Galloway 2013) in the financial 
advisory sector. Public discussions emerged around professionalising the financial advice 
sector away from a sales-driven distribution network (Taylor, Juchau & Houterman 2013; 
Burke & Hung 2015) to improve the lost public trust and confidence in financial services (Ap 
2011). Ripoll contemplated  the effectiveness of licensees overseeing and taking responsibility 
for the conduct of their authorised representatives (Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services 2009b). As part of this contemplation, individual licensing 
and an industry-based professional standards entity was considered a possible solution to 
overcome inadequate oversight of authorised representatives by their licensees (Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009b). However, Government put 
aside the matter of individual licensing and a professional standards body during the FOFA 
legislative reforms. 
Instead, FOFA reforms started with consumer credit legislation.24  Under this legislation, 
effective 1 January 2010 (Ap 2011), the Australian Government regulated conflicts of interest 
relating to loan products (Banister et al. 2013). ASIC enforced from 1 July 2010 an Australian 
Credit Licence (ACL) on licensees and their credit representatives (Holley Nethercoate 
Commercial & Financial Services Lawyers 2014a), who were, in many instances, also ARs 
(Banister et al. 2013). This additional regulation moved FOFA away from a single licence back 
to multiple licences. Banister et al. (2013) maintained the overlap between the ACLs, full 
AFSLs and the limited AFSLs initially confused everyone.  
After implementation of  the first phase of FOFA reforms, critics contended its proposals would 
not prevent unethical behaviour (West 2009; Hartnett 2010). Their concerns were confirmed 
when more financial corporate collapses ensued, specifically Trio Capital (Taylor 2012; 
Commonwealth of Australia 2016a) and Storm Financial (Kingsford Smith 2009; Ap 2011; 
Lewis 2013; Commonwealth of Australia 2016a, 2016c). Subsequently, three tranches of 
FOFA legislation were implemented to amend specific clauses of the Act (Kell 2013). 
                                                 
24 Australian Credit Licence was specified in the National Consumer Credit Protection Regulations 2010 
<https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2014C00815>. 
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Operative 1 July 2012, with mandatory compliance commencing 1 July 2013 (Burke & Hung 
2015), the first25 and second26 tranches were implemented as separate yet related FOFA 
regulations (North 2015), covering client’s best interests duty, annual fee disclosure statements 
and renewal notices where clients would opt in every two years to continue ongoing fees. It 
banned conflicted commission and volume payments (Burke & Hung 2015). Implementation 
of a voluntary transition period and grandfathering arrangements to provide time for licensees 
and advisers to adjust their business models to comply with FOFA ensued. Initially, ASIC took 
a facilitative approach to compliance; afterwards, all AFSL licensees had to comply (Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission 2016g). The third27 tranche covering commissions, 
best interests duty, opt-in requirements and fee disclosure statements, was mooted on 19 
November 2014 (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016g). In addition, the 
Corporations (Statements of Advice) Repeal Regulation 2014 revoked the Corporations 
Amendment (Statements of Advice) Regulation 2014. The Australian Senate reversed some of 
the laws back to the initial regulations before their implementation (Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2016g). Subsequently, the government worked on foundations of the 
disallowed regulation. Two regulations, implemented on 16 December 201428 and 1 July 201529 
reinstated a few provisions in the disallowed legislation.  
In addition to the foregoing changes, amendments30 were made to the previous qualified 
accountants’ FSRA AFSL licensing exemptions (Banister et al. 2013) commencing 1 July 
2013. Until 30 June 2016, accountants’ Regulation 7.1.29A exemption (Halsey & Halsey 2014) 
applied, allowing them, for example, to set up self-managed superannuation funds or advise on 
the tax implications of financial products, or provide ‘incidental advice’ (Adams 2002). 
Operative 1 July 2016 this exemption was repealed31. Now recognised accountants must hold 
a full or limited AFSL or become ARs under another licensees’ AFSL should they advise on 
                                                 
25 Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Act 2012 (Tranche 1) <https://www.legislation.gov. 
au/Details/C2012A00067>. 
26 Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) 2012 (Tranche 2) <https://www. 
legislation.gov.au/Details/C2013C00529>. 
27 Mooted Corporations Amendment (Streamlining of Future of Financial Advice) Act 2014 (Tranche 3) <https: 
//www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2014B00043>. 
28 Corporations Amendment (Revising Future of Financial Advice) Regulation 2014 <https://www.legislation. 
gov.au/Details/F2014L01707>. 
29 Corporations Amendment (Financial Advice) Regulation 2015 <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/ 
F2015L00969>. 
30 Corporations Amendment Regulation 2013 (No 3) <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2013L00905>. 
31 Corporations Amendment Regulation 2013 (No 3) F2013L00905 <http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2013 
L00905> 
 
31 
 
certain financial products and services, such as SMSFs (Global Accounting Alliance, Chartered 
Accountants Worldwide & charteredaccountantsanz.com 2016), tax implications of financial 
products and ‘incidental advice’ on securities, general and life insurance products, basic deposit 
products, superannuation, managed investment schemes, etcetera. To assist accountants to 
adjust their business models, they have until 30 June 2019 under a streamlined application 
process to apply for a full or limited licence as specified in Regulation 7.6.01BA. However, 
after 1 July 2019, this regulation will be removed and any future licence applications from 
accountants will have to comply with the full obligation of s912 (1e) of the Act, like other 
licensees. 
With FOFA reforms taking hold, some maintained the reforms were reactive (Valentine 2013), 
unnecessarily complex and a burden; while reducing advice availability to the public by 
increasing advice costs (Mennen 2014). Accordingly, on 20 November 2013 the Australian 
government announced a Financial System Inquiry [Murray Inquiry] reviewing the financial 
services industry’s overall strength (Commonwealth of Australia 2014a). To encourage advice 
cost flow-on-effects to clients, the review’s purpose was to simplify the system’s overall 
complexity, provide certainty, reduce compliance costs and lower administrative burdens by 
decreasing red tape (North 2015). On that account, the review pointed to the claim professional, 
ethical and education standards among financial advisers should be lifted (Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2014). At this stage acceptable standards 
for admission into the emerging financial planning profession in Australia, notwithstanding 
internationally, had been lacking. For instance, in terms of educational standards, all Australian 
advisers had to comply with ASIC Regulatory Guide 146 Licensing: Training of financial 
product advisers32 by undergoing some initial minimum competency tests, continuing with 
ongoing and specialised training and education with accredited training providers. Although 
previously recognised as sufficient to address the regulators minimum licensing requirements, 
inconsistent standards of financial planning qualifications were evident at the Graduate 
Diploma and/or Advanced Diploma level offered at various vocational education institutions 
of variable standards as part of competency-based programs (Bruce 2012). This indicated 
advisers only needed a diploma in financial planning and/or specialist accreditations in the 
areas of SMSF, gearing and derivatives (Deloitte & Financial Services Council 2014). 
Additionally, it is documented in financial planning academic literature, government and the 
                                                 
32 Details available at <http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/regulatory-guides/rg-146-
licensing-training-of-financial-product-advisers/>. 
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regulator ASIC’s websites, as well as via online searches, the FPA® is considered the premier 
professional association advisers look to for their professional qualifications in Australia. Yet, 
although FPA® encourages its members to obtain the internationally recognised Certified 
Financial Planner® [CFP®] qualification, not all financial advisers seek a CFP® qualification 
nor is it mandatory. Therefore,  the PJC’s consideration from March 2015, based on Murray’s 
recommendations in 2014, to raise advisers’ educational standards by expecting all new 
advisers to complete a minimum degree qualification; obligatory ongoing professional 
development; as well as a structured professional year as a prerequisite for registration as a 
financial adviser (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
2015), started moving financial advisers away from a product sales focus to a professional 
advisory focus. 
Aside from the professional standards issue during the Murray Review’s consultation phase, a 
brief, yet separate, dialogue in the Australian Senate took place with regards to a single financial 
licence for each individual financial adviser, rather than one licence for an institutional licensee 
contractually engaging a number of advisers (Commonwealth of Australia 2014e). Recall from 
ponderings above, this was not the first time a government inquiry contemplated individual 
licensing. The Ripoll Inquiry considered individual licensing and a professional standards body 
“to share responsibility with ASIC for establishing, monitoring and enforcing competency and 
conduct standards for financial advisers” (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services 2009b, p. 136). Despite a second inquiry contemplating individual licensing, 
surprisingly, the Murray report made no recommendations regarding the matter 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2014a). Instead, his report concluded the existing regulatory 
framework of product design, product distribution, disclosure and financial advice is 
insufficient to deliver reasonable treatment to clients (Commonwealth of Australia 2014a). 
However, as was mentioned earlier, with more financial scandals emerging, notably 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (Mennen 2014), the Australian Government had no choice 
but to implement a “policy nudge” (Ariely, Amir & Lobel 2008, p. 2098) in the form of new 
legislation33 passed on 9 February 2017 to further spearhead the process of professionalising 
financial advisers away from financial product sales. This prod was followed by “coercive 
measures” (Ariely, Amir & Lobel 2008, p. 2098) of including an independent professional 
                                                 
33 Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017 <https://www.legislation. 
gov.au/Details/C2017A00007>. 
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standards setting body34, the Financial Adviser Standards and Ethics Authority (O'Dwyer 
2017). This body develops and sets educational standards and examinations for all new 
advisers, professional year requirements, continuing professional development requirements 
and develops a code of ethics for financial advisers.  In the new legislation, existing advisers 
are given a transition period to complete an appropriate degree equivalent, have a recognised 
transition pathway and/or as pass an exam. At the end of this research project, the independent 
standard setting body FASEA tasked with this statutory responsibility was determining details. 
Legislating a code of ethics that all advisers will be expected to comply with, is an indication 
the Australian Government realises, as anticipated by Heath (2009), merely urging more ethical 
behaviour upon financial advisers, does not present a solution to prevent the unethical 
behaviour of rogue advisers. Consequently, at the time of writing, individual advisers were now 
being regulated by two regulators, namely ASIC via third-party licensees and FASEA directly. 
Equivocally, although still in early stages, both FASEA and ASIC share overlapping licensing 
powers to prevent or cancel the authorisation of individual financial advisers from practising 
their craft, albeit for different reasons. Thus, these latest regulatory requirements around 
professionalism are yet to take hold to protect the Australian public when receiving financial 
advice. 
2.2.2 Adviser licensing regime in Australia 
Part 7 Division 5, key parts in the Act, relates to licensing financial institutions and authorising 
their agents. In addition to Chapter 7 of the Act, Teale (2008) highlighted, the regulations are 
continually updated to be legally enforceable with a separate process from the government 
involving Corporations Regulations 200135, plus Schedule 2 and 3 in the Corporations 
Amendment Regulations 2013 (No 3)36 as additional support (Beal & McKeown 2009; Global 
Accounting Alliance, Chartered Accountants Worldwide & charteredaccountantsanz.com 
2016). In addition, ASIC introduced Regulatory Guides [RG]37, previously known as Policy 
Statements as guidance to ‘regulated entities’ within the financial planning industry when 
considering the interpretation and compliance of the law (Beal & McKeown 2009). Although 
not legally enforceable, they assist in the understanding, interpretation and regulation of the 
                                                 
34 Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017 <https://www.legislation. 
gov.au/Details/C2017A00007/Download>. 
35 Access to Corporations Regulations 2001 is via <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Series/F2001B00274> 
36 Corporations Amendment Regulations 2013 (No 3) available at <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details 
/F2013L00905>. 
37 List of ASIC's regulatory guides available at <http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/ 
regulatory-guides/>. 
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licensing of licensees and authorised representatives (Bennett 2000; Tomlinson 2001; Clayton 
Utz Financial Services Reform Group 2002; Pearson 2006b; Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2014a). Illustrated above, as part of the process of keeping 
participants in the advice industry informed or to clarify any confusion, ASIC continues to 
amend existing regulatory guidance over the course of the changes to reflect the FOFA reforms 
where necessary (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2014d). Furthermore, 
there are also Explanatory Memoranda and Statements38 accompanying every new Bill, which 
the Commonwealth Government issues (O'Neill 2006). Although they are not legally 
enforceable, they form part of the additional guidance notes to the Act and the Regulations to 
offer insights into the intention behind any rules and how the Commonwealth Government 
intends for it to operate in practice. Of note, although financial product advisers are subject to 
the Act, this legislation is also backed up by other important protections in common law 
(Sinodinos 2014; Boyle 2015). The law of contract and duty of care exercised by financial 
advisers are of specific relevance in common law (Adams 2002). Therefore, the principles of 
common law built up through successive court decisions, also extends and complements the 
Corporations Act 2001. 
The Act and supporting documents requires institutions who provide financial services and 
products (Beal & McKeown 2009) to hold an Australian Financial Services Licence with a few 
exceptions (Beal & McKeown 2009; Jones 2012; Banister et al. 2013). AFS licensees are either 
individuals, partnerships or companies, but not trusts, unless held in their capacity as trustees, 
but not in the name of the trustees, as qualified in the Act (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2016d). Therefore, the AFSL regime is available to financial institutions, 
accountants, and credit licensees, trustees of superannuation funds, fund managers and 
individuals who qualify. Notably, licensees once licensed are registered on the Professional 
Register (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016f). An AFSL imposes a range 
of ongoing obligations (Adams 2002) and minimum standards of conduct provisions on the 
licensees at institutional level and on their advisers at the individual level (Harvey 2002; Teale 
2008; Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016d). To illustrate further, these 
obligations include the type of advice, general or personal, provided; audit requirements; 
uniform product disclosure obligations and authorised representative competency standards 
(Holley Nethercoate Commercial & Financial Services Lawyers 2014b; Australian Securities 
                                                 
38 Index of EM available at <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/ 
Parliamentary_ Library/Browse_by_Topic/law/explanmem>. 
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and Investments Commission 2016d). All licensing, conduct and disclosure requirements apply 
to all providers in relation to financial services offered to both wholesale and retail client 
(Banister et al. 2013). Both Banister et al. (2013) and Rantall (2014) mentioned, the policies, 
processes and procedures licensees have in place to ensure their compliance with the law, serve 
as critical proof to ASIC of their, and their ARs’, competency to deliver financial services in 
an efficient, honest and fair manner.  
Since implementation of FSR, ASIC has introduced three licensing options to provide certain 
financial product and financial advice services with some common legal responsibilities as 
tabled in Table 2.1 below. Either a full AFS licence  (Teale 2008) or a limited AFSL licence 
option (Serpell 2008; Halsey & Halsey 2014) or where the AR is licensed via  AFSL licensees. 
Obtaining full AFSL39 enables the licensee and their adviser to offer comprehensive personal 
financial product and services advice, including recommendations in a broad range of areas 
(Halsey & Halsey 2014). Obtaining a full licence requires the employment of experienced and 
qualified responsible manager/s for the licensees too (Holley Nethercoate Commercial & 
Financial Services Lawyers 2014a; Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016k). 
A limited advice licence is available to a range of  institutions and individuals, such as industry 
superannuation trustees, financial advisers and potential accountants to offer clients ‘one-off 
advice’ or ‘scaled advice’40 (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2012b; 
Sinodinos 2013b). Consumers receive ‘scaled advice’ to meet a restricted or limited quantity 
of their financial planning needs, such as insurance advice only, SMSF advice only, or advise 
on superannuation products, securities, simple managed investment schemes, general and life 
insurance, and basic deposit products. Thus, licensees engineer their business models around 
the expertise of their financial advisers in terms of the following classifications: expert, 
generalist, holistic advisers and/or product specialists (Chene, Gold & Gramlich 2010; Banister 
et al. 2013). 
Along similar lines, prominent in the legislation41, media and in practice (Fox 2014; Pokrajac 
2014; Spits 2014a; Jacobson 2016; Lester 2016; Power 2016b) yet insufficiently addressed in 
scholarly literature is the identification and definitions of the categories of licensees and their 
ARs.. 
                                                 
39 Regulatory Guide 244: Giving information, general advice and scaled advice. 
40 Regulatory Guide 244: Giving information, general advice and scaled advice. 
41 Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 is available at this link: <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017 
C00328/Html/Volume_1#primary-nav>. 
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Table 2.1 Summary of licensing options available to advisers with some legal obligations 
Licensing obligations42 Limited license43 Full license44 AR of an AFSL licensee45 
Definitions Describes licensees who are 
authorised to provide only one or 
more of a limited range of 
financial services for SMSFs, 
superannuation products, 
securities, simple managed 
investment schemes, general 
insurance products, life risk 
insurance products, and basic 
deposit products. 
Describes licensees who are 
authorised to provide a full range 
of financial services and products. 
Describes individuals, bodies 
corporate, partnerships, of 
corporate authorised 
representatives appointed by 
AFSL licensees to provide 
specific financial services and 
products on its behalf. 
Provide all financial services covered under 
the AFS Licence efficiently, honestly and 
fairly. 
Licensees and ARs must comply. Licensees and ARs must comply. Licensees and ARs must comply. 
Adequate arrangements to manage conflicts 
of interests. 
Licensees and ARs must comply. Licensees and ARs must comply. Licensees and ARs must comply. 
Comply with licensing terms and conditions. Licensees and ARs must comply. Licensees and ARs must comply. Licensees and ARs must comply. 
Ensure AFSL licensees and ARs comply with 
financial services laws, such as they are 
competent and trained. 
Informal action plans developed 
by the licensees must be in place. 
Formalised action plans 
developed by the licensees must 
be in place. 
AFSL licensees’ obligation. 
Must have adequate resources and 
compensation arrangements in place. 
Licensees requires limited 
resources as they do less research 
and have lower compensation 
obligations. 
Licensees requires sufficient 
resources to implement their 
research plans and they have 
greater compensation obligations. 
AFSL licensees’ obligation. 
Comply with other statutory laws Licensees and ARs must comply. Licensees and ARs must comply. Licensees and ARs must comply. 
                                                 
42 Refer S.912A of the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 for the licensing obligations of the AFSL holders. 
43 See regulations 7.8.12A (4) and 7.8.14B (3) of the Corporations Regulations referred to at https://asic.gov.au/for-finance-professionals/afs-licensees/applying-for-and-
managing-an-afs-licence/limited-financial-services/. 
44 See details at https://asic.gov.au/for-finance-professionals/afs-licensees/do-you-need-an-afs-licence/. 
45 See s916A, 916B and 916F of the Corporations Act and regulation 7.6.08(1) and (3) of the Corporations Regulations 2001 referred to at https://asic.gov.au/for-finance-
professionals/afs-licensees/appointing-and-ceasing-an-afs-authorised-representative/who-can-be-an-authorised-representative-of-an-afs-licensee/. 
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Table 1.1 Summary of licensing options and the legal obligations available to advisers continued 
Licensing obligations46 Limited license47 Full license48 AR of an AFSL licensee49 
Financial product research capacity. Not necessary. Need to provide proof to ASIC. AFSL licensees’ obligation. 
Have a dispute resolution and risk 
management systems. 
Member Financial Ombudsman 
Scheme (FOS) or Credit & 
Investments Ombudsman (CIO) 
Member Financial Ombudsman 
Scheme (FOS) or Credit & 
Investments Ombudsman (CIO) 
AFSL licensees’ obligation. 
Notify ASIC of compliance breaches and any 
significant changes, like the appointment and 
cessation of ARs. 
AFSL licensees’ obligation. AFSL licensee obligation AFSL licensees’ obligation. 
Lodge annual returns. Unaudited annual returns. Audited annual returns. AFSL licensees’ obligation. 
Ensure licensees and ARs have adequate PI. AFSL licensees’ obligation. AFSL licensees’ obligation. AFSL licensees’ obligation. 
Have a Privacy and Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism 
Financing policy. 
Licensees and ARs must comply. Licensees and ARs must comply. Licensees and ARs must comply. 
Keep registers: business document, service 
providers, authorised representatives, and 
advertising and promotions. 
AFSL licensees’ obligation. AFSL licensees’ obligation. AFSL licensees’ obligation. 
Engage an employee, director and/or third 
party contractor who is of ‘good fame and 
character’ to be directly involved in 
overseeing the provision of financial 
services, referred to as a responsible 
manager. 
Appoint at least one person per 
license who has had business 
references, police clearances and 
bankruptcy checks, meet 
education and relevant experience 
requirements. 
Appoint at least one person per 
license who has had business 
references, police clearances and 
bankruptcy checks, meet 
education and relevant experience 
requirements. 
The AFSL licensee must appoint 
at least one person per license 
who has had business references, 
police clearances and bankruptcy 
checks, meet education and 
relevant experience 
requirements. 
                                                 
46 Refer S.912A of the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 for the licensing obligations of the AFSL holders. 
47 See regulations 7.8.12A (4) and 7.8.14B (3) of the Corporations Regulations referred to at https://asic.gov.au/for-finance-professionals/afs-licensees/applying-for-and-
managing-an-afs-licence/limited-financial-services/. 
48 See details at https://asic.gov.au/for-finance-professionals/afs-licensees/do-you-need-an-afs-licence/. 
49 See s916A, 916B and 916F of the Corporations Act and regulation 7.6.08(1) and (3) of the Corporations Regulations 2001 referred to at https://asic.gov.au/for-finance-
professionals/afs-licensees/appointing-and-ceasing-an-afs-authorised-representative/who-can-be-an-authorised-representative-of-an-afs-licensee/. 
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Well-documented in this chapter, in this thesis and elsewhere (Senate Economics References 
Committee 2014; Ferguson 2015; Commonwealth of Australia 2016b; Steen, McGrath & 
Wong 2016) is the Australian Government concern about the detriment of misconduct within 
financial services. Thus, in October 2014, ASIC established the Wealth Management Project 
(Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016a). Their objective was to lift conduct 
and standards of the largest financial advice institutions [NAB, Westpac, CBA, ANZ, AMP 
and Macquarie] (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016a). As part of this 
project, on 2 March 2016 ASIC announced they will increase their surveillance, seek out, 
publicly name and shame financial services licensees or their authorised representatives who 
illegally refer to their financial services as “independent” (Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2016e; Jacobson 2016).  
If the Act is read carefully, s923A states financial services providers must operate without any 
conflicts of interest from remuneration, affiliation, association and ownership links to product 
issuers50 (Jacobson 2016). It prohibits advisers, any related body corporates or their associates 
receiving remuneration in the form of commissions, some asset-based fees, volume-based 
payments, bonuses, gifts and/or other benefits51 (Elliott 2006; Jacobson 2016). Asset-based fees 
are remuneration in the form of a percentage incentive payment for funds under management 
(Brown 2011). If turning-off commissions is impractical, the Act instructs the rebate of these 
commissions back to the client52. Moreover, this law disallows restricting recommendations of 
financial products by a narrow-approved product list (Elliott 2006; Jacobson 2016). Currently, 
s923A permits receiving or charging asset-based fees for funds under management (Power 
2016b), but bans asset-based fees on investments limited to borrowed funds under management 
[s964D and s964E]53. Available non-scholarly literature seems to indicate, permitting asset-
based fees is a controversial issue. For Industry Super Australia (2014), and others, like the 
Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board (Brown 2011), receiving asset-based fees 
via a specific platform is technically a commission from platforms and hence product sales, 
which potentially leads to conflicts of interest. To the contrary the  Financial Planning 
Association (2014) claimed asset-based fees are advice fees, not commissions. These fees are 
                                                 
50 Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 is available at link: <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017 
C00328/Html/Volume_1#primary-nav>. 
51 Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 is available at link: <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017 
C00328/Html/Volume_1#primary-nav>. 
52 See page 222 of the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001: <https://www.legislation.gov.au/ Details/C2017  
C00328/Html/Volume_1#primary-nav> 
53 Regulatory Guide 246: Conflicted remuneration  
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charged through the product under the direction of the client for ongoing services to obtain 
regular information on each investment in the client’s portfolio from respective platforms and 
product issuers. Like Australia, the UK Financial Conduct Authority [previously Financial 
Standards Authority] also permits asset-based fees with the condition it fairly represents 
services provided to the client (International Financial Law Review 2009). Curiously, while 
this research was underway, a journalist reported, ASIC is seeking independent legal guidance 
to establish whether those who claim independence, while charging asset-based fees are 
conflicted  (Santacruz 2016b). 
Section 923A of the Act appears to create two categories of advisers licensed via licensee, 
namely advisers who are either not independent [product-aligned] or independent. However, 
during this study, anecdotal evidence (based on reports by, Elliott 2006; Fox 2014; Spits 2014a, 
2015a; Jacobson 2016; Lester 2016; Power 2016b) indicated more than two categories 
identifying and defining the role of advisers existed. These categories were based on ownership 
and remuneration, with limited reference to s923A. Colloquially, they were known as 
“independent” (Power 2016b), “aligned”, and “non-aligned” (Lester 2016). Seemingly, these 
terms were inconclusively debated in non-scholarly literature, in practice (Tucker 2009; Starke 
2013b; May 2014; Spits 2014a; Vickovich 2014a) and in online blogs (Lester 2016).   
Those licensees and their advisers who considered themselves aligned to product issuers 
providing aligned advice seem clear, they cannot legally use the terms “independent”, 
“impartial” or “unbiased”, because they do not meet the requirements in section 923A [for 
example AMP-owned and the bank licensees and advisers]. Characteristically, salaried 
employee or self-employed advisers licensed to licensees who are affiliated to product issuers 
provide aligned advice (Perri 2014; Spits 2014b). Their product-aligned employer affiliates, 
inter alia, AMP-owned and the bank-licensees, are generally vertically integrated (Pokrajac 
2014). Aligned institutions tend to control and restrict the products and platforms on their 
approved product lists [APLs] (Smith 2009; North 2015; Certified Practicing Accountants 
Australia 2016). A fundamental challenge for aligned advisers, Sandlant (2011) and Power 
(2016b) claimed,  is their role as distribution channels for product providers for revenue 
benefits.  
Furthermore, the media reported (Independent Financial Adviser News 2016c) these licensees 
also restrict adviser ownership of the client by, for example offering buyer of last resort 
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[BOLR]54 terms. In the agreements self-employed advisers retire or transfer to another licensee, 
they sell the clients to the abandoned licensee or sells these clients to an authorised 
representative approved by the abandoned licensee. Some formula specified in the BOLR 
agreement calculates the selling price. ASIC estimated that around 80 to 85 per cent of the 
often-cited unconfirmed numbers of 15,000, 18,000 or 22,500 advisers in Australia were 
associated with product issuers (Smith, Armstrong & Francis 2009; Accounting Professional 
& Ethical Standards Board Limited 2012; Australian Government The Treasury 2014; North 
2015). These unconfirmed figures they wrote included a controversial third group: the so-called 
non-aligned licensees. Spits (2015a) reported the findings of the annual Money Management 
Top 100 Financial Planning Group Survey, which provides a snapshot of the leading advice 
groups in the financial advice sector. In 2015, they found the total aligned ownership of 
financial advisers was 72 per cent of advisers in the Top 100 advice groups. Between these, 
AMP and the big four banks, licensed 57.2 per cent of the Top 100 advice groups. These official 
numbers, Spits (2015a) established, seem to indicate a larger so-called a non-aligned financial 
advice sector than generally conveyed in practice.  
From the literature evidence, the so-called non-aligned sector, at the time of writing the findings 
of this secondary study, is a contentious matter. Until recently, in practice, the licensees and 
advisers who considered themselves as so-called non-aligned [for example licensees, 
Professional Investment Services and Count] did refer to their services as independently owned 
or non-institutionally owned, while not necessarily meeting all the requirements of s923A of 
the Act (Boutique Financial Planners 2014, p. 4; Fox 2014; Industry Super Australia 2014, p. 
33). For instance, these so-called non-aligned or so-called independently owned licensees 
derived their primary source of income from volume rebates through a particular platform 
(Industry Super Australia 2014). Thus, the review of non-scholarly literature revealed a debate 
was raging around the controversial non-aligned category.  
For instance, in 2014, mainstream media proposed the terms ‘aligned’ and ‘non-aligned’ to 
position the services Australian advisers provided to the public (Spits 2014a). Spits (2014a) 
reported an informal online poll, found 74 per cent were in favour when responding to the 
                                                 
54 Buyer of last resort [BOLR] agreement is a contract between a licensee, who usually distributes financial 
products, and their AR, allowing the licensee to purchase the client base from the adviser when they retire or 
exit the licensee. The capital purchase value is calculated based on formula applied to the funds under 
management [FUM] or revenue the adviser had generated. Generally, a higher percentage is paid if the FUM 
is with the licensee. Thus, encouraging advisers to increase the capital value of the business by 
recommending mainly the licensee’s in-house financial products (Francis 2006). 
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question “Should the term ‘financial advice’ be classified as either ‘aligned' or ‘non-aligned’?” 
In his report, he explained this poll led to the following issues: (1) how the terms ‘aligned’ and 
‘non-aligned’ should be defined; (2) whether these terms should be used at all; and (3) the 
extent to which the terms would have meaning for the client. Some financial advisers (Hewison 
2014; Perri 2014) and authors of other works (Certified Practicing Accountants 2014; Pokrajac 
2014; Spits 2014a; North 2015; Spits 2015b; Lester 2016) agreed it is imperative for the sake 
of simplicity; to define the nature and scope of the advice; and provide clarity and protection 
to the public. This can be achieved through the correct definitions and use of the term 
‘independent’ to better differentiate independent advisers from those advisers who are not.  
Added to this controversy were allegations55 (see for example, Munro 2011; Sandlant 2011; 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2013b, 2013c; Vickovich 2015) claiming 
mid-sized licensees and their ARs advertised themselves as ‘independent’. While under the 
misconception of following the independent advice principles, they were still selling their own 
‘white label’56 or ‘private label’57 products recommended from single platforms and/or 
allowing commissions or asset-based fees (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services 2009b; Smith, Armstrong & Francis 2009; Sandlant 2011; North 2015; Spits 
2015a).  To the contrary, ASIC’s (2014f) interpretation of s923A is different (Santacruz 2016a). 
They asserted licensees are not necessarily “independent” just because no affiliation to a 
financial product issuer exists. Subsequently, ASIC sought legal advice around the terms 
“independently-owned” (Santacruz 2016a), “non-institutionally owned” and “non-aligned”. 
This was after they penalised two non-aligned licensees, because they used these terms when 
they did not meet the requirements of s923A (Independent Financial Adviser News 2016a). 
The argument proposed by one of these non-aligned licensees for using the term 
“independently-owned” was to inform the public, the banks and/or other financial institutions 
do not own them (Santacruz 2016c). Arguably, if they can make this claim, then on these 
grounds any self-employed authorised representative authorised via an aligned licensee could 
make the same argument. Namely, they can argue they are independently owned, because their 
licensee does not own them, just authorise them and restrict their activities or actions.  
                                                 
55 Regulatory Guide 246: Conflicted remuneration. 
56 Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2013b, p. 24) defined a platform ‘white label’ 
arrangement as a contractual agreement between a platform owner and licensee to rebrand the platform to 
give the appearance it is the licensees’ own platform.  
57 ‘Private label’ agreements occur when the licensee is also the platform owner and characteristically contracts 
out the administration of the platform to another platform operator (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2013b, p. 27) 
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Interestingly, the literature review revealed Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(2014f) used the term “non-affiliated” in some of their reports and the term “non-aligned” in a 
media report (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016b). Yet notably, the 
Australian Government only seem to use the terms “aligned” and “independent” in their public 
reports, with no evidence of the term ‘non-aligned’ in any of them (Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009b; Australian Government The 
Treasury 2014).  
Despite this, advisers who did not meet the requirements of s923A independence definition 
were referring to themselves with related terms to independence, such as “independently 
owned”, “non-institutionally owned” and “non-aligned”, without using the terms 
“independent”, “impartial” and “unbiased”. Some viewed this play on words as potentially 
misinterpreting and misapplying the requirements in section 923A of the Act. Thus, potentially 
misleading the public to think they were dealing with an independent adviser when they had 
mixed feelings. Therefore, based on legal advice, the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (2017b) clarified, the terms “independently owned”, “non-institutionally owned” 
and “non-aligned” or related terms could only be used if advisers complied with the 
requirements of s923A. Consequently, they have updated Regulatory Guide 175 Licensing: 
Financial product advisers – conduct and disclosure explaining how to interpret s923A of the 
Act.  
Although ASIC has clarified two categories of licensee and advice under s923A, at the time of 
finalising the editing of this thesis, this section of the Act remains contentious with lobby 
groups wanting it amended or repealed (Johnston & Walker 2017b; Vickovich 2017b, 2017c). 
Notably, Elliott (2006) defended, saying s923A was difficult for advisers and licensees to 
implement. She explained, in practice a fee-for-service business sometimes finds it almost 
impossible to rebate commissions back to clients when these commissions cannot be turned 
off. Another financial planning practitioner also confirmed, for a financial adviser, it was 
difficult to structure their business to meet the independence requirements, because “the 
industry is not set up to support this kind of ethics – it actually drives against it” (Beaman 
2010c, p. 9).  However, it is argued any potential misapplication or misrepresentation of s923A 
of the Corporations Act places licensees and advisers at risk of ASIC taking action (Pearson 
2008; Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016b), as well as legal liability 
consequences subject to various other regulations (Bird & Gilligan 2015a). 
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Thus, at the time of finalising this research, a s923A independent adviser is considered a non-
aligned self-employed or salaried employee unaffiliated, unrelated or unowned by product 
issuers (Perri 2014; Spits 2014b, 2014a; Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
2017d). Licensees and advisers who are truly independent providing independent advice are 
legally able to use the terms “independent”, “impartial”, “unbiased”, “independently owned”, 
“non-institutionally owned”, “non-aligned” and/or related terms, as specified in section 923A 
of the Act, for several reasons. They either meet (1) the Independent Financial Advisers 
Association of Australian’s gold standard and strict independence conditions, with no direct or 
indirect ownership, affiliation or association links to product issuers, and charge no 
commissions or asset-based fees [for example licensees Roskow Independent Advisory and 
Brocktons Independent Advisory]; or (2) all the requirements in section 923A of the Act, with 
no direct or indirect affiliation links to product issuers, charge no commissions, but charge 
asset-based fees [for examples licensees Pitcher Partners Wealth Management and Aspire 
Financial Consultants]. These licensees do not restrict the ownership of the client with for 
example BOLR terms (Perri 2014; Spits 2014b, 2014a). Unlike in many aligned cases, clients 
are transferred with their advisers to another licensee without any encumbrance (Perri 2014; 
Spits 2014b, 2014a). Allegedly, they are not vertically integrated. They enjoy broad APLs not 
commonly controlled by their licensees (Pokrajac 2014). The clients of the non-aligned advice 
sector allegedly receive a greater degree of independent advice (Starke 2013b), because 
allegedly product bias in the recommendations is obscured (Pokrajac 2014).  
Licensees obtain an AFSL by lodging an application with ASIC once it meets regulatory 
standards as prescribed in the Act and several ASIC regulatory guides58 (Deloitte & Financial 
Services Council 2014). Only once licensed, are licensees permitted to appoint ARs, who are 
their agents comprising either ‘natural persons’, body corporates or partnerships [S916A of the 
Act] providing advice on financial products and services to the public (Beal & McKeown 2009; 
Deloitte & Financial Services Council 2014). Accordingly, among their numerous regulatory 
responsibilities, ASIC enforces a demanding legal process (Jones 2012; Banister et al. 2013) 
                                                 
58  Regulatory Guide 104. Licensing: Meeting the general obligations. Issued 1 July 2015. 
Regulatory Guide 105 Licensing: Organisational competence. Issued 15 December 2016. 
Regulatory Guide 126 Compensation and insurance arrangements for AFS licensees. Issued 20 December 
2010. 
Regulatory Guide 146. Licensing: Training of financial product advisers. July 2012. 
Regulatory Guide 165. Licensing: Internal and external dispute resolution. Issued July 2015. 
Regulatory Guide 166. Licensing: Financial requirements. Issued December 2009. 
Regulatory Guide 175. Licensing - Financial product advisers - conduct and disclosure. Issued April 2011. 
Regulatory Guide 181. Licensing: Managing conflicts of interest. Issued 30 August 2004. 
Regulatory Guide 182. Dollar disclosure. Issued 19 June 2008. 
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prescribed in Sections 916A, 916B, 916C, 916D, 916E and 916F of the Act to appoint, 
authorise and regulate individual advisers through third-party licensees (Beal & McKeown 
2009). The licensees’ role involves providing internal and external legitimacy for the actions 
of their advisers. 
Outwardly this is demonstrated by a rigorous selection process (Bender 2011) using a 
monitoring, supervising and training compliance system (Bennett 2000) that meets the 
requirements of the legislation. For instance, some of the statutory duties imposed on licensees 
and advisers include: providing appropriate advice; adequate warnings of the risks; managing 
controlling and/or avoiding conflicts of interest through disclosure59; utilising some form of 
documented risk management system; and always placing the clients best interest with ‘safe 
harbour’ requirements ahead of their own interests (Deloitte & Financial Services Council 
2014). Also noteworthy, section 916B of the Act states, where authorised representatives are 
body corporates, its employees and directors also needs to be appointed as authorised 
representatives of the licensees (Bearden 2006). Notable, individual ARs do not require a 
licence as specified in Section 911A, unless they deliver financial advice without supervision 
via an AFSL licensee (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
2009b, p. 23). From 31 March 2015, authorised representatives of licensees must be registered 
on the ASIC Financial Adviser Register available to the public online (Bateman & Kingston 
2014).  
Apparent in practice (Holley Nethercoate Commercial & Financial Services Lawyers 2014a; 
Power 2015; Global Accounting Alliance, Chartered Accountants Worldwide & 
charteredaccountantsanz.com 2016), but subtly defined in scholarly works, ARs can only 
practise their craft if licensed in one of three ways: 1) licensed as independent individual self-
employed financial advisers with their own licence [self-licensing]; 2) contracted to licensees 
like a franchise arrangement using the licensees support services (Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009b); or 3) becoming employees of 
licensees (Bennett 2000; Holley Nethercoate Commercial & Financial Services Lawyers 
2014a). Firstly, independent financial advisers, who comply with s923A of the Act, can take 
out an AFSL and be themselves legally responsible and accountable (Teale 2008). This 
involves following a process as prescribed by the law and ASIC to set up a practice on their 
own after meeting ASIC’s education, experience, and licensee licensing requirements (Bennett 
                                                 
59 Disclosure is in the form of a Financial Services Guide, Statement of Advice, which includes a Fee 
Disclosure Statement and Product Disclosure Statements. 
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2000). In Australia, the s923A independent self-licensed adviser has the freedom to recommend 
from a choice of products for their clients, because they operate open product lists of all the 
products in the marketplace (Pokrajac 2014).  Secondly, the contracted or franchised financial 
advisers wanting to be self-employed without taking on the legal and financial responsibility 
of an AFSL may enter a contract or franchise arrangement with licensee groups. The licensee 
groups remain legally responsible for the education, training supervision and conduct of the 
franchised financial advisers, while the advisers operate their own business with comparative 
autonomy. In exchange for a fee, these licensee groups offers ARs subsidised support services 
(Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009b; Professional 
Planner 2017b), such as education, compliance, marketing and software (Bennett 2000). 
Thirdly, ARs can become employees of licensees and be paid, generally, a base salary with 
additional performance-based remuneration (Bennett 2000).  Notable, employees of AFSLs can 
provide financial product advice on behalf of their AFSL employer without requiring to become 
an authorised representative or holding and AFSL as long as their employer has an AFSL 
(Simes, Harper & Green 2008). 
From the foregoing, it is apparent the financial services regulator, ASIC, is responsible for 
licensing and monitoring the activities of the AFSL holders and their agents. This involves 
taking the necessary action for any violations identified; imposing or changing licence 
conditions; reviewing sales, marketing material and investment schemes of licensees; and 
reviewing selected documents, such as product disclosure statements and financial statements 
lodged with them (Jones 2012; Banister et al. 2013). ASIC takes action against advisers who 
offer financial services beyond the scope of their licence conditions (Pearson 2006b) by 
suspending or cancelling a licence or banning a ‘natural person’ from acting as an adviser 
(Simes, Harper & Green 2008; Serpell 2012). If problems with the information disclosed occurs 
or if the offer documents require additional or corrective disclosure, then ASIC is expected to 
enforce appropriate disclosures (Jones 2012).  The enforcement involves an administrative 
remedy in addition to any civil or criminal remedies (Jones 2012), including enforceable 
undertakings and related penalties (Bird & Gilligan 2015b; Gilligan et al. 2015a; Gilligan et al. 
2015b; Bird et al. 2016; Gilligan et al. 2017).  
2.2.3 Australian reform consequences and challenges 
Implementation of the Act, plus its subsequent amendments by both Financial Services (see, 
Tomlinson 2001; Bulling 2003; Moutsopoulos 2005; Haigh 2006; Jackling & Sullivan 2007) 
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and Future of Financial Advice Reforms (see for example, Serpell 2008; Bowen 2010; 
Alexander 2011; Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2014e) have not been 
without its critics. Pearson (2006b) claimed the FOFA rules are so wide in scope, complex and 
confusing it continually requires further explanation. Illustrated above was such a situation, 
namely the recent review by ASIC of the legal interpretation of s923A of the Act (Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission 2017b; Tran 2017; Vickovich 2017b; Waterson & 
Vickovich 2017). Valentine (2008, p.283) critically argued, some parts of the financial services 
industry is highly regulated, while others lightly regulated.  He also noted, not all advisers 
operate on a level playing field, nor carry uniform regulatory burdens under the existing 
licensing model. For example, S765A of the Act disregards physical assets such as direct real 
estate [property], wine, art, stamp collections and credit facilities as financial products. 
Therefore, insurance brokers, mortgage brokers, real estate agents, art dealers, coin and stamp 
dealers, jewellers and sellers of sporting memorabilia do not require an AFSL or are only 
partially covered by the AFSL. Furthermore, Smith, Armstrong and Francis (2009) noted, the 
Act excludes estate planning or non-product strategic advice.  
Although FSR was supposed to result in efficiencies and cost savings for financial services 
providers,  Pearson (2006b) also felt it has been an expensive endeavour for the industry in 
terms of compliance costs, financial adviser turnovers within licensees, as well as from the exit 
of financial advisers from the advisory sector.  
Although unverified in scholarly literature, advisers transferring between licensees, place 
licensees, the clients and advisers at risk, both legally and financially. For example, clients are 
adversely affected concerning professional indemnity insurance and when BOLR agreements 
are in place, especially when individual financial advisers change licensees. In 2010 Guardian 
and Synchron licensees had a disagreement over a clause in an adviser transfer agreement, that 
unless Guardian agreed to the transfer conditions, Synchron would not be covered by 
Professional Indemnity insurance in the event a transferring client was unhappy with the advice 
given to them while at Guardian, and before moving over to Synchron (Levy 2010).  
Furthermore, anecdotally where clients are ‘owned’ by the licensees, particularly when BOLR 
agreements are in place, the client is expected to wait for the licensee to find and allocate a new 
adviser to the client, which may not be of the client’s choosing. Although authorised 
representatives can leave their licensees at any time, they lose their authority to continue 
working until they sign up with another licensee, or obtain their own licence (Clayton Utz 
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Financial Services Reform Group 2002). This potentially leaves clients, who have invested 
considerable time building a relationship of trust with a particular adviser (Banister 2016), 
without a designated adviser during the transition time of the transfer to another licensee.  This 
void for clients could gravely impact any existing trust relationships between adviser and client 
(Banister 2016), notwithstanding future trust associations. 
Haigh (2006) observed, despite FSR legislation introducing a legal and ethical framework 
governing advisers and licensees, commensurate levels of accountability are missing when 
shared between licensee and adviser. Under FOFA legislation accountability is not at the 
individual level, but at the institutional level, especially where the majority of advisers are 
affiliated to product producers (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services 2009b). Prior to statutory best interest duty obligation, Gor (2005) noted, the 
accountability burden rested entirely on licensees to authorise representatives to offer financial 
services. Thereafter, he argued, they rested with both the licensees and their ARs, in 
indistinguishable proportions. In this regard, Haigh (2006) and Pearson (2006b) may be correct 
when they decided the legislation produced no tangible benefits to the Australian public.  
North (2015) contended the licensing regulations disseminated a range of business models 
covering different sizes. Debatably, leading to inconsistent standards between licensees 
(Vickovich 2014d) for compliance audits, education, training, supervision, licensee licensing 
requirements and conduct (Bennett 2000). Highly questionable, the Act validates commercial 
product-aligned licensees to acquire advisers to be their financial product distributors 
(Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2014, p. 24) and 
hence, arguably, condones conflict of interest from association, which threatens independence 
and professionalism.  
Furthermore, agency theory, according to Scott (2013, p. 61), highlighted the cost and difficulty 
of monitoring the regulation through third parties who may not necessarily be neutral. Another 
problem with the legislation is the potential for licensees to take advantage of technical and 
detailed licensing rules of the Act to develop formal compliance programs on paper to give the 
appearance of satisfying the regulatory requirements [window dressing], while still allowing 
for sales-based culture (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
2009b; Smith 2009; Newnham 2012; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services 2014; North 2015).  
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Also subject to deficits in academic works, yet apparent in media commentaries (Vickovich & 
Micallef 2013), were discussions on the advantages and disadvantages of licensing advisers 
through third-party licensees. Some advantages include, third-party licensees allowing advisers 
to focus their attention on the client while leaving back-office, compliance and regulatory 
burdens to the licensees. Licensees affiliated to large institutions are in a better position to pay 
compensation to clients for losses suffered if legal compliance violations or unethical behaviour 
occurred (Pokrajac 2014). Disadvantages include, inter alia, advisers unable to market 
themselves as independent to clients who consider independence important, as well as being 
restricted by the licensees’ approved product list when providing advice to clients 
(Santhebennur 2014).  
In a later paper, Valentine (2013) proposed the legislation did not deal with the fragmentation 
of financial advice, limited licences, tax agents, grandfathering, horizontal and vertical 
integration, adequately. The underlying argument by Valentine (2013) was against reforms 
being reactive, such as for example, when the use of the descriptions ‘financial planner’ or 
‘financial adviser’ by licensed individuals were added to the Act at the eleventh hour. 
Burke and Hung (2015) documented the scant evidential research in Australia studying the 
impacts of FOFA.  For example, Australian Government The Treasury (2014) released a FOFA 
Regulation Impact Statement titled Future of Financial Advice Amendments—Details-stage 
regulation Impact Statement in March 2014, noting the decline in the number of financial 
advisers since implementation of FOFA. They conceded two contributory factors to this decline 
in adviser numbers, namely both FOFA reforms and the ailing economy. However, it is unclear, 
according to Burke and Hung (2015), which contributed more to the decline, because these two 
impacts were connected. They also could not deduce from their findings whether increased 
industry concentration and compliance costs, together with increased costs of advice reduced 
access to financial advice for retail clients.  
Another bit of research reported in the Review of the financial advice industry’s implementation 
of the FOFA reforms (Report 407) reviewing the industry’s implementation of FOFA was 
conducted by ASIC with their findings released in September 2014 (Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2014f). They found, which Burke and Hung (2015) also reported in 
an article, although most licensees increased scaled advice and strategic advice, most did no 
change the type of advice services they offered post-FOFA implementation.  ASIC also found 
the statutory fiduciary duty obligations did not have any impact on most institutions’ approved 
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product lists, except for a few amendments such as a reduction in the number or types of 
products on the list. However, they did find the presence of an estimated reduction in 
commissions paid by product issuers, a reduction in fees based on volume of assets under 
advice, and an increase in fixed fees paid by clients. Yet they stated after implementation of 
FOFA, the [unweighted] average income source for these licensees changed little. Burke and 
Hung (2015) determined in post-FOFA some institutions were continuing to receive most 
revenues from commissions, because of grandfathering arrangements existing before July 
2013, or because of excluding banning insurance commissions. Seemingly FSR and FOFA has 
been a long and difficult road with many sections in the Act seemingly omitted (Roberts 2012), 
unresolved or continuing as a work-in-progress for Australian policymakers.  Interestingly, 
Australia is not alone in finding a suitable model to regulate the financial advice sector. Thus, 
this chapter shifts the focus internationally, to the UK and US, because other countries face 
similar challenges. 
2.3 UNITED STATES 
2.3.1 Legislative background to United States adviser regulation 
Prior to 2010 US providers of financial services operated in a relatively unregulated 
environment (Baily, Klein & Schardin 2017). They would distinguished themselves, for 
example, by registering with private self-regulatory organizations, such as the Certified 
Financial Planner Board of Standards Incorporated  (Finke & Langdon 2012). Historically, 
documented by Inderst and Ottaviani (2012e), advice provided by US investment advisers was 
not always in the best interests of the public. For instance, Finke, Huston and Waller (2009b)  
explained US retail consumers struggled to clearly distinguish between investment financial 
advisers and brokers designations, because of the similarity in their job titles. On top of this, 
the GFC in 2008 nearly destroyed the US Financial System and led to financial hardships for 
many Americans (Kelleher, Hall & Medina 2016).   
This all changed with the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act 2010 [Dodd-Frank Act] in response by the US Government to the calamities of 
the GFC (Himstreet 2012; Kennedy, McCoy & Bernstein 2012; Burke & Hung 2015; Kelleher, 
Hall & Medina 2016). A major component of this legislation focused on the regulation of two 
distinct categories of financial services providers. Namely, to regulate product- and 
remuneration-conflicted broker-dealer institutions and independent investment adviser 
institutions separately by a different regulator with a different set of rules to make them more 
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distinguishable (Carosa 2012; Rubin 2015). Specifically, the primary regulator, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission [SEC] regulates the financial advisory institutions [FAIs], together 
with their registered investment advisers [RIAs] or registered independent advice 
representatives [RIARs] (Zabel 2010; Himstreet 2012). While broker-dealers institutions [BDs] 
with their broker-dealer registered representatives [RRs] (Bateman & Kingston 2014; Burke & 
Hung 2015) are now regulated by Financial Industry Regulatory Authority [FINRA] under the 
supervision of SEC.  
The primary regulator, SEC,  is authorised to write and enforce the legislative rules, as well as 
conduct examinations (Inderst & Ottaviani 2012e). Together with the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau they track consumer complaints (Inderst & Ottaviani 2012b). SEC, for 
example, deals with matters of competence, standards and disclosures of any unavoidable 
conflicts of interest in the financial sector (Balasubramnian, Brisker & Gradisher 2014; fi360 
FiduciaryPath 2015, p. 26). Burke and Hung (2015) also claimed, SEC has, on an ongoing 
basis, been expected to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing legal and/or regulatory 
provisions, while also identifying any gaps, duplication or shortcomings in the regulations 
protecting retail clients (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2011)60. Interestingly, 
Balasubramnian, Brisker and Gradisher (2014) recommended in their paper, Section 913 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, obligates the SEC to consider changes in how different financial professional 
designations apply their fiduciary responsibilities to their clients. SEC with the US Department 
of Labor [DOL] was in the process of considering some rule changes in this regard. 
Specifically, on 8 April 2016 DOL announced a ‘fiduciary rule’, which defined US advisers as 
fiduciary (United States Department of Labour 2017). This is expected to affect all advisers in 
the US. However, the controversial rule with final compliance initially scheduled to be phased 
in from 10 April 2017 to 1 January 2018, was delayed until 9 June 2017. Illustrating the 
difficulty of the issue, a further delay until 1 July 2019 [18 months] was granted on the 28 
August after DOL lodged a legal document to the US District Court for Minnesota in this regard 
(Waddell 2017).  
Interestingly, Baily, Klein and Schardin (2017) concluded, Dodd-Frank legislation has made 
the financial sector much safer and more stable without loss of efficiency and economic growth. 
They concluded further, the legislation is addressing the “too-big-to-fail” (Baily, Klein & 
Schardin 2017, p. 43) problem with clear procedures for dealing with institutions in trouble. In 
                                                 
60 Prescribed in Section 913 of Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010. 
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their view, by removing misleading financial products the legislation ensures the public is 
protected. Yet they acknowledged improvement in agency supervision has some way to go with 
the need to continue tweaking Dodd-Frank to improve its performance. Accordingly, in the 
next section an explanation is presented considering how the Dodd-Frank reform legislation 
resulted in US policymakers incorporating a financial advisory structure (Demina 2014) to 
impact the relationship between product providers, advisers and clients of financial services 
with consumer protection as a main objective (Inderst & Ottaviani 2009).  
2.3.2 Adviser licensing regime in the United States 
To permit financial institutions and their agents to provide independent financial advice, SEC 
enforces the definitions and specifications of the US Investment Advisers Act 1940 [54 Stat. 
847] (Laby 2010) on financial advisory institutions. FAIs are not ‘natural persons’, but legal 
entities comprising investment advisory institutions obligated to register with the SEC (Rubin 
2015). Notably, FAIs can also be registered with state agencies, depending on the size of funds 
under their management (Balasubramnian, Brisker & Gradisher 2014). Therefore, in order to 
register  with the SEC, the financial advisory institutions must meet a funds under management 
[FUM] threshold, which at the time of writing, is set at $100  million (fi360 FiduciaryPath 
2015). Accordingly, institutions with less than $100 million in FUM, instead of registering with 
SEC, are required to register with the states in which they have clients (fi360 FiduciaryPath 
2015). Additionally, Bateman and Kingston (2014) mentioned, an extensive list of exclusions 
from this legislation of FAI institutions who do not have to register with the SEC is available. 
FAIs must comply with the regulations promulgated  by the SEC when engaging the services 
of registered independent advisers [registered investment advisers] (Burke & Hung 2015; 
Rubin 2015). Zabel (2010) penned, IARs are either independent [self-employed, while 
affiliated to an FIA or they have their own FAI] or they can join existing FAI as supervised 
employees. Independent advice representatives may include Certified Financial Planners® 
and/or others with similar designations (Balasubramnian, Brisker & Gradisher 2014). IARs, 
according to the writings of Rubin (2015), provide ongoing financial advice for compensation 
in the form of a fee-for-service, regardless of whether the client purchases or sells a particular 
financial product. Consequently, earning a transaction-based commission incentivises them to 
distribute any financial products (Demina 2014; Burke & Hung 2015; Egan, Matvos & Seru 
2016). Noteworthy, the majority, Burke and Hung (2015) established, earned FUM based 
percentage fees. This confirmed the US had not placed a widespread ban on commissions for 
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these agents. However, IARs must disclose their qualifications and background (United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission 2017). Fee-for-service disclosures are required as well 
(United States Securities and Exchange Commission 2017). FAI licensees must also provide a 
written internal compliance program of policies and procedures (United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission 2017). 
Whether the FAI institutions are either state-registered or SEC-registered, these institutions and 
their IARs are required to comply with a statutory fiduciary duty of care, as defined by the 
Investment Advisors Act (Himstreet 2012; Tittsworth 2013; Burke & Hung 2015).  To reflect 
their fiduciary duty,  SEC enforces SEC rule204A-1, where the FAI institutions adopt and 
enforce a code of ethics, which forms part of the code of conduct standards for all their IARs 
(Balasubramnian, Brisker & Gradisher 2014).   Finke, Huston and Waller (2009b) mentioned, 
CFPs® agree to uphold a fiduciary standard higher than required by the Investment Advisers 
Act.  Apparently, inconsistency in the application of the best interests duty occurred, because 
Rubin (2015) argued, for the state-registered FIAs the application of fiduciary duty to financial 
advisers varies from state to state.  Consequently, many financial clients did not realise, unlike 
CFP®s or SEC-registered IARs, some state-registered IARs are not required to owe a high level 
of fiduciary responsibilities to their retail clients (Rubin 2015).  
Unlike in Australia and the UK, to become an independent adviser [IAR] requires limited 
competency assessment with no formal educational requirements (United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission 2017). The only exception is where an IAR also wants to advise on 
mutual funds. Then, depending on the state in which they operate, they have to pass a securities 
examinations (United States Securities and Exchange Commission 2017). At the minimum 
advisers need to pass the Uniform Investment Adviser Law Examination with a grade of 72 per 
cent (Kaissar 2016). This is simply a three-hour exam, covering a variety of law and 
investment-related subjects for a token fee (Kaissar 2016). The US has yet to raise the 
educational standards. Kaissar (2016) recommended in a non-scholarly article, for example, 
new entrant advisers should complete a rigorous admissions process.  
In his article, like Australia, he proposed, after completing a minimum amount of undergraduate 
or graduate-level coursework in finance, accounting, or economics, entrants should also pass 
examinations in law and regulation, economics, financial statement analysis and portfolio 
management similar in difficulty to the CPA®, bar or medical board examinations.  He argued 
an effective deterrent to misconduct and non-compliance is ensuring advisers invest a 
53 
 
substantial amount of time, money and effort into joining the profession. His underlying 
argument suggests making it difficult for an individual to obtain a licence through a demanding 
admissions standard process to encourage high ethical standards. Although Kaissar (2016) 
admitted, it may be unfair and impractical to impose new licensing requirements on existing 
advisers, he suggested there was no reason why advisers should not undertake continuing 
professional development.  
Arguably, Frumento and Korenman (2013) informed not all advisers in the US may lack the 
necessary educational standards, because the Certified Financial Planner® Board of Standards 
Incorporated has developed a complete program to certify US fee-only financial advisers with 
specific curricula and examinations criteria. According to a paper published a few years ago by 
the Financial Planning Coalition (2014), the CFP® Board has had limited success in 
encouraging increased CFP® certification, setting and enforcing competency and ethical 
standards, plus identifying qualified advisers to fill some of the gaps in the regulation. Of note, 
Frumento and Korenman (2013) mentioned, the National Association of Personal Financial 
Advice [NAPFA], the professional body for fee-only US financial advisers, only accept CFP®-
designated financial advisers for membership. The NAPFA National Board was increasingly 
supporting the emerging financial planning profession with a singular professional designation 
they want the public to trust in the same way Certified Practicing Accountants, medical doctors, 
or lawyers do by meeting education, training and ethics requirements (Frumento & Korenman 
2013).  
Balasubramnian, Brisker and Gradisher (2014) claimed to provide retail clients a degree of 
assurance about any financial adviser’s registration, licensing, conduct, reliability, educational 
and professional experience competence they have access to some of this information and 
education from the SEC. With the assistance of Investment Adviser Public Disclosure [IAPD], 
SEC provide consumers with background checks of registered investment advisers and their 
affiliated institutions (Demina 2014). In a joint venture with North American Securities 
Administrators Association [NASAA], SEC maintain the Investment Advisers Registration 
Depository (IARD) (Balasubramnian, Brisker & Gradisher 2014). Moreover, various 
institutions, such as for example CFP® Board, various individual state agencies and American 
Association of Retired Persons [AARP] provides information to retired retail clients regarding 
how to conduct background checks on advisers and what should be considered when dealing 
with advisers. Through its Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations [OCIE], the 
SEC monitors the activities and conduct of IARs to identify higher-risk advisers of any 
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misconduct the SEC’s Division of Enforcement should pursue (Demina 2014). All advisers 
who have been disciplined, are listed on a public record for misconduct (Egan, Matvos & Seru 
2016). However, despite the US Government’s intent to protect retail consumers with 
legislation, the onus continues to lie ultimately with the retail clients to take responsibility for 
selecting their financial adviser and negotiating arrangements with them based on the 
disclosures they receive (United States Department of The Treasury 2009).  
In contrast to FAIs, broker-dealers are subject to the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 [Exchange Act] [48 Stat. 881] (Laby 2010; Demina 2014; Burke & Hung 2015). They 
must become members of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (Balasubramnian, 
Brisker & Gradisher 2014; Egan, Matvos & Seru 2016), which is an independent non-profit 
self-regulatory organisation (Inderst & Ottaviani 2009; fi360 FiduciaryPath 2015) registered 
with the SEC (Rubin 2015). Interestingly, according to the writings of Powell (2008) a United 
States based Financial Planning Association survey many years ago found, US financial 
advisers would prefer regulation by a professional regulatory organisation such as the CFP® 
board than self-regulation by SRO boards administered by FINRA.  
Like IFAs, the BDs are not ‘natural persons’. They are business entities performing brokerage 
activities, such as purchasing and disposing of financial instruments (United States Department 
of The Treasury 2009) for profit (fi360 FiduciaryPath 2015). In addition to earning transaction-
based commissions (Burke & Hung 2015), these institutions are referred to as dealers when 
they not only purchase or dispose of financial instruments for third parties, but also for their 
own account (United States Department of The Treasury 2009). The employees of BDs, are 
registered representatives [RRs] who are ‘natural persons’ (fi360 FiduciaryPath 2015). A paper 
by Burke and Hung (2015) indicated, BD entities do not have their own licensing requirements, 
however their RRs are generally subject to the licensing requirements of FINRA, which include 
Series 6, 7 licences, which comes with educational requirements. Affiliated individuals of BDs 
have no qualification requirements, unless they also provide advice in securities transactions 
(Burke & Hung 2015).  
Unlike IARs, RRs are incentivised to sell products to receive remuneration in the form of 
commission payments (Demina 2014). So as not to mislead retail consumers, Rubin (2015) 
clearly stated, these institutions are obligated to be transparent in their advertising, informing 
consumers RRs are arms-length sales people. FINRA authorised by Congress, Rubin (2015) 
enlightened further, promulgates and enforces the Exchange Act provisions and rules as well 
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as FINRA rules (fi360 FiduciaryPath 2015). For example, they enforce the requirement that 
BDs disclose to FINRA all customer complaints and arbitrations, regulatory actions, 
employment terminations, bankruptcy and criminal or judicial proceedings (Egan, Matvos & 
Seru 2016). They also implement educational standards, which include for example the 
Series63, Series65, Series66, Series7 and Series6 licensing examinations (Egan, Matvos & Seru 
2016), as well as rules governing the activities and conduct of brokers-dealers and market 
transparency (Balasubramnian, Brisker & Gradisher 2014). FINRA is also responsible for 
educating retail consumers (Balasubramnian, Brisker & Gradisher 2014) while monitoring the 
outcomes of risk assessment audits of the broker-dealer institutions for compliance (Demina 
2014). Noteworthy, despite all these requirements, the onus remains with the retail consumer 
to access and select a suitable broker-dealer using FINRA Broker-Check10 of background 
information on brokers (Balasubramnian, Brisker & Gradisher 2014).   
Instead of a higher fiduciary standard of care (Balasubramnian, Brisker & Gradisher 2014), 
RRs fiduciary duty is much broader (Deloitte & Financial Services Council 2014). However, it 
is a legal requirement under current US securities regulations, for BDs to make financial 
recommendations ‘suitable’ to the portfolio, financial situation, needs (Balasubramnian, 
Brisker & Gradisher 2014; Burke & Hung 2015; Rubin 2015) and risk profile of their clients 
(United States Department of The Treasury 2009). They also have disclosure requirements by 
providing to clients in plain English a narrative brochure containing all information as specified 
in Part 2 of Form ADV61 (Deloitte & Financial Services Council 2014). To do so it is 
mandatory for commission BDs to make a reasonable attempt to obtain personal financial 
information of their non-institutional client. Failing this they face FINRA’s disciplinary 
procedures and regulatory sanctions, such as the loss of their licence and/or possible litigation 
(Inderst & Ottaviani 2009), which limits their self-interests to some extent (fi360 FiduciaryPath 
2015). Although  Demina (2014) warned, retail clients run the risk of being placed into sub-
optimal investments under the ’suitability rule’. Arguably, it is a subordinate standard to 
fiduciary duty, because there is no need to avoid conflicts of interest, except to disclose them 
for specific financial products (fi360 FiduciaryPath 2015, p. 26). Consequently, the riskier 
products yielding higher returns and product commissions tied to their riskiness misaligns BDs’ 
RRs  and their clients’ interests (Demina 2014). Hence, conflicts of interest from remuneration 
may potentially bias the product sales. 
                                                 
61 For more information go to <https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-part2.pdf>. 
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Balasubramnian, Brisker and Gradisher (2014) wrote consumers have the means to determine 
if any advisers have been involved in professional misconduct by going to the Misconduct 
Register. Despite US advisers being named and shamed on a public misconduct register, 
according to Egan, Matvos and Seru (2016) the resultant loss of reputation and increased 
competition from good advisers has not deterred many rogue advisers. Remarkably, Egan, 
Matvos and Seru (2016) found in their study, US financial advisers who were punished for 
misconduct are able to continue providing financial advice after being dismissed from their 
institution for their bad behaviour as a means of discipline. They claimed their results indicated 
evidence of misconduct matching of institutions and advisers, whereby advisers with a history 
of misconduct transfer to institutions that tend to employ advisers with a history of misconduct. 
This they argued weakens to some extent the disciplining mechanism of the US regulator as 
well as decreases the punishment for the misconduct. By implication a systemic problem for 
the whole industry. 
2.3.3 United States reform consequences and challenges 
Apparent, the above reforms legally regulate BDs and FAIs relationships with their clients 
(Demina 2014) differently (Bhargava 2009) in terms of definitions, registration, duties, 
compensations, legal requirements, legal obligations and standards of care (Bhargava 2009; 
Baris & Cohn 2012; Demina 2014; Burke & Hung 2015; Egan, Matvos & Seru 2016). 
However, Frumento and Korenman (2013) observed, despite these reforms retail consumers 
continue to find it difficult to separate the advice and services they offer. Bhargava (2009), 
Finke, Huston and Waller (2009b) concurred, the US public cannot clearly distinguish between 
conflicted broker-dealers licensed to sell securities or insurance products and independent 
registered investment-advisers regulated to deliver investment advice, because they are 
perceived to offer similar services. Especially when investment advisers and broker-dealers are 
perceived by clients to offer similar financial advice services (Demina 2014). This perception 
Demina (2014) pointed out, put clients at risk of harm, because it may result in divergence 
between adviser-client interests.  
Interestingly, both FINRA and SEC regulate some advisers. Thus they receive commissions 
for product transactions as well as fee-for-service for offering advice (Deloitte & Financial 
Services Council 2014). This was confirmed in an empirical study by Burke and Hung (2015) 
when they found a hybrid business model is evident in practice where SEC-registered FAIs are 
also either registered as BDs or they have affiliations with BDs. They found in their study, 
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some IARs are also registered representatives of BDs, or RRs are also registered as FAIs. A 
later study by Egan, Matvos and Seru (2016) supported their empirical findings by confirming, 
those registered as both brokers and investment advisers account for about 50 per cent of all 
US active advisers.  
While the US financial planning market is still developing (Treasury 2015), SEC has been 
continually working on changes, innovation and setting new rules to help retail clients 
distinguish between the different FAI designations who have a fiduciary duty from those RRs 
who do not (Balasubramnian, Brisker & Gradisher 2014). Furthermore, penalties for 
misconduct include fines, probation, and restitution, such as a prison sentence in the event of 
fraudulent misconduct (Egan, Matvos & Seru 2016).  
Although US regulators continue to consider adding to the oversight legislation for advisers 
(Stolz 2009b), Varriale (2012) claimed, the United States regulators are struggling to decide 
how to regulate advisers (Baris & Cohn 2012). For example, Frumento and Korenman (2013) 
reported, two pieces of legislation, Investment Advisory Oversight Act of 2012, known as the 
‘Bacchus Bill’, and Investment Adviser Examination Improvement Act of 2012, were 
introduced by the US Government with the purpose to increase what was perceived as not 
enough regulation regulating professionalism and investment advisers. The Investment Adviser 
Oversight Act of 2012 was introduced. Yet it was never enacted to mandate many Securities 
and Exchange Commission and state-registered investment advisers to become a member in a 
SRO (Tittsworth, 2013).  
They also reported evidence of uncertainty as to who [which body] should supervise financial 
advisers. However, despite support for this legislation by several private bodies, namely 
FINRA (Tittsworth, 2013), Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, National 
Association of Insurance and Financial Advisers and Financial Services Institute (Frumento & 
Korenman 2013), the Investment Advisers Association opposed it (Frumento & Korenman 
2013). They opposed it for a number of reasons highlighted in a paper by Tittsworth (2013), 
such as unnecessary costs and lack of transparency or accountability. Both legislations were 
mooted after reaching the House of Financial Services Committee.  Although the legislation 
was unpassed, it reopened the debate to professionalism of the financial advice industry and 
who should regulate advisers in the US (Frumento & Korenman 2013). 
Schulaka (2009) observed, just under a decade ago, the move by US advisers to an 
independence advisory model. In his critique, he concluded, independence is unsuitable for 
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some advisers. Furthermore, reports indicate mainly the affluent clients seek out independent 
holistic advisory services (Journal of Financial Planning 2009). Yet Zabel (2010) noted, the US 
independence institutional business models are growing faster than broker-dealer institutional 
models, because of higher revenue increases, more control over client accounts, improved 
brand building ability as well as the opportunity to maximise value for their businesses.  
Difficulties with the independence channel in the US, Aschkenasy (2009) pointed out includes 
the duplication of support services, such as for example, marketing plans, compliance and 
regulatory matters, in addition to the power wielded by a large wire house, bank or insurance-
owned broker-dealer when negotiating fees or deals on behalf of their representatives. Also, if 
a US representative should depart from their principal licensed institution then the adviser 
immediately becomes a non-affiliate third-party and, from this point, the institution [FAIs or 
BDs] retains the client (Hansen 2008). Questionable is whether this is in the best interest of the 
clients retained. 
Evident from the literature writings by Bateman and Kingston (2014) and Burke and Hung 
(2015), apparently the United States is looking towards the developments in the United 
Kingdom since the implementation of Retail Distribution Review in 2012.  However, Salka 
(2015) US reforms will be delayed or limited, should the US attempt to imitate the UK model. 
This they base on the power of broker-dealers, multiple collage of regulations and a litigious 
US society. Therefore, further developments involving licensing, regulating and authorising 
financial advisers in the US is yet unrealised. 
2.4 UNITED KINGDOM 
2.4.1 Legislative background to United Kingdom adviser regulation 
From 2005 to 2008 data was collected and reported in three separate thematic reports, involving 
mystery shopping expeditions proving the presence of inherent and widespread weaknesses in 
the manner UK institutions and their representatives sold products across much of the UK 
financial services industry (Pain 2013). This scrutiny of consumer protection, financial service 
integrity and competition initiatives by the UK Government (Walker 2012) resulted in the 
launch of Retail Distribution Review in 2006. Important for this study, is the RDR reforms and 
legislation, which came into effect from 1 January 2013 (Clare et al. 2013) to address the 
scandals in the UK retail advice sector (Ring 2015). Its purpose was to regain the lost UK 
consumer trust and confidence in the retail market for financial products and services (United 
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Kingdom House of Commons Treasury Committee 2011; Financial Services Authority 2012b; 
Atkin et al. 2013) by identifying and eliminating the root causes of poor advice (Burke & Hung 
2015).  
Until the enactment of Financial Services Act 2012 (Inderst & Ottaviani 2012b), the initial 
RDR UK supervisory responsibilities of financial advisory institutions and their representatives 
was vested in the Financial Services Authority [FSA]. Subsequently, the FSA, a single 
regulatory body for the entire UK financial services markets (Kwon 2013),  was replaced with 
a new Financial Conduct Authority [FCA] (McMeel 2013) by the Financial Services Act 2012. 
FCA was empowered to regulate the institutions and individuals who advise on, sell or 
distribute financial products and services (Inderst & Ottaviani 2012e). The Financial Services 
and Markets Act 200062 defines their purpose and responsibilities in FCA as a single non-
government independent body, accountable to the UK Treasury, who in turn is accountable to 
the UK Parliament (Inderst & Ottaviani 2012e). The record of FCA legal rules and guidance 
are set out in the FCA Handbook63. The statutory duties, such as best interest64, disclosure65, 
suitability rule66 imposed in them are set out in the Conduct of Business Source Book [COBS] 
(Financial Conduct Authority 2017a). 
Specifically, FCA’s attention to supervise individual advisers via third-parties (Financial 
Services Authority 2010; Adamson 2012; Bateman & Kingston 2014) to ensure “appropriate, 
affordable, and fair advice and intermediary services” (Salka 2015, p. 87). For example, one 
of the broader objectives of RDR in Policy Statement PS13/1, issued by the Financial Conduct 
Authority (2013a), is to restrict the undesirable influence on consumer outcomes product 
providers have on distribution and adviser remuneration. Furthermore, the  legislation has the 
objectives of aligning advisers interests with those of their clients as well as promoting effective 
competitive behaviour between the product providers (Financial Conduct Authority 2014a) by 
removing product provider influence over the distribution of products (Financial Conduct 
Authority 2013a). McDermott (2016) determined the FCA was, in the first instance, tasked 
with continuing arrangements for supervising authorised persons for compliance, and secondly 
                                                 
62 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 viewed at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/8/contents>. 
63 FCA Handbook is accessible at this link: <https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook>. 
64 COB 2.1.1 ‘A firm must act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its 
client (the client's best interests rule)’. 
65 COBS 2.2.1 ‘A firm must provide appropriate information in a comprehensible form to a client’. 
66 COBS 9.2.1 ‘A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that a personal recommendation, or a decision to 
trade, is suitable for its client’. 
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to manage the risk of non-compliance by financial institutions [of course their representatives] 
of managing conflicts of interest between their clients and themselves.  
If UK firms want to offer financial services, including financial advice, then they must apply 
for permission from the FCA by lodging a Part IV Permission (Deloitte & Financial Services 
Council 2014) application as specified in the  Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(Financial Conduct Authority 2016b). Furthermore, FCA must approve a person who wants to 
deliver advice. Similar to ASIC, FCA assesses an institution against strict criteria ‘fit and 
proper’ (Deloitte & Financial Services Council 2014) to provide independent advice (Financial 
Services Authority 2012b; Financial Conduct Authority 2014c; Burke & Hung 2015).  
Furthermore, individual advisers must meet a minimum standard of education, including a 
minimum of 35 hours of continual professional development hours annually. Also they must 
be issued with a statement of professional standing by a recognised professional body (Deloitte 
& Financial Services Council 2014). The UK policymakers from 31 December 2012 imposed 
additional requirements. Like Australia new pre-sale disclosure requirements67 and point-of-
sale disclosure requirements68 were imposed (Deloitte & Financial Services Council 2014; 
Financial Conduct Authority 2017a). Commissions were also banned after 31 December 2012 
(Deloitte & Financial Services Council 2014). Notable, financial services institutions and their 
representatives were obligated to describe or self-label their financial services to fall in one of 
two regulated activities, namely as either ‘restricted’ or ‘independent’ advice (Bateman & 
Kingston 2014; Burke & Hung 2015), which is a prominent feature of the UK’s regulations. 
2.4.2 Adviser licensing regime in the United Kingdom 
The first category of UK advisers, namely independent financial advisers [IFAs], Burke and 
Hung (2015), defined as those who are legally obliged to consider all types of retail investment 
products distributed across the whole financial services market by all financial institutions, in 
addition to making unbiased and unrestricted recommendations. IFAs, whether individuals or 
institutions, according to Thorpe (2012) and supported by information from the Financial 
Conduct Authority (2016c) must show they have adequate structures and processes in place to 
ensure compliance. Specifically, concerning the twin tests of “comprehensive and fair 
analysis” (Financial Services Authority 2012b, p. 6; Thorpe 2012)  and “unbiased and 
                                                 
67 COBS 6.3 Services and Costs Disclosures or Combined Initial Disclosure Document at <https://www. 
handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/COBS/6/3.html?date=2016-07-03>. 
68 COBS 9 Suitability (including basic advice) at <https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/COBS/9.pdf>. 
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unrestricted” (Financial Services Authority 2012b, p. 6) criteria for independence. To 
demonstrate achievement of the twin tests, Thorpe (2012) concluded may involve the use of 
software, third-party research providers, review panels of selected products and/or product 
providers to show how the market and selected products are aligned with a client’s risk 
tolerance and suitability. What needs clear articulation to retail clients, he further 
recommended, is the nature of the service and restrictions, the types of products, size of product 
range, access to different product providers, together with specialisations offered to 
differentiate independent from ‘restricted’ advice. Unlike restricted advisers, the UK 
independent financial advisers are authorised and regulated by FSA [now FCA] to work in the 
best interest of clients by not representing any financial institutions such as insurance 
companies, banks or other product providers when providing recommendations to clients 
(Fernandez-Aviles & Davila 2012).  
The second category, ‘restricted’ advisers or appointed representatives [RAR], Burke and Hung 
(2015) explained can only recommend certain products, product providers, or both. Fernandez-
Aviles and Davila (2012) documented, ‘restricted’ advisers are like the traditional ‘aligned’ or 
‘tied’ UK advisers. Therefore, performing ‘regulated activities’, effectively means ‘appointed 
representatives’ either acts as agents for authorised restricted institutions, such as product 
distributors, banks or insurance companies or authorised independent institutions69 (Financial 
Services Authority 2012a). As far as licensing is concerned, ‘restricted’ institutions, like their 
independent counterparts, must recruit, appoint and supervise one or more ‘appointed 
representatives’, who comply with the FCA’s ‘fit and proper’ test to deliver tied advice 
restricted by products or providers (Financial Services Authority 2012b; Financial Conduct 
Authority 2014c; Burke & Hung 2015). Like their counterparts, restricted ‘appointed 
representatives’ can either be institutions or ‘natural persons’ who perform regulated activities 
and acts as agents for  the FCA authorised principals (Financial Conduct Authority 2015). 
Both independent financial ‘appointed representatives’ and  restricted ‘appointed 
representatives’ must register with the FCA (Burke & Hung 2015), paying them a levy 
(Financial Conduct Authority 2014c). This includes a written contract between the principals 
and the ‘appointed representatives’ documenting the arrangements. The principals of both IFA 
and RAR takes full responsibility for ensuring the ‘appointed representatives’ complies with 
                                                 
69 For more information, refer to <https://www.the-fca.org.uk/appointed-representatives-and-principals>. 
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FCA rules.70  For example, the ‘appointed representatives’ must comply with the Statements of 
Principle and Code of Practice (Financial Conduct Authority 2014c). These principles explains 
the behaviour FCA expected of ‘appointed representatives’ and together with a further 
requirement for advisers, the Statement of Professional Standing [SPS] (Financial Conduct 
Authority 2014c). ‘Appointed representatives’ are expected to understand and comply with the 
regulatory requirements of their affiliated institutions (whether independent or 
‘restricted’(Financial Conduct Authority 2015). If they conduct any ‘regulated activities’ 
outside this scope, they are expected to become authorised in their own right (Financial Conduct 
Authority 2015). If affiliated ‘appointed representatives’ wish to transfer and 
become ‘authorised’ they have to give notice to their principals as well as come to some 
agreement with their principals as to how they can have direct access to ex-client files in the 
event of client complaints (Financial Conduct Authority 2015). Once ‘appointed 
representatives’ leave their authorised institutions their agreement with their principals will 
determine whether they can continue dealing with existing clients, or not. All FCA authorised 
institutions or individuals are responsible for having systems in place to deal with, inter 
alia, professional indemnity insurance, compliance, and related business liabilities71 (Financial 
Conduct Authority 2015). The directly authorised institutions are responsible for ensuring their 
ARs, while carrying out ‘regulated activities’, also commonly referred to as controlled 
functions, meet the relevant selling standards, such as the independent advice rules (Financial 
Services Authority 2012b; Financial Conduct Authority 2014c). The principals have access to 
all employees, their premises and records to carry out regular audits to ensure they are 
financially stable and competent (Financial Conduct Authority 2015). They are obligated to  
report anything affecting the ongoing suitability of ‘appointed representatives’ to FCA and the 
authorised institutions (Financial Conduct Authority 2014c). 
2.4.3 United Kingdom reform consequences and challenges 
Reported in popular media, some institutions, such as for example Sanlam, created a hybrid 
advisory model, where their advisers offer Sanlam-only [‘restricted’] or whole of market 
investment recommendations [independent] (Trudeau 2012). Trudeau (2012) put 
forward the claim; this practice is permitted, if representatives of hybrid models call themselves 
‘financial planners’ and not independent financial advisers. Although Brittain (2013) presented 
                                                 
70 See more at <https://www.the-fca.org.uk/appointed-representatives-and-principals?field_fcasf_sector= 
unset&field_fcasf_page_category=unset#sthash.VmHl0PBx.dpuf>. 
71 See more at <https://www.the-fca.org.uk/appointed-representatives/move-being-ar-being-authorised?field_ 
fcasf_sector=unset&field_fcasf_page_category=unset#sthash.nmfTxEu7.dpuf>. 
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the difference between financial advisers and financial planners in their paper, by stating the 
former performs product transactions with a sales focus and the latter tends to charge separately 
for advice and so is not reliant on securing a sale, this distinction is confusing.  
Unlike the US, the UK has placed a widespread ban on commissions, except for commissions72 
on life insurance products and percentage assets-based fees set by the advisers to mirror the 
clients’ service (Boynton & Mathieson 2009, p. 15; Bateman & Kingston 2014). Along similar 
lines, depending on the product provider or the product type, it is alleged the fees charged 
should not “vary inappropriately” (Boynton & Mathieson 2009, p. 15) nor be prejudiced by 
facilities offered by product providers to, for example, recuperate the financial product charges. 
Furthermore, in addition to the conditions on remuneration practices, RDR rules have also 
included disclosure of remuneration and services (Financial Conduct Authority 2014a). Other 
benefits of RDR, include the unlikelihood larger clients would subsidise smaller clients, 
because technology helps meet the needs of smaller clients (Financial Conduct Authority 
2014d; Burke & Hung 2015). At the time of this study and confirmed in a paper written by 
Bateman and Kingston (2014), although an ongoing debate about the matter of best interests of 
the retail client in the UK is ever present, they have still not imposed a statutory fiduciary duty 
on advisers.   
Traditionally, most IFAs carried out basic financial advisory services with the minimum of 
educational competencies, whereas others sat the Certificate of Financial Planning with the 
Chartered Insurance Institute or the CFP® exam with the Institute of Financial Planning [IFP],  
which is affiliated with the US CFP® Standards Board (Brittain 2013). Cole and Salimath 
(2013) contended, CFP® qualified advisers are generally more highly qualified with 
backgrounds in accountancy or the law. As of 1 January 2013, to become ‘appointed 
representatives’ in the United Kingdom requires meeting minimum specified professional 
education requirements and experience (Financial Services Authority 2012a). In the works of 
Burke and Hung (2015) clearly all existing and new ‘appointed representatives’ entrants have 
to meet the same qualification requirements and educational standards. This, they mentioned 
included the prerequisite to hold an approved Qualifications and Credit Framework [QCF] 
                                                 
72 COBS 6.1.A Adviser charging and remuneration <https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/COBS/6/ 
1A.html>. 
COBS 6.1B.5 Retail investment product provider, operator of an electronic system in relation to lending, and 
platform service provider requirements relating to adviser charging and remuneration 
<https://www.handbook. fca.org.uk/handbook/COBS/6/1B.html>. 
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Level 4 qualification, namely Diplomas in Financial Planning, Investment Planning, Banking, 
Investment Advice, or Financial Advice, which is equivalent to one year of university study.  
Benefits of better qualified UK advisers and advisers working for independent institutions free 
from product or provider bias (Reichman 2013) should increase their professionalism. By 
implication, their clients should then receive more appropriate, affordable and fair advisory 
services (Reichman 2013). However, although seemingly, RDR has initiated moves towards 
increased professionalism among advisers (Financial Conduct Authority 2014c), it is not 
without its critics. For instance, not everyone thinks all retail clients need independent 
professional advice (Harvey 2011).  Ferran (2012) is unsure whether retail clients of financial 
advice approve of RDR or not. Reichman (2013) questioned whether the reforms introduced 
following RDR, de-risked the advice process. They offered compelling reasons arguing RDR 
may have created an advice gap where lower asset clients are unable to obtain advice, cost of 
advice has not necessarily decreased and, unless specifically identified, rogue advisers were 
still able to put retail clients at risk of loss. Coghill (2013) found professional bodies, such as 
the Law Society, Solicitors’ Regulation Authority and Institute of Chartered Accountants had 
opposing views on whether particularly ‘restricted’ institutions and their ‘appointed 
representatives’ are truly competent.  
Therefore, since RDR implementation, before intervening, UK Policymakers and their 
Regulator require significant evidence-based data on any financial services issue (Pain 2013).  
From 2013 to 2017, Europe Economics, an independent external European consultant, was 
commissioned to undertake a three-stage thematic review looking at how financial institutions 
and their financial advisers were managing with the RDR requirements and to determine the 
extent RDR has delivered on its original objectives (Financial Conduct Authority 2014a, 2014b, 
2014c; Burke et al. 2015). Burke and Hung (2015) summarised the Europe Economics latest 
research findings, considering the impacts of UK’s RDR since its implementation. The first 
stage review completed in July 2013 indicated, it was unclear whether independent and 
‘restricted’ institutions were acting within their scope of independence or restrictions, 
respectively. Aside, problems were identified with regards to remuneration disclosures and 
transparency issues with ongoing services propositions (Financial Conduct Authority 2013b; 
Burke et al. 2015). Furthermore, despite the distinction between ‘restricted’ and ‘independent’ 
advisers, findings by Europe Economics indicated, confusion and uncertainty still reigned 
amongst UK retail clients about these designations (Financial Conduct Authority 2014b).  
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Although one of the initial impacts of RDR was adviser numbers declined, Europe Economics 
claimed they found these numbers were on the increase again as advisers became more 
confident about their futures (Financial Conduct Authority 2014c). To the contrary, Clare et al. 
(2013) argued the increase in the minimum education standards for advisers under RDR,  the 
increased regulatory and compliance costs, downward pressure on revenues, the challenges of 
adjusting business models, declining business value and the decline in cross-subsidisation from 
larger to smaller clients did not bode well for the future numbers of advisers. Also Clare et al. 
(2013) claimed RDR led to some major UK banks withdrawing from providing wealth 
management advice to small investors, which impacted the number of appointed 
representatives to supply financial advisory services. Clare et al. (2013) also wrote RDR has 
taken the past role of advisers from product distributors and fund selectors to a new role of 
financial planner or a combination of both fund selector and financial planner. They claim 
computer literacy will lead the mass market of consumers in the future to rather do their own 
financial planning using technology.  
Thus, like Australia, technology (Morgan Stanley 2018) is forcing UK financial advice business 
models to evolve. The second review concluded in March 2014 found, yet not compelling 
enough to be certain, institutions were describing themselves as independent, when perhaps it 
was questionable whether they were operating an independent practice (Financial Conduct 
Authority 2014e; Burke & Hung 2015). In this review they also found a significant number of 
institutions were not disclosing the cost of advice, nor how they were charging for the advice, 
types of services offered, and the nature of any ongoing services within a reasonable timeframe 
(Financial Conduct Authority 2014f; Burke & Hung 2015). However, the third and final review 
found the institutions became better at disclosing costs, scope and nature of services and were 
providing ongoing services to clients. However, inadequate ongoing service fee disclosures 
(Financial Conduct Authority 2014d; Burke & Hung 2015), including transparency of 
concealed costs and fees of underlying products (Salka 2015) still happens. Furthermore, their 
research indicated business models have adapted. A decline in sales of high commission paying 
products and increases in sales of low commission or no commission pre-RDR financial 
products (Salka 2015) now exists. However, Salka (2015) claimed the data appeared to prove 
evidence of an issue surrounding adviser reputations.  
Increasingly, advances in technology, particularly the increasing availability of online services, 
mobile app services and blockchain (Morgan Stanley 2018) is leading changes in how people 
seek advice for their financial planning needs (Financial Conduct Authority 2014a). Therefore, 
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FCA is keen to remove unnecessary regulatory obstacles to affordability and accessibility 
standing in the way of innovations in advice models (Financial Conduct Authority 2014a). 
Therefore, jointly with Her Majesty's Treasury, the FCA launched the Financial Advice Market 
Review in August 2015 (Treasury 2015). Their final report found despite post-RDR, trust, 
affordability and accessibility remains relatively low (Financial Conduct Authority 2016a). 
Thus, they make recommendations in their report to improve these. From the report it is clear 
the UK has moved away from deciding how to regulate advisers to looking at ways to protect 
consumers, improve access, affordability and quality of advice under the existing regulatory 
model  (Financial Conduct Authority 2017b). While the next review by Europe Economics was 
planned for 2017, in July 2017 FCA decided to delay its review until 2019 to overlap with the 
review on the impact of Financial Advice Market Review [FAMR] Reforms73.  Although, 
several scholars, namely Walker (2012), Bateman and Kingston (2014) and Salka (2015) feel 
RDR may be a blueprint for not only policy reform discussions, but also regulatory reform 
deliberations and implementations of licensing, regulating and authorising financial advisers in 
other nations, this research considers a different blueprint for Australian advisers.  
2.5 COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE THREE NATIONS 
Australian regulators argued, the best protection for consumers is compliance by the financial 
services industry with a fair and transparent principles-based regulatory system (Pearson 
2006b). Likewise the US has been moving from a rules-based approach with lower standards 
of care to a principles-based framework, which requires advisers to provide a higher standard 
of care to clients (Trone 2009). Whereas the UK is, wondering whether the principle-based 
approach is working for them and are apparently moving back to a rules-based approach. Kwon 
(2013) commented, it does not matter whether supervision and regulation of financial service 
is rule-based or principle-based, what matters is lowering the risk to the public dealing with 
financial services providers.  
According to Deloitte and Financial Services Council (2014), Australia has higher standards of 
regulation encompassing narrow requirements than the US and UK. Reading articles presented 
at a symposium titled: Revolution in the regulation of financial advice: The U.S., the U.K. and 
Australia (Facciolo 2013) evidently regulating financial advisers in US, UK and Australia 
continues to be a controversial matter, polarising many with an interest in the financial advisory 
                                                 
73 Details can be found here <https://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2017/july/financial-conduct-authority-to-
merge-rdr-review-with-assessment-of-famr/>. 
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industry. From the above discussion, plainly both similarities and differences between these 
three countries in the way they license regulate and authorise their financial advisers. UK and 
Australian models are closer in similarity than the US model (Deloitte & Financial Services 
Council 2014) exists.  Licensing is at the institutional level for all three nations. All these 
nations have disclosure requirements of information found in the Australian FSGs. However, 
UK and Australia are more prescriptive in terms of disclosures (Deloitte & Financial Services 
Council 2014). The Australian statement of advice is more comprehensive compared to 
suitability letters in the UK (Deloitte & Financial Services Council 2014). With a few 
exceptions, Australia and the UK are the only countries having banned conflicted remuneration.  
Similar to Australia (Valentine 2008; Hartnett 2010; Bruce 2012), both the UK (Bateman & 
Kingston 2014) and the US  (Laby 2010; Kaissar 2016) financial services are undergoing 
regulatory reforms to protect retail clients, which are having significant impact on individual 
financial advisers. The underlying objectives of all these nations’ regulations is to promote 
managing, controlling, avoiding or eliminating conflicts of interest, ensuring statutory fiduciary 
duty [US and Australia only], aligning the institutions [principals] and their representatives’ 
interests with the clients’ interest, as well as encouraging competition between financial service 
providers. 
In Australia, United Kingdom or the United States, all advisory or financial institutions74 and 
their appointed agents75 must register with their respective regulator76. Therefore, evident in all 
these countries, their financial advisers are agents of institutions or third-party affiliates when 
they provide financial advice and/or product sales. State regulators via third-party affiliates or 
principals effectively regulate them. Yet, insufficient compelling evidence is need to validate 
this as the most effective approach to achieve the objective of protecting the public. What has 
been overlooked in the empirical studies and scholarly literature, in contrast to other 
professions, such as accounting, law and medicine, once any of these agents [IARs, RRs, IFAs, 
‘appointed representatives’ and ‘authorised representatives’] departs from or terminates their 
contractual arrangements with any of these principals [FAIs, BDs, ‘restricted’ advice 
institutions, independent advice institutions and Australian licensees], then they immediately 
                                                 
74 US financial advisory institutions, US broker-dealer institutions, ‘UK restricted’ advice institutions, UK 
independent advice institutions and Australian Financial Services licensees  
75 US independent registered investment advisers, US broker-dealer registered representatives, UK independent 
appointed representatives, UK ‘restricted’ appointed representatives and Australian s923A independent 
authorised representatives and Australian product-aligned authorised representatives 
76 US Securities and Exchange Commission, US Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, UK Financial Conduct 
Authority and Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
68 
 
are no longer legally allowed to offer advice. Generally, the representative’s possession of or 
use of any client information obtained, while at the principal, is prohibited without prior 
agreement to the contrary. In effect, these authorised financial institutions principals [FAIs, 
BDs, ‘restricted’ advice institutions, independent advice institutions and Australian licensees] 
generally owns the client, depending on the terms of the contract between principal and agent, 
irrespective of any relationship established between client and ’natural person’ adviser. 
Neglected in the literature is the potential consequences of severing this relationship between 
adviser and client, because of the departure of the adviser.  
Observations by Bateman and Kingston (2014) and Burke and Hung (2015), indicated US and 
UK policymakers have put legal provisions in place to distinguish between two categories of 
financial advisory institutions and financial advisers. For them, a prominent feature of their 
regulations was the separation of ‘independent’ advice, from advice not independent, both in 
terminology and categories. Australian legal and accounting professionals both concurred, 
legislating and disclosing the difference between financial product sales and independent 
financial advice should resolve the best interest duty and APLs disputes (Certified Practicing 
Accountants 2014; Hewison 2014; Mitchell 2014). Trends in the UK (Brittain 2013), US 
(Frumento & Korenman 2013)  and Australia (Arman & Shackman 2012) indicate the public 
struggle to clearly distinguish between two categories of advisers, namely conflicted [product 
advisory institutions] and non-conflicted advisers [independent advisory institutions]. US and 
Australia have tried to distinguish between sales and advice. In contrast to the US and Australia, 
the United Kingdom has dropped this idea by settling instead for independent advice and 
restricted advice (McMeel 2013). Aside, the impact of Brexit is yet unrealised as the United 
Kingdom negotiates with the European Union its exit (Deloitte 2016). Financial advisers in 
Australia have been restricted in practice and restricted in the use of occupational title of 
‘independent financial adviser’. Interestingly, the Australian definition of independence is 
attached to product and remuneration independence, and dissimilar to the UK, cannot be 
overcome through an expansive product list (Money Marketing 2011). Therefore, the definition 
of independence in Australia is more rigorous and hence more difficult to achieve than the case 
of the UK definition (Money Marketing 2011).  
In the US, the product advisory institutions are not legally obligated to follow a fiduciary 
standard nor disclose any conflicts of interest to their clients (Balasubramnian, Brisker & 
Gradisher 2014). Whereas their independent advisory institutions owes a statutory fiduciary 
duty and conflicts of interest are as specified in the Investment Advisors Act 1940 (United 
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States Department of The Treasury 2009). Although, at the time of writing clearly no 
uniformity in their fiduciary standards for IAs and their RRs is obvious, SEC is considering 
exercising its rulemaking authority to implement a uniform fiduciary standard of conduct for 
all of them (Burke & Hung 2015). In Australia, whether institutions are product-aligned or 
independent, they all have a statutory fiduciary duty obligation, as well as a legal obligation to 
disclose all conflicts of interest. Although under debate at the time of writing this thesis, the 
UK Government has disregarded a fiduciary duty requirement for UK financial advisers. 
Unlike Australia and UK, who have generally banned commissions, because of conflicts of 
interest from remuneration, the US still allow commissions or regulated remuneration practices. 
Although the ban on commission in Australia is far more widespread than the position evident 
in the UK, on the grounds of ongoing scandals in Australia, such as the Commonwealth Bank 
(North 2015), banning commissions has not prevented clients suffering at the hands of advisers 
of large banking institutions. With conflicts of interest dealt with by the regulators, perhaps 
conflict of interest from association to product-aligned licensees need further scrutiny.  
Currently, s923A of the Act permits receiving or charging asset-based fees for funds under 
management77 (Power 2016b). However, specified in s964D and s964E of the Act, the ban on 
asset-based fees on investments are limited to borrowed funds under management78. The 
available non-scholarly literature supposes permitting asset-based fees is a contentious matter. 
For Industry Super Australia (2014), and others, like the Accounting Professional and Ethical 
Standards Board (Brown 2011), receiving remuneration in the form of a percentage incentive 
payment for funds under management (asset-based fees) through a specific platform is 
technically a commission from platforms and product sales, which potentially leads to conflicts 
of interest. Whereas contrary views by the Financial Planning Association (2014) claimed 
asset-based fees are advice fees, not commissions, charged through the product under the 
direction of the client for ongoing services to obtain regular information on each investment in 
the client’s portfolio from respective platforms and product issuers.  
Notably, platforms are not considered financial products under the present legislation79. 
Interestingly, the UK Financial Conduct Authority (previously Financial Standards Authority) 
                                                 
77 Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 is available at link: <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017 
C00328/Html/Volume_1#primary-nav>. 
78  Regulatory Guide 246: Conflicted remuneration. 
79 Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 is available at link: <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017 
C00328/Html/Volume_1#primary-nav>. 
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permits asset-based fees with the condition it fairly represents services provided to the client 
(International Financial Law Review 2009). Curiously, during this research a journalist 
reported ASIC was seeking independent legal guidance to establish whether those who claim 
independence, while charging asset-based fees are conflicted  (Santacruz 2016b). 
Disparate from the UK and Australia, the United States has not yet established minimum 
standards for advisers to improve the quality of advice (Valentine 2013) to retail clients by 
raising the professional  and educational standards of advisers (Burke & Hung 2015).  Debates 
in the US about professional standards, education and ethics are happening. Whereas, the UK 
has implemented professional standards and educational requirements for their advisers. 
Australia has just legislated and set up a body to implement standards, education and ethics.  
From the above, shortcomings in licensing, regulating and authorising financial advisers’ post-
regulatory reforms for all these nations is evident. So seemingly the policymakers in these 
nations are looking at developments in each other’s respective countries (McMeel 2013) to 
overcome these shortcomings. For example, the Financial System Inquiry panel has sought 
feedback on the push to more clearly distinguish between independent and restricted financial 
advice, looking to the UK model as a potential blueprint (Independent Financial Adviser News 
2014b). Fernandez-Aviles and Davila (2012) claimed in their paper referring to the United 
Kingdom market, although the independent financial adviser is rarely evident in financial 
institutions, and hence misconstrued by clients, they are increasingly becoming relevant.  
Evident in both popular and professional literature, the UK’s RDR (Money Marketing 2011; 
Independent Financial Adviser News 2014b; Burke & Hung 2015) and Australia’s FOFA 
(Burke & Hung 2015) developments are being watched by other nations as a possible blueprint. 
Compared to both the UK and US Australia is in a better position to take reforms further.  
Australia does not face a society as litigious as the US (Salka 2015), nor do they face the 
constraints imposed by Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) to harmonise 
regulation in the financial markets across the European Union (Burke & Hung 2015)80 or 
arguably the ramifications of Brexit once implemented (Deloitte & Financial Services Council 
2014).  However, professional media mentioned, although RDR may go further than the Act, 
FOFA goes much further than RDR (Money Marketing 2011). Just as the United States, 
regulators are considering SROs should regulate investment advisers in the retail market 
                                                 
80 For more information see <https://www.the-fca.org.uk/focus-areas/mifid-ii?field_fcasf_page_category=426 
&field_fcasf_sector=unset>. 
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without any clues as to how to do so (Varriale 2012), so too does Australia and the UK need to 
consider where to next with their reforms. 
 In closing, if personal accountability is what RDR is promoting (McDermott 2016), and if 
lessons should be learnt from the UK by US and Australia (Bateman & Kingston 2014; Salka 
2015), then questionable, how this personal accountability is achieved if advisers are licensed, 
regulated and authorised at the institutional level where accountabilities are indistinguishable, 
rather than at the individual level as true professionals.  
2.6 CONCLUSION 
Not only is licensing financial advisers problematic for Australian policymakers, but for the 
UK and the US too. The overriding collective goal financial services regulation pursues is the 
protection of the public from rogue financial advisers. Licensing plays a vital role in regulating 
and authorising commercially driven financial institutions. From the readings surrounding the 
licensing models of financial advisers in the US, UK and Australia, both similarities and 
significant differences as to how financial advisers are regulated, authorised and supervised 
occurs.  Clearly, the legislative focus for all countries appears to remain on the macro-level 
rather than at the micro-level, at the institutional level rather than the individual level, 
particularly to solve the conflict of interest from association problem. Yet, their approach of 
licensing via multiple third parties is questionable, because the client does not receive financial 
recommendations from the institutional entities. Instead, retail clients trust ‘natural persons’ to 
provide them with recommendations in their best interests.  
Undoubtedly, policymakers have been legislating the attributes of a professional financial 
adviser, such as meeting the fit and proper test, best interest duty, independence, professional 
standards, educational and training standards, as well as ethical standards, when reviewing 
licensing, regulating and authorising individual advisers, neglecting to consider conflict of 
interest from association by licensing advisers through commercially driven third-party 
licensees. Neglected is conflict of interest from association, where the focus has been on 
conflict of interest from remuneration. The main argument advanced in this study is the 
licensing of individual financial advisers via institutions prevents a clear separation between 
the institution and the individual provider of financial advice, leading to potential of conflict of 
interest from association.  
72 
 
Totally ignored as a potential risk for all the Financial Services stakeholders is licensing 
individual financial advisers through conflicted third parties [IAs, BDs, ‘restricted’ advice 
institutions, independent advice institutions and Australian licensees]. Arguably, the current 
licensing model may be inconsistent with the objectives of any legislation aiming to protect the 
retail consumer of financial products and services.  
Despite licensing’s wide acceptance to protect the public from being sold unsuitable financial 
products, this project considers whether it has limited application to regulate and authorised 
individual professional financial advisers through numerous third-party institutions, rather than 
a single professionals board like other true professions. In the last few years, a growing interest 
in individual licensing of financial advisers in Australia by an independent industry 
professional body has emerged. However, unless finding the current licensing model for 
Australian advisers illegitimate, then there is no basis to consider an independent industry 
professional body by Australian policymakers. Therefore, to provide a more evidence-based 
approach for policy makers considering changes to licensing, regulating and authorising 
individual financial advisers, specifically in Australia, the next chapter develops the conceptual 
framework to test with empirical research the extent of the legitimacy of the current AFSL-AR 
licensing model.  
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE 
LEGITIMACY OF THE CURRENT LICENSEE-
ADVISER LICENSING MODEL FOR 
AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL ADVISERS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Against the backdrop of the previous chapter on licensing, regulating and authorising individual 
financial advisers in Australia, the US and the UK; the stage is set for the literature review. The 
intent of this chapter is to embed into the literature review a thematic conceptual gestalt, 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 investigating the legitimacy of the Australian current AFSL-AR 
financial planning licensing model.  
Figure 3.1 Conceptualised theoretical model to examine licensee-adviser licensing 
legitimacy 
Accordingly, the theory is postulated on the grounds of assertions in the secondary sources 
(Beal & McKeown 2009; Evetts 2011; Banister et al. 2013; Taylor, Juchau & Houterman 2013; 
Kingston & Weng 2014) licensing advisers via third-party commercial product-aligned 
licensees, as specified in the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001, creates a dual-agency 
[licensee-adviser-client] role, whereby advisers serve the licensees’ commercial interests and 
their clients’ best interests simultaneously. This licensee-adviser-client role leads to conflicts 
Strengthening arguments for independent professional individual licensing, 
 evident in other professions 
Thus threatening the legitimacy of the current AFSL-AR licensing model 
This manner of licensing is inconsistent with four objectives of the Act 
Licensing advisers via third-party AFS licensees  
creates a dual-agency role, 
 leading to conflict of interest from association 
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of interest, specifically conflicts of interest from association, ownership or affiliation. 
Consequently, the author of this thesis considers this approach inconsistent with four of the 
objectives of the Act. This inconsistency, debatably results in potentially threatening the 
legitimacy of the current licensee-adviser licensing model, when assessed against the criteria 
of Suchman’s (1995) legitimacy theoretical framework extended and applied to financial 
planning theory. If the AFSL-AR licensing model is found illegitimate, then arguments for 
independent individual professional licensing (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations 
and Financial Services 2009b; Sanders & Roberts 2015), like other professions, is strengthened. 
As central argument, a discussion of this normative conceptual model with its theoretical 
underpinnings, illustrated in Figure 3.1, occurs in more detail next. This is done by relying on 
integrating principal-agent theory, the objectives of the Act, legitimacy theory and theory of 
professions into financial planning theory.  
3.2 DUAL AGENCY ROLE OF ADVISERS 
The first part of the model considers agency theory, particularly principal agent theory to 
understand the principles underlying the dual-agency role of individual advisers.  
3.2.1 Agency theory integrated into financial planning theory 
Early literature (Eisenhardt 1989; Leslie 2008) commonly identified an agency relationship 
exists whenever a principal engages an agent to complete their duties to create value for the 
principal. Dawson, Watson and Boudreau (2010) pointed out, agents and their principals hold 
symmetric knowledge, which is an assumption evident in agency theory encouraging them to, 
for instance, engage each other in formalised relationships of trust in the form of written 
contractual agreements. They proposed the difficulties of this assumption were the 
complications created by the reality of information asymmetry and moral hazard.  Furthermore, 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Haigh (2006) drawing on a substantial body of agency theory literature, 
observed the problems of information asymmetry and moral hazard was due to the assumption: 
agents and principals put their personal interests first without regard for others. The information 
asymmetry problem, referred to as problems of adverse selection, operate ex ante where agents 
hide information about the true reality (Haigh 2006). These problems are pre-contractual 
information problems (Bergen, Dutta & Walker Jr 1992). For instance, Steen, McGrath and 
Wong (2016) explained licensees who manufacture and issue products have product knowledge 
superior to their agents’ [advisers] knowledge, who in in turn knows more about the products 
than their clients. According to them, this information asymmetry is evident between product 
75 
 
licensees-advisers-clients in all financial services markets, causing inefficiency in financial 
products or services in terms of prices and quantities. Consequently, they felt this meant clients 
end up with unsuitable financial products. Likewise, problems of moral hazard operate in a 
similar way to adverse selection, but ex post (Haigh 2006). These problems are post-contractual 
(Bergen, Dutta & Walker Jr 1992) concealed action issues (Aras & Crowther 2011) where the 
agents do not deliver what they should deliver. As illustration, representatives of licensees may 
be tempted to overrate the merits and viability of the financial services or products they sell on 
behalf of their licensees (Sandlant 2011). They do so to secure business from clients in order 
to achieve key performance indicators or gain positive recognition from their licensees for 
earning them revenues (Sandlant 2011). Also, clients of financial advisers, Schwarcz (2014) 
wrote, have limited cognitive resources and background knowledge and time to devote to 
understanding complex and ever-changing financial products. In addition, principals spend 
time continually trying to discover the true intentions of their agents, albeit with varying success 
(Bolton, Freixas & Shapiro 2007; Bhattacharya et al. 2012; Carlin & Gervais 2012). 
Thus, the two key agency problems come into play once a principal engages an agent to deliver 
services. The agency problem does not exist when the interests, goals, values, or expectations 
of the principal-agent are congruent (Eisenhardt, 1989). Arthurs and Busenitz (2003), were of 
the view, agency theory is inapplicable when no agency problem exists. This means if there are 
no misaligned interests then no agency costs, such as monitoring costs, bonding and residual 
losses occurs (Balasubramnian, Brisker & Gradisher 2014). Consequently, the greater the gap 
between agents’ and principals’ interest, the greater the agency problem, and hence the agency 
costs (Wasserman 2006; Leslie 2008; Balasubramnian, Brisker & Gradisher 2014). Leslie 
(2008) wrote further in his paper, most agency theory literature stated, the agency problem and 
related costs were undesirable and should be minimised, because it may lead to inefficiency in 
professional relationships. Eisenhardt (1989) and Leslie (2008) explained the solution to this 
principal-agent problem involves encouraging congruency of the principal-agent interests, 
which they argued will not only reduce agency costs, but would also result in increased trust 
and loyalty between them. By inference, restoring trust and confidence between clients and 
advisers is possible.  Heath (2009) asserted the principal-agent theory is about managing how 
the inaptness of the goals between two or more people and institutions resulting in an agency 
problem occurs. For instance, agency costs can be minimised through monitoring (Wasserman 
2006).  
76 
 
When it comes to preventing moral hazard issues with regards to licensing obligations,  
licensees are obligated by law to monitor the agent’s work in accordance with ASIC’s (2007) 
guidelines, standard procedures and compliance agreements with limitations of course. Some 
of these monitoring mechanisms include undertaking annual compliance audits on systems, 
standardised practices and compliant statements of advice documents, making use of metering 
control and overseeing the behaviour and training of agents (Dawson, Watson & Boudreau 
2010) to prevent opportunism. Yet, Dawson, Watson and Boudreau (2010) described 
professional agents’ intellectual and expert knowledge was difficult for any principal to identify 
and monitor effectively. 
 Furthermore, according to Scott (2013,p. 61), agency theory highlights the cost and difficulty 
of monitoring the regulation through third-parties who may not necessarily be neutral. By 
implication, licensees may find it difficult to monitor the advisers’ skills, ethics and abilities 
when employing the services of representatives. Consequently, they cannot guarantee their 
representatives may refrain from unlawful practices, which was the case in a review by ASIC 
of how large institutions oversee their advisers (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2017e). Interestingly,  Carlin and Gervais (2012) established the focus of 
economic agency theory studies was to search for contractual arrangements realigning the 
incentives of agents with those of the principals. Therefore, incentives is another form of 
changing the agent’s behaviour (Wasserman 2006), such as ASIC’s compliance incentives 
(Chalmers & Godfrey 2004) and licensees’ soft dollar incentives (Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2016i, p. 14).  
Also Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) claimed, information asymmetry is a strong reason for 
intervention by government to minimise harmful impact of agency costs. For instance, the 
underlying problem, policymakers tried to solve with the licensing legislation is the information 
asymmetry between retail financial product consumers and product-aligned institutions 
(Slattery & Nellis 2005).  Pearson (2006a) argued information asymmetry is a justification 
licensing is appropriate, because it is a deterrent for unlawful undesirable practices. Therefore, 
this research considers the appropriateness of the type of licensing model, either the current 
AFSL-AR or a new individual professional licensing model to solve the information asymmetry 
problem. Whereas Carlin and Gervais (2012) observed, legal scholars studying agency law 
were more interested in determining who [the principal, agent, or both] is liable, when they 
wronged someone. They claimed the legal fraternity pursued methods to obtain redress for 
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damages done by the principal and/or agent, where it seems policymakers try to prevent 
principals and agents causing damages. Thus, Chapter 7 of the Act serves as intervention to 
protect the Australian public from suffering at the hands of unscrupulous financial advisers 
and/or their AFSL licensees by legislating to encourage congruency of licensee-adviser-client 
goals, values and expectations. In other words, attempts to reduce information asymmetry 
between product-aligned licensees, advisers and their clients has been minimised by licensing 
the appointment, regulation and cessation of individual advisers via third-party licensees.  
More recently, by legislating education and training standards of advisers (Steen, McGrath & 
Wong 2016) via a professional standards, education and ethics standards body81 (O'Dwyer 
2017) is another shot to reduce information asymmetry and moral hazards. Further efforts to 
reduce information asymmetry between advisers and clients, included implementation of 
literacy programs (Steen, McGrath & Wong 2016). Discussed in Chapter 2 amendments to 
specific compliance requirements of the Act and the ASIC Adviser Register are additional 
efforts to deal with moral hazards in the licensee-adviser-client relationship. The limited 
academic attention to principal-agent theory in financial planning is surprising. Zhou (2002) 
claimed the complexity of the mathematical models (see for example, Malcomson 2009) has 
resulted in restricting academic attention of the principal-agent theory to only a few disciplines, 
such as economics and industrial organisation. Just as Bergen, Dutta and Walker Jr (1992) 
reported deficiencies in agency-based research in marketing research, in the same manner 
financial planning research with regards to the principal–agent problem suffers similar 
deficiencies. 
3.2.2 Licensee-adviser-client dual agency relationship 
Rees (1985) contended, most principal-agent models assumed a single principal and a single 
agent, yet usually many principals for a single agent occurs, which essentially leads to 
challenges of reconciling the conflicts of interest among these principals. Consequently, the 
various agency associations in the emerging financial planning profession identified in the 
literature are twofold. Firstly, acknowledged by financial planning scholars (Beal & McKeown 
2009; Banister et al. 2013; Taylor, Juchau & Houterman 2013) in financial planning literature 
nationally and internationally, is the client-adviser (Corones & Galloway 2013) relationship. 
                                                 
81 Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017 <https://www.legislation. 
gov.au/Details/C2017A00007/Download>. 
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Thus, an agency relationship between client [principal] and financial adviser [agent] arises 
(Moutsopoulos 2005; Finke, Huston & Waller 2009a).   
The financial planning theory (Beal & McKeown 2009; Hartnett 2009; Banister et al. 2013; 
Taylor, Juchau & Houterman 2013) described the purpose of financial advisers is to provide 
strategic advice to ensure their clients achieve their financial and lifestyle goals by developing 
a strategic financial plan with recommendations and implementation of appropriate strategies 
to achieve financial health. The financial plan or statement of advice document signed by both 
adviser and client cements the legal agency relationship between them. Notably Boone (2000) 
argued, no widespread single definition of what financial advisers do [or not do] is apparent, 
except follow the six step financial planning process as criteria to define the purpose of financial 
advisers. Surprisingly, no mention is made of advisers providing financial products for this 
purpose, at least not within the definitions evident in the literature. However, in the Act, quite 
clearly authorised representatives recommend financial products and services to their clients 
on behalf of licensees. Whereas the financial planning literature emphasises the adviser-client 
agency relationship, while neglecting the licensee-adviser relationship. Intriguing, the client is 
defined in Section 761G as the person receiving the financial product advice. It is reasoned 
from the definitions in the literature (Beal & McKeown 2009; Hartnett 2010; Arman & 
Shackman 2012; Taylor, Juchau & Houterman 2013), the adviser should be client-focused 
when providing advice rather than product-focused. Hence, product does not feature in the 
definitions presented in scholarly financial planning literature. This contrasts with the 
definitions of financial adviser in the Act, where the legislation focuses on product advice 
definitions. Furthermore, no suggestion is evident the adviser works on behalf of the client in 
the relevant sections of the Act.  However, Sitkoff (2014) asserted the fiduciary obligation 
implies the adviser operates as an agent for the client.   
Secondly, leading from the foregoing statements, the Act, rather than scholarly literature, 
embeds the second competing agency relationship. The emphasis in the Act is more the 
licensee-adviser agency relationship, neglecting the adviser-client relationship. This is the 
relationship between licensee [the principal] and authorised representative [the agent or 
financial adviser] specified in Chapter 7 (Moran 2014). Expressed in s911B of the legislation 
“a person [the provider] must only provide a financial service in this jurisdiction on behalf of 
another person (the principal) who carries on a financial services business if ... the principal 
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holds an Australian financial services licence covering the provisions of the service ...”82. 
Evident from the legislation, an advisers’ occupational contractual duty to their licensees as 
authorised representatives, which is specified in s916A and s916B is “to provide a specified 
financial service or financial services on behalf of the licensee”83 (Tuch 2005; Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission 2012a).  Section 761A of the Act defines the financial 
adviser as the agent providing the services on behalf of the licensee (Den-Toll 2001). For 
example, in practice apparently insurance authorised representatives are agents for the licensees 
(Clayton Utz Financial Services Reform Group 2002). Found in the writings of Beal and 
McKeown (2009) the purpose of licensees is to provide financial products, comply with the 
Act, and as specified in s912 of the Act - screen, appoint, monitor, train and supervise  ARs for 
ASIC. On reflection, the literature review revealed neglect of the licensee-adviser relationship 
in the literature and neglect of the adviser-client relationship in the Act. Identified are some 
inconsistencies between the financial planning literatures’ understanding and the legislated 
interpretations of the licensee-adviser-client relationship. Thus, this thesis explores this issue 
further, by establishing how advisers view their licensee and client relationship in practice. 
Facciolo (2011) and others (Smith & Walter 2001; Gor 2005; Hackethal, Haliassos & Jappelli 
2012) found advisers have played a dual role as distributors of financial products for product 
providers and as advisers to the ultimate purchasers of these products. From agency theory 
perspectives, financial advisers serve at least two principals, the licensee and the client, 
simultaneously (Kingston & Weng 2014, p. 294) when complying with the Act. Kingston and 
Weng (2014, p. 294) argued, “an agent should not try to serve two principals simultaneously – 
they create the possibility of a conflict of interest between adviser and client.” As mentioned 
earlier, specifically examined here is the academic neglect of conflict of interest from 
association. Conflict of interest from association for purposes of this study is defined as the 
conflicts arising when the licensee is either directly or indirectly affiliated to financial product 
issuers, retail superannuation or aligned platforms. These include but are not limited to: 
financial product issuers [for example, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, National Australian 
Bank, Westpac and AMP aligned groups]; retail superannuation [Westpac’s BT Super 
(Westpac), National Australian Bank’s MLC, Commonwealth Bank’s Colonial First State 
and ANZ Bank’s OnePath]; aligned platforms [Westpac’s BT Wrap, Macquarie Wrap, 
Commonwealth Bank’s Colonial First State FirstChoice Wrap and AMP’s North® Wrap]. Thus, 
                                                 
82 Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001, page 186 <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017C00312>. 
83 Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001, page 206 <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017C00312>. 
80 
 
if the corporates whose main business is funds management can control financial advisers, then 
conflicts are evident (Sampson 2010).  
When products are sold through institutions’ distribution channels - as in the case of many retail 
banks, financial product issuers, superannuation funds and/or platforms - or whether sales or 
advice is reliant on third parties - as is often the case with insurance institutions; a trilateral 
agency problem arises between the client, the agent and the product providers (Inderst 2009). 
From the previous chapter evidently, not only do Australian regulators face this trilateral 
dilemma or a trilateral agency problem (Inderst & Ottaviani 2009, p. 885) as a result of a 
trilateral arrangement (Carlin & Gervais 2012, p. 69) between licensee, adviser and client. 
Inderst (2009) confirmed UK regulators also face policy decisions around the relationship 
between product providers-advisers-clients. In their paper, Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) focused 
on mis-selling in a mathematical model to highlight the internal agency problem between a 
financial institution and their agents. They claimed the risk of mis-selling is severe and 
complicated when an adviser faces a dual-agency role of canvassing for clients while also 
providing advice to clients to commit to a product. In a later paper, Inderst and Ottaviani 
(2012b) also demonstrated mathematically a conflict with the duty of supplying unbiased 
advice arises. This situation they found occurred when, instead of a single role of getting to 
know a customer’s personal circumstances and providing recommendations to clients, an 
adviser is faced with searching for clients, learning new products, and then finally 
recommending and providing product recommendations on behalf of the product providers 
(Inderst 2009). As a solution, Inderst and Ottaviani (2012b) recommended a dual-agency role 
with a trilateral agency problem required more stringent regulation than a single agency role 
would need.  
From the above discussion, apparently agency theory, models and propositions found in 
textbooks of financial planning or personal finance in Australia (for example, Beal & 
McKeown 2009; Banister et al. 2013) were mainly incorporated into the client-adviser 
(Corones & Galloway 2013) relationship and neglecting mentioning the legislated licensee-
adviser relationship, both conceptually and empirically. Contended in this study the agency 
relationship is not only a client-adviser (Corones & Galloway 2013) relationship, but also 
licensee-adviser relationship. Combined they form the trilateral (Inderst & Ottaviani 2009) 
licensee-adviser-client relationship, resulting in a dual-agency role for advisers. No hard-
empirical evidence in scholarly literature about the dual-agency role leading to a trilateral 
agency problem is available, which is investigated as a conflict of interest (Kingston & Weng 
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2014) from association. Therefore, to address this gap, this study aims to establish if individual 
authorised representatives perceive a dual-agency role, where they serve the interests of both 
their licensees and clients simultaneously, leading to conflicts of interest, when subject to 
compliance with Chapter 7 of the Act.  
3.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 [CWTH] 
Given Carlin and Gervais (2012) claimed two forces are at work between institutions 
[principals] and their agents [advisers], namely the contracts agreed between them, together 
with the legal environment imposed by the government, including the objectives of the Act. 
According to Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2012) the financial regulation policy debate 
and theoretical work centring around harmful adviser behaviours and conflicts of interest 
damages public trust. Recall from Chapter 2, similar to the regulators of the United States 
(Financial Planning Coalition 2014) and the United Kingdom (Inderst & Ottaviani 2012e), the 
main aim for ASIC is to protect retail financial consumers and to improve public trust and 
confidence in financial advisers (Australian Government The Treasury 2016). Underlying this 
main aim are four important objectives of the Act pertinent to this study. They include: 1) 
managing, controlling or avoiding conflicts of interest, 2) ensuring statutory fiduciary duty are 
implemented, 3) aligning the adviser’s interests with the client’s best interest, as well as 4) 
encouraging competitive behaviour between financial service providers (Bora & Lewis 1997; 
Corbett 1999; Mutton 2001; Collier 2003; Serpell 2008; Jones 2009; Alexander 2011; Ap 2011; 
Ireland & Gray 2011; Kell 2012). Conceptually, the argument suggest here the legitimacy of 
the AFSL-AR licensing model needs evaluation in terms of these four objectives to safeguard 
the integrity of professionalising the emerging financial planning profession, while ensuring 
the effective protection of retail financial consumers. 
3.3.1 Conflicts of interest 
Researchers have studied conflicts of interest extensively for decades with published articles 
prolific in the literature (See inter alia Vessenes 1997; Bearden 2002; Tuch 2005; Bolton, 
Freixas & Shapiro 2007; Palazzo & Rethel 2008; Felsenthal & Guttenberg 2009; Bird 2011; 
Loewenstein, Cain & Sah 2011; Inderst & Ottaviani 2012b; Angel & McCabe 2013; Burke et 
al. 2015; Calcagno & Monticone 2015). With regards to the first objective, managing, 
controlling or avoiding conflicts of interest is not only a difficulty for financial advisers, but 
also for other professionals in medicine, accounting and law (Bruce 2012; Burke et al. 2015). 
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Subsection 912A[1][a] [aa] of the Act states “adequate arrangements” should be put in place 
to manage, control or avoid any conflicts of interest “in relation to activities undertaken by the 
licensees or their representatives when providing financial advice” (Zammit 2004, p. 20; Tuch 
2005). Licensees and their representatives are obligated to manage (Tuch 2005) actual, apparent 
or potential (Pearson 2006b) conflicts of interest where the interests of clients diverge from the  
interests of the licensee or its representatives.  
Surprisingly, the government of the Commonwealth of Australia (2014a) conceded, although 
conflicts of interest are morally wrong, they are legally permitted as long as they are disclosed 
and clients consent to them. However, in accordance with ASIC’s Regulatory Guide 18184, it 
is insufficient to just disclose conflicts and obtain consent. Johnston (2014) claimed since 2005, 
post-FSR, it was no longer necessary for advisers from mostly vertically integrated 
institutionally aligned/owned licensees (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
2016i) to disclose on all marketing material their licensee’s institutional logos. They argued, 
with no reference the licensees of the many advisers, consumers were unable to recognise 
whom they were engaging. Consequently, clients were ending up with ‘in-house-products’ 
without realising it (Morris 2013; Johnston 2014; Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2017c). Thus, these different interpretations of disclosure rules are confusing. 
Journalist Vickovich (2014a) recommended additional amendments to the legislation should 
include full disclosure of licensee ownership on all marketing material as was the case pre-
FSR. ASIC. In addition, government commentators have conceded, significant room is 
inevitable for improvement concerning inadequate disclosures to retail clients (Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission 2013a, 2014c; Sinodinos 2014; Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission 2016i).  
Apparent during the literature review among the many other types of conflicts was the primary 
focus on specifically conflict of interest from remuneration. This inherent specific conflict has 
been the focus of many non-scholarly and scholarly authors (see, for example, Bailey 2000; 
Palazzo & Rethel 2008; Beal & McKeown 2009; Inderst & Ottaviani 2012d; Walton 2012; 
Banister et al. 2013; Kingston & Weng 2014). In addition, legislators in the US, UK and 
Australia have given remuneration much attention (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2003; Collier 2003; Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2012c; 
                                                 
84 Regulatory guide 181. Licensing: Managing conflicts of interest. Chapter 7 - Financial services and markets 
outlines the ASIC’s approach to how conflicts should be controlled, avoided and disclosed 
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Inderst & Ottaviani 2012c, 2012e). Burke et al. (2015) confirmed, after reviewing and 
summarising their empirical research, conflicts were prevalent and affected the behaviour of 
financial advisers when remuneration schemes existed. Undoubtedly, to date conflicted 
remuneration is still the main reason cited for the loss of confidence by the public in financial 
advisers (Batten & Pearson 2013; Steen, McGrath & Wong 2016).  
Thus, support for the banning of commissions [s961J of the Act]  to eliminate this conflict of 
interest (Julian 2009) led to some of the FOFA legislative reforms discussed in Chapter 2. 
However, Inderst (2009),  as well as Bateman and Kingston (2014) highlighted the unintended 
consequences of banning commissions. They concluded banning commissions has made the 
financial service uneconomic for people of humble means who seek advice. It also lowered 
social efficiency. Interestingly, Sinodinos (2013c) acknowledged, eliminating commissions has 
been proved problematic in the United Kingdom. Specifically advice has become unaffordable 
for many in the UK, making advice accessible to mainly high income investors (Financial 
Conduct Authority 2016a). On the plus side, independent research undertaken by Europe 
Economics (Financial Conduct Authority 2014b, 2014c) found in the UK, post-RDR 
implementation, after banning commissions, a decline in high commission paying product sales 
and product prices occurred. UK policymakers are presently in the process of working on 
solutions to address affordability, accessibility and quality of advice (Financial Conduct 
Authority 2017b). 
Interestingly, the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services (2009b) found the conflicts between advisers and their clients arose not only from 
commission remuneration practices, but also from ownership, affiliations or association 
structures between particularly conflicted licensees and their ARs who distribute product.  Also 
conflict of interest from association has received some comment in the media (Brown 2007; 
Beaman 2010a; Vickovich & Stewart 2014), those in favour independence (Brammall 2012) 
and government commentators (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services 2009b; Sinodinos 2013a, 2013c, 2014) and in trade publications (Kennedy, McCoy & 
Bernstein 2012; Pokrajac 2014). Evidence during this literature review, among them presented 
by Valentine (2008), demonstrated scholars and legislators have tended to ignore this issue of 
conflicts from association, resulting in a deficiency in scholarly research and literature about 
this matter. This is surprising, given numerous unconfirmed approximations estimated 80 per 
cent to 85 per cent (Bearden 2002; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services 2009b; Kingston & Weng 2011, 2014; Steen, McGrath & Wong 2016) of 
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financial advisers are sponsored by product issuers to allegedly act as their product distribution 
pipeline (Starke 2013a). Therefore, this thesis addresses Valentine’s (2008) view,  the corporate 
scandals within the financial planning sector emphasised the need to place conflict of interest 
from association at the forefront of further research. Especially if Perkins and Monahan (2011) 
are correct when they claim a primary responsibility of a professional adviser is to avoid 
conflicts with that of the client. Important to note: from an Australian Government 
commentator’s perspective (Sinodinos 2013c, 2013a) expressed at several conferences, the 
political agenda is about eliminating conflicts of interest within financial planning.  
3.3.2 Best interest duty 
Since FOFA reforms were designed to tackle conflicts of interest (Alexander 2011), it also 
included amending the Act to introduce an explicit statutory fiduciary duty obligation (Ireland 
& Gray 2011).  Arguable from the Government and ASIC’s perspective, FOFA addressed 
conflicts of interest by introducing the principle of putting the priorities of clients first 
(Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2013a, 2014c; Sinodinos 2014). This 
fiduciary duty, defined in s961A of the Corporations Act, is a key obligation of Australian 
licensees and their representatives (Banister et al. 2013).  The Australian regulator makes it 
clear in their Future of Financial Advice: Best interests duty and related obligations: 
Regulation Impact Statement (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2012a) as to 
who, when and how a fiduciary owes another a best interest duty. A critical aspect of financial 
advice is the professional obligations and duties of the Australian financial adviser to put the 
interest of their clients first or above their own [and/or the licensee’s] interest when providing 
financial advice or services. This duty includes ‘safe harbour’ requirements set out in s961B[2] 
(Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2013a).  
For Tuch (2005, p. 38), an inconsistency between the regulations of managing, controlling or 
avoiding conflicts of interest and the statutory obligations is occurring. In this regard, 
considering his views, despite statutory fiduciary duty obligations, retail clients may still 
receive personal advice persuading them to purchase unsuitable products of unacceptable 
quality, because of conflicts of interest. Moreover fiduciary duty is also influenced by advisers’ 
occupational contractual duty to their licensees as authorised representatives [s916A or 916B 
of the legislation] (Tuch 2005; Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2012a), 
while simultaneously they are legally obligated to serve the best interests of their clients. 
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Conceivably, fiduciary duty is of relevance in this study, because advisers’ statutory fiduciary 
duty to their Australian clients influences conflicted association, vice versa.  
Most of the international and national literature emphasises the various legal interpretations of 
fiduciary duty in terms of case law formulated through the courts, common law of agency and 
from a corporate perspective under corporation legislation, such as the Act85 (Tuch 2005; 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016h). Although, Tuch (2005) claimed the 
courts uphold the view that commercial banks owe a fiduciary duty to their customers when 
providing product advice, he claimed this best interest duty is unnecessary in the following 
cases. Namely, when banks provide general financial advice on a sales transaction or where the 
retail clients did not rely on the bank’s advice to transact, nor expect the transaction may not 
be in their best interest. A legal case during this project highlighted the interpretation and 
application of the fiduciary duty in this way may be problematic. On 22 December 2016, ASIC 
commenced civil penalty proceedings against Westpac Securities Administration Limited and 
BT Funds Management Limited in the Australian Federal Court for failing to comply with the 
best interest duty (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016c). Westpac 
allegedly claimed to deliver general advice [telephonically], which ASIC argued was personal 
advice (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016c). At the time of writing, the 
matter has yet unsettled in court.  
Furthermore, Batten and Pearson (2013) argued, the best interest duty standard as defined in 
the Act, does not refer to the outcome of the advice, rather it refers to a process of automatic 
compliance. They claimed with outcomes likely to fail a common law test of financial adviser 
duty of care, the definition of conflicts of interest in the legislation is non-existent and the 
examples provided in the Explanatory Memorandum are insufficient to comply with the 
common law best interest duty. They further explained the licensee seemingly has the 
requirement to manage conflicts of interest, whereas the individual financial advice provider 
has the requirement to act in the client’s best interests. He finds this tricky, because the best 
interest requirement only occurs if the adviser is aware or should be aware of any conflicts. It 
is important to note, currently almost two-thirds of investors do not believe advice providers 
act in their best interests (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2013a).  
In this study, academic attention shifts from legal interpretations, to assess instead whether the 
objectives of the Act of protecting the client by placing their interest first is being achieved 
                                                 
85 Regulatory guide 181. Licensing: Managing conflicts of interest. Chapter 7 - Financial services and markets. 
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when advisers are legally licensed via third parties who are often conflicted by product or 
revenue.  
3.3.3 Licensee-adviser-client interest alignment 
To some extent, scholarly literature discussed alignment of institution-adviser interests 
(Bewley et al. 2008; Aschkenasy 2009) with client interests (Black 2005; Nyberg et al. 2010; 
Finke & Langdon 2012; Inderst & Ottaviani 2012d; Knutsen & Cameron 2012; Mazzola 2013; 
Starke 2013b). Also a recent Review on Retail Life Insurance Advice (Trowbridge 2015)  
indicated a problem of misaligned interests, especially in terms of remuneration models 
between licensees and insurers, and licensees and advisers. This misalignment is allegedly 
impacting the quality of advice negatively and contributing to the underinsurance in Australia 
(Trowbridge 2015). Yet, Goedecke (2001) claimed Australian banks and financial planning 
practices acknowledge investment and risk insurance products are often nonaligned to the 
client’s best interests. Moreover, many articles (see for example, Black 2005; Bowen 2010; 
Johnsen 2010; Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2012a; Inderst & Ottaviani 
2012d; Kell 2012; Kingsford Smith 2012) focused on remuneration practices and incentives or 
lack of educational and ethical standards as reasons why mis-selling has led to adviser-clients’ 
interests to be nonaligned. In their report, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations 
and Financial Services (2009b) acknowledged, both remuneration practices and ownership 
structures serve as the reasons for the incongruence of interests between adviser-client.  
Although much has been written about remuneration practices discussed earlier in this chapter, 
conceptually and empirically theorists have neglected the impact institutional financial 
advisory ownership structures may have had on aligning advisers’ interests with those of their 
client. This is surprising, when aligning the interests of advisers to those of their clients more 
closely [specified in Schedule 1, item 13, division 2, and section 961K of the Act] is also one 
of the broader FOFA objectives. Notably, the Australian Financial Systems Inquiry’s 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2014a) singled out aligning financial institutions, presumably 
licensees and consumers’ interests, rather than individual financial advisers’ and their clients’ 
interests. Perhaps it is so because; the legislation about licensing, regulating and authorising 
individual advisers is at the corporate commercial institutional licensee level, rather than at the 
individual professional adviser level. Recall from the discussion above, if no misaligned 
interests are present, then no agency costs, such as monitoring costs, bonding and residual 
losses are present (Balasubramnian, Brisker & Gradisher 2014). However, the broader the gap 
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between the interests of agents’ and principals’, the more the agency costs (Wasserman 2006; 
Leslie 2008; Balasubramnian, Brisker & Gradisher 2014).  Furthermore, with an additional 
agency relationship between licensees and advisers, an actual and/or potential incongruence 
between the interests of the authorised representatives and their licensees may exist. This 
potentially leads to incongruence between the interests of advisers and their clients. Starke 
(2013b) drew attention to the fact that congruency between the interests of clients and 
individual professional advisers is essential to any profession. Thus, he claimed alignment of 
licensee-adviser-client interests should be an important part of any regulatory reforms. 
Therefore, this thesis addresses the lack of scholarly attention to aligning the interests of 
Australian financial advisers with their retail clients within the framework of the licensee-
adviser licensing model. 
3.3.4 Competitive financial advisory environment 
The initial philosophy of FSR regulation was “free and competitive markets can produce an 
efficient allocation of resources and provide a strong foundation for economic growth and 
development” (Pearson 2006b, p. 103). Viable competition between financial services 
providers, according to Inderst and Ottaviani (2009), generally ensures protection for all 
consumers of financial products. They maintained further when faced with intense competition 
for retail customers, financial services sales force [advisers], while complying with specified 
standards, and require more incentives from their institutions. They argued convincingly using 
mathematics; these additional incentives make the regulation so costly for their institutions and 
advisers, and the opportunity to mis-sell financial products becomes increasingly attractive.  
Evident in practice, product-aligned licensees and dealer groups enter vertically integrated or 
franchise type business models to improve their product distribution channels (Christie 2015). 
It is argued by Starke (2013b) this is resulting in anti-competitive consequences between 
various financial services providers within the financial planning sector. This anti-competitive 
behaviour was confirmed during the Murray (Commonwealth of Australia 2014a) and ASIC 
(Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016i) review when they considered the 
increasingly high concentration of vertical integration in financial services. A consequence of 
the licensing provisions and regulatory framework they conceded potentially limits 
competition, contributes to conflicts of interest, lowers investor confidence and imposes 
barriers to the entry and growth for new entrants with business models ill fitting within the 
existing regulatory frameworks. Moreover, financial services in Australia are considered by 
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Steen, McGrath and Wong (2016) as less competitive than the US markets due to the highly 
concentrated and vertically integrated financial services sector. Furthermore, to build on the 
brief investigations conducted by for example, Simes, Harper and Green (2008), Bhati (2009), 
Milne (2007), Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (2009b) 
and others (Commonwealth of Australia 2014a), this issue  is addressed within the context of 
licensee-adviser licensing model.  
3.4 LEGITIMACY INTEGRATED INTO FINANCIAL PLANNING 
THEORY 
According to Kury (2007) legitimacy is complementary to agency theory. Thus when 
considering the legitimacy of an entity, attention should be given to agency (Clegg 2010) 
theory. Moreover, Bender (2011) claimed legitimacy is threatened by conflicts of interest. 
Therefore, if licensing advisers via third-party licensees creates a dual-agency role leading to 
conflict of interest from association for advisers, and if this conflict is inconsistent with the four 
objectives of the Act, then the legitimacy of the current licensee-adviser model is threatened. 
This threat to legitimacy is normatively assessed and verified in the next section of the 
discussion using criteria from the legitimacy framework of Suchman (1995) integrated into 
financial planning theory.  
3.4.1 Overview of legitimacy theory 
Researchers’ Díez-Martín, Prado-Roman and Blanco-González (2013), substantiated in their 
paper, secondary sources provide extensive studies in legitimacy theory since the middle of the 
1990s. Empirical work in legitimacy theory internationally focused on organisational theory 
(Ellis 2006; Golant & Sillince 2007; Díez-Martín, Prado-Roman & Blanco-González 2013), 
management theory (Bitektine 2011), economic theory and political science (Gualini 2004; 
Ellis 2006). Some studies in legitimacy studies centred on specific industry fields, such as 
mining (Pellegrino & Lodhia 2012), telecommunications (Low 2010) and healthcare (Sonpar, 
Pazzaglia & Kornijenko 2010). Others focused research attention on specific professions, for 
example the accounting profession (Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings 2002; Tilling 2004b; 
Fisher, Swanson & Schmidt 2007; Kury 2007; Andon, Free & Sivabalan 2014). Yet researchers 
in business schools in Australia neglected the topic of legitimacy within the context of financial 
planning theory.  
89 
 
As with any developing theory, Tilling (2004b) acknowledged in his paper, defining, 
understanding and suitably applying legitimacy is challenging. A challenge this research takes 
on. Accordingly, the most cited definition of legitimacy given by Suchman (1995, p. 574) 
stated: 
“Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions.” 
Suchman’s (1995) theoretical definition of legitimacy was understood by Bitektine (2011) and 
Pellegrino and Lodhia (2012) as the perceptions, beliefs, values and judgements by various 
actors about the social acceptability of the goals, which entities pursue.  However, according 
to Tilling (2004b), although legitimacy has concrete outcomes, it is an abstract concept based 
on the biased perceptions of the actors. As Suchman (1995, p. 583) stated, “legitimacy is 
possessed objectively, yet created subjectively.” Santana (2012) reaffirmed this statement in a 
later paper. Furthermore, a “socially constructed system” (Suchman 1995, p. 574), found within 
the definition, refers to the institutional frameworks, which consists of, for example, legal, 
moral or cognitive elements (Scott 2013). For purposes of this investigation, it is inferred the 
Act is the “socially constructed system” (Suchman 1995, p. 574), which arguably qualifies the 
current AFSL-AR licensing model, while simultaneously endorsing conflict of interest from 
association.  
Hence, the rules and the requirements of the Act influences the perceptions, beliefs and 
considerations of the institutional constituents, including the public, government, the 
regulators, professional associations, media, licensees and the authorised representatives. Thus, 
according to Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) and de Queiroz, de Vasconcelos and Goldszmidt 
(2007) legitimacy as a valuable resource for an institution. To the contrary Scott (2013, p. 72) 
reasoned “it is not a specific resource, but a fundamental condition of social existence.” 
Whether legitimacy is a “resource” Scott (2013, p. 72)  or “condition of social existence” Scott 
(2013, p. 72), this study drew on Kury’s (2007) conviction that perception is the element, which  
determines through judgement the entity’s standing, survival and activities. Therefore, the 
legitimacy of the current licensing model, is an intangible (Bender 2011), dynamic,  general 
societal perception (Santana 2012) or “assumption, that the actions of” (Suchman 1995, p. 574) 
licensing advisers through third-party, often commercially oriented product-conflicted 
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licensees, as specified presently in the Act “are desirable, proper, or appropriate” (Suchman 
1995, p. 574). This perception should rise above the adverse financial scandals (Kury 2007).  
Noteworthy, legitimacy affects not only how the actors understand, but also how they behave 
towards (de Queiroz, de Vasconcelos & Goldszmidt 2007) the licensee-adviser licensing 
model. Perceptions reflects the expectations of congruence (Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002) 
between the behaviours and beliefs (Santana 2012) of the licensee, adviser and the shared, or 
assumedly shared, interests of their clients. According to Chen and Roberts (2010), with the 
purpose to create social order. Although  Ellis (2006) argued, the legitimacy judged from 
outside audiences matters, it is contended by other scholars (see for example, Bitektine 2011; 
Rocha & Granerud 2011; Cole & Salimath 2013), so is judgements by inside audiences. 
Therefore, this research aims to obtain supportive evidence to investigate whether the current 
AFSL-AR licensing model for individual financial advisers is seen as socially legitimate as 
perceived and judged by the internal actors (Bitektine 2011), namely the authorised 
representatives registered on the ASIC Adviser Register.   
Surprisingly, during the literature review, it became evident that legitimacy theory, including 
the broad societal-level definition of legitimacy itself does not provide the means as to how 
legitimacy achieves social expectations, social support or congruency. However, it hints at 
certain actions and events either increases or decreases legitimacy (Chua & Rahman 2011). As 
illustration, the scandals creating distrust among clients, advisers facing conflicts of interest, 
fiduciary duty obligations, misaligned interests between adviser and client and anti-competitive 
behaviour either intensifies or diminishes the legitimacy of the AFSL-AR licensing model.  
The literature on legitimacy theory is indeed fragmented (Sonpar, Pazzaglia & Kornijenko 
2010). Hence, legitimacy experts (Suchman 1995; Kury 2007; Chen & Roberts 2010) felt the 
division of legitimacy into institutional, or social legitimacy and organisational, or strategic, 
legitimacy was necessary, because then researchers have a practical and empirical means of 
examining legitimacy. Institutional [social] legitimacy asserts that external institutional 
pressures will be sufficient to achieve (Soin & Huber 2013) or to maintain legitimacy (Chelli, 
Durocher & Richard 2014). Looking at the roles of ASIC, licensees and their authorised 
representatives, the Act, although enforced by ASIC and their licensees, is present externally. 
In other words, it influences the internal authorised representatives from externally.  In their 
paper, Wenzel and Jobling (2006) argued legitimacy is gained or lost depending on the level 
and consistency of the power used by the enforcers. Therefore, to achieve or maintain 
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legitimacy requires licensees and their authorised representatives to consistently conform to the 
legislation and ASIC’s compliance rules. A key legitimation strategy is to keep the entity and 
legal surroundings closely aligned (Suchman 1995, p. 595; Chelli, Durocher & Richard 2014).  
Furthermore, institutional legitimacy investigates what and which institutional structures [for 
example for purposes of this study aligned or independent licensee business models], activities 
[stakeholder maximisation, shareholder wealth maximisation, aligning the interests of clients 
and advisers, managing conflicts of interest, competitive behaviour and fiduciary duty 
obligations] and procedures [licensing compliance sales procedures] are legitimate. Utilise 
these as the variables to evaluate legitimacy (Chen & Roberts 2010). 
Sonpar, Pazzaglia and Kornijenko (2010) alleged, the institutional approach, although 
generally appealing, has been criticised in various studies. For instance, he mentioned a 
shortcoming, namely it downplays how different institutional powers may put pressure on 
entities to prioritise different sets of values. To further exemplify this criticism by Sonpar, 
Pazzaglia and Kornijenko (2010) within the context of this investigation the following issue is 
apparent. Who, should appoint, train, monitor and supervise individual financial advisers? Is it 
ASIC, licensees, an independent industry professional standards board or advisers themselves? 
How should financial advisers be appointed, trained, monitored and supervised? Should it be 
the current licensee-adviser licensing model or a new alternative licensing model? Finally, why 
should individual financial advisers be licensed in this manner? Is it to achieve the objectives 
of the Act? Furthermore, they reiterate that this view of legitimacy neglects the fact that 
legitimacy is temporary and dynamic in nature. In contrast to the institutional [social] view of 
legitimacy, Suchman’s (1995) strategic [organisational] perspective placed legitimacy under 
the control of the internal actors of the institution, instead of operating at the ‘macro-level’ as 
Tilling (2004b) expressed for the case of institutional legitimacy.  
Thus, strategic legitimacy operates at the ‘micro-level’ of legitimacy. Thus, legitimacy is 
malleable like an operational resource or tool to meet the desires of the internal actors according 
to Suchman (1995, p. 576) to give them credibility (Kury 2007) and to gather societal support 
(Durocher, Fortin & Côté 2007). Kury (2007) maintained this legitimacy is actively sought and 
developed from the inside, rather than always simply received from outside. Consequently, 
institutions develop strategies affecting the external surroundings to achieve legitimacy. For 
instance, licensees may develop specific internal policies, procedures and practices to meet the 
compliance requirements of the legislation, while concurrently achieving their business goals. 
Legitimacy thus becomes an internal instrument or resource (Tilling 2004b) for licensees to 
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give integrity to their actions and those of their ARs. From Santana’s (2012) perspective entities 
self-construct through the actors’ perceptions. For instance, the self-construction of the current 
AFSL-AR licensing system by the internal actors determines its legitimacy.  
In contrast to the institutional view of legitimacy, strategic legitimacy acknowledged, 
legitimacy is temporary and dynamic (Sonpar, Pazzaglia & Kornijenko 2010), Thus, it requires 
renegotiation periodically. According to Chelli, Durocher and Richard (2014), both the 
institutional and strategic legitimation cannot happen together.  These two views of legitimacy 
assists with understanding how congruency is reached, the legitimacy gap closed (Pellegrino 
& Lodhia 2012) or how it is justified (Chen & Roberts 2010). Chelli, Durocher and Richard 
(2014) also wrote in their paper, when doing research in legitimacy, researchers should clearly 
determine whether institutional [or social] legitimacy and/or organisational [or strategic] 
legitimacy is of relevance in their research. Therefore, this thesis considers both divisions to 
understand the legitimacy of the current licensing model, because based on observations of 
Kostova and Zaheer (1999), legitimacy affects an entity [like the licensing model] from 
externally and internally. Licensing advisers via third parties is enforced from outside by ASIC 
while simultaneously influencing the perceptions and assumptions of the internal actors 
[advisers] from the inside through compliance. Bitektine (2011) maintained most research 
contributes to legitimacy theory from various evaluators’ outlooks on legitimacy, whether for 
purposes of this study they are the regulators, media, public, investors, advocacy groups and/or 
insiders. Consequently, this research tests the social judgements of financial advisers [insiders] 
in terms of whether the licensee-adviser licensing model [the entity under investigation] 
successfully achieves the objectives of the Act from an institutional legitimacy perspective and 
a strategic legitimacy perspective. 
Legitimation is the process by which an institution builds, maintains or retains legitimacy 
(Díez-Martín, Prado-Roman & Blanco-González 2013) by continuously testing and redefining 
the entity operating within its surroundings (Kostova & Zaheer 1999). Significantly, Suchman 
(1995) reasoned, legitimation is purposeful, calculating, and often oppositional. Regulation, as 
viewed by Yeung (2009); and Santana (2012) is an attempt at legitimation to achieve the status 
of legitimacy. Therefore, the study surmises, the “tool of legitimation”, as defined by Chen and 
Roberts (2010, p. 654), is the current AFSL-AR licensing model.  
Following the approach by Riaz, Buchanan and Bapuji (2011), this investigation framed the 
discussion further, into institutional fields. Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings (2002) defined 
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institutional field as the social structure comprising collections of institutions, which are related 
in some way, and/or collectively organise to form a part of institutional life. Here the emerging 
financial planning profession’s institutional field is defined as the financial advisory sector 
operating within the financial services sector. 
Central to the field are the sources of legitimacy (Díez-Martín, Prado-Roman & Blanco-
González 2013). They include all the internal and external social actors (Chalmers & Godfrey 
2004) who will all judge the licensee-adviser licensing model and confer legitimacy if observed 
and assessed valuable (Suchman 1995). Thus, the sources of legitimacy comprise 
policymakers, regulators, professional associations, licensees, authorised representatives, 
clients [or the public] and the media, which all confer legitimacy differently on the current 
licensing model. Institutional logics are the symbolic constructions used by these social actors 
to evaluate legitimacy (Bitektine 2011) within the institutional field (Soin & Huber 2013).   
Using appropriate norms and logics is important when assessing legitimacy (Bitektine 2011), 
because Kury (2007) found logics to be both enduring and dynamic. Therefore, to evaluate the 
current AFSL-AR licensing model’s legitimacy, here conflicts of interest, financial adviser’s 
fiduciary duty obligations, aligned interests between adviser and client, and competitive 
behaviour between financial services providers, criteria of Suchman’s legitimacy model to 
assess legitimacy and the factors affecting the dual-agency role of advisers are some of the 
institutional logics specifically relevant in this thesis. Financial advisers, the internal actors, 
utilise these logics to guide them as to how effectively they operate within the rules of the 
current licensing model.  Lounsbury (2007, p. 2), Herremans, Herschovis and Bertels (2009) 
plus Soin and Huber (2013) highlighted the influence of the coexistence of competing logics 
on legitimacy in their research. Thus, a major concern for this enquiry is the influence of the 
coexistence of these competing logics, such as for example, between statutory fiduciary duty, 
commercial interests and conflict of interest from association.  
3.4.2 Suchman’s legitimacy theoretical framework extended and applied  
Chua and Rahman (2011) pointed out; the basis of legitimacy is the concept of ‘social contract’. 
‘Social contract’ is derived from political economic theory (Pellegrino & Lodhia 2012). It is 
central to legitimacy theory (Chelli, Durocher & Richard 2014), because it exemplifies the 
unspoken and obvious perceptions or expectations of society regarding how an entity is 
expected to be (Pellegrino & Lodhia 2012). Whether, or not the current licensing model is 
“desirable, proper, or appropriate” as Suchman (1995, p. 574) viewed it, depends upon the 
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perceptions, of the relevant social audience of actors shown in Table 3.1 of a breach of the 
social contract, in addition to how they influence three forms of legitimacy. 
Table 3.1 Institutional actors within financial planning adapted from the taxonomy of 
Kury (2007) 
Pragmatic [Regulative] 
Legitimacy 
Normative [Moral] 
Legitimacy 
Cultural-cognitive 
Legitimacy 
 
Institutional actors 
 who regulate the licensing of 
financial advisers 
 
Institutional actors 
 who offer normative or a 
professional platform for 
financial advisers  
 
Institutional actors who  
have a shared 
understanding of the 
current licensing model 
 
 Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission  
 
 Financial Adviser 
Standards and Ethics 
Authority 
 Financial planning 
associations such as 
the Financial 
Planning Association 
and Australian 
Financial Advisers 
Association, etc.  
 
 AFS licensees 
 
 Individual financial 
advisers  
 
 Clients of financial 
advisers 
 
 Public 
 
 Media 
 
 
Legitimacy is threatened if violations of the ‘social contract’ occurs (Pellegrino & Lodhia 
2012). This violation results in some of the actors intervening  (Suchman 1995) and possibly 
rescinding on their contract stated Johnson and Holub (2003). Seemingly, the appropriation of 
scandals in financial services signalled severe contraventions by the emerging financial 
planning profession of their ‘social contract’. In the book Institutions and Organizations (Scott 
2013), it is apparent rules, norms and meanings can be empirically accessed by inspecting 
events, beliefs [perceptions] and behaviours. This study inspects epistemological beliefs 
[perceptions] of advisers regarding the current licensing model, because how they perceive 
licensing via third parties is likely one of the determining factors as to how they may behave 
within their role. 
Several legitimacy scholars have proposed various legitimacy typologies to evaluate and 
understand legitimacy (Bitektine 2011) of the licensee-adviser licensing model. Doh et al. 
(2010) claimed most research would only evaluate some of the criteria of legitimacy, instead 
of using a complete framework to evaluate it. In accordance with Zimmerman’s and Zeitz’s 
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(2002) view, the legitimacy criteria for evaluation should be all inclusive or should clearly 
identify the specific variables relevant for a more narrowly focused study. 
 
Note this diagram is adopted from the works of Suchman (1995) and Scott (2014) 
Figure 3.2. Legitimacy of the current AFSL-AR licensing model  
Although, they advise legitimacy is difficult to measure, they claim by using proxy variables, 
quantitative analysis is achievable. On these grounds, this study explored, extended and applied 
to financial planning theory, Suchman’s (1995) complete theoretical framework. Particularly, 
because empirical research in legitimacy theory is a relatively new concept to financial 
planning. Also, his typology was useful to study the notion of legitimacy in both the accounting 
and non-accounting literature (see for example, Carnegie, Edwards & West 2003; Durocher, 
Fortin & Côté 2007; Kury 2007; Doh et al. 2010).  Furthermore of concern in this research, and 
mentioned before, Suchman’s framework covers both institutional and strategic legitimacy 
   
No unintentional 
compliance breaches 
of the Act 
Australian public can 
clearly distinguish 
between s923A 
independent advisers 
from those who are not 
Licensees’ commercial interests 
do not compromise advisers’ best 
interest duty 
Licensees do not design sales 
procedures, standards and practices 
to reinforce product distribution, 
while giving the appearance 
(window dressing) of satisfying 
regulatory requirements 
Evidence of no conflicts of 
interests from association with 
product-affiliated licensees 
Contributions by individual 
licensee leaders to the debate 
surrounding the licensing of 
advisers are not aimed at 
protecting distribution channels 
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issues. Consequently, to conceptually understand the legitimacy of the AFSL-AR licensing 
model depends on the examination of Suchman’s (1995) three broad, yet specific, types of 
legitimacy: pragmatic, normative and cognitive. Importantly, Scott (2014) highlighted, entities 
exhibiting these three typologies of legitimacy increase their survival rates. Based on a study 
by Carnegie, Edwards and West (2003) these three forms of legitimacy -consisting of elements 
of rules, norms and meanings (Scott 2013) respectively - are inter-related, yet can also be 
mutually exclusive. Figure 3.2 illustrates the criteria of the legitimacy of the AFSL-AR 
licensing model, which this study explores next in more detail. 
3.4.2.1 Pragmatic [regulative] legitimacy  
Suchman (1995) defined pragmatic legitimacy as considering the perception of the social 
support for an entity’s intentions, objectives and activities operating within some socially 
acceptable system. Johnson and Holub (2003) claimed this social support depends on the 
expected benefit to the conferring body. Therefore, it is a form of legitimacy, which is both 
audience-based (Bitektine 2011) and self-interest-based (Scott 2013), because it captures the 
degree to which an entity represents its audiences’ self-interests (Díez-Martín, Prado-Roman 
& Blanco-González 2013).  
Regulative legitimacy, derived from pragmatic legitimacy (Baum & Oliver 1991; Deephouse 
1996; Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002; Rao 2004; Chen & Roberts 2010), occurs when regulatory 
entities use rules and laws to create trust, confidence, stability and order in society (Kostova & 
Zaheer 1999) by regulating and constraining certain types of behaviour (Scott 2013, p. 59). 
Yeung (2009) felt, regulative legitimacy is considered a form of political legitimacy, where 
researchers have tried to understand why or when actors comply with a country’s authorities. 
Carruthers (1995) made the point, traditional approaches of legislating, assumes the rules and 
compliance requirements are present to influence the choices actors make in response to or in 
compliance with their institutional surroundings. Thus, the legislation embodies a form of 
social control (Yeung 2009; Santana 2012). Translating this for the purposes of this enquiry, it 
means ASIC under the authority of the Act, authorised licensees to grant or withhold legitimacy 
(Bitektine 2011) by appointing or removing ARs from practising. From Table 3.1 discernibly, 
the immediate influential regulative actors who regulate the licensing of financial advisers, 
clearly with an institutional power base is the government with the assistance of its regulators, 
namely ASIC and FASEA. The Act guides how conducting the licensing of advisers occurs 
and in theory support regulative legitimacy.  
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Licensees do not have the “right to exist” (Bitektine 2011, p. 153) without an AFSL and 
authorised representatives do not have the “right to exist” (Bitektine 2011, p. 153) without an 
authorisation from a licensee with an AFSL. Therefore the current regulatory licensing system 
as authorised by the Act forms the basis of individual financial adviser’s regulative legitimacy 
or “right to exist” (Bitektine 2011, p. 153).  Serpell (2008) asserted both the sources and legal 
form of legitimacy influence the trust actors have for any financial system. Also regulative 
legitimacy serves as a defence for the “right to exist” (Bitektine 2011, p. 153), which arguably 
is being tested by the loss in public confidence and trust (Kell 2013).  Thus, to qualify as 
legitimate the licensing model’s “right to exist” (Chen & Roberts 2010, p. 654; Bitektine 2011, 
p. 153; Pellegrino & Lodhia 2012, p. 70) is achieved by obtaining approval or avoiding sanction 
from the public (Tilling 2004b) or other relevant stakeholders listed in Table 3.1. 
Licensees are responsible for the actions of their representatives. Specifically, s917B and 
s917D of this Act regulate licensees responsibility for compliance contraventions by their 
advisers86, even if their advisers operate outside the scope of their licensees’ rules (Chen 2009). 
If a client is dealing with an AR, they are protected as though they are dealing with the licensee 
(Harvey 2002; Overland 2007; Serpell 2008; Sinodinos 2013d; Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2014a). From a legislator and licensees’ perspective, this is entirely 
appropriate; licensees must ensure compliance with ASIC rules and regulations to retain their 
licence by monitoring, supervising and training their authorised representatives. The rest is up 
to the adviser. However, Smith (2009, p. 326) found a focus group of financial advisers she 
interviewed during her study were frustrated, because they were of the opinion their AFS 
licensees are unable and do not have the desire to implement consistent behaviour and adviser 
conduct standards across their financial advisory groups. Furthermore, although compliance 
has not only become a liability, but also a repetitive mantra (Pearson 2006b), results from 
empirical studies by Smith (2009) established compliance officers of licensees were hindered 
in their ability to prevent compliance failure, especially in terms of disciplining rogue advisers 
for misconduct or related performance issues. 
According to Bruce (2012) it is well-documented, the Australian Government’s regulation has 
a significant influence on the activities of financial advisers. ASIC considered the legal 
requirements in the Act to be sufficient to achieve legitimacy (Australian Securities and 
                                                 
86 Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 is available at link: <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017 
C00328/Html/Volume_1#primary-nav>. 
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Investments Commission 2013d). They have available various strategies as incentive to enforce 
compliance with the rules and principles. Legal coercion, repercussions of litigation, penalties, 
sanctions, the courts and police (Wenzel & Jobling 2006), provide additional compliance 
incentives (Chalmers & Godfrey 2004) for licensees and their ARs to comply. Yet it is argued 
by Wenzel and Jobling (2006), these forms of deterrence mechanisms are not necessarily the 
most efficient means to regulate, because of the need to constantly and unsuccessfully monitor. 
Empirical research by Melbourne Law School researchers (Bird & Gilligan 2015b; Gilligan et 
al. 2015a; Gilligan et al. 2015b; Bird et al. 2016; Bird, Gilligan & Ramsay 2016) considered 
the influence ASIC has to sanction and discipline the Financial Services sector. This view is 
confirmed in a paper by Gilligan et al. (2015a) that suggested that financial penalties are viewed 
by large corporates as an operational risk rather than a deterrence to prevent compliance 
offenses. Gilligan et al. (2017) advocated not only are ASIC’s enforcement powers and 
practices inadequate, inconsistent and ineffective, but ASIC is inadequately resourced from a 
personnel and surveillance perspective to regulate a large number and wide range of bodies to 
prevent misconduct. They are not the only ones with this viewpoint, because Kingsford Smith 
(2011) critiqued financial regulations as well as criticised ASIC in his paper as ineffective in 
their ability to investigate, enforce and prosecute, because they are not properly equipped with 
the necessary power, resources and a culture of regulatory relationships required in responsive 
financial regulation. Also, Gilligan et al. (2017) found, when ASIC does impose corporate 
finance law, then it is often too late. Black (2012) warned if inconsistencies were evident in the 
performance of any regulation, then this would lead to its failure and its unintentional 
consequences in terms of behaviour, risks or objectives. After all, Slattery and Nellis (2005) 
acknowledged, while regulators face political pressures and media attention when regulating 
financial services, their flexibility and certainty is limited when using legal rulemaking. 
Although the penalty regime in Australia is consistent with those found in other overseas 
jurisdictions, such as the US, UK, Canada and Hong Kong, it seems, for instance, ASIC has 
less capacity and “scope to seek disgorgement of profits and other benefits gained” compared 
to these countries (Gilligan et al. 2015a, p. 4). According to Bird and Gilligan (2015b) ASIC is 
calling for more regulation and severe penalties for contraventions of the Act to encourage 
organisational cultural and normative change within the financial services sector.   Bird and 
Gilligan (2015b) mentioned the David Murray’s Financial Systems Inquiry report 
recommended the government must provide ASIC with banning powers, substantially increase 
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civil and criminal penalties and permit ASIC to seek disgorgement of profits earned because of 
the infringements.  
Empirical studies in legitimacy (for example, Bitektine 2011; Chelli, Durocher & Richard 
2014) revealed, to gain desired legitimacy a perception of compliance with the legislation 
imposed by the external surroundings must exist (Carruthers 1995). Therefore, to determine 
empirically the licensing model’s regulative legitimacy involves examining the presence of the 
perception licensing advisers through third-party aligned licensees risks their advisers 
unintentionally breaching regulatory compliance duty (Degeling & Hudson 2014), because of 
their licensees’ affiliations to product issuers. If indeed, the authorised representatives of 
licensees comply with the Act, then arguably the current licensing model can be perceived as 
legitimate [Figure 3.2]. Verifying regulative legitimacy is imperative, because Australian 
regulators argued the best protection for consumers is compliance by the financial services 
industry with a fair and transparent principles-based regulatory system (Pearson 2006b). Any 
infringements may result in ASIC or even public class action (Pearson 2008; Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission 2016b), as well as legal liability consequences for 
licensees and/or their advisers under various regulations (Degeling & Hudson 2014; Bird & 
Gilligan 2015a). In addition, licensees and advisers will lose their reputations if or when 
breaches in compliance are discovered and make headline news. Furthermore, the financial 
losses suffered by clients results in the public choosing to avoid seeking financial advice when 
the ensuing distrust sets in (Carlin & Gervais 2012). Importantly, Bender (2011) made the claim 
compliance with the law does not necessarily mean legitimacy. Therefore, to reduce chances 
of opposition from critics (Bitektine 2011), this research includes other criteria to test for 
legitimacy of the licensing model.  
3.4.2.2 Normative [moral] legitimacy  
Normative [moral] legitimacy is considered by theorists as a feature-based (Suchman 1995)  
and a judgement-based (Scott 2013) typology. This definition of legitimacy focuses on the 
perceptions of specific morals, values or ethics (Chen & Roberts 2010; Chua & Rahman 2011) 
of an entity’s outcomes, goals, activities, and/or structure (Bitektine 2011), within some 
socially accepted (Johnson & Holub 2003) or socially constructed value system (Bitektine 
2011).  
Normative legitimacy provides the moral justification to support regulative legitimacy through 
social norms. While, regulative legitimacy shapes the legal surroundings with formal rules to 
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influence the structure, operation and responsibility of institutions (Thynne 2011). Moreover 
normative legitimacy shapes the moral or professional foundation through institutions (Scott 
2013) [policymakers, regulators ASIC and FASEA, professional associations and AFS 
licensees as illustrated in Figure 3.1] applying the law. These normative actors interpret the 
regulative rules, implement the rules and perpetuate the institutional order (Carnegie & 
O'Connell 2012).   
Thus, this legitimacy’s purpose is to provide a moral foundation, a basis to aid as a tool to foster 
positive images of the emerging profession amongst the public. It is about what is perceived 
and judged as the “right thing to do” (Yeung 2009, p. 286) morally to promote societal welfare. 
For instance, the Australian financial regulations aims to clean up the financial services sector 
(Hii & Su-King 2009). Owen (2003) noted, regulations drove the way institutions, within 
financial services, developed the manner in which financial products were structured and 
distributed. Suchman (1995) categorised normative legitimacy into consequential, procedural, 
structural and personal moral legitimacy. Understanding and assessing moral legitimacy of the 
current licensing model requires further scrutiny of these four variables.  
3.4.2.3 Consequential moral legitimacy  
Consequential moral legitimacy contemplates the moral assessment of an entity’s socially 
acceptable and socially valued deeds, outputs and outcomes, which includes a political element 
(Suchman 1995, p. 579). Lindorff and Peck (2010) wrote legitimacy requires institutions to 
manage their businesses for the benefit of all stakeholders, not just shareholders and employees.  
Observed during the literature review, legislating stakeholder wealth maximisation is 
challenging, because numerous effects are in play. Yun (2012,p. 66) wrote, within the US 
context: “Corporate executives have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders”. Likewise, Australian corporate law [s180 – s184] applies 
this principle to corporate executives of Australian corporations (Jones & Welsh 2012, p. 373). 
According to the writings of Jones and Welsh (2012, p. 373), this fiduciary duty included 
avoiding conflicts of interest between shareholders and management. They maintained further, 
in addition to their fiduciary duties, Australian directors, other officers and their employees, 
such as employee ARs, are legally expected not to work for self-interest or cause any detriment 
to the corporation [s182[1] and s183[1]] (Jones & Welsh 2012, p. 373) without disclosure to, 
and consent from the corporation (Hargovan 2011).  
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Agency theory works under the assumption: the principal’s main interest is profit maximisation 
and agents acting on behalf of their principals should advance the principal’s goals (Moran 
2014). By implication then the adviser must advance the licensees goals who in turn according 
to Australian Corporate Law [s180 – s184] must advance the interests of the shareholders, 
including complying with the fiduciary duty to shareholders. Unsurprisingly, the Australian 
Corporations Act expects licensees and their ARs, when managing conflicts of interest to put 
the client’s best interests first [s961B], even if not in the licensees’ or the licensees’ 
shareholders’ interests (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016i). AFS 
licensees must always be able to prove they have given priority to the interests of clients over 
other interests (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016i). Yet, evidence 
collected in the UK exposed financial institutions, such as banks, focus on profitability rather 
than what is in the best interests of clients or treating them fairly (Pain 2013). Seemingly, the 
same holds true for the US, when Finke, Huston and Waller (2009b) reported commission-
based investments sold through brokers sacrificed best interests in favour of profitability. 
Although, not empirically evaluated or verified in Australia, Bennett (2000) argued, it is 
indisputable licensees are in the business to make money. Fund managers or product issuers 
paid for licensees’ main source of revenue according to data gathered during two ASIC reviews 
in 201187  and 201488. In the literature, specifically aligned licensees are seen as “commercial 
businesses using advisers as a sales force” (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations 
and Financial Services 2014, p. 24) to support shareholder theory89 (Griffiths 2007, p. 231; 
Lindorff & Peck 2010; Kofman & Murawski 2015) instead of stakeholders’ interests to develop 
social capital90 (Lindorff & Peck 2010).  
Seemingly, the Act is encouraging conflicted commercially driven product-aligned licensees 
to exert legal control over their representatives (Carruthers 1995) to attend the best interests of 
their clients, while simultaneously expecting them to also meet shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation interests. Smith (2009) found a shift away by institutions from merely profit 
making [shareholders’ wealth maximisation] to ethics and social responsibility [stakeholders’ 
wealth maximisation]. Yet she concluded in her study when behaving ethically is perceived as 
financially lossmaking,  then the question of what firms should do as opposed to what they 
actually do may in fact be two different things (Smith 2009, p. 62). Her quantitative findings 
                                                 
87 Report 251: Review of Financial Advice Industry Practice Report.  
88 Report 407: Review of the financial advice industry’s implementation of the FOFA reforms. 
89 Shareholder wealth maximisation and/or profit maximisation. 
90 Goodwill, reputation and/or sustainability. 
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confirmed employee financial advisers face conflicts between their professional obligations to 
deliver appropriate advice to clients and commercial obligations of business profit within their 
current advisory models. Furthermore, the Review of Retail Insurance Advice, it was 
recommended insurers remove misaligned financial incentives in their distribution channels 
being offered to advisers and licensees (Trowbridge 2015). 
On the grounds of the aforementioned discussion tension between commercial interests and the 
best interest, duty is apparent. Maclean and Behnam (2010) maintained financial institutions 
struggle to manage regulatory compliance when the legal requirements appear to conflict with 
or compromise commercial activities. They maintained resolving this tension is critical to 
ensure legitimacy.  According to several studies assessed by Carnegie and O'Connell (2012) 
consequential legitimacy appeared challenging to measure. They found especially testing 
perceptions objectively to obtain reliable evidence.  
 
Despite these potential problems, this study assesses whether licensing advisers through third-
party aligned licensees creates tension between the licensees’ commercial interests and their 
clients’ best interests to determine the existence of consequential moral legitimacy. The 
premise is if aligned licensees’ commercial interests are consistent with the clients’ best 
interests, perceived or otherwise, then licensing advisers through third-party aligned licensees 
is more difficult to challenge and the existing licensing model retains consequential moral 
legitimacy [Figure 3.2].  
 
Establishing this legitimacy is important, because Smith (2009)  maintained further, financial 
services firms owe economic, social, legal and ethical responsibilities to all stakeholders. 
Moreover, clarified by Griffiths (2007), focusing on immediate shareholders profits results in 
undesirable social costs to retail clients. Furthermore, Bearden (2002) pointed out financial 
interests can compromise advisers’ professional judgement, hence damaging the adviser-client 
professional relationship of trust notwithstanding the quality in the advisers’ work. Any 
incompatibility between the institutions’ values and the professional values of the adviser 
manifests into institutional-professional conflicts, which requires compromise (Bamber & Iyer 
2002). 
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3.4.2.4 Procedural moral legitimacy 
Procedural moral legitimacy studies the moral assessment of the entity’s socially acceptable 
and desired economic and non-economic (Meyer 2007) practices, techniques, systems, 
standards and procedures (Suchman 1995, p. 579; Carnegie & O'Connell 2012). According to 
Carruthers (1995) and Bender (2011) institutions emulate, reproduce and implement these to 
achieve legitimacy. Documented by Banister et al. (2013), professional financial planning 
associations support their member licensees and advisers to put in place socially desired best 
practices, standards, procedures, rules and structures such as codes of conduct, educational 
standards and programs. Furthermore, licensees reveal they deliver moral acceptability for the 
actions and behaviour of their ARs, both internally and externally, through a rigorous selection 
process (Bender 2011). This is followed by a strict compliance system of monitoring involving 
audits, supervision and training (Bennett 2000). 
Yet some legitimacy theorists argued decoupling (Rocha & Granerud 2011; Cole & Salimath 
2013) occurs when these formal codes of conduct, policies, processes and rules for legislative 
compliance differ from actual practice (Carruthers 1995) and behaviour (Scott 2014). 
Decoupling seems evident in financial services, based on several pieces of available evidence. 
For instance, scholarly evidence was produced by Smith (2009, p. 319) when she demonstrated 
licensee compliance officers, not only failed at influencing the ethical decision making of the 
financial advisers they supervise, but also failed to prevent contraventions and to protect 
consumers. She counted as some of the contraventions to include failure by some advisers and 
licensee compliance officers to follow internal procedures and policies, a failure to keep 
appropriate records of advice and ensure the integrity of records kept. In addition, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2017e)91 found in a review, the largest 
banking and financial institutions’ licensees were ineffective in overseeing their advisers. They 
reported the audit process of a sample of 160 client files audited by the licensees’ compliance 
manager were found ineffective in 25 per cent, partially effective in 57 per cent and only 
effective in 18 per cent of the cases (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2017e; 
Graham 2017). Smith (2009, p. 316) identified, irrespective of whether it was in the clients’ 
best interest or not, practices, supporting financial product sales and recommendations 
associated with their AFS licensee, were evident among financial planners. 
                                                 
91 Report 515: Financial advice: Review of how large institutions oversee their advisers. 
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Apparent in practice, product-aligned licensees were found to employ business practice 
managers and compliance managers to monitor and supervise financial advisers to ensure they 
comply with the law (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2007). Yet, the 
available evidence verified compliance officers of licensees were hindered in their ability to 
discipline advisers when their performance or conduct were inadequate or to prevent 
compliance failure occurring (Smith 2009).  
Therefore, in this research the legislated practices, standards and procedures licensees 
implement to reinforce the advisers’ product distribution role is investigated (Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2014, p. 24). In addition, under 
investigation is the view held by Sampson (2010), namely the product distribution role is 
sometimes practiced without detection. Additionally, Smith (2009, p. 316-317) discovered, 
when she considered the ethical decision making of AFS licensee compliance managers, not 
only was deceptive behaviour linked to a failure of the compliance systems and procedures of 
AFSL licensees to specifically prevent the unethical behaviour surrounding product 
recommendations, but also an ineffective ethical climate and culture. Interesting used structural 
equation modelling and AMOS version 6 software Valentine and Hollingworth (2015) 
supported the hypothesis, employees make decisions around an institutions’ ethical values 
based on the verbal and non-verbal messages conveyed to them within a context, situation and 
around an issue. A more recent international case study (Brannan 2017) concur with these 
findings. Namely, the culture plays a significant role in influencing the conduct of those 
operating in financial services. Additionally, Carruthers (1995) theorised in his accounting 
research paper institutions decouple by developing relatively elaborate administrative systems 
so institutional rules appear technical in nature.  Newnham (2012) and Valentine (2013) argued, 
licensees are adept at keeping in place actual distribution networks masquerading as sources of 
advice. For instance, product sales targets are set (Jones 2009; Smith 2009; Mennen 2014; 
Burke & Hung 2015) to ‘encourage’ their aligned financial planning practices and employees 
to achieve revenue benchmarks (Industry Super Australia 2014; Morris 2014), which results in 
their distribution networks promoting in-house products (Valentine 2013). Notably, Smith 
(2009), Starke (2013b) and Mennen (2014) confirmed the financial planning business of CBA, 
a bank financial product distributor controlled advice channels, set product sales targets for 
their salaried representatives and threatened them with dismissal to ignite a sales-driven culture 
of ‘cross selling’ and ‘up selling’.  
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Equally important, practices involving setting sales targets to reinforce product distribution are 
evident internationally too (United Kingdom House of Commons Treasury Committee 2011; 
Inderst & Ottaviani 2012b; Brannan 2017). For instance, Inderst and Ottaviani (2012b) 
explored how product providers can distort advice by means of promoting employees who 
achieve specific sales targets. Inderst (2009) argued, if combining the sale of financial products 
with the provision of financial advice then opportunities of mis-selling and unsuitable advice 
opens. Evidence from the high volume of Financial Ombudsman Services complaints, mystery 
shopping findings and sales file reviews in the United Kingdom between 2005 and 2011 
demonstrated consumers were at high risk of suffering losses as a result of widespread flaws in 
sales practices [mis-selling of products] across much of the UK financial services industry 
(Ferran 2012; Pain 2013). Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) also proved when the agents face greater 
competition for clients, then compliance with a regulatory standard becomes costly for the 
institution, increasing the risk of potential mis-selling.  
Secondary non-academic sources claimed Australian aligned licensees limited their ARs to 
recommendations of mainly products they select and assess for the APL (Australian 
Government The Treasury 2014; Sheehan 2016). Interestingly, the existence of APLs are 
justified by licensees as important for risk management purposes (Stewart 2013). Furthermore, 
Hutson and Vonnessen (2003) indicated, designing systems for risk management, dispute 
resolution, client compensation and general compliance may be beyond even proficient 
financial service providers. Achieving an acceptable standard of risk management is 
challenging. For instance, to lower their risks professional indemnity [PI] insurers, require 
licensees to make provisions for approved product lists to prevent advisers from selling just 
any product on the market (Stewart 2013). Thus, investment committees will assess products 
for the APL for all their advisers to use to ensure product is covered by the licensee’s 
professional indemnity insurance (Stewart 2013). Although, Regulatory Guide 175 (Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission 2017d) explicitly states advisers may need to go 
outside their licensee’s APL to serve their clients’ best interests, West (2009) and Stewart 
(2013) expected no reason why aligned licensees would want their representatives to retain, 
recommend or include a competitor’s financial products in their recommendations.  This 
practice is confirmed in the literature (Collier 2003; Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services 2009b) whereby most product-aligned ARs are expected 
to recommend the product of the parent institutions. In practice, ASIC shadow shopping 
(Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2003, 2006, 2010a, 2012c) and reviews 
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(Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016i) identified product-aligned ARs 
tend to favour recommending strategies linked to the specific branded products of their 
licensee.  
Yet, advisers have the opportunity to apply for one-off approvals, where an investment 
committee of the licensee will evaluate products not on the APL to either reject or approve for 
use by that adviser only (Stewart 2013; Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
2017d). Despite one-off approvals, Batten and Pearson (2013) claimed advisers are inclined to 
recommend only a few key products from approved product lists including those linked to 
platforms92 of a variety of investment choices. ASIC found in a review 93 the statutory fiduciary 
duty obligations failed to impact most institutions’ APLs, except for a few amendments such 
as a reduction in the number or types of products on the list (Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2014f).  
According to Maclean and Behnam (2010) these forms of decoupling produces formal 
compliance programs symbolising gestures of myth, ceremony and window dressing. While in 
the meantime,  it is “business as usual” (Maclean and Behnam (2010) effectively manipulating 
back-stage to maintain appearances (Kury 2007). In other words, to achieve a better outcome 
institutions use their time and resources to create processes and rules for compliance purposes, 
instead of following them (Carruthers 1995).  For example, ASIC found some evidence 
licensees adopted policies designed to meet compliance without adequate implementation into 
their business culture, systems and processes (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2016i).  
From the above, clearly achieving procedural legitimacy is not as straight forward as following 
rules and codes (Considnine and Ali Afzal, 2011) nor having best practice procedures and 
processes (Maclean & Behnam 2010) in place as a defence against accusation of bias, 
imprudence or violations of the Act.  Except for the  inductive qualitative case study analysis 
by Maclean and Behnam (2010) of a US financial services organisation where widespread 
deceptive sales practices occurred, while a deficiency in Australian empirical research with 
regards to this matter of undetected sales compliance deception is apparent. Also an Australian 
study discovered an ethical culture promoting ethical behaviour within AFSL licensees, is 
                                                 
92 Notable, platforms are not considered financial products under the present legislation. 
93 Report 407: Review of the financial advice industry’s implementation of the FOFA reforms. 
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dependent on the presence of formal and informal systems and procedures (Smith 2009), yet 
unassessed for their legitimacy.  
Thus, to verify the licensing model’s procedural moral legitimacy, requires examining 
declarations licensing advisers via third-party product-aligned licensees has resulted in 
deceptive sales procedures, standards and practices designed to give the appearance [window 
dressing] of satisfying regulatory requirements, while reinforcing product distribution. If this 
is not the case, then there is no question mark placed on its procedural legitimacy.  
This information is significant, because Maclean and Behnam (2010) demonstrated decoupling 
the compliance program from practice, results in the loss of external legitimacy, because 
internal legitimacy of the formal compliance program is damaged, which then culminates in 
unethical practices becoming institutionalised. Furthermore, it is well documented (Senate 
Economics References Committee 2014; Ferguson 2015; Commonwealth of Australia 2016b; 
Steen, McGrath & Wong 2016) the Australian Government is concerned about the detriment 
of misconduct within financial services. Regulators internationally consider at the root of many 
conduct risks is the exploitation of conflicts of interest built into financial sector structures, 
processes and management over time (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
2016i). Moreover, Smith (2009) maintained, AFS Licensees do not have the breadth of systems 
and procedures in place necessary to ensure an effective ethical climate and culture.  
3.4.2.5 Structural moral legitimacy 
Structural moral legitimacy is defined by Suchman (1995), as the moral evaluation of the 
adoption of formal structures acceptable to society to make it the appropriate structure for the 
job. Thus this research considers whether the licensing system is “worthy of support because 
its structural characteristics locate it within a morally favoured taxonomic category”(Suchman 
1995, p. 581). Applying this definition to financial planning theory within the context of the 
current licensing regime was challenging at first, because Suchman (1995) noticed similarity 
between procedural and structural legitimacy. However, he distinguished between them as 
follows: 1) procedural depends on “discrete routines viewed in isolation” (Suchman 1995, p. 
581), namely do the product-aligned licensees control their affiliated advisers to distribute their 
in-house products? whereas 2) structural depends on whether “entire systems of activities recur 
consistently over time” (Suchman 1995, p. 581) such as do advisers structurally licensed via 
product-aligned licensees confront conflict of interest from association? 
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Extending the foregoing within the context of the current licensing regime, the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (2009b) confirmed conflicts between 
advisers and their clients arise from licensee ownership structures. Conflict of interest from 
association with the associated agency problems is a longstanding issue, because Davis (1995) 
claimed a conflict of interest from association is at odds with aligning financial adviser’s 
interest to that of the client interests. Additionally, Smith (2009, p. 317) wrote in her thesis 
Australian financial services ownership structures of institutions, together with the 
management of the conflicts of interest linked with these ownership structures contributed to 
financial advisers’ unethical behaviour. ASIC agreed, when a legal relationship between 
product manufacturers, distributors, licensees, financial planning practices and advisers were 
shared, this results in conflicts of interest (Money Management 2014). Valentine (2013) 
identified, more specifically, the conflict of interest where product providers, for example, 
banks and insurance institutions, owned financial advisory services businesses. 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) demonstrated with empirical findings, the multiple tasks of both 
searching for retail clients and facilitating transactions on behalf of the principal product-
aligned institution may conflict with the task of providing unbiased advice. Controversial 
debate in the media has revolved around advisers being viewed as quasi-employees controlled 
by their licensees (Pokrajac 2014). This situation creates institutional-professional conflicts 
(Bamber & Iyer 2002). This conflict may be a problem, because Smith, Armstrong and Francis 
(2009) determined in their research licensees lack the breadth within their systems and 
procedures to ensure an effective ethical climate and culture for professional advisers.  Smith 
(2009, p. 66) also questioned whether financial advisers can balance both their professional 
agency obligations to their clients with their agency responsibilities to their licensees. 
Especially in the presence of a moral hazard when the adviser faces weighing the importance 
of their agency relationship with third parties against their professional obligations to clients.  
A willingness on the part of authorised representatives to observe professional obligations by 
avoiding competing with their clients or profiting at their expense is apparent, but this seems 
more challenging when affiliations to licensees who also distributes products arises (Collier 
2003; Banister et al. 2013). The reason for this is that the Act is encouraging product-aligned 
licensees to exert legal control and discipline over their authorised representatives (Carruthers 
1995), while at the same time expecting them to serve the best interests of their clients. Smith 
(2009, p. 324) found, financial advisers felt tension between their obligations around profit, 
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together with the pressure to sell financial products, which have led to unresolved conflicts of 
interest.  
Pertinent, yet empirically unverified and invalidated, conflicts of interest is exacerbated if the 
licensees offered monetary or other soft dollar benefits94 (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2004; Pearson 2006b; Professional Planner 2017b). Peretz and Schroedel (2009) 
mentioned, rather than product innovations, conflicting incentives for those participating in the 
financial field is the underlying the problem. ASIC acknowledged, “at the employee level, a 
conflict of interest could also arise when similar incentives or an inappropriate remuneration 
structure encourages the employee to promote group-manufactured products or platform 
products in priority to a third party’s products, which may not be in the best interests of the 
client.” (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016i, p. 14). Possibly, buyer-of-
last-resort agreements95 depending on its terms and conditions, may also be an inducement for 
advisers to prefer recommending in-house products (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2004; Pearson 2006b; Industry Super Network 2011; Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2016i). These arrangements can also be considered, according to Beal 
and McKeown (2009), motivation to trap authorised representatives to work with only one 
financial institution for most of their career. Moran (2014) and Kennedy (2012) asserted the 
legislation has encouraged advisers towards larger conflicted product-aligned licensees, rather 
than towards smaller business of advisers to protect business value, save cost, obtain 
subsidisation of support services and manage their uncertainty.  
Many large licensees have adopted vertically integrated business sales models with platforms 
for competitive advantage (Valentine 2013) to develop financial products for distribution via 
their own financial planning advice channels through cross selling (Mennen 2016; Steen, 
McGrath & Wong 2016). Furthermore, Sampson (2010) asserted, the ownership of financial 
planning practices - which are concentrated among a handful of large licensees, with the 
purpose of an efficient structure and business environment for distribution - is structurally 
                                                 
94 For example, licensees offer financial support, invitations to overseas conferences or holidays, subsidised 
office equipment, offers of shares in financial services companies, fee rebates, subsidised dealer fees, 
subsidised professional indemnity insurance, paraplanning support, training and continuous professional 
development, marketing allowances, transition payments, and access to cheap capital and enhanced buy-back 
agreements. 
95 Buyer of last resort agreements are prevalent among a third of AFS licensees (Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2011) who offers their advisers a guaranteed minimum sale value for their client 
base, usually when they retire or leave the licensee, and if they cannot find a buyer on the open market 
(Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2004). The sale value is based on a multiple of revenue, 
with a higher multiple offered for the licensees in-house products (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2004). 
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corrupt. Steen, McGrath and Wong (2016, p. 3) argued the structural issue of the vertically 
integrated model contributes to the undesirable effects of information asymmetry, adverse 
selection and moral hazard consequences. 
For instance, Suciu (2011) wrote moral hazard refers to an agent’s willingness to take excessive 
risks, because they can be bailed out during an adverse event. For instance,  Pokrajac (2014) 
claimed authorised representatives are aware their institutionally owned licensee is large 
enough, has the means to pay for remedies, such as client compensation, out-of-court 
settlements, and other legal remedies imposed by the regulators should they fail in complying 
with the Act. Notable Egan, Matvos and Seru (2016) found in the United States misconduct is 
often more evident in some of the largest financial institutions, and lower in established older 
institutions managed by ethical executives with clean records of misconduct. Based on the 
actions taken against CBA and Westpac (Nehme 2010; Corones & Irving 2016) and the 50 per 
cent of 414 enforceable undertakings accepted by ASIC over 17.5 years [1 July 1998 until 31 
December 2015] concerning financial services misconduct for financial planning and wealth 
management advice (Bird et al. 2016), perhaps the same can be concluded for Australian 
financial institutions. 
Interestingly, Young and Thyil (2014) found during their qualitative study some financial 
institutions’ leaders hold the view individual’s behaviour cannot be regulated - only structures 
can be put in place for individuals to buy into. The premise here is the Australian financial 
advisory industry is buying into a formal structure without critical assessment or evaluation. 
Hence, to evaluate the licensing model’s structural moral legitimacy means examining the 
claim, licensing advisers through product-aligned licensees, results in conflict of interest from 
association. This conflict is an important issue, because policymakers are trying to 
professionalise financial planning with legislation (Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services 2015) within an existing system plagued by conflict of 
interest from financial product association, ownership or affiliation. This trilateral agency 
structure qualified by the Act places the licensee in control, rather than the client, which puts 
the client at risk of conflict of interest from association.  
According to Pearson (2006b) risks to the financial product retail consumer with regard to the 
regulation of financial services has not been sufficiently articulated. Specifically, the legal 
scholar Walton (2012) claimed, what is often neglected in regulation is a discussion on the real 
risks to individual members of the public when third parties are involved in a relationship. 
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Along similar lines, professionalisation of financial advisers will likely be illusive so long as 
clients’ interests are secondary in practice to that of the institutions (Rubin 2015). For instance, 
buyer of last resort agreements severs adviser-client relationships when an adviser leaves a 
licensee for another licensee. Severed  adviser-client associations is a problem, because NMG 
Consulting (2014) found in the UK once client-adviser relationships are established, clients are 
often loath to switch advisers, even for the opportunity of making small financial gains, because 
trusted associations under pin ongoing service arrangements (Financial Conduct Authority 
2014c). Therefore, BOLR is not in the best interest of the client, because no continuity for the 
client is present (Kendell 2017). In addition, qualified competent advisers lose their 
accreditation to provide financial advice when they leave a licensee. Although they may be 
highly qualified, competent and ethical, unlike other professionals, they cannot practise their 
craft unless another licensee institution employs them or become self-licensed. Furthermore, 
advisers licensed through a third-party commercial conflicted rather than a professional 
independent institution may act as a disincentive for potential new entrants to pursue a career 
in financial planning. Further contributing to the shortage of financial advisers as baby boomers 
start retiring. 
3.4.2.6 Personal moral legitimacy  
The fourth and largely uncommon form of moral legitimacy identified in Legitimacy: Strategic 
and Institutional Approaches (Suchman 1995) is personal moral legitimacy. According to the 
few collected works, personal moral legitimacy is achieved through the moral and social 
evaluations of the roles of charismatic individuals (Carnegie & O'Connell 2012; Goretzki, 
Strauss & Weber 2013) who exert their personal influence to dismantle or create new entities 
depending on their vested interests (Suchman 1995). Mainly the role changes of influential 
individuals and their impact on legitimacy is discussed in the literature (Goretzki, Strauss & 
Weber 2013).  For instance, when the Australian Government uses its democratic consultative 
approach when considering policy changes to augment the legitimacy of policy, they face the 
issue of who to include in the consultation (Catt & Murphy 2003).  
Non-scholarly literature makes allegations about certain key people as members of seniority of 
multiple diversified licensees (Vickovich 2014d) and financial planning professional bodies 
(Vickovich 2014c) with varying stakes (Commonwealth of Australia 2014d) presenting as 
committee members on panels to respond as lobby groups at roundtables (Vickovich 2014d), 
private and public hearings making submissions (Australian Bankers' Association Inc 2014) to 
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persuade or dissuade the government to increase or decrease the amount of legislation. These 
are allegedly men [and women] of power  who as a whole continue to work in the background 
and foreground (Carruthers 1995) politically lobbying the government, legislators and 
regulators of the day to protect their vested interests. Sampson (2010) claimed some financial 
services industry participants lobby government to water down elements of the reforms to 
protect the relationship between financial advisers and companies offering financial products.  
Campo (2014) confirmed this, when she posted a blog explaining the FOFA reforms are being 
stymied by financial institutions who control around 80 per cent of all advisers through their 
lobby efforts. For example, mentioned in popular media reports, Senator David Fawcett [Chair 
of the PJC of Corporations and Financial Services from 9 December 2013 to 9 May 2016], 
initially focused on the issue of alternative licensing models for advisers during the Murray 
Inquiry (Vickovich 2014c; Vickovich & Garber 2014). However, seemingly due to submissions 
and direct lobbying shifted the focus to other issues (Commonwealth of Australia 2014c, 
2014b; Perri 2014; North 2015).  
Historically, ASIC (2003) and Collier (2003) conceded product-aligned licensees employ 
representatives to distribute their products. These writings support earlier findings during ASIC 
investigations into the National Australia Bank Limited, and Australia and New Zealand 
Banking Group Limited over their sales practices on separate occasions (Bailey 2000).  
Although not empirically assessed and substantiated, each contribute different, sometimes 
opposing recommendations to the debate surrounding regulating individual advisers, while 
simultaneously implement competing training, accreditation and professional recognition 
programs (Reese 2011). In addition, the Financial Planning Association allows their members 
to be affiliated to product providers. This affiliation makes it very difficult for Australians to 
identify financial advisers not torn between their client’s interests and that of their licensees’ 
(Moisand 2008). Yet no empirical research searching secondary scholarly literature has 
considered the influence of these influential men [and women] in this emerging profession, 
particularly pertaining to the licensing of financial advisers.  
Therefore, empirical evidence examining the licensing model’s personal moral legitimacy may 
be substantiated by considering whether [or not] the contributions made by individual leaders 
of product-aligned licensees to the debate surrounding the licensing of advisers is mainly 
protection of their product distribution channels. If it is found not to be the case, then the 
licensing model displays personal legitimacy.  
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Consideration of this legitimacy is important, because Young and Thyil (2014) determined, 
financial institutional leaders’ duty and moral obligation are to all stakeholders, not only 
shareholders, to be doing the right thing to obtain their implicit or explicit consent to operate. 
The extent stakeholders provide this consent to operate, they claimed, provides these 
institutions the legitimacy to operate. 
3.4.2.7 Cultural-cognitive legitimacy 
Cultural-cognitive legitimacy, also referred to as cognitive legitimacy in the literature, is about 
an entity pursuing goals that ensures shared understanding, shared norms, common beliefs and 
common knowledge systems (Santana 2012) to perpetuate an institutional order (Kury 2007) 
based on cognition or awareness (Meyer 2007). Cognitive legitimacy considers the “taken-for-
granted” (Kury 2007, p. 373) identity, roles, rules and performance of taking certain actions 
(Scott 2013). In other words, cognitive legitimacy is about “this is how we do things” (Kury 
2007, p. 373) where elements of inevitability, necessity, and replication or “mimicking” (Kury 
2007, p. 378) of the status quo within such a belief system is present (Suchman 1995, p. 582; 
Durocher, Fortin & Côté 2007; Kury 2007; Carnegie & O'Connell 2012). Unlike the self-
interest-based and judgment-based regulative and normative legitimacy, the source of this form 
of legitimacy is communal-based (Kury 2007).  
The cultural-cognitive actors tabled in Table 3.1, include the media [external actors], the clients 
of financial advisers [external actors] and the individual financial advisers [internal actors]. The 
literature review on this topic shows that the media stories and general rhetoric exposed, 
manipulated and/or shifted logics by which legitimacy is assessed (Suddaby & Greenwood 
2005). Rhetoric per Suddaby and Greenwood (2005, p. 39), is a critical ingredient to 
intentionally influence cognitive legitimacy. The media serves to expose the lack, or existence, 
of cultural-cognitive legitimacy. The reaction of the external actors, namely the public in terms 
of having trust and confidence in financial advisers further reinforces this lack of cognitive 
legitimacy. Notably, although the media, media professionals and their audiences (Pellegrino 
& Lodhia 2012) are considered as hostile and unfair (Harvey & Schaefer 2001), Bird (2011) is 
of the opinion that the role of the media in increasing accountability of the regulators, licensees 
and advisers should be recognised.  Therefore, the news media coverage (Hoyle 2016; 
Vickovich 2017a) informs the public of aspects of deeds within the financial advice industry 
that might have been previously unknown or requires some attention. The media, thus creates 
legitimacy gaps or crisis that run against the values and beliefs (Chelli, Durocher & Richard 
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2014) of the public. Noteworthy, many of the gaps identified in this research come from media 
reports, albeit much of the news was damaging.  
For instance, with regards to the shared understanding of the identity, role and performance of 
financial advisers, a press release about the main research findings of a Roy Morgan study 
(Morris 2013) reported, the public were generally unsure as to whether financial advisers were 
product-aligned or s923A independent. They reported the majority incorrectly perceived and 
claimed, for example, Financial Wisdom [owned by Commonwealth Bank of Australia] or 
Godfrey Pembroke [National Australian Bank/MLC Australia] or RetireInvest [ANZ Bank] 
provide independent financial advice (Morris 2013; Vickovich 2013). Questionable, Sampson 
(2009) maintained in earlier years, is the common practice for the licensee to own or have an 
interest in the financial planning group, to rebrand its aligned advisers so that the link is not 
immediately apparent to clients seeking independent advice. He maintained, and noted earlier 
when discussing conflicts of interest, further disclosure is often inconspicuous. Notably, this 
problem is not limited to the Australian financial advisory sector. Interestingly, Inderst and 
Ottaviani (2012e) mentioned a survey undertaken in Europe among 6,000 purchasers of retail 
investment products, where findings in this report (Chater, Huck & Inderst 2010) indicated, 
participants were ill-informed on conflicts of interest; believing aligned financial advisers 
provided completely independent advice.   
Although elements of this cognitive concept have been researched, Scott (2013) and Yeung 
(2009) claimed this form of legitimacy is also problematic to determine, because all the other 
forms of legitimacy mentioned above have an influence on it. Despite their views, an attempt 
is made to determine cognitive legitimacy, by starting with the concept cognitive legitimacy is 
judged by placing an entity into a category or classification using identifiable variables, such 
as the observable structural properties, technical and procedural features of the entity (Bitektine 
2011). Therefore,  if the legitimacy to financial planning theory is extended and applied, then 
clients and their advisers should have, as Scott (2013) notably theorised, a shared understanding 
as to ‘who advisers are ’ [identity] (Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002, p. 420), ‘what is expected of 
advisers’ [role] (Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002, p. 420) and ‘how effective advisers are’ 
[performance] (Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002, p. 420). In this regard, the perceptions of the internal 
actors, namely advisers, are the main concern in this study, because, operationally they enact 
the rules, while sharing, or assumedly sharing, common beliefs with their clients and the media 
(Kury 2007).  
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Although Faherty (2010) and my discussion in Chapter 2 pointed out two categories of advisers, 
namely advisers who provide advice and those who sell product, Moisand (2008b) wrote in an 
earlier paper, the lines between sales and advice is blurred. Recall, from Chapter 2, to protect 
clients from being misled, fairly restrictive requirements of section 923A of the Act96 specifies 
when financial services providers can describe themselves or market their services as 
‘independent’ to existing or potential clients (Elliott 2006). Although authorised representatives 
are registered on the ASIC Financial Advisers Register since 31 March 2015, Power (2016b) 
reported it does not disclose the independent or aligned status of the client.  Making matters 
more complicated and leading to further public confusion is this register includes people who 
are not financial advisers, such as for example time-share holiday sales representatives, foreign 
currency brokers, stockbrokers, industry funds advisers, credit union brokers, mortgage brokers 
and accountants. Consequently, despite the legislated definition of s923A, it is not clear who is 
independent and who is not.  
Apparent during the literature survey, several scholarly writings from UK and US reflected on 
the issue of ‘independent advisers’ and ‘independent advice’ (Gough 2005; Zabel 2010; Bender 
2011; Chaston 2013; Bateman & Kingston 2014; Burke & Hung 2015). However, a hole in the 
existing literature dealing with this issue within the Australian context exists (McInnes & 
Ahmed 2016). Bateman and Kingston (2014) and Burke and Hung (2015), observed US and 
UK policymakers have included legal provisions in their laws to distinguish between two 
categories of financial advisory institutions and financial advisers. A prominent feature of their 
regulations was the separation of ‘independent’ advisers, from those who are not, both in 
terminology and categories. S923A attempts to do so for Australian policymakers as discussed 
in Chapter 2. Australian legal and accounting professionals both concurred, legislating and 
disclosing the difference between financial product sales and independent financial advice 
should resolve the best interest duty, APLs disputes (Certified Practicing Accountants 2014; 
Hewison 2014; Mitchell 2014) and misunderstandings by the public.  
Therefore, to empirically assess cultural-cognitive legitimacy depends on establishing whether 
licensing authorised representatives through third-party product-aligned licensees provides 
clients with a clear distinction between independence [identity] and conflicted association to 
product-aligned licensees [identity]; hence independent advice [role] and conflicted advice 
                                                 
96 Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 is available at this link: <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017 
C00328/Html/Volume_1#primary-nav>. 
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[role]; to achieve the objectives of the Act [performance]. If the distinction between 
independent financial advice and conflicted product advice is clear, then the author concludes 
here licensing advisers via licensees displays cognitive legitimacy.   
Clearly defining and differentiating advisers who provide s923A independent advice97 from 
those who may provide conflicted advice (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services 2009b; Boutique Financial Planners 2014) is important to avoid clients being 
misled. As was mentioned earlier, a Roy Morgan study (Morris 2013) provided some evidence 
licensees who do not use or display their affiliated institutional brand are placing clients under 
the misconception they are dealing with an independent financial adviser, when they are not 
(Vickovich 2013). Arguably misleading clients in this way contravenes the Act, potentially 
leading to civil and criminal legal action and/or penalties against licensees and their advisers 
(Bird & Gilligan 2015a). Therefore, visibly defining and differentiating advisers who comply 
with s923A from those who do not (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services 2009b; Boutique Financial Planners 2014) is important to avoid clients being 
misled. Furthermore, an article in Money Management (2012) stated financial planning is 
unable to be recognised as a true profession until the public understands the clear division 
between financial planning and product distribution. In addition to this important view, North 
(2015) claimed for Australians to receive high quality reasonable priced financial advice, the 
advice industry needs more independent advisers. 
3.5 ALTERNATIVE ADVISER LICENSING MODEL IN THE DEBATE 
A crisis, exposed by the media according to Riaz, Buchanan and Bapuji (2011), forces actors 
to recognise the end and inevitability of change in practice. In agreement with the reasoning of 
Scott (2013), if the existing set of rules, norms and beliefs are under siege, hence undergoing 
delegitimation, then it inevitably should be superseded by new rules, norms and scripts. Various 
researchers (see, Suchman 1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002; Chelli, Durocher & Richard 2014) 
have proposed various legitimation strategies in the company of a legitimacy crisis. Low (2010) 
theorised, once one makes a branding of ‘illegitimacy’, it is difficult to defend or repair the 
legitimacy. Accordingly, if advisers themselves upon reflection think they face a dual-agency 
role, the objectives of the Act are unachieved and/or Suchman’s legitimacy criteria extended 
                                                 
97 Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 is available at this link: <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017 
C00328/Html/Volume_1#primary-nav>. 
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and applied to the current licensing model above are unmet, then arguments are strengthened 
for alternative options of licensing.  
While a myriad of alternative solutions is available, this section specifically focuses on 
individual licensing of financial advisers through an independent professional body, coined 
here as an independent financial planning professional standards board. Addressed in the next 
section are the many reasons for this focus on individual licensing, namely promoting public 
trust and confidence, independent individual advisers versus conflicted institutional advisers, 
other professions licensing regimes, a single [independent professional financial planning 
standards board] rather than multiple licensing entity/ies [AFS licensees] with the purpose of 
eliminating conflict of interest from association.  
3.5.1 Client trust and confidence 
Recall from Chapter 2, one of the purposes of FOFA reforms was to build trust and confidence 
in financial advisers (Ap 2011; Gray & Ireland 2011; Kell 2012; Moran 2014).  
Balasubramnian, Brisker and Gradisher (2014) found, trust is one of two most important 
determining factors to influence whether a person seeks financial advice or not.  The other is 
cost, which is a matter for future research, because it is outside the scope of this study. The 
legal fraternity also refers to trust and confidence relationships as fiduciary relationships 
(Himstreet 2012; Lazaro 2013; Campbell 2014; Corones & Irving 2016).  
Unsurprisingly, Hely (2012) mentioned an ANZ Bank financial literacy survey (The Social 
Research Centre 2011) found approximately 42 per cent of Australians distrust what advisers 
recommended. Nearly 67 per cent of investors, according to findings by Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (2013a) distrust financial advisers to take their fiduciary best 
interest duty seriously. In the annual Roy Morgan ‘Image of Professions’ survey of 2015 only 
24  per cent [down by 4 per cent since the previous year] of Australians over the age of 14 rated 
financial advisers very high or high for ‘ethics and honesty’ (Morgan & Levine 2015). A year 
later, the annual Roy Morgan ‘Image of Professions’ survey found only 27 per cent [up by 3 
per cent since the previous year] rated financial advisers very high or high for the same 
variables (Independent Financial Adviser News 2016b). Accountants were up by 6 per cent 
from the previous year, rating 51 per cent (Independent Financial Adviser News 2016b). These 
statistics are important to consider, because underlying elements of trust and confidence is 
ethical behaviour (Chua & Rahman 2011). Another underlying element of trust and confidence 
is best interest duty (Himstreet 2012; Lazaro 2013; Campbell 2014; Corones & Irving 2016). 
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Trust and confidence issues are not only a difficulty for financial advisers, but also for medical 
professionals, accountants and lawyers (Bruce 2012; Burke et al. 2015). Given the continuing 
low level of financial literacy (The Social Research Centre 2015) among the public means 
clients need to trust professional advisers’ intentions (Worthington 2006; Evetts 2011). US 
legal scholars agree; trust and confidence favour a long-term personal relationship considering 
the personal circumstances of a person (Black 2005; Kay 2012; Frumento & Korenman 2013). 
It is not, or should not be, simply a short-term arms-length financial product sales transaction 
between strangers (Black 2005; Kay 2012; Frumento & Korenman 2013). Therefore, trust and 
confidence between principal and agent is imperative in professionalism (Evetts 2011, 2014).  
Thus the use of legal rules to create legal trust relationships (Haigh 2006), such as the current 
licensing model should be investigated as a potential source of distrust among the public. 
Especially, if Kay (2012) is correct in believing  information asymmetry and misalignment of 
incentives can be addressed by an ethos of trust and confidence generated from long-term 
personal relationships and low-volume personal sales.  Additionally, Calcagno and Monticone 
(2015) showed non-independent advisers cannot solve the low financial literacy problem. 
Hence, the researchers examines extent advisers think individual licensing would improve trust 
and confidence. This legitimacy  criteria is important to investigate, because the Professional 
Standards Councils (2014) found in research they undertook, some financial services sector 
stakeholders, mainly licensees, believed improvement in trust and confidence was one of the 
many benefits of professionalism.  
3.5.2 Independent professional versus conflicted institutional licensing 
Although the numbers are unconfirmed, probable from the discussion so far, only a few 
financial advisers work for s923A independent Australian Financial Services licensees. Most 
advisers are associated with various product issuers with numerous financial services business 
models, including financial advisory services (Steen, McGrath & Wong 2016) offering 
differing roles for them (Sanders & Roberts 2015). Even advisers who represent themselves as 
IFAs follow the institutional model, whereby conflicted recommendations involve indirect 
investments and platform options, ignoring direct investments and ‘off platform’ options for 
clients (Vickovich 2017a).  Explained in detail above, when product manufacturers, distributors 
and advisers are co-workers this leads to conflicts of interest as a consequence of this 
cohabitation (Money Management 2014). 
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Sanders and Roberts (2015, p. 18) highlighted in a white paper, the licensee-adviser licensing 
model within the financial advisory sector together with the Act favours the institutional 
commercial licensee over the individual professional adviser. They acknowledged despite the 
“legitimate legislative basis for this” (Sanders & Roberts 2015, p. 18),  it is contrary to the 
approach of professions where the individual professional advisers’ duties and obligations 
overrides those of the licensee as employer and/or principal. Consistent with this view, research 
by Hackethal, Haliassos and Jappelli (2012) indicated, both multitasking and effective 
monitoring agency costs lead to institutions with employed agents, such as bank financial 
advisers, choosing lower standards of product recommendations to both unsophisticated and 
inattentive experienced sophisticated clients, than the more entrepreneurial independent 
financial advisers. Thus private profit-seeking institutions are untrustworthy to regulate their 
own activities in the best interests of the public (Omarova 2010). Even as far back as 2003 
(Bakir), institutional regulation in financial services was suggested to becoming obsolete where 
institutional, sectoral, and product boundaries were being eroded by technological and technical 
innovations in finance. 
Additionally, recall from Chapter 2, Haigh (2006) interpreted, the introduction of the legislation 
through FSR has produced incommensurate levels of accountability in financial services nor 
tangible benefits to the public. Rogue financial advisers (Valentine 2008; Beal & McKeown 
2009; Cull 2009; Chua & Rahman 2011; Fitzpatrick 2011; Kingsford Smith 2011; Taylor 2011; 
Walton 2012), for example Don Nguyen and Anthony Awkar of Commonwealth Bank 
Financial Planning, (Staff Reporter 2011; Independent Financial Adviser News 2014a; Mennen 
2014) could easily hide within large institutions.  According to Starke (2013a), large institutions 
make monitoring and supervising individual advisers for compliance contraventions 
problematic. Prior to statutory fiduciary duty obligation, Gor (2005) claimed the burden of 
accountability rested entirely on the licensee to authorise the representative to offer financial 
services. However, post-statutory best interest duty has made individuals personally 
accountable to some extent, because current licensing makes the licensee responsible for the 
actions of their agents (Smith, Clarke & Rogers 2017). Carlin and Gervais (2012) argued, when 
a retail client is financially hurt, then in theory two parties are liable, namely the product 
provider [licensee] and their agent [adviser]. Yet evidently, in practice, despite licensees 
auditing their authorised representatives to ensure they comply with the requirements of the 
licence, large licensees are ineffective in making individual advisers accountable when things 
go wrong (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2017e).  
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Carlin and Gervais (2012) proposed the legislation must take into consideration compliance by 
both the product provider regarding product quality, in terms of transparency and cost 
effectiveness. Important to note, is compliance concerning the behaviour of the advisers in 
placing clients into financial instruments and the contractual agreements between these parties. 
Yet, the current licensing model does not reinforce their best interest duty to clients, because 
evidence (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2017e) demonstrate it makes 
identifying the rogue advisers within large institutions challenging.  
From the standpoint of Considnine and Ali Afzal (2011), effective accountability necessitates 
the ability to determine the contributions of each actor, before apportioning responsibility to 
the true actors.  Furthermore, important is the extent these writers view how the accountability 
is shared in indistinguishable proportions between two actors with overlapping vertical and 
horizontal domains and responsibilities. Certainly from the above discussion on legitimacy, 
both vertical [for example managing conflict of interest from association] and horizontal 
[putting the interest of the client first](Valentine 2013) domains and responsibilities between 
Australian licensees and their representatives under the current licensing regime occurs. No 
scholarly research, measuring the extent advisers and licensees share accountability for 
breaches, is evident. The reason may be, because Considnine and Ali Afzal (2011) contended, 
identifying each one’s contribution to the violation, as well as identifying individuals 
responsible for infringements within entities is difficult.  
Transgressions in Australia were also at the institutional level in the case of Great Southern 
Limited, TimberCorp Group and Commonwealth Bank of Australia, who encouraged their 
agents to deliver narrow sales focused recommendations to their clients (Australian 
Government Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee 2012; Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2017e). Thus, identifying whether licensee, adviser or both are 
responsible for violations under the current licensing regime is difficult. This difficulty is 
confirmed by Doctor George Gilligan during his submission to the Murray Review (O'Brien & 
Gilligan 2014, p. 7)  claiming “...there is a certain imbalance between the privileged position 
that participation in the financial sector allows through the mechanism of the licence—which 
is a gift of the state—and what might be termed the civic duties and obligations that potential 
carries with it. We think the balance has shifted too far towards an almost automatic 
expectation of assuming a licence. This has been compounded because of the organisational 
context—many of the financial planners and advisers in Australia are employed by large 
organisations, so there is a diminution of accountability and transparency in relation to the 
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activities of individuals who are selling products or recommending products to consumers.” 
With this issue being problematic, individual accountability affords strong incentive for agents 
to align their actions with the principals’ preferences (Considnine & Ali Afzal 2011), namely 
the client as opposed to institutional-individual [licensee-adviser] accountability. Thus, 
questionable under the current licensing regime is how individual financial advisers can be 
accountable to their clients under statutory fiduciary duty, when they are not independently 
licensed from institutional licensees.  
Well-documented in academic works is independence is considered one of the attributes of a 
professional (Riaz, Buchanan & Bapuji 2011). Independent financial advice and how it is 
applied is also recognised in practice by the leaders of financial planning professional 
associations (Slattery 2014) and the Professional Standards Authority (Power 2016a) as a 
critical ingredient in ensuring the professionalism of the financial advisory industry. Both 
corporation [institutional licensees] (Australian Government Corporations and Markets 
Advisory Committee 2012) and natural persons [individual financial advisers, including those 
who self-license] are subject to the same licensing regime when clients do not receive financial 
recommendations from the institutional entities. Instead, retail clients develop a supposedly 
long-term relationship (Knie-Andersen 2002; Johnsen 2010; Siddiqui & Sharma 2010; Bruce 
2012, p. 86) of trust with ‘natural persons’ to provide them with recommendations that are 
supposedly in their best interests. Moreover, Considnine and Ali Afzal (2011) cautioned 
individual accountability is determined retrospectively when an assessment of the agent’s 
actions by principals is made after the fact.  
Recent developments in behavioural theory, notably Dolan et al. (2012) showed making even 
subtle changes to contexts, environment or choice architecture can have a powerful effect on 
behaviour. Therefore, in this study advisers are asked to reflect on the recommendation by 
Steen, McGrath and Wong (2016) of removing the connection between product issuers, because 
it may lead to a culture shift the financial adviser sector needs to minimise financial scandals.  
What is questioned here is whether advisers should be disconnected from being licensed, 
regulated and authorised by multiple AFSL institutions by reconsidering recommendations 
during the Ripoll Inquiry (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services 2009b) and consultations during the Murray Review. Both put individual licensing for 
financial advisers on the table (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services 2014). Also, individual licensing was supported by both Professor Justin O’ Brien and 
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Doctor George Gilligan, who proposed framing the professional obligation required 
considering empirical evidence around the failure of the prevalent codes of conduct, together 
with the risks associated with the existing institutional licensing regime over individual 
licensing (O'Brien & Gilligan 2014).  
Providing an alternative licensing solution is important, because although the current licensing 
model may have made significant inroads to protect clients, it has neglected to adequately 
define and categorise the different services authorised representatives offer in a manner to assist 
the public to clearly differentiate (Australian Government 2016) between advisers who are 
s923A independent from those who are not. Furthermore, the structure of the current licensing 
system needs a review, as this is one of the determining factors of how licensees and their 
advisers define and develop their business models. From observations made by Sanders and 
Roberts (2015, p. 11) as financial planning professionalises, one of the challenges the financial 
advisory sector faces is identifying and defining the professional and seemingly non-
professional roles.  
Furthermore, Evetts (2011) discovered, when investigating professionals [specifically, doctors 
and academics] employed in public services organisations [hospitals and universities], he found 
professionals are closed to being controlled through managerial interventions and institutional 
controls. His research established, accompanied by high status, these professional groups have 
autonomy over their work practices, providing them with both power and authority. 
Furthermore, for him it is difficult to measure and standardise these professionals’ outputs nor 
their work. In other words, they cannot be controlled using institutions nor the market. His 
findings showed the state-employee medical practitioner use their cultural authority and 
legitimacy to maintain dominance to retain occupational control of work processes and 
relations with their patients. According to him, what is detrimental to professionalism are 
institutional audits, targets and key performance indicators, because they lead to distorting not 
only work processes, procedures and priorities, but also cause ‘unintended’ consequences for 
the doctors and their patients. Arguably, professionalising advisers will lead to similar 
detriments, albeit absent under the current institutional licensing model. Evetts (2011) 
recommended, a practitioner’s identity, work culture, opportunity to engage with peers to form 
and maintain knowledge and expertise all contribute to improving professionalism benefiting 
both practitioner and patient.  
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Questionable and a matter of contention is whether institutions and ‘natural persons’ should be 
subject to the same regulations. Many authors agreed (see for example, North 2015; Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission 2017a; Smith, Clarke & Rogers 2017; Vickovich 
2017a), professional independence is a key controversial issue facing the advisory sector. From 
the discussion so far, the focus of previous studies, but with scant attention, has been on 
corporate licensing of financial advisers. Serpell (2008) supports the view of individual 
financial advisers having a separate standalone licensing or registration system, separate from 
financial product and service institutions. Financial planning is a multidisciplinary profession, 
which can support a standalone regulatory system (Macey 2002b). Especially as the financial 
planning discipline specialises more and more, the need to develop standards for 
comprehensive advice separate from specialities along similar lines to medical boards 
responsible for reviewing medical specialities is inevitable (Macey 2002a). Thus, it is time to 
consider individual licensing of ‘natural persons’, like other professions. Especially when 
principally this system of institutional licensing is absent in other true professions.  
3.5.3 Individual licensing in line with other Australian professions  
Troubling in practice and the media (see, Macey 2002b; Horsley & Thomas 2003; Moisand 
2008a; Valentine 2008; Australian Government Treasury 2009; Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Corporations and Financial Services 2009b; Smith 2009; Financial Services Authority 2010; 
Laby 2010; Ap 2011; Bruce 2012, p. 303; Inderst & Ottaviani 2012a; Knutsen & Cameron 
2012; Frumento & Korenman 2013; Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2014f; 
Campo 2014; Financial Planning Coalition 2014; McInnes, Ahmed & Delpachitra 2014; Burke 
et al. 2015; fi360 FiduciaryPath 2015; North 2015; Rubin 2015), the Australian financial 
planning emerging profession is often compared to being similar in professionalism to other 
professions. Financial advisers have been likened to other professionals, including doctors, 
lawyers and accountants (Ap 2011; Bruce 2012; Knutsen & Cameron 2012; Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission 2014f; Burke et al. 2015). For example, just as doctors 
manage their patients’ health needs following a logical process, so financial advisers do the 
same for their clients’ regarding their future financial needs following a financial planning 
process.  
Yet upon closer inspection, these proclamations of similarity are misleading. Medical 
practitoners may work for corporations (Breakey & Sampford 2017, p. 262) and/or prescribe 
pharmaceutical products from preferred suppliers (Everingham 2014), but they are not licensed 
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by these third parties.  Similarly, lawyers and accountants may work for large corporate 
commercial institutions, yet they hold professional autonomy and control within their 
employment roles (Rubin 2015; Breakey & Sampford 2017). Once accountants, (Bamber & 
Iyer 2002; Institute of Chartered Accountants of Australia 2012) lawyers (Arteta 2016; 
Australian Bar Association 2016) and doctors (Medical Board of Australia 2012) leave their 
workplace they may retain their professional status (Evetts 2011), plus their licence to practise 
and are permitted to continue working without needing to transfer to any licensee.  
Therefore, upon closer examination, the way individual financial advisers are licensed through 
the ASIC licensees as specified in the Act, makes this claim of similarity deceptive for several 
reasons. Despite this comparative likeness, Cull (2009) reported in her paper, some accountants 
do not see financial planning as meeting all the requirements of a profession in light of their 
historical and current embedded sales culture. What is missing in the FOFA legislation is the 
part that begs the question whether financial advisers are indeed able to become a true 
profession, in substance, like doctors, accountants and lawyers when not licensed in a similar 
manner as these professionals (Sanders, 2015).  
Furthermore, among others, Bearden (2002) and Cheetham and Chivers (2005) set out 
numerous characteristics of  traditional professions, which they believed provides professions 
their legitimacy. A substantial body of literature (see for example, Watts & Murphy 2009; 
Frumento & Korenman 2013) supports this perspective. Key attributes to being a profession 
include it is self-regulatory, collegial and client-focused (Bearden 2002). Bearden (2002) stated 
all of this adds up to a profession with status within a society operating within a recognised 
professional body. These characteristics gives the profession its legitimacy (Cheetham & 
Chivers 2005). Initially it was the legal profession adopting a self-regulatory model where its 
ethical standards are managed through legal professional associations, within law firms and by 
barristers using the rules of the court (Parker 2004). Accountants drew on the experience of 
lawyers in their efforts to professionalise according to Cooper and Robson (2006) by working 
together on an independence model (Carnegie & O'Connell 2012).  
Surprisingly, Cull (2009) observed based on her research results no amount of legislation has 
led the emerging financial planning profession to pursue self-regulation in their efforts to 
professionalise. This is surprising, given the advice sector can draw on the history, experiences 
and model of these other professions to develop their own professional licensing model. Bruce 
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(2012,p. 344) observed, historically advisers have not formally belonged to a profession or 
were formally classified as professionals.  
Notably, a wide variety of academic research define these professions as altruistic in nature 
whereby they are oriented towards service rather than profit operating with autonomy within 
their job role (Rubin 2015). This has not been the case with financial advisers who face conflict 
of interest from association. Distinct from the financial advice profession, the medical, legal 
and accounting professions are independent, structured and hierarchical (Riaz, Buchanan & 
Bapuji 2011). In 2011, noted by several authors (Riaz, Buchanan & Bapuji) was, in contrast to 
other professions, Australian advisers were not self-regulatory, collegial, independent, 
structured, hierarchical and client-focused. Nor do even highly qualified and professional 
advisers have professional autonomy (Smith, Armstrong & Francis 2009). Nor do they operate 
within a recognised single independent professional body with status within a society, as 
observed in other professionals (Riaz, Buchanan & Bapuji 2011). Unlike financial advisers, 
other true professionals who are personally and individually licensed or registered either with 
a national licence and/or with a state-based licence to practise their profession in Australia via 
a professional standards board, which is usually a single enforcement body. Through their 
independent bodies such as the Medical Board of Australia, Law Societies of each state, 
Australian Bar Association, Institute of Chartered Accountants Australian Board and the CPA 
Board, Tom (1995, p. 3) noted, each new entrant into the profession must meet their specific 
requirements, including specific entrance and ongoing membership requirements and standards 
of ethics, education and performance on a continual basis (Breakey & Sampford 2017). Similar 
to doctors (Medical Board of Australia 2012) and lawyers (Arteta 2016; Australian Bar 
Association 2016), when accountants leave public practice they can retain their registration 
with their professional association (Bamber & Iyer 2002; Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Australia 2012; Certified Practicing Accountant 2016). Therefore, once medical, accounting 
and legal professionals acquire a license or become registered, they never lose their licence to 
practise their profession unless barred by their independent professional bodies. This contrasts 
with what happens to Australian financial advisers. According to Clayton Utz Financial 
Services Reform Group (2002) financial advisers lose their ability to earn a living once they 
leave a licensee. They either must join another licensee or apply for their own licence. Although 
empirically unconfirmed, this could act as a disincentive for potential new entrants to pursue a 
career as a financial adviser.  
126 
 
Despite competent advisers investing in degree qualifications, unless affiliated to a licensee 
they are no longer legally or technically ‘authorised’ to provide financial advice. This 
contributes to the shortages of professional financial advisers, and more so the independents. 
The professional associations of other professions, such as the CPA Australia, Institute of 
Chartered Accountants Australia and Law Society of NSW are formally recognised as 
professions under the Professional Standards legislation and schemes (Sanders & Roberts 
2015). The entrants are required to meet entry prerequisites, formalised education, ongoing 
training and work experience.  
Doctors, lawyers and accountants possess independence, knowledge and skills based on 
theoretical knowledge gained at a university or tertiary educational institution or a training 
provider where entry is on a selective basis in contrast to occupations of a more manual nature 
such as the trades and sales.  They meet the five key elements of 40 separate units of a 
profession and professionalism (Sanders & Roberts 2015). Within this framework, they can 
work in different sectors of their profession with different competencies and specialisations. 
Unsurprising, financial advisers also work with varying competencies and specialisations, inter 
alia, estate planning, SMSF, age-care and retirement planning, as well as in different sectors of 
the financial services industry. Unlike other professionals, Schuchardt et al. (2007) confirmed 
financial advisers do not control their specialised knowledge and skills.  Nor do they have any 
autonomy when operating under the licence conditions and engagement contractual 
arrangements of their AFSL licensees.  
Reinforced by a substantial body of literature (see for example, Rogers 2004; Watts & Murphy 
2009; Frumento & Korenman 2013; Rogers, Smith & Chellew 2017) contemporary professions 
are constantly evolving to address new challenges. Especially around professional ethics 
(Breakey 2017) autonomy, power and authority as a result of corporatisation of professions and 
professionals (Evetts 2011; Breakey & Sampford 2017; Rogers, Smith & Chellew 2017), 
notwithstanding technological consequences (Greenleaf 2017). This includes problems created 
by large corporate professional services institutions employing them [corporatisation of 
professions and professionals] (Breakey & Sampford 2017) and of course, technology (Rogers, 
Smith & Chellew 2017; Smith, Clarke & Rogers 2017), specifically Fintech disruptions 
(Morgan Stanley 2018). Like other professions, seemingly advisers face a struggle for 
autonomy, power and authority around professional ethics too (Smith, Armstrong & Francis 
2009).  
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Importantly, Arman and Shackman (2012) argued, the Australian general public can distinguish 
between the different designations in the medical, legal and accounting professions, by their 
title, qualification and competencies [specialisations]. However, allegedly with no compelling 
empirical evidence in Australia, they cannot readily identify the different designations for 
financial advisers (Australian Government Treasury 2009; Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services 2009b; Ap 2011). Financial adviser regulation covers 
various titles, are subject to different, and arguably inconsistent (Laby 2010), educational, 
regulatory and ethical standards. North (2015) was of the view lawyers, doctors and 
accountants of a range of skills and experience charging varying fees operate via both regional 
and non-regional large and small practices across Australia with services provided to a broad 
spectrum of people. Along these lines, what sets true professions apart from the emerging 
financial advice profession is all professionals observe both a code of practice and ethics. They 
also have the characteristic of being non-commercial, which is a key difficulty for financial 
advisers working for commercially oriented licensees. Professionally qualified doctors, lawyers 
and accountants are subject to discipline should they infringe the profession’s code of practice 
or ethics (see for example, Australian Medical Association (AMA) 2009; Accounting 
Professional and Ethical Standards Board Ltd 2011; Law Council of Australia (LCA) 2011).  
As was discussed in Chapter 2, to promote financial planning to be more in line with the other 
professions, and following the footsteps of UK’s RDR, new legislation - the Corporations 
Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Bill 2017 was passed on 9 February 
2017 with the aim to raise the existing professional, educational and ethical standards of 
Australian financial advisers wanting to enter the emerging profession. To operate within the 
emerging profession, this legislation effective from 1 July 2017, all new entrants will require 
an undergraduate degree, completion of a professional year and pass an exam, in addition to 
complying with a code of ethics and ongoing professional training. 
Particularly important in this research setting is the view of Rubin (2015) about  confusion 
around titles and designations undermining the trust society requires to justify granting 
individuals professional autonomy, which is needed to qualify as true professionals. Bearden 
(2006) was adamant, uncompromised professional judgement without conflicts of interest is 
the most valuable service a financial adviser can give to their clients. Unlike other professions, 
Schuchardt et al. (2007) confirmed financial advisers do not have a monopoly over the use of 
their expert knowledge and skills to practise their craft. North (2015) claimed if financial advice 
industry is to be competitive and innovative while transitioning into profession then similar 
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features to other professions will be important. If advisers want to be trusted professionals, then 
Kaissar (2016) recommended they must first become a profession.  
3.5.4 Single independent monopoly self-regulatory adviser licensing body  
While much has been done by the policymakers, according to Steen, McGrath and Wong (2016) 
financial planning has some way to go before it will be considered a true profession. However, 
it is argued here this maybe not so, because government support was present during the Ripoll 
Inquiry (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009b), 
Murray Review  (Commonwealth of Australia 2014a; Vickovich & Garber 2014), and more 
recently support by the Professional Standards Authority (Sanders & Roberts 2015) for 
encouraging financial planning to professionalise by, for instance, considering self-regulatory 
approaches. Yet to date, no clear decisive commitment by the government to self-regulation 
has been evident, except perhaps setting up FASEA. Yet, professional associations such as the 
SMSF Professionals’ Association of Australia has called for a new licensing system to 
encourage a proliferation of independent financial advisers, akin to the Registered Independent 
Advisor regime in the United States (Vickovich 2014b). Efforts by the FPA of Australia is 
focusing on encouraging Commonwealth policy to accept a so-called SRO (Taylor 2014). 
Therefore, of interest in this study is self-regulation in the form of a single independent 
professional financial planning self-regulatory body to license or accredit individual advisers 
as true professionals.  
From the literature review evidently, the debate surrounding self-regulation is nothing new in 
Australia (Carroll & McGregor-Lowndes 2001), nor abroad (Omarova 2010). Numerous 
government inquiries and public comment has spanned many years into the nature of self-
regulation in Financial Services in Australia (Bell 1975; Carroll & McGregor-Lowndes 2001; 
Pearson 2006a) and the United States (Gillis 1986; ICFP 1999; On Wall Street 2003; Powell 
2008). Various speeches by regulators wondering about self-regulatory approaches (Pearson 
2006b) complemented these inquiries and commentaries. Professional media in Australia has 
also made anecdotal reference to self-regulation (Vickovich & Stewart 2014). 
Omarova (2010) observed neither the US reform legislation nor the Australian FOFA 
considered the role of self-regulation. The researcher in this enquiry concurs with them. Any 
long-term regulatory reform in the financial services sector must consider the potential role of 
self-regulation (Omarova 2010). Notably, an independent professional standards board was 
mooted in the UK when feedback to FSA surmised this would potentially incur duplicative 
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operating costs, roles and responsibility, as well as potentially lead to contradictory decision 
making between a professional standards board and the FSA (Complinet – Thomson Reuters – 
Governance Risk & Compliance 2010; Financial Services Authority 2010). The UK 
Government also believed, unlike the legal services profession, which has recently separated 
the approved regulators’ representative functions from their regulatory functions, the financial 
services sector already has that separation (Financial Services Authority 2010). Instead, FSA 
[now FCA] decided to focus on supervising the competence and ethical conduct of advisers 
within the regulated financial institutions as well as development of standards for advisers  
(Complinet – Thomson Reuters – Governance Risk & Compliance 2010; Financial Services 
Authority 2010). Yet, US financial planner groups supported a single SRO as a means to restrict 
anyone else from offering financial planning services unless registered with the SRO and 
maintaining fiduciary standards (Thompson 2001). The merits of a self-regulatory organisation 
were considered by the SEC in the US, because SEC examiners are spread too thin trying to 
perform their regulatory duties overseeing advisers (Schapiro 2009). Specifically FINRA 
believed, self-regulation is the most effective and efficient solution (Bhargava 2009) to ensure 
consumer protection and market integrity for an efficient and effective securities market 
(Balasubramnian, Brisker & Gradisher 2014).   
Yet not all authors agreed (Hansen 2008; Powell 2008) on the basis any regulation by the SRO 
would be too excessive. Powell (2008) found from an FPA survey, US financial advisers prefer 
regulation by a professional regulatory organisation such as the CFP® board, rather than self-
regulation as investment advisers under a SRO boards administered by the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority. For the main reason advisers viewed the CFP® board better understands 
the difference between financial advisers and RIAs or registered representatives than FINRA 
or SEC. Unlike the SEC and FINRA, ASIC believes self-regulation, self-licensing at the 
individual level or a professional standards board is not an appropriate solution, rather opting 
for retention of co-regulation with licensee institutions (Tyson-Chan 2006; Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission 2012a). ASIC argued, self-licensing of individuals is 
difficult to achieve, given presently financial advice providers of varying competencies work 
in different sectors of financial services (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
2012a). Whereas FPA called for self-regulation through professional association membership 
(Spits 2013). The same arguments prevailed in the United States since 1999 (ICFP 1999), when 
the Institute of Certified Financial Planner® and life insurers (Thompson 2001) opposed efforts 
by the United States government to establish a self-regulatory organisation. The prevailing 
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argument centred around the financial service community to be considered too diverse for this 
type of regulatory structure, as well as adding another layer of supervision, which has been 
empirically unsupported. 
Corbett (1999) contended self-regulation is an indirect form of regulation also known as 
deregulation. To the contrary, Omarova (2010) proposed it is not identical to deregulation at 
all, but a far more complex and flexible system combining direct government regulation with 
participation by private industry participants. For purposes of this study Omarova (2010, p. 
700) defined  “...self-regulation as a regime of collective rule-making, a regulatory process 
whereby an industry-level [as opposed to a governmental or firm-level] organization sets rules 
and standards.” In this way, they oversee, monitor and enforce compliance of the rules, while 
governing the behaviour of the members of that industry. Omarova (2010) theorised, self-
regulation is a move away from policing the conduct of financial institutions to a more 
comprehensive idea.  
The literature review revealed numerous advantages and disadvantages of industry self-
regulation. For example, compared to regulators regulating financial service sector-wide 
conduct, industry self-regulation supplements the law with more effective governance setting, 
customer service or technical standards in the presence of the potential for commercial interests 
to undermine standards (Commonwealth of Australia 2014a). Ojo (2011) construed, 
contribution to the advantages of self-regulation included proximity, flexibility, compliance 
and resources. Also supported by the writings of Omarova (2010), Ojo (2011) claimed, in 
contrast to government regulators, a self-regulatory institution can identify, assess and resolve 
problems and obtain information quicker, because of their closer access to the industry. 
However, he warned, proximity to the industry can also be a disadvantage of self-regulation, 
especially when conflicts of interest are present. For the reason of political limitations and 
processes faced by regulators, especially during times of unpopular or difficult decisions, 
makes self-regulation much more flexible. In addition to articulating the theoretical basis for a 
self-regulatory body, Overton (2008) believed this body is also more likely to commit to greater 
compliance. However, he does caution, this will depend on whether adequate disciplining of 
serious perpetrators who breach the rules, the strength of enforcement and monitoring rules for 
compliance and accountability are in place. Pearson (2006b) claimed self-regulation might 
reduce the costs for both government and business, if targeted and needs specific. From a 
funding point of view, Overton (2008) felt it is easier to procure resources through a self-
regulatory private institution as opposed to through the government. Yet not everyone agrees 
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costs will decrease, because for some stakeholders in Australia (Sanders & Roberts 2015) and 
in the US (Tittworthy, 2013) it is likely to send many businesses into insolvency.  
Notwithstanding, increase to advice costs for financial planning clients due to regulatory 
reforms and changing the licensing model (Mennen, 2014). Although accountants of Chartered 
Accountants Australia and New Zealand and Certified Practicing Accountants Australia 
supported individual licensing for financial advisers, they felt the individual compliance costs 
may act as a disincentive for individual licensees (Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services 2014). Yet, based on a qualitative study to establish some 
of the challenges the public, government and industry face, together with the drivers and 
barriers with regards to professionalism (Sanders & Roberts 2015), some financial services 
stakeholders interviewed, felt the costs of compliance and regulation should reduce by 38 per 
cent by professionalising (Sanders & Roberts 2015).  
Despite the barriers identified, importantly the interviewees claimed professionalisation should 
outweigh the costs (Sanders & Roberts 2015). Furthermore, Pearson (2006b) cautioned, to 
achieve the regulatory objectives, self-regulation depends not only on the cost, but also how 
responsive to rule-making the body may be, and the extent the regulatees engage in the process. 
Especially if Omarova (2010) is correct in trusting the ability of private industry participants to 
better monitor and regulate themselves within a dynamic global context, than government 
regulators would be able to. Furthermore, Omarova (2010) argued, self-regulation, similar to 
professional self-regulation evident in law and medicine, is critical to the proper functioning of 
the financial services industry. Although papers written on self-regulation for professions such 
as for legal (Parker 1999, 2004) and accounting (Cooper & Robson 2006; Raar 2008) is around, 
this has been more the case in the United States, with less research evident in Australian 
financial planning literature. This is surprising, because a white paper (Sanders & Roberts 
2015) and several legal journal articles (Tuch 2005; Tuffin 2009; Sanders 2014) considers self-
regulation as a viable option for the emerging financial planning profession.  
It is well-documented there is the need to put in place appropriate, properly working systems 
to maintain the integrity (Thynne 2011), acceptability, credibility, approval and support 
(Considnine & Ali Afzal 2011) among all the participants within the emerging financial 
planning profession of self-regulation. If the government is serious about professionalising 
financial planning, then independent financial planning professional education, registration, 
competence, conduct and disciplinary standards board is the proposed model for individual 
licensing of financial advisers to ensure financial planning moves towards a recognised 
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profession operating in a similar manner to those of other professions. By linking into the 
government regulatory purpose, this professional body would then enforce their own conditions 
of membership, formulate their own rules, carry out their own discipline and impose their own 
conditions of dismissal (Black 1996). For instance, according to the white paper by Sanders 
and Roberts (2015), for a profession to exist requires a self-regulatory entity, regulated by the 
Professional Standards Board as qualified by the professional standards regulation. 
Accordingly, on behalf of the Australian public, this entity oversees and administers 
professional entry, professional standards of educational and ethics, a professional year 
requirement as well as registration examination requirements, notwithstanding the compliance 
expectations (Sanders & Roberts 2015). Included in its list of requirements, the professional 
must be a member of a professional body operating under a Professional Standards Scheme 
approved by the Professional Standards Councils. If financial advisers were to become true 
professionals, they would need to observe the regulations governing professions, namely the 
state-based Professional Standards Act98 (Power 2016a). Applied to individual licensing of 
financial advisers, effectively means regulating advisers at the individual financial planning 
professional level, not regulator ASIC or institutional licensee level.  
Thus, this research considers a single independent professional financial planning body to set 
the rules and standards to govern the entry, behaviour and exit of the members of the emerging 
profession, while monitoring and enforcing compliance rules specific to financial advisers. 
ASIC lacks confidence one industry body can effectively be disciplined enough to enforce a 
self-regulatory code across the different industry sectors (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2012a).  Yet Sanders and Roberts (2015, p. 20) agreed, if the rules and 
“regulations are specified, administered and enforced by a combination of the state and the 
regulated organisations” it will lead to a principle-based, rather than rules-based approach. In 
other words, the government identifies and legislates the principles and the profession regulates 
the detail to regulation (Sanders & Roberts 2015).  
Recently the government has made a concerted move towards a single professional body to set 
rules and standards to govern behaviour of financial advisers with the passing of 
the Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Bill 2017 and 
setting up of the Financial Adviser Standards and Ethics Authority (FASEA) (Newnham 2017). 
                                                 
98 This legislation specifies for Australian professions rules around being a professional, with independence 
requirements being prominent. To gain access to the legislation that governs the Professional Standards 
Scheme covering every Australian jurisdiction please go to <http://www.psc.gov.au/legislation>. 
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FASEA will be responsible for governing the conduct of financial advice professionals 
whereby all advisers will complete mandatory educational and training requirements, an 
industry exam, and will adhere to a Code of Ethics commencing 1 January 2019 (O'Dwyer 
2017). Kohler (2017) is raising some important points in popular media so that everyone starts 
thinking about this new body. Specifically, he claimed it is unclear how FASEA and the 
licensing powers of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission will work together. 
For instance, he noted advisers must now comply with both ASIC and FASEA requirements. 
ASIC can cancel advisers’ authority to practise their craft for specific infringements of the Act 
and FASEA for breaching educational and ethical standards. Thus, he wonders if this an 
opportunity for FASEA to eventually be fully responsible for the licensing of individual 
financial advisers or not. In this research a key consideration is whether FASEA is key to 
removing the connection between product issuers, resulting in the culture shift the financial 
advisor sector needs to minimise ongoing financial services advisory scandals (Steen, McGrath 
& Wong 2016). Thus, a question emerges: should this body evolve and take on the entry, 
appointment, regulation and cessation of advisers to disconnect individual advisers from 
institutional licensees?  
Importantly, previous legitimacy literature warned, according to Suddaby and Greenwood 
(2005), any proposed and implemented new institution must attain legitimacy too. If a change 
to a legitimate new system occurs, then a significant difference between the old and the new 
system is required (Rao, Morrill & Zald 2000). For instance, by eliminating conflict of interest 
from association by disconnecting advisers from product-aligned licensees.  
3.5.5 Eliminate conflict of interest from association 
Walker (2006) and West (2009), claimed the public in reality seek advice free of all conflicts 
of interest. In light of Australian policymakers’ push for professional standards advice to ensure 
higher standards of protection for the public (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations 
and Financial Services 2015), conflict of interest from association should be eliminated. 
Applying behavioural research to the licensee-adviser relationship, evidently advisers face 
institutional-professional conflict within the institutional licensing model. To illustrate how 
advisers face institutional-professional conflict, this study briefly draws on social identity 
theory, whereby Bamber and Iyer (2002) proposed, individuals put themselves into either 
compatible or competing categories, social groups or identities, such as for instance occupation 
and institution. Apply this to the current project, by licensing individual financial advisers 
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through product-aligned licensees allegedly has resulted in advisers having to choose between 
serving their clients as a ‘professional’, where conflicts of interest should matter (Bearden 
2002), while simultaneously being regulated by conflicted licensee institutions who often 
manufacture and distribute product. This identification impacts their decision making and 
behaviour (Smith 2009). For instance, employee financial advisers face conflicts between their 
professional obligations to deliver appropriate advice to clients and commercial obligations of 
business profit and time pressures within their current advisory models (Smith 2009).  
Abernethy and Wai Fong (1996) made the claim; institutions tend to mimic the behavioural 
expectations, or rules of those institutions within their field or outside their fields similar in 
complexity to themselves. Therefore, whatever the norm, irrespective of whether explicitly 
stated or implicitly observed, it will be imitated (Dolan et al. 2012). The manner in which 
advisers communicate, reason or understand information, has meant they have been faced with 
choosing between internalising the norms and values of either the occupation, institutions 
(Bamber & Iyer 2002), or both.  
Smith (2009, p. 324) found unethical behaviour because of remuneration sources is unrelated 
to the cognitive ethical reasoning of a decision maker. Instead, her findings provided evidenced 
those contextual factors, such as for example the financial services institutions’ ethical climate 
and culture influenced unethical patterns of conduct associated with remuneration structures. 
By implication, the product-aligned licensees’ ethical climate and culture should therefore 
influence the ethical behaviour of their representatives. Thus, the corporate personality of the 
licensee may possibly interfere with the operation of the professional obligation of the adviser 
employed by the licensee. When institutions’ values are incompatible with individuals’ 
professional values, then it manifests into institutional-professional conflicts (Bamber & Iyer 
2002). Bamber and Iyer (2002) noted when studying auditors, a conflict exists between the 
institutions’ wish for control, expectations of institutional loyalty, compliance with rules and 
regulations and professional employees’ [agents’] wish for professional autonomy to maintain 
high standards when serving their clients. Within the current licensing regime, a similar 
incompatibility occurs between licensees and their representatives. Arguably, licensees subject 
to their licensing conditions and commercial interests, dictate advisers’ use of knowledge and 
skills to provide unbiased professional financial advice to clients. Accordingly, he surmised, 
this conflict between meeting institutional demands, while acting in accordance with 
professional values and judgements needs some form of compromise. He added further, the 
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greater the compromise, the greater the institutional-professional tension and hence the greater 
the incompatibility between institutional and professional demands. English (2008) indicated 
professionals who work in institutions sharing the same values and goals as the profession, are 
less likely to experience the tension between their commitment and loyalty to their institution 
and their occupation.  
Although conflicts of interest can be managed, controlled and avoided through disclosures 
according to Bruhn and Miller (2014), they have their limitations. Disclosure to minimise bias 
in advice (Inderst 2009) is not always the best way to protect clients (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2014a; Demina 2014). For instance, more than a handful of international scholars 
(see, for example, the papers by Inderst & Ottaviani 2009; Loewenstein, Cain & Sah 2011; 
Inderst & Ottaviani 2012a) held the view mandatory disclosure could be publicly harmful. 
Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a) found previous experimental studies predicted disclosed 
commissions might prevent clients overloaded with facts from effectively digesting all the 
relevant information. More recently, an empirical study conducted by Egan, Matvos and Seru 
(2016) on US retail clients showed unsophisticated clients are often unaware disclosures exists, 
do not know where to source the disclosures nor interpret them adequately.  In addition, Inderst 
and Ottaviani (2012a) and others (including, Loewenstein, Cain & Sah 2011; Walton 2012) 
found previous experimental studies predicted any disclosures may lead advisers to be 
incentivised or morally justified to deviate from observing their professional standards. 
Specifically, Rubin (2015) generalised, disclosure and client consent could be used as reasons 
for advisers to dismiss their statutory fiduciary duty. Schwarcz (2014) provided an interesting 
discussion on the limitations and ineffectiveness of disclosure surrounding financial products, 
especially in terms of their design and implementation. Rubin (2015) reasoned clients trust their 
advisers so much, they will agree to disclosures in error or out of ignorance, unaware of the full 
extent of any unintended future consequences.  
Considerable evidence is available, which has led to the emergence of behavioural finance 
theory, demonstrating the risk averse public are irrational in making investment choices 
(Valentine 2013). Especially when irrelevant attributes of the financial products they invest in 
distract them from fully appreciating the risk of potential losses (Valentine 2013). Evidence 
reported by the Commonwealth of Australia (2014a) highlighted financial institutions and their 
representatives should consider their clients’ behavioural prejudices and information 
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asymmetry. Arguably, disclosure to minimise bias in advice (Inderst 2009) is not always the 
best way to protect clients (Commonwealth of Australia 2014a; Demina 2014).  
Although Angel and McCabe (2013) asserted, society tolerates conflicts of interest as 
inescapable, (Tuch 2005, p. 38) maintained complying by managing the conflict, not 
necessarily avoiding or eliminating it, may leave an institution in breach of their fiduciary duty. 
This fact infers not only are advisers at risk of unintended non-compliance of their fiduciary 
duty, but their licensees too. Schwarcz (2009) says this is an example of unintended, adverse 
consequences created by the regulation. Especially, if Australian Government commentators 
(Sinodinos 2013c, 2013a) claimed at various conferences in 2013, the political agenda is about 
eliminating conflicts of interest within financial planning. Therefore, with this lack of 
consensus on some of the issues around conflicts of interest, this study considers the extent it 
licensing advisers with an individual licence via a single independent professional body 
eliminates this. This is important because Bearden (2002) noted a defining characteristic of a 
profession is conflicts of interest matter. He stated further, professional bodies expect 
avoidance of conflicts of interest, because they theoretically damage both the professional 
relationship of trust between adviser and client, plus the quality of work provided by the 
adviser. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
Whether the appointment, authorisation and regulation of advisers through third-party licensees 
as specified in the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 is a significant problem is unclear. 
Therefore, questioned in this inquiry is the support for the legitimacy of the current licensee-
adviser licensing model for individual financial advisers. Mainly, because predominantly 
negative mixed messages from various stakeholders confronts this matter without any 
compelling scientific-based evidence of what is appropriate for this emerging profession. Until 
empirical research based on a conceptualised theoretic construct is undertaken, a vacuum in 
financial planning scholarly theory, empirical research literature, as well as the myths and 
unsubstantiated arguments surrounding licensing advisers through third-party licensees will 
remain.  
From the above discussion the lack of academic attention to define, model and measure 
legitimacy of the licensing model was seemingly due to the difficulty to define and quantify 
the conceptual construct. In addition, financial planning literature on this topic is inconclusive 
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and under-researched. Thus, this document addresses the deficiencies in financial planning 
theory on the matter of licensing with a conceptual model built on various established theories. 
Therefore, the proposed rectification of these deficiencies to obtain a balanced view, is applying 
agency theory, legislation, Suchman’s theoretical legitimacy framework and theory of the 
professions and/or professionals integrated with financial planning theory. This serves as a 
theoretical foundation to obtain conclusive evidence to validate the extent of the legitimacy of 
the current AFSL-AR licensing model.  
By applying these theories, licensing advisers via third-party licensees as specified in the 
Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 creates a dual-agency role. Advisers serving the 
commercial interests of licensees and the best interests of clients simultaneously leads to 
conflict of interest from association.  
Debatably, this conflict is inconsistent with four objectives of the Act, namely aligning adviser-
client interests, avoiding conflicts of interest, promoting best interest duty and encouraging 
competitive behaviour.  
Consequently, threatening the legitimacy of the current licensing model based on criteria in 
Suchman’s legitimacy framework extended and applied to financial planning theory. Therefore, 
arguably here if by ASIC outsourcing the licensing to product-aligned licensees leads to 
regulative, consequential normative, procedural normative, structural normative, personal 
normative and/or cultural-cognitive legitimacy, then the current AFSL-AR licensing model is 
legitimate. Apparent from journal articles and related secondary sources financial advisers will 
enjoy regulative legitimacy by following the formal legal rules of the Act as enforced by ASIC. 
Normative or moral legitimacy is evident when the licensing model is perceived to display 
socially acceptable outcomes [commercial interests does not compromise best interests], 
procedures [not window-dressed for compliance purposes], structure [no conflict of interest 
from product-affiliations] and/or values [product-aligned leaders’ do not lobby legislators to 
protect their product distribution channels]. The licensing model faces cultural-cognitive 
legitimacy if, as framed by the media and accepted by the public, the Australian public can 
clearly distinguish between s923A independent financial advice and conflicted financial 
advice. Thus, contraventions of any of these criteria means the current licensing model has lost 
its legitimacy.   
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Fundamentally if the claim, the current licensing model is illegitimate, then proposals for 
individual professional licensing model like other professions over the institutional licensee 
licensing model is strengthened. This thesis considers whether financial advisers should operate 
at the same level of professionalism with the same status, independent self-regulatory 
standards, governance and structures as lawyers, accountants, doctors or other professionals. In 
the last few years, interest in individual licensing of financial advisers in Australia by an 
independent professional body has emerged.  
This epistemologically conceptual framework will serve as an important theoretical 
contribution to empirically evaluate and verify the legitimacy of the current licensing model 
for individual financial advisers. Will this enquiry not only advance financial planning theory 
but will also raise questions and provide a scholarly platform for further investigation. 
Furthermore, empirical data collected using this framework will provide policymakers concrete 
evidence to make decisions around licensing individual advisers without having to rely on 
unconfirmed claims. In closing, evaluating the legitimacy of the current licensing model is 
important in achieving the FOFA aim of protecting the clients of advisers and creating trust 
and confidence in the advisory sector by professionalising financial advisers into a recognised 
and accredited profession.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH PARADIGM, METHODOLOGY 
AND SEM DESIGN 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Previous chapters indicated unsubstantiated controversial public debate and incomplete 
scholarly literature about licensing financial advisers. Recommended by Black (2012) 
eventually any public debate should move to peer-reviewed academic works. To achieve this, 
the study tested existing assumptions underlying the desirability, propriety and appropriateness 
of current adviser licensing to come up with suitable policy recommendations to serve the 
Australian public interests. This chapter builds on the previous theoretical discussion with the 
development of the hypothetical empirical model to test the legitimacy of current AFSL-AR 
licensing regime.  
The plan of the chapter begins with stating the main research question, investigative questions 
and hypotheses. Although lacking in many Australian Financial Planning higher degrees by 
research theses, this chapter starts with a brief discussion on the researcher’s selected paradigm 
or research philosophy. Then the mixed methods methodology of choice for the empirical 
research is recognised. Towards the end of the chapter, a discussion follows on the research 
design, together with aspects of the sampling procedure and research analysis techniques.  
4.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS WITH HYPOTHESES 
To evaluate the legitimacy of the current AFSL-AR licensing model the research started with 
the ensuing complex primary research question. 
To what extent do financial advisers agree the current AFSL-AR licensing model, as specified 
in the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001, creates a dual-agency role, leading to conflict of 
interest from association, which is considered inconsistent with four objectives of the Act, 
resulting in potentially delegitimising the current licensee-adviser licensing model, based on 
Suchman’s legitimacy theoretical framework, and therefore strengthening arguments for an 
independent individual  licensing model, like other professions? 
Put simply, to what extent do advisers agree the current AFSL-AR licensing is legitimate?  
Accordingly, to find answers to this main research question, this chapter provides four proposed 
secondary investigative questions and hypotheses in Figure 4.1 below.  
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Figure 4.1 Main research question, investigative questions and their hypotheses 
4. strengthens arguments for independent professional individual licensing, 
 evident in other professions? 
3. threatens the legitimacy of the current AFSL-AR licensing model  
using Suchman's (1995) legitimacy criteria? 
2. is inconsistent with four objectives of the Act? 
1.  creates a dual-agency role (licensee-adviser-client), as specified in the Act,  
where they serve the interests of both the licensee and client simultaneously,  
leading to conflict of interest from association? 
Four investigative research questions 
To what extent do financial advisers agree licensing advisers via third-party licensees: 
H4: should be replaced with independent individual licensing, like other professions 
H3: is illegitimate based on the criteria of Suchman’s (1995) theoretical legitimacy 
framework. 
H2: does not achieve four (4) identified objectives of the Act 
H1:  creates a the dual-agency role, which leads to conflict of interest from association 
 
Main research hypothesis:  
Financial advisers registered on the ASIC Adviser Register agree the current licensing model 
is illegitimate. 
 
Four sub-hypotheses: 
Thus, financial advisers significantly agree licensing advisers via third-party AFS licensees: 
Main research question 
To what extent do financial advisers agree  
the current AFSL-AR licensing is model legitimate? 
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H1 [a]: creates a dual-agency role comprising adviser-licensee and adviser-client relationship. 
H1 [b]:  results in advisers serving the interests of their clients and licensees, simultaneously. 
H1 [c]:  generates revenue for their licensees, while they serve the best interests of their clients. 
H2 [a]: achieve alignment of adviser and clients' interests.  
H2 [b]: achieve avoidance of conflicts of interest. 
 
H2 [c]: achieve compliance with the statutory fiduciary duty obligations. 
 H2 [d]: encourage fair competition within the financial advisory sector. 
H3 [a]: regulative legitimacy. 
 
H3 [c]: procedural normative legitimacy. 
H3 [b]: consequential normative legitimacy. 
 
H3 [d]: structural normative legitimacy.  
 
H3 [e]: personal normative legitimacy. 
 
H3 [f]: cultural-cognitive legitimacy. 
H4 [a]: will improve the publics’ trust and confidence in financial advisers. 
H4 [b]: will promote independence from commercial product conflicted licensees. 
H4 [c]: should be modelled on other professions, namely accounting, legal and medical. 
H4 [d]: regulation via a single independent body is preferred by them. 
H4 [e]: will eliminate conflict of interest from association. 
Financial advisers 
significantly agree, 
the current licensee-adviser 
licensing model fails to:  
Financial advisers 
significantly agree, the 
existing AFSL-AR licensing 
model lacks: 
Financial advisers 
significantly agree an 
individual license: 
Figure 4.2 Sub-hypotheses to test the four investigative hypotheses of the respecified model 
Financial advisers 
significantly agree, 
licensing advisers via third-
party licensees:  
 
H1 
H2
1 
H3
1 
H4 
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Above the textboxes of Figure 4.2, highlight the formulated investigative research questions 
and hypotheses.  
The first key point under investigation was framed hypothesis H1 [Figure 4.1], namely the 
advisers’ dual-agency role devised by financial planning scholars (Banister et al., 2013, Taylor 
et al., 2013, Beal and McKeown, 2009) as the adviser-client and the legislated licensee-adviser 
agency relationships (Finke, Huston and Waller, 2009, Kingston and Weng, 2014). However, 
the licensee-adviser relationship is vague in the financial planning literature. Whereas in the 
legislation the adviser-client relationship is insufficiently addressed.  Thus, with hypothesis H1 
[a] [Figure 4.2] it is investigated how advisers see, and hence, portray their dual-agency role in 
practice.  
Recall Kingston and Weng (2014, p. 294) asserted advisers who allegedly serve the licensees’ 
and the clients’ interest simultaneously lead to conflicts of interest in the adviser-client 
relationship. Therefore, hypothesis H1 [b] may provide valuable insights into how advisers 
understand their roles under the current licensing regime.  
Not only is evidence obtainable in the UK attesting financial institutions, such as banks, focus 
on profitability rather than what is in the best interests of clients or treating them fairly (Pain 
2013).  Previous research (Smith 2009) and investigative journalism (Starke 2013b) indicated 
Australian licensees’ salaried representatives were often threatened with dismissal or poor 
performance reviews if product revenue targets were unachieved. Apparent, fund managers or 
product issuers paid licensees’ main source of revenue according to findings of two ASIC 
reviews in 201199  and 2014100.  In the literature, specifically aligned licensees are seen as 
“commercial businesses using advisers as a sales force” (Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services 2014, p. 24), while meeting best interest duty compliance 
requirements. The study, specifically, addresses conflict of interest from association, whereby 
advisers are generally structurally licensed via third-party licensees to earn revenue by 
distributing financial products from approved financial product lists. With remuneration from 
licensee to adviser dealt with by legislators, revenues from client to licensees via advisers 
remains a neglected and unresolved topic. Thus, hypothesis H1 [c] tentatively aims to address 
this neglected matter.  
                                                 
99 Report 251: Review of Financial Advice Industry Practice Report (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2011). 
100 Report 407: Review of the financial advice industry’s implementation of the FOFA reforms (Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission 2014f). 
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Next, the objectives of the Act [Figure 4.1] is the second key issue [H2] examined in this study 
by considering four sub-hypotheses. Not only does the Act specify the importance of aligning 
the interests of financial advisers with those of their clients (Bora & Lewis 1997; Corbett 1999; 
Mutton 2001; Collier 2003; Serpell 2008; Jones 2009; Alexander 2011; Ap 2011; Ireland & 
Gray 2011; Kell 2012), so does financial planning theory (Black 2005; Nyberg et al. 2010; 
Finke & Langdon 2012; Inderst & Ottaviani 2012d; Knutsen & Cameron 2012; Mazzola 2013; 
Starke 2013b).  Davis (1995) postulated conflict of interest from association was at odds with 
aligning financial adviser’s interest to the client interests. Moreover, many articles (see for 
example, Black 2005; Bowen 2010; Johnsen 2010; Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2012a; Inderst & Ottaviani 2012d; Kell 2012; Kingsford Smith 2012) indicated, 
cultural practices within financial planning leading to misalignment of adviser-client interest 
happens. 
An important unexplored licensing issue pursued here is the acknowledgment of the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (2009b) that ownership 
structures also serve as the reasons for the incongruence of interests between adviser-client. 
Hence, the reasons for hypothesis H2 [a] [Figure 4.2].  
Although conflicted remuneration appears to be well-researched (see, for example, Bailey 
2000; Palazzo & Rethel 2008; Beal & McKeown 2009; Inderst & Ottaviani 2012d; Walton 
2012; Banister et al. 2013; Kingston & Weng 2014), conflict of interest from association 
debated in public domain (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services 2009b; Kennedy, McCoy & Bernstein 2012; Sinodinos 2013a, 2013c, 2014), is 
neglected by scholars. Persuaded by Valentine's (2008) belief the corporate scandals within the 
financial planning industry emphasised the need to place conflict of interest from association 
at the forefront of further research, the research considered hypothesis H2 [b] [Figure 4.2] of 
importance within the context of adviser licensing.  
Recall from Chapter 3, Tuch (2005, p. 38) concluded, clearly an inconsistency between the 
regulations of managing conflict of interest and the statutory obligation occurs, requiring the 
institutions to manage, control or avoid the conflict of interest. He maintained, by merely 
complying through managing the conflict, not necessarily avoiding or eliminating it, may leave 
institutions and their representatives in breach of their fiduciary duty. Therefore, hypothesis 
H2 [c] [Figure 4.2] serves to highlight the potential danger; the current licensing model may 
threaten unintentional compliance contraventions of the fiduciary duty.  
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With the exception of brief discussions in papers by Simes, Harper and Green (2008), Bhati 
(2009), Milne (2007), Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
(2009b) and more recently the Commonwealth of Australia (2014a) report on Future of 
Financial Advice Amendments—Details-stage regulation Impact Statement, the secondary 
study revealed a deficiency in compelling empirical data addressing competitive behaviour 
between financial services providers within the context of the current authorised representative 
licensing model. However, Steen, McGrath and Wong (2016) claimed financial services in 
Australia are less competitive than the US markets due to the highly concentrated and vertically 
integrated financial services sector. Therefore, hypothesis H2 [d] [Figure 4.2] will test the 
validity of these claims from the advisers’ perspective.  
The third key issue in Figure 4.1 is assessing the legitimacy of licensee-adviser licensing by 
considering Suchman’s (1995) legitimacy criteria [H3] formulated into six sub-hypotheses. 
Addressing the lack of theoretical models to define, measure and assess the legitimacy of the 
current AFSL-AR licensing was the rationale for interpreting, extending and applying 
Suchman’s (1995) criteria of legitimacy to financial planning theory. Empirical studies in 
legitimacy (for example, Bitektine, 2011, Chelli et al., 2014); indicated entities maintain 
regulative legitimacy if a perception of compliance with the legislation occurs. Consequently, 
the licensing will not enjoy regulative legitimacy as specified in hypothesis H3 [a] [Figure 4.2] 
should advisers agree the licensing advisers via third-parties can lead to unintentional 
compliance contraventions of the Act (Degeling & Hudson 2014).  
The literature pointed out, the Act qualifies commercially driven conflicted licensees to exert 
legal control over their representatives (Carruthers 1995) with the objective to achieve 
profitability101, while simultaneously (Kingston & Weng, 2014) expecting their agents to serve 
the best interests of their clients. Although Smith (2009) found in her study a shift away from 
merely profit making [shareholders’ wealth maximisation] to ethics and social responsibility 
[stakeholders’ wealth maximisation]. She concluded only when behaving ethically is perceived 
as profitable does stakeholder wealth maximisation come into play (Smith 2009, p. 62). Her 
quantitative findings confirmed employee financial advisers face conflicts between their 
professional obligations to deliver appropriate advice to clients and commercial obligations of 
business profit within their current advisory models. Maclean and Behnam (2010) maintained 
financial institutions struggle to manage their regulatory compliance, when the legal 
                                                 
101 Regulatory guide 181. Licensing: Managing conflicts of interest. Chapter 7 - Financial services and markets. 
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requirements appear to conflict with or compromise commercial activities. Moreover, they 
maintained resolving this tension is critical to ensure legitimacy.  Hence, H3 [b] [figure 4.2] 
validates consequential moral legitimacy will be deficient with regards to the AFSL-AR 
licensing model if a perception product-aligned licensees’ commercial interests compromises 
the clients’ best interest is found.  
It has been alleged licensees implemented legislated deceptive practices, standards and 
procedures to reinforce the product distribution role of advisers (Collier 2003; Lee 2007; West 
2009), and sometimes without detection (Sampson 2010). Newnham (2012) and Valentine 
(2013) reasoned, licensees are adept at keeping in place distribution channels masquerading as 
sources of advice. Therefore, it is surmised with hypothesis H3 [c] [Figure 4.2], if the current 
licensing model is prone to encourage deceptive sales procedures, standards and practices 
designed to give the appearance [window dressing] of satisfying regulatory requirements, then 
it fails the procedural moral legitimacy criteria.  
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (2009b) and ASIC 
(Money Management 2014) reported, conflicts between advisers and their clients arise from 
ownership structures, namely a sharing of a legal relationship between product manufacturers, 
distributors, licensees, financial planning practices and advisers. Additionally, Smith (2009, p. 
317) established in her study,  a contributory factor to financial advisers’ unethical behaviour 
was Australian financial services ownership structures of institutions, together with the 
management of conflicts of interest linked with these ownership structures. Valentine (2013) 
identified, more specifically, the conflict of interest where product providers [for example, 
banks and insurance institutions] own financial advisory services businesses.  Thus, hypothesis 
H3 [d] [figure 4.2] considers, if a perception exists suggesting actors do not support the 
structure (Suchman 1995, p. 581) of licensing advisers via third-party licensees, because it 
creates a conflict of interest from association; This which the literature has indicated 
questionable on ethical grounds (Davis 1995; Smith 2009; Valentine 2013), then AFSL-AR 
licensing model displays a shortfall in structural moral legitimacy.  
To assess personal moral legitimacy the theory infers, requires the moral assessment of the 
influence of key people who are members of seniority (Carnegie & O'Connell 2012; Goretzki, 
Strauss & Weber 2013) of multiple diversified licensees (Vickovich 2014d) and financial 
planning professional bodies (Vickovich 2014c) with their own vested interests (Suchman 
1995; Commonwealth of Australia 2014d). They present as committee members on panels or 
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make submissions (Australian Bankers' Association Inc 2014) to respond as lobby groups to 
persuade or dissuade the Government to increase or decrease the amount of legislation affecting 
advisers. Each contribute different, sometimes opposing recommendations to the licensing 
regulation debate, while simultaneously implementing competing training, accreditation and 
professional recognition programs (Reese, 2011). Yet no empirical research was obtainable, 
after searching secondary scholarly literature, which has considered the influence of these 
influential men [and women] in this emerging profession, particularly pertaining to the 
licensing of financial advisers. In this regard, hypothesis H3 [e] [Figure 4.2] tested, if advisers 
perceive the contributions by specifically individual leaders of product-aligned licensees to the 
licensing regulation, only have the regard of protecting their product distribution channels, then 
it can be argued the licensing model will not have personal moral legitimacy.  
With cultural-cognitive legitimacy, it is taken for granted (Carnegie and O'Connell, 2012, 
Kury, 2007, Suchman, 1995, Durocher et al., 2007), “this is how we do things”(Kury 2007, p. 
373). In terms of financial planning, clients and their advisers have a shared understanding as 
to “who they are” (Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002, p. 420) [advisers’ identity], “what is expected of 
them” (Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002, p. 420) [advisers’ role] and “how effective they are” 
[advisers’ performance] (Scott, 2013). Therefore, hypothesis H3 [f] [Figure 4.2] verifies if the 
public cannot clearly distinguish between independent and conflicted advisers [identity], thus 
between independent financial advice and conflicted financial advice [role] to achieve the 
identified four (4) objectives of the Act [performance], then cultural-cognitive illegitimacy is 
apparent. 
Finally, the conceptualised theoretical framework finishes with the epistemological fourth key 
issue and hypothesis [Figure 4.1], namely should a single independent individual professional 
licence replace the existing conflicted multiple AFS licence. This question required 
consideration of five sub-hypotheses. Balasubramnian, Brisker and Gradisher (2014) found, 
trust is one of two most important determining factors influencing whether a person seeks 
financial advice or not. The use of legal rules to create legal trust relationships (Haigh 2006), 
namely the Act, to licensing individual financial advisers through third-party, often conflicted 
licensees, may have over the past few years contributed to the levels of distrust among the 
public (Hely 2012; Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2013a). The same can 
be said for using legal licensee compliance deterrence mechanisms (Tucker 2009). Therefore, 
by implication, hypothesis H4 [a] [Figure 4.2 above] wonders whether advisers think individual 
licensing would improve trust and confidence in financial advisers.  
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Presently most financial advisers are licensed under a conflicted institutional licensee licensing 
model endorsing conflict of interest from association, rather than an individual professional 
adviser licensing model (Sanders & Roberts 2015), which is free of this conflict. Sanders and 
Roberts (2015) also acknowledged licensing advisers in this way is contrary to the approach of 
professions where the individual professional advisers’ duties and obligations overrides those 
of the licensee. Unlike other true professionals, not all advisers are independent. Independence 
is one of the key attributes of a professional (Carnegie & O'Connell 2012). It is clear from 
statements by the leaders of financial planning professional associations (Slattery 2014) and 
the Professional Standards Authority (Power 2016a), independent financial advice and how it 
is applied is a critical ingredient in ensuring the professionalism of the financial advisory 
industry. Hence, the justifying hypothesis H4 [b] [Figure 4.2] in this study.  
Advisers have been likened to other professionals, including doctors, lawyers and accountants, 
within a prolific number of papers (Macey 2002b; Horsley & Thomas 2003; Moisand 2008a; 
Valentine 2008; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009a, 
2009b; Smith 2009; Financial Services Authority 2010; Laby 2010; Ap 2011; Bruce 2012, p. 
303; Inderst & Ottaviani 2012a; Knutsen & Cameron 2012; Frumento & Korenman 2013; 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2014f; Campo 2014; Financial Planning 
Coalition 2014; McInnes, Ahmed & Delpachitra 2014; Burke et al. 2015; fi360 FiduciaryPath 
2015; North 2015; Rubin 2015). Yet these are misleading statements, because advisers are not 
accredited to practise their craft like other professionals as evidenced in the literature review 
in Chapter 3. What is missing in the FOFA legislation is the part that begs the question whether 
financial advisers are indeed able to, or should become, a true profession, in substance, like 
doctors, accountants and lawyers when they are not licensed in a similar manner as these 
professionals (Sanders, 2015).  Leading from the foregoing, this research therefore tried to 
establish with hypothesis H4 [c] [Figure 4.2] the extent of adviser support for individual 
licensing like other professions. 
Initially a professional industry standards board was recommended by Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (2009b), but mooted after consultations 
with the financial services industry, without substantive empirical research backed evidence. 
Subsequently, nearly two decades later, as mentioned in Chapter 2 and 3, in a bid to raise 
professional, educational, training and ethical standards of financial advisers (Parliamentary 
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Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2015), legislation102  passed in 2017 
included an independent financial planning standard setting body, namely FASEA (Newnham 
2017). This body is only presently tasked with setting professional standards, education and 
ethics. In light of the views expressed by Kingsford Smith (2014), namely a single monopoly 
body is the most effective way to regulate professionals, an important question with regards to 
individual licensing, is advisers’ attitudes regarding whether a single body should also be 
tasked with registration, conduct and disciplinary standards like other professions’ standards 
boards. Arguably disconnecting adviser registration and control from conflicted or product-
aligned licensees to eliminate conflict of interest from association. Moreover, a single body 
may be more suited to deal with some of the new problems that profession and professional 
corporatisation through employment causes (Breakey & Sampford 2017; Rogers, Smith & 
Chellew 2017). Not forgetting the significant technological changes influencing professions 
and professionals too (Greenleaf 2017; Rogers, Smith & Chellew 2017; Smith, Clarke & 
Rogers 2017). Therefore, hypothesis H4 [d] [Figure 4.2] considers adviser support for a single 
independent body.  
Although regulator ASIC is against a self-regulatory model (Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2012a), they acknowledged the potential benefit of individual 
licensing making employee advisers more visible to everyone (see, Vickovich 2014c). 
Unsurprisingly, the Professional Standards Authority supports self-regulation designed for the 
advice sector (Professional Standards Councils 2014; Sanders & Roberts 2015). Omarova 
(2010) argued self-regulation is critical to ensure the proper functioning of financial services. 
He reasoned private profit-seeking institutions are unreliable to regulate their own activities in 
the public’s best interests. This reasoning is supported by evidence reported in report number 
515 by Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2017e). Furthermore, Tuch (2005, 
p. 515) maintained, complying through only managing conflicts using disclosures, may still 
leave parties in breach of their fiduciary duty. In rebuttal, Angel and McCabe (2013) asserted, 
society endures conflicts of interest, because it is unavoidable.  With consensus absent on issues 
around conflict of interest from association, hypothesis H4 [e] considers the extent licensing 
advisers with an individual licence via a single independent professional body will eliminate 
conflicted association. 
 
                                                 
102 The Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Bill 2017. 
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4.3 RESEARCH PARADIGM 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Research process for this study 
Post-positivist paradigm  
Mixed methods  
Parallel convergent design 
Population: ASIC Adviser Register authorised representatives 
Modified continuous ruler/option scale (Yusoff & Mohd Janor 2014) 
Data collection 
RMIT BCHEAN ethics approval: 23 Feb 2016 to 7 May 2018 
Pilot study  
Stratified probability random sampling 
n = 40 [♂️ : ♀️ split 80:20] 
Extended study 
 Stratified probability random sample 
n = 4,000 [♂️ : ♀️ split 80:20] 
Quantitative Data Analysis: 
Structural equation modelling 
[IBM SPSS & AMOS v24, Microsoft Excel 2016] 
 
Qualitative Data Analysis: 
Constant comparative method 
Content analysis of respondents written words 
[Microsoft Word & Excel 2016] 
 
 
Reporting results and findings 
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To find answers to the research questions in this thesis, the researcher measured and tested 
eighteen sub-hypotheses {Figure 4.2 above] by engaging in the scientific research process 
illustrated in Figure 4.3 below. This process is defined by Mackenzie and Knipe (2006) as 
scientifically investigating a phenomena, by collecting, analysing and interpreting data using 
quantitative and/or qualitative methodologies, in order to verify hypotheses to come up with 
new conclusions and solutions. The definition they claimed is influenced by the researchers’ 
theoretical framework [paradigm]. As well as the methodology, they may use to learn or 
understand new knowledge. Gioia and Pitre (1990) defined paradigm as a philosophical 
theoretical framework, perception or belief consisting of ontology [realism or relativism about 
a phenomenon]. This explanation includes epistemology [the nature of the knowledge about 
the phenomenon], whether subjective or objective, and methodology [whether the line of attack 
is quantitative or qualitative or both to investigate the phenomenon]. Mackenzie and Knipe 
(2006) anticipated, this theoretical framework is different to theory, because it forms the basis 
for the choice of research strategies, methodology, and hence the research design to achieve 
the research objectives (Al-Shirawi 2012).  
Therefore, before going on to looking at a specific methodology, the researcher felt it important 
to consider the various research paradigms to start the empirical research journey. From the 
proliferation of the number of [scientific] research paradigms in the applied, social and 
behavioural science literature (Gioia & Pitre 1990; Willmott 1993; Creswell 2003; Mertens 
2005; Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Lukka & Kuorikoski 2008; Caginalp & Desantis 2011; Taneja, 
Taneja & Gupta 2011; Venable 2013; Aliyu Ahmad et al. 2014) it was evident, the theory of 
the various research paradigms was still evolving (Willmott 1993) and changing over time 
(Taneja, Taneja & Gupta 2011; Venable 2013).  Hence, the researcher concurred with 
Mackenzie and Knipe (2006) who claimed, this proliferation of new research paradigms is 
confusing to a first time or early career researcher making it difficult to pinpoint one specific 
research paradigm. In the literature on research paradigms, criticisms were levelled at their 
assumptions for conducting research. For example, assumptions of mutual exclusivity 
(Willmott 1993; Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Lukka & Kuorikoski 2008) clarified in some research 
comprised overlapping multi-paradigms (Onwuegbuzie, Johnson & Collins 2009) with blurred 
boundaries (Gioia & Pitre 1990). Hence, perhaps the foregoing highlighted some of the reasons 
some researchers may neglect to address it specifically in their research projects, which seemed 
evident in many applied, social and behavioural science disciplines when reviewing doctoral 
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theses in Australia. Aliyu Ahmad et al. (2014) warned researchers should critically assess any 
paradigm they intend to use in their research activity. While Laughlin (2004) recommended, it 
was necessary to choose a paradigm, before conducting any type of research, many ways are 
present to understand the world. Having a research paradigm adds rigour, transparency and 
perspective to the research project, which is important in scientific research. He explained 
further, once one made the ontological and theoretical choice, then this had consequences for 
the roles of both the researcher and participants during the data collection phase. Important to 
note, research in financial planning is still in infancy in Australia with no sanctioned conceptual 
or methodical framework (Wiseman & Anderson 2013) adequately developed. Therefore, to 
ensure sufficient acceptable standards for research (Willmott 1993) the multitude of available 
research paradigms have yet to be applied, tried, or tested, and reported in Australian financial 
planning literature. Consequently, here this research attempted some alternative ways used in 
other disciplines to incorporate paradigms into financial planning research. 
Reflecting upon the writings of research philosophy by Lowe (2004) and Laughlin (2004), it 
became apparent selecting an appropriate research paradigm meant focusing on the main 
research question from a specific paradigmatic perspective. Even though other appropriate 
paradigmatic viewpoints are available. Therefore in light of these recommendations, to 
determine a suitable research paradigm for this research a framework classifying research 
paradigms developed by Venable (2013), colourfully tabled in Table 4.1 was used. This 
framework was combined with the writings of Onwuegbuzie, Johnson and Collins (2009), 
which assisted to determine whether or how the paradigms may apply to this investigation, 
while demystifying how the numerous research paradigms differ in terms of their underlying 
philosophical assumptions [ontology, epistemology and methodology]. 
Table 4.1 Applied classification framework of Venable (2013) - post-positivist paradigm 
Dimension Value-Naïve Value-Aware Value-Critical Dimension 
Empirical  
Realism/Post-Positivist Paradigm 
 Descriptive 
Evaluative or 
Normative Non-Empirical 
  
 
  
 Descriptive 
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In this thesis the philosophical view of the post-positivist paradigm was adopted, because the 
specified hypothesised a priori conceptual framework was built with the intention to test 
hypotheses about associations through deductive reasoning (Arghode 2012). Moreover, these 
hypotheses were based on a conceptual framework originally developed inductively from 
extant theories from numerous disciplines [namely, legislative, agency, financial planning, 
legitimacy theories and theories of true professionals] to investigate the licensing of individual 
Australian advisers. Consequently, a post-positivist [realism] paradigm was determined an 
appropriate approach. Thus, the study represented multiple and differing attributes; comprising 
one [1] main research hypothesis, four [4] investigative hypotheses and eighteen [18] 
measurement sub-hypotheses about a single independent reality [the legitimacy of the current 
licensing model], which can also differ from the reality (Krauss 2005). Therefore, in an attempt 
to find out the truth of the legitimacy of the licensing model, it was appropriate to test these 
multiple relationships empirically in a linear scientific manner (Onwuegbuzie, Johnson & 
Collins 2009). However, on the grounds of the sensitive and controversial nature of the topic, 
it was clearly not completely a positivist study. Necessary was some qualitative interpretation 
of the quantitative data, resulting in entering the realms of post-positivist research. 
To illustrate, by referring to Table 4.1, Venable’s (2013) framework positioned post-positivist 
within three dimensions, where according to the literature it is empirical, rather than non-
empirical [coloured yellow in Table 4.1]. As far as the second dimension [green in Table 4.1] 
was concerned this study involved descriptive knowledge to predict the way the world works 
without the researcher being completely value-ladened. Philosophically, this research appeared 
both descriptive and evaluative, because the literature review explained and predicted a 
qualitatively determined conceptualised framework for assessing the legitimacy of the current 
conflicted licensing model, with some value judgements and interpretations of the literature.  
Furthermore, it was important researcher bias was acknowledged throughout the research 
process (Wiseman & Anderson 2013). Therefore, the third dimension in Venable’s (2013) 
framework included value-naïve versus value-aware versus value-critical dimensions [pink in 
Table 4.1]. Here the researcher considered what the different value perspectives she may carry 
during the research.  Therefore, illustrated in Table 4.1, this project is post-positivist, because 
a conceptualised theory needed revising by theoretical reasoning as well as some 
experimentation. This makes this paradigm value aware (Krauss 2005). After reading the works 
of Kline (2010), Krauss (2005) and Borsboom, Mellenbergh and Van Heerden (2003) it was 
evident for this research, one did not need to rely solely on the research objectives and the 
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quantitative data collected, but also on knowledge about the choice of variables to analyse 
during data analysis. The researcher also needed to rely on the interpretation of the theory, 
specifically the conceptualised framework. Thus, the researcher’s prior and current research 
experience, beliefs, intuition, notwithstanding the circumstances in which the data was 
collected, influenced the development of the conceptualised framework.  Therefore, it was 
expected this model would need adjustment if in anticipation it misfit the initial raw data. It 
was important for the data to fit the model, because then there is a valid model to interpret the 
theory and results. In other words based on the findings of the research, the theoretical model 
may need revision by controlling the variables to better predict the reality (Krauss 2005), 
because it is acknowledged, the conceptual model of Chapter 3 is not infallible. Thus, these 
examples of potential researcher’s bias in the way they may objectively perceive the real world 
is another reason why post-positivism [realism] and positivist paradigm views differ 
(Onwuegbuzie, Johnson & Collins 2009). Although it was not ascertained and critically 
examined [axiology] (Venable 2013), and hence not value-critical, the researcher was 
conscious her values may have formed part of the research (Venable 2013). Every effort was 
made to minimise this.  
In summary, this study is not fully quantitative, because the researcher and participants may 
bias the interpretations of the research observations. In other words, this research is not 
completely positivist, but post-positivist. Furthermore this project is value-naïve, because 
values are completely ignored during quantitative analysis in the research (Venable 2013). 
Thus, to encourage reliability (Carr 1994), objectivity (Carroll & McGregor-Lowndes 2001) 
and control (Arghode 2012) to this enquiry, the researcher wanted to be isolated from the 
randomly selected participants during data collection (Arghode 2012)  and during data analysis, 
to avoid biasing the data. 
4.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Mackenzie and Knipe (2006) asserted, the research paradigm is the theoretical approach, 
whereas quantitative and qualitative data determines the data collection methods, analysis and 
reporting modes. Thus, during the literature review, previous research revealed, many scholars 
claimed measuring legitimacy challenging (Suchman 1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002; 
Carnegie, Edwards & West 2003; Kline 2010). Most research evaluated legitimacy 
qualitatively (Low 2010; Maclean & Behnam 2010; Sonpar, Pazzaglia & Kornijenko 2010; 
Pellegrino & Lodhia 2012; Díez-Martín, Prado-Roman & Blanco-González 2013; Andon, Free 
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& Sivabalan 2014) using mainly the case study approach. Tilling (2004a) warned research in 
legitimacy is a subjective activity potentially partial to the researcher’s biases. On the other 
hand, Wimmel (2009) maintained, it is possible to measure legitimacy empirically, using 
structured survey questionnaires to measure perceptions of whether societal support for a 
particular system occurs. There is little evidence available relating to quantitative research 
measuring legitimacy, and particularly in financial planning theory.  Van der Stede, Young and 
Chen (2005) clearly explained acceptable evidence is not dependent on the method, but 
dependent on how well the method is used.  
Caginalp and Desantis (2011) claimed if no quantitative procedure for determining whether a 
hypothesised effect has statistical validity is attainable, then the theory remains a philosophy, 
rather than becoming a science. The same for qualitative procedures. Although, all methods 
(Clark & Creswell 2008) are suitable to research this project’s reality (Krauss 2005). The 
decision to pursue mixed methods, was based on the strengths and weaknesses (Carr 1994; Al-
Dossary 2008) as well as the similarities and differences (Jean Lee 1992; Arghode 2012) 
between quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods (Clark & Creswell 2008). Furthermore, 
mixed methods approach is valid under any of the research paradigms (Clark & Creswell 2008). 
The mixed methods design the researcher applied was the convergent parallel design (Creswell 
& Plano Clark 2011), whereby the quantitative and qualitative data collection occurred 
simultaneously in a single phase from the same participants using one source of collection [a 
single survey]. By integrating both data forms into the overall interpretation of the results 
(Baran & Jones 2016), resulted in the numerical and non-numerical data complementing each 
other to provide a more comprehensive analysis than if done on their own (Classen et al. 2007). 
I also chose mixed methods methodology (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011; Baran & Jones 2016), 
because this research integrated several theories for the first time.   
4.5 SEM RESEARCH DESIGN 
To obtain a comprehensive quantitative picture regarding the legitimacy of adviser licensing 
the investigator measured, collected and analysed the data following the research process 
already shown in Figure 4.3 above.  
Structural equation modelling was my statistical technique of choice. SEM is a useful tool for 
the post-positivist researcher, because it comprises both quantitative and qualitative 
components.  Qualitative contextual information can be used within a post-positivist paradigm 
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(Mertens 2005). SEM is arguably a procedure conducive to mixed analysis procedures, because 
it is a tool to describe, control, estimate, explain, interpret data while allowing for 
recommendations, particularly around relationships (Arghode 2012). Furthermore, before this 
study, SEM had been used in a variety of disciplines (Kirby & Bollen 2009), such as for 
example accounting (Herda 2013), psychology (Anderson & Gerbing 1988; MacCallum & 
Austin 2000; McDonald 2011), behavioural studies (Hox & Bechger 1998), operations 
management, management information systems (Shah & Goldstein 2006), educational, 
medical, marketing (McNally & Griffin 2005) (Siddiqui & Sharma 2010; Al-Shirawi, El-Hajjar 
& Charles 2014), organisational research (Shah & Goldstein 2006), psychometric, biostatistics, 
and education (Rovine & Molenaar 2001), other social sciences (Chiu 2014) and so the list 
goes on. Al-Shirawi, El-Hajjar and Charles (2014) used SEM in a study of the financial services 
sector in Bahrain, (Al Qeisi & Al Zagheer 2015) to investigate determinants of knowledge 
sharing behaviour among Jordanian banking staff. Although attitudes (Jackson, Gillaspy & 
Purc-Stephenson 2009) or perceptions (Chiandotto & Masserini 2011) of subjects were 
evaluated using SEM, only a few studies used it in previous financial planning theory studies 
in Australia, but not to study perceptions of financial advisers relating to the licensing model. 
Consequently, based on empirical studies of other researchers (Bacon 1997; Chin 1998; Akhtar 
2011), the researchers identified structural equation modelling appropriate.  
By specifying a priori hypotheses about relations between variables as already discussed, 
methodologically hypotheses testing meant an element of objectivity is required. Priority was 
given to the quantitative data in this research, because it involved variable-oriented analyses 
identifying relationships [Figures 4.1 and 4.2], which involved mainly quantitative research 
and analysis (Onwuegbuzie, Johnson & Collins 2009). In this way researcher’s biases found 
evident in purely qualitative research are minimised for both non-experimental, (MacCallum 
& Austin 2000) as well as experimental observation and measurement (Lee 2011) when 
measuring abstract concepts. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007); Hair et al. (2010), explained SEM 
can be used to simultaneously measure subjective abstract concepts as specified by the four 
investigative questions above with concrete consequences. It is a research methodology which 
represents a series of hypotheses about how the variables in the analysis are generated and 
related (Hu & Bentler 1999).  
Given the researcher was new to SEM, the traditional SEM methodology for non-experimental 
research requiring several equations (Blunch 2008). This focus involved multiple regression 
analyses of factors of many interrelated dependence associations (Herda 2013) of complex 
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hypotheses with a network of paths (Grace 2008) estimated simultaneously while taking into 
account the measurement error (McFadyen, Maclaren & Webster 2007). Maximum likelihood 
estimation [MLE] was the method of estimation, because according to Hu and Bentler (1999),  
it is the most widely used estimation technique for large sample sizes. In SEM, large sample 
sizes are samples greater than 250 (Hu & Bentler 1999). Measurement error is also a special 
feature of SEM, whereas, for multiple regression the predictor latent factors are estimated 
without any errors (McCoach, Black & O'Connell 2007; Kline 2010). Though, SEM corrects 
for measurement errors, which may bias parameter estimates (Kim, Pratt & Wallace 2014). 
Thus, this technique is useful in separating ‘true variance’ [variance common among indicators 
of a single construct] from ‘error variance’ or ‘disturbance’ [variance due to other factors, 
including error in measurement] (McCoach, Black & O'Connell 2007).  
Techniques such as analysis of variance and multiple regression only analyses means of 
observed variables, and certainly not simultaneously for both observed and latent variables 
(Kline 2010). Thus, they were considered inappropriate. Shortcomings of SEM as a data 
analytic technique according to McCoach, Black and O'Connell (2007) include: it cannot solve 
problems in theory, nor researcher errors of inference. They warned, any misconceptions and 
misinterpretations during statistical hypothesis testing, model equivalence, model 
modification, model fit versus model prediction, and causality is important to note. Insight and 
judgement were critical to applying SEM involving covariance structure analysis and latent 
variable analysis (Hair et al. 2010; Nebojsa 2014) correctly (Shook et al. 2004).   
By interpreting the quantitative data and results to make sense of it, Marsh, Hau and Wen 
(2004) theorised, was a subjective activity. Therefore, it was critical the scientist collected 
qualitative data to further appreciate the results of the associations between the variables, while 
obtaining a richer understanding of the quantitative results (Onwuegbuzie, Johnson & Collins 
2009) from the participants point of view. It also served to describe and validate the quantitative 
estimates where qualitative views overlapped while collecting additional contradictory 
information (Feldon & Kafai 2008; Creswell & Plano Clark 2011). Especially, when Marsh, 
Hau and Wen (2004) felt despite the quantitative statistical results; two or more researchers 
may come to different factor solutions where the researcher served as research instrument as 
well. Post-positivist researchers should acknowledge and try to eliminate the possibility of this 
happening (Onwuegbuzie, Johnson & Collins 2009).  According to Lichterman (2015), by 
incorporating interpretative explanation is an acknowledgement the quantitative data collected 
is incomplete and needs interpretation of qualitative data to show what the participants meant 
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in their responses. Consequently, the researchers integrated both data alongside each other at 
the interpretation and discussion stage (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011; Baran & Jones 2016).  
4.5.1 Preliminary a priori confirmatory factor analysis measurement model 
Using symbols from the McArdle-McDonald reticular action model (Kline 2010, p. 95), the 
conceptualised normative model and hypothesis were graphically visualised (Herda 2013) in 
an a priori empirical model with the assistance of the IBM SPSS AMOS Graphic version 24 
software [Figure 4.3]. An important aspect of this a priori empirical model is the initial 
theoretical model highlighted in Chapter 3 and illustrated in Figure 3.1 was based on well-
grounded substantive theory (Blunch 2008). Accordingly, the structural equation model in this 
study incorporated both a set of observed variables and unobserved variables (McCoach, Black 
& O'Connell 2007). The abstract constructs in Figure 3.1 were all difficult to measure directly, 
thus some working definitions of the latent factors were designed. These were also referred to 
in the literature as construct or predictor or exogenous or dependent variables of the structural 
part of the model, which is unobserved.  Illustrated in the form of ellipses in Figure 4.4 below, 
they were defined as: 
 Dual-agency role [𝑏1]: representing the extent licensing advisers via third parties 
creates a dual agency, whereby advisers serve the interests of both the licensees and 
clients simultaneously, leading to conflict of interest from association. 
 Objectives of the Act [𝑏2]: representing the extent licensing advisers via third-party 
licensees achieves four identified objectives of the Commonwealth Corporations Act 
2001. 
 Legitimacy of the current AFSL-AR licensing of individual Financial Advisers [𝑏3]: 
representing the extent licensing advisers via third parties meets the criteria of 
Suchman’s (1995) legitimacy theoretical framework.  
 Individual licensing as an alternative option [𝑏4]: representing individual licensing via 
a single independent professional self-regulatory body as an alternative licensing option 
for individual financial advisers. 
No known measures to understand the above latent constructs were available. Therefore, the 
preliminary endogenous, observed parameters, manifest, indicator variables or factor loadings 
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captured, estimated or observed the different aspects of the factors. They represented as squares 
in Figure 4.4 as follows: 
 𝑎1 to 𝑎4  [four endogenous indicators]: representing functions of financial adviser’s 
dual-agency role [𝑏1] 
 𝑎5 to 𝑎8  [four endogenous indicators]: representing functions of objectives of 
Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 [𝑏2] 
 𝑎9 to 𝑎15  [seven endogenous indicators]: representing functions of legitimacy of the 
current AFSL-AR licensing model [𝑏3]  
 𝑎16 to 𝑎21  [six endogenous variables]: representing functions of the individual 
licensing option for individual professional financial advisers [𝑏4]. 
The causal paths or hypothesised directional effects or direct linear effects (Kline 2010) of the 
model in Figure 4.4 are represented by one-headed arrows running from the exogenous 
predictor unobserved latent construct or factors to the endogenous measured observed outcome 
variables in the form of squares (Ullman & Bentler 2012). Mathematically, these associations 
are represented as λ [lambda]. They represent regression coefficients [path, factor loadings or 
pattern coefficients] in the unstandardised or the standardised model between exogenous 
factors and endogenous variables  (Kline 2010).  
Evident in the literature, when considering the relationship between observed measures and 
unobserved latent constructs, it is important to specify the direction of the regression weights 
(Edwards & Bagozzi 2000). They are either formative or reflective (Bagozzi 2007; Howell, 
Breivik & Wilcox 2007; Nebojsa 2014). However, when reading the journal articles, published 
in academic journals on the matter, disagreement in some of the social science writings 
(Bagozzi 2007; Howell, Breivik & Wilcox 2007; Nebojsa 2014) about whether a social science 
study should be reflective or formative was present. In other words, whether a construct causes, 
or is caused by, its observed measures (Edwards & Bagozzi 2000). An underlying assumption 
for my SEM analysis is the items or indicators used to measure a factor are reflective (Shah & 
Goldstein 2006). This means the observed variables depend on the latent variables or are the 
reflections of the construct (Schmitt 2011). Thus in this research the focus is on measuring the 
latent construct and not predicting them, which are two different concepts McDonald (2011) 
explained.  
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Interestingly, Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2006) cautioned type one errors are more likely 
when a model is erroneously reflective. Therefore, decision rules for assessing whether the 
SEM should be reflective rather than formative (Chin 1998; Edwards & Bagozzi 2000; Howell, 
Breivik & Wilcox 2007; Bollen & Bauldry 2011) were established using a process developed 
by Coltman et al. (2008, p. 5). Their process is helpful in clarifying the similarities and 
differences between reflective and formative features (Bollen & Bauldry 2011). Furthermore, 
recommendations made by Borsboom, Mellenbergh and Van Heerden (2003) made it clear to 
us the importance of carefully defining the latent constructs (Rossiter 2002) in the preliminary 
a priori model in this enquiry. They must also be independent of the observations.  Simply, a 
reflective model shows any variation in the construct causes variation in the observed 
measures. Whereas, it is expected observed measures do not cause variation to the latent 
construct (Bollen & Lennox 1991; Rossiter 2002; Coltman et al. 2008). To explain, if the 
current licensing model is changed, then effectively this should change the measurement of the 
indicators. For instance, the indicators: licensee-adviser-client relationship [𝑎1] and serving 
two principles simultaneously [𝑎2] are caused by the dual-agency role of financial advisers 
[latent variable𝑏1]. Another example, aligning adviser-client interests [𝑎5], conflict of interest 
[𝑎6], best interest duty [𝑎7], and competition [𝑎8] are surmised to be instigated by objectives 
of the Act [latent variable𝑏2]. Regulative [𝑎9], normative [𝑎10,11,12&13] and cultural-cognitive 
[𝑎14] legitimacies are triggered by the legitimacy [latent variable 𝑏3] of licensing advisers via 
third-party licensees. Similarly, individual licensing [latent variable 𝑏4] influences elimination 
of conflict of interest [indicator variable 𝑎21] or promotion of public trust and confidence 
[indicator variable𝑎16]. Thus, this study is unconcerned with indicators 𝑎1 to 𝑎21 predicting 
the latent variables 𝑏1 to 𝑏4. Instead it is concerned the direction of causality runs from the 
latent construct to the measured items. 
Furthermore, the endogenous variables, which are interchangeable, share a common theme, 
vis-à-vis, and the legitimacy of the licensing model (Rossiter 2002; Coltman et al. 2008). Thus, 
by adding or dropping any indicators does not change the constructs’ conceptual theory 
(Rossiter 2002; Coltman et al. 2008). For this a priori confirmatory factor analysis model, 
evident from the above evaluation, theoretically a choice of a reflective measurement over a 
formative model is appropriate. Finally, the variable error ‘ɛ’ [epsilon], represented as a circle 
[e] in Figure 4.4, are the unexplained variance or unmeasured causes of the corresponding 
endogenous variables and latent constructs. 
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Figure 4.4 Preliminary a priori recursive acyclic confirmatory factor analysis model 
They are initially set to a scaling constant or unstandardised residual path coefficient of one, to 
give the latent factor an interpretable value, before the software can estimate it and not result 
in an undetermined result too (Kline 2010, p. 105).  
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This study is mainly concerned with the regression coefficients (Hox & Bechger 1998) between 
the endogenous [𝑎1 to 𝑎21] and exogenous variables [𝑏1, 𝑏2,  𝑏3 and 𝑏4]. Thus, in this way the 
study estimates the unstructured population covariance matrix compared to the observed 
sample covariance matrix [the data set] (Schreiber et al. 2006; Ullman 2006). In other words, 
covariance tests the relationships among a set of variables to determine the existence of a match 
between hypothesised model and the sample data. Thus, this SEM research tested the extent 
four exogenous factors explained the 21 endogenous indicators under the assumption the SEM 
model was true. It also tested the extent the latent factors, which assumedly co-vary, affect each 
other. According to Kline (2010, p. 252), any SEM empirical study detects a false theoretical 
model, rather than claim the retained theoretical model is true and correct.   
Important to note from Figure 4.4, the researchers fixed one of the path coefficients of each of 
the covariates to one, while allowing the rest to run freely during the analysis phase. 
Effectively, this fixing ensured the factor variance is the same as the measured variance and 
assigns a scale to the factor (Ullman & Bentler 2012). Thus creating, what Chiu (2014) refers 
to as, an anchor variable. An anchor or reference variable enables statistically testing of the 
differences in the path coefficient estimates (Ullman & Bentler 2012; Chiu 2014). Otherwise, 
without an anchor variable the software cannot estimate the model, which leads to an 
undetermined result (Kline 2010, p. 105). These parameters are either unknown (Chiu 2014) 
and estimated free [unconstrained] (Al-Dossary 2008), or is fixed [constrained] to a known 
specific value of zero or one (Al-Dossary 2008). To choose an anchor variable for Figure 4.4, 
Chiu (2014) endorsed to find the observed variable of each latent variable with the highest 
coefficient of determination or squared multiple correlation [r2] with respect to the covariate. 
Thus, for the first estimation, the initial reference variable with unit loading identification 
constraint were allocated to 𝑎1, 𝑎5, 𝑎9 and 𝑎16 endogenous variables to assign a scale to latent 
factors 𝑏1, 𝑏2, 𝑏3 and 𝑏4 respectively, until an indicator with a more reliable score was 
identified. 
Quantitative structural equation modelling is a technique evaluating models of linear 
relationships  whereby the sample data is assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution 
and the means and covariance matrix contain all the information (Shah & Goldstein 2006). 
Therefore, in the foregoing, both the preliminary indicators and predictors, together with the 
preliminary inter-relationships between the constructs (Nebojsa 2014) are translated into a 
series of mathematical covariance matrices and regression Equations 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. 
These equations and matrices were adaptions of the basic model common in most statistical 
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textbooks, vis-à-vis data equals model plus error (Hox & Bechger 1998, p. 8; Field 2014), 
including equations and matrix models of Doctor Charles Hofacker (2007) and Wei et al. 
(2010).  
Equation 4.1  𝑎𝑝 = 𝜆𝑝,𝑞𝑏1 + 𝜆𝑝,𝑞𝑏2 + 𝜆𝑝,𝑞𝑏3 + 𝜆𝑝,𝑞𝑏4 + ɛ𝑝  
For example, 𝑎1 = 𝜆1,1𝑏1 + 𝜆1,2𝑏2 + 𝜆1,3𝑏3 + 𝜆1,4𝑏4 + ɛ1; 
 𝑎2 = 𝜆2 ,1𝑏2 + 𝜆2,2𝑏2 + 𝜆2 ,3𝑏3 + 𝜆2,4𝑏4 + ɛ2; 
 𝑎3 = 𝜆3 ,1𝑏3 + 𝜆3,2𝑏3 + 𝜆3 ,3𝑏3 + 𝜆3,4𝑏4 + ɛ3; Et cetera 
Equation 4.2 𝑎𝑝 = 𝜆𝑝,𝑞𝑏𝑞 + 𝜆𝑝,𝑞𝑏𝑞 + 𝜆 ,𝑝 𝑞𝑏𝑞 + 𝜆𝑝,𝑞𝑏𝑞 + ɛ𝑝  
Equation 4.3 𝑎𝑝 = 𝛽𝑝,𝑞𝑎𝑝 + 𝜆𝑝,𝑞𝑏𝑞 + ɛ𝑝 
Equation 4.4 𝑎 = 𝛽𝑎 + 𝜆𝑏 + 𝜀 
The key latent constructs and endogenous indicators of the covariance structure assuming the 
mean is equal to zero is mathematically represented in Equation 4.4 and illustrated in Figure 
4.4.  The initial reflective model in matrix terms:  
 A B C D   E F 
 
 
 
 
The above matrix and Equations 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate initially p equals 21 
simultaneous equations were set. The column vector 𝐴, contains p endogenous observed 
measured variables and the column vector E, contains q exogenous unobserved factors. 
Therefore, the observations are found in the rows [p] and the latent variables in the columns 
[q]. The measured variables serve as response variables (Chiu 2014). The regression 
coefficients λ [lambda] denotes the amount of effect the latent variables have on the observed 
variables (Chiu 2014). The standardised or unstandardised regression coefficients λ is found in 
column vector D and variance ɛ [epsilon] is found in column vector F. The 21 endogenous 
variables [a] are demonstrated as a function of the four exogenous covariates [b]. Noteworthy, 
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the sum of λ plus the error variance for each variable is equal to one (Streiner 2006). In column 
vector B, β  [beta] the unknown element represents the regression slopes estimated using 
maximum likelihood estimates, which according to Kline (2010, p. 154) is the method used to 
derive the parameter estimates. Beta [β] represents the non-directional hypothesised correlation 
relationships between the constructs and illustrated by double-headed arrows in Figure 4.4. In 
column vector F, ɛ [epsilon] are the errors-in-variables or measurement errors for endogenous 
variables or disturbances. They account for the uncommon variance unique to each 𝑎 
endogenous variable (Bacon 1997; Hofacker 2007) under a few assumptions (Chiu 2014).  
The factor loadings between the measured variables are assumed random and uncorrelated with 
each other and the latent variables (Cole, Ciesla & Steiger 2007a; Chiu 2014). Namely they are 
initially assumed identical and constrained to expected values equal to zero (Chiu 2014) and 
so no arrows between them (Hox & Bechger 1998). Commonality between the endogenous 
variables is measured by their variance (Bacon 1997; Hofacker 2007). In the β matrix [column 
vector B above], the p by p contains the coefficients of the regressions of covariates 𝑎 on other 
covariates of 𝑎 with 0’s on the diagonal, because a variable cannot cause itself.  All factors in 
the confirmatory factor analysis model are assumed to covary and are unanalysed (Kline 2010). 
In these regression equations the latent variable serve as a covariate (Chiu 2014). The p by q 
λ contains the regression coefficients of the 𝑎’s on the 𝑏’s in column vector D.  The error vector 
or unique factors, ɛ [epsilon], are p by one in column vector F.  These errors are not factor 
analysis errors, but errors-in-equations or specification errors. Hence all the measurement 
errors are assumed independent of each other (Chiu 2014) and the factors.  
Consequently, considering the linear equation 𝑎𝑝 = 𝛽𝑝 𝑞𝑎𝑝 + 𝜆𝑝 𝑞𝑏𝑞 + ɛ𝑝 [Equation 4.4 
above] it represents the perceived dependent endogenous value 𝑎, for case 𝑝, is the sum of the 
exogenous variable 𝑎, for case 𝑝,  multiplied by the coefficient 𝛽, for the case 𝑝𝑞, the exogenous 
variable 𝑏, for case 𝑞, multiplied by coefficient 𝜆, for the case 𝑝𝑞, plus an estimated error term 
or variance ɛ𝑝 [epsilon] for the endogenous observed variables 𝑎 for case 𝑝. This model allows 
for the endogenous variable 𝑎 to estimate other endogenous variables (Ullman & Bentler 2012). 
The first subscript p in the equation refers to the equation and the second subscript q refers to 
the cause. The error term is the difference between the observed and predicted values for each 
of the cases 𝑝𝑞. Thus, this model includes more than one linear equation to describe how the 
variables depend on each other with path coefficients describing how the exogenous variables 
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𝑏 affects the endogenous variables of 𝑎 covariates. Precisely, the matrix algebra is explained 
further as follows: 
Equation 4.5 𝑎𝑝 = 𝛽𝑝 𝑞𝑎𝑝 + 𝜆𝑝 𝑞 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒 𝑞 +  ɛ𝑝 
Equation 4.6 𝑎𝑝 = 𝛽𝑝 𝑞𝑎𝑝 + 𝜆𝑝 𝑞 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑐𝑡 𝑞 + ɛ𝑝 
Equation 4.7 𝑎𝑝 = 𝛽𝑝 𝑞𝑎𝑝 + 𝜆𝑝 𝑞 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑞 +  ɛ𝑝 
Equation 4.8 𝑎𝑝 = 𝛽𝑝 𝑞𝑎𝑝 + 𝜆𝑝𝑞 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑞 +  ɛ𝑝 
To assess the model, the expected 𝑎 and 𝑏 are assumed equal to zero. The goal is to estimate 
how much variation or loadings, represented as λ in Equations 4.1 to 4.4 and Figure 4.4, namely 
the observed endogenous covariates [𝑎1 to 𝑎21] can be attributed to the latent unobserved 
exogenous constructs [𝑏1, 𝑏2, 𝑏3 and 𝑏4]. Although the four exogenous constructs will be 
correlated with each other, all the measured indicator variables are consigned to only one 
construct each and endogenous. The latent constructs were assumed measurable with a test of 
positively correlated items. The error terms shown in Figure 4.4 were initially unrelated to any 
other measured variable making the initial measurement model co-generic. This was further 
confirmed by the measurement model’s initial degrees of freedom using Jӧreskog congeneric 
model (Rigdon 1994). In SEM, the initial degrees of freedom are calculated based on the size 
of the covariance matrix, not on the sample size (Yusoff & Mohd Janor 2014). Degrees of 
freedom is the difference between the number of endogenous observed manifest variables [m], 
and the exogenous latent constructs [ƍ] (Blunch 2008). This value should be greater or equal 
to zero for amenable empirical analyses (Byrne 2013). This CFA’s degrees of freedom based 
on equation 4.9 below where m is 21 and ƍ is four equates to 21 (21+1)/2-2 (21) – 4(4-1)/2 = 
183 degrees of freedom.  
Equation 4.9  Degree of freedom formula = m (m +1)/2 – 2m – ƍ (ƍ – 1)/2 
Another important attribute of the measurement model is making sure a unique set of 
parameters consistent with the sample data, commonly known as model identification is present 
(Al-Dossary 2008; Bollen & Noble 2011). Model identification determines whether the model 
fits the data (Al-Dossary 2008; Bollen & Noble 2011). Identification problems, especially 
under-identification issues, lead to admissible or spurious solutions and a waste of research 
resources (Kline 2010). The issue is whether the parameters estimated are unique. Software, 
such as IBM AMOS v24 is able to detect and notify across a range of identifications and 
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provide recommended remedies (Arbuckle 2014), such as using more constraints (Bacon 
1997). Although, only once data has been collected and estimated, could the investigator 
determine if a problem with the data about under-identification is happening. Thus, the 
researcher followed additional recommendations of Blunch (2008) during model development. 
For instance, he proposed starting with four manifest variables per latent factor when 
developing an a priori measurement model. However, later literature indicated the standard 
measurement model is identified, because each factor has more than two [2] indicators per 
factor, meeting both the two and three indicator rule (Kline 2010, p. 138). Both these writers 
advanced this should ensure the model is initially identified before any data collection and 
analysis,  because Brito and Pearl (2002) reasoned, models tend to change during research 
analysis, which impacts the identification status of the model. Thus, for this study, the 
measurement portion of the model in Figure 4.4 was identified, because each factor had more 
than three indicators. The complexity of the model also affects the identification according to 
claims in the literature. Complexity is determined by the number of parameters, hence number 
of observations or data points [v] the scientist estimate (Kline 2010). To estimate the model in 
different ways, the initial measurement model in Figure 4.5 was designed to be over-identified 
with 2,352 data points [v] to 48 parameters [r] [21 regression coefficients λ, 6 covariance 𝛽 and 
21 variance ɛ] as calculated by equation 4.10.  
Equation 4.10  Number of data points formula (v) = r (r +1)/2 
Having more data points than parameters is necessary to test the hypotheses using a statistical 
test such as the chi-square statistic and fit indices (Ullman & Bentler 2012).  Thus, this initial 
SEM model was designed with degrees of freedom of 183. Additionally, this preliminary a 
priori model is a recursive model, because its equations are acyclic, where the variance errors 
and error covariance are uncorrelated (Brito & Pearl 2002; Shah & Goldstein 2006; Blunch 
2008). It is also uni-dimensional, because each manifest variable is predicted only by its 
respective factor (Brito & Pearl 2002; Shah & Goldstein 2006; Blunch 2008).  
In closing, in the four-factor a priori measurement model above [Figure 4.4] started with six 
paths among the constructs with non-directional covariance. Therefore, they represent all 
possible unanalysed associations. In contrast, the investigator took one-step further and 
designed the a priori structural path between the factors, illustrated in Figure 4.5 below, to 
have three paths among the factors to indicate the direct effects of the measured relationships 
in the normative model as specified in Figure 3.1 and discussed in Chapter 3. Thus, not only 
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are causal assumptions made about the endogenous observed variables, but also assumptions 
are made concerning the covariance between the latent factors.  Therefore, based on the CFA 
correlation [β] results, the researcher confirmed the structural model depicted in Figure 4.5 
below. Thus, the researcher used β results of the hypothesised respecified model depicting the 
relationships between dual-agency role, legitimacy of the licensing model to achieve the 
objectives of the Act and individual licensing to determine if the posited model structure and 
their hypotheses [relationship between latent variables and manifest variables and among latent 
variables] was reasonable (Chiu 2014).  
 
Figure 4.5 Conceptualised a priori structural model 
4.5.2 Population and sample 
Defining the population and sample was critical, because Van der Stede, Young and Chen 
(2005) claimed it is a key determining factor when making valid inferences. Given it is the first 
time this topic has been addressed by scholars, the main concern were the views of financial 
advisers. Especially given the issues about licensing influenced them directly as already noted 
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in previous chapters. Thus, the population was drawn from the list of authorised representatives 
registered on the ASIC Adviser Register [referred to in Figure 4.2].  
Prior to sourcing contact details of potential participants to collect the data, the principal 
researcher, emailed the Information Services Team of ASIC on 20 March 2016 requesting them 
to complete a customised search of the ASIC Adviser Register to produce a full list of 
authorised representatives’ names and email addresses for use in this research. ASIC responded 
by email with a link103 to this register, explaining they do not hold email addresses of authorised 
representatives. Subsequently, a population of 15,623 authorised representatives listed in the 
ASIC Adviser Register was downloaded on 21 March 2016 as indicated in the time line of 
Figure 4.8 below. Since publications claimed the Adviser Register comprised a population of 
23,309 financial planners/advisers registered on the ASIC Adviser Register (Financial Service 
Council & UBS Asset Management 2016), this number of only 15,623 was surprising. 
Therefore, a second file was downloaded in case an irregularity occurred in the download. 
However, the researcher met with the same result.  Evident from an initial examination and 
analysis of this adviser register, the gender distribution based on an examination of first names 
was approximately 81 per cent males and 19 per cent females. However, note during this 
analysis of the population, unisex names were allocated to males, because according to media 
reports (Chaplin 2015) significantly fewer female advisers than males work in the financial 
advisory industry, with a ratio comprising 80 per cent male and 20 per cent female reported. 
By implication, if a different gender split ratio was selected for this study, then collecting a 
suitable representative number of female respondents may be problematic. Therefore, a gender 
split of 80 per cent males and 20 per cent females was considered appropriate for this project. 
Accordingly, the downloaded database was split into male and female genders, based on the 
first names, with unisex names allocated to the list of males.  
Then the investigator selected a probability random sample (Cooper & Schindler 2003; Garner 
2005; Black et al. 2010; Swift & Piff 2010; Argyrous 2011; Yusoff & Mohd Janor 2014) of 
4,040 [80 per cent male and 20 per cent females] using the <Rand> function in Microsoft® 
Excel. The sample of 40 were allocated to the pilot study and 4,000 to the extended main study. 
For the main study, the sample comprised 3,200 males and 800 females. Four thousand was 
not only considered cost effective, but also sufficient to ensure maximum likelihood estimation 
                                                 
103 <https://data.gov.au/dataset/asic-afs-authorised-representative>. 
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procedures were possible. This sample size was also selected to avoid sampling error in SEM 
due to sample size (Kline 2010).  
As already noted, the list of prospective participants’ email addresses was unavailable on the 
ASIC Adviser Register. Therefore, prior to commencing the study’s data collection, the 
investigator performed a search via Google search engine for valid email addresses of this 
selected sample from 2 April 2016 to 29 May 2016. Not only did searching email addresses 
take weeks, it was unclear whether the 4,040 emails collected were valid addresses.  Qualtrics 
did not provide a verification service to check emails before distribution. Thus, before 
distribution an email verification service104 was paid to check validity of emails prior to 
including them in the final sample on 28 August 2016. Several email addresses were invalid 
and replaced with additional probability randomly sampled prospects to make up the sample 
of 4,040.  
Although a more difficult approach to source prospective participants in this way, according to 
literature (Niemierko & Goitein 1990; Cooper & Schindler 2003; Garner 2005; Black et al. 
2010; Swift & Piff 2010; Argyrous 2011; Yusoff & Mohd Janor 2014) a probability simple 
random sampling method was considered far more scientific. Particularly, when this method 
allows for the calculation of sampling error (Niemierko & Goitein 1990; Cooper & Schindler 
2003; Garner 2005; Black et al. 2010; Swift & Piff 2010; Argyrous 2011; Yusoff & Mohd 
Janor 2014). It is also professed to keep sampling bias to a minimum more effectively than 
other approaches (Field 2014). Moreover, McCoach, Black and O'Connell (2007) claimed 
applications of SEM using non-probability samples in numerous studies places generalisability 
of research results in doubt. Although Niemierko and Goitein (1990) found random sampling 
significantly reduces estimation errors, they do concede it does have a few disadvantages, such 
as the possibility of low response rates.  
Therefore, in the uncertain event, of a too low response rate for the structural equation 
modelling technique, the investigators made the decision to revert to convenience sampling to 
increase the number in the collection sample. To do so required the plan to approach the 
professional associations for help to recruit more respondents from their membership lists. 
Fortunately, the data collection sample size was sufficient, and this plan B did not eventuate. 
Therefore, recruiting from the membership lists of professional associations was unnecessary, 
because a major drawback would have been the compromised independence of this sensitive 
                                                 
104 <www. emailchecker.com.au>. 
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and controversial research. Note, instead of providing participants a financial or other incentive 
for participation, the investigators offered a summary of the results if they sent their email 
addresses to the researcher once the research findings were concluded. 
4.5.3 Research instrument, measurement items and measurement scale  
Data collection occurred electronically in a single snapshot, cross-sectional, newly developed 
self-administered, web-based semi-structured survey questionnaire. Some researchers (Al-
Debei, Akroush & Ashouri 2015; Al Qeisi & Al Zagheer 2015) claimed this is a common 
approach in many other social studies involving structural equation modelling. According to 
Yanamandram and White (2010) previous research showed,  online surveys produce quicker 
responses, were more cost effective to reach the target group located in different geographical 
states of Australia, while producing the same accuracy and completeness as mail surveys. 
Furthermore, the survey was easily accessible by mobile smartphones, tablets and computers. 
However, Akbulut (2015) highlighted some of the limitations of online questionnaires. 
Typically, e-mail invitations can be perceived as junk mail, unclear instructions may reduce 
the quality of responses; the lack of human contact may limit the ability of the researchers to 
obtain in-depth details, and privacy and security concerns of respondents needs proper 
consideration.  
The questionnaire was designed to connect the structural equation model [Figures 4.4 and 4.5] 
developed from the underlying theory  [Figure 3.1] to the data collected to test the hypotheses 
[Figures 4.1 and 4.2] from which the scientist deduce the inferences (Nebojsa 2014). The 
questionnaire was designed to take about 35 minutes to complete.  Furthermore, given the a 
priori model was solely constructed based on theoretical principles and no evidence of similar 
empirical studies was obtainable, the C-OAR-SE [Construct definition, Object classification, 
Attribute classification, Rater identification, Scale formation, and Enumeration] theory offered 
useful guidelines to develop the measurement variables (Rigdon et al. 2011) for this study. 
Additionally, each endogenous variable was estimated using one question for reasons as 
specified in C-OAR-SE theory (Rossiter 2002; Dolnicar, Grün & Leisch 2011). The 
questionnaire consisted of closed questions, to collect quantitative data, and open-ended 
questions, to collect qualitative data. This research was mainly concerned with measuring 
levels of perceptions commonly found in other social science research (for example, 
Yanamandram & White 2010; Bendixen & Yurova 2011). The questionnaire was divided in 
two parts. The first part of the survey asked respondents to reflect on their current perceptions 
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as the operational procedure and indicated their approximate percentage level of agreement to 
21 statements.  
For this enquiry the continuous numerical scale developed by Yusoff and Mohd Janor (2014) 
for measuring perceptions, namely the ruler-option [RO] scale, was modified. According to 
Yusoff and Mohd Janor (2012), RO is consistent with operational measurement theory. The 
Qualtrics Survey Software technical support specifically customise their existing scale option, 
and create the Yusoff and Mohd Janor (2014) ruler-option scale to collect the data measuring 
attitudes, feelings or opinions. Mainly, because it was unavailable in their options of scales. 
Operational measurement theory contended intangible qualitative attributes such as 
perceptions are quantifiable for measurement if there is the understanding a concept can only 
be understood once a method to estimate it is found. This makes the RO measurement scale 
appropriate for this social science research project, because it involves measuring perceptions, 
which is a qualitative attribute, quantitatively. Furthermore, there is agreement here with the 
views of Yusoff and Mohd Janor (2014), namely human thinking and feeling are continuous 
concepts by definition with little evidence it can be broken down into minute discrete amounts 
of thinking and feeling. When Yusoff and Mohd Janor (2014) tested their newly-developed 
scale they found for respondents it was easy to use and for researchers easy to administer. They 
also found, which was confirmed in a later study by Akbulut (2015), RO scale compared to the 
Likert scale resulted in a stronger relationship between indicator and its associated construct. 
Furthermore, they all found the RO scale compared to the Likert scale measurement model 
data produced higher internal reliability, internal consistency of the observations, and 
percentage of variance explained by the observations, and ratio of degrees of freedom to 
number of parameters. The former providing more mathematical information to estimate model 
parameters. In terms of validity of the regression coefficients, they confirmed the measurement 
model for data using RO scale had higher convergent validity. However, they confirmed both 
models attained almost the same level of discriminant and construct validity. Thus this scale is 
ideally suited to SEM, because compared to conventional ordinal Likert-scale (Beal & Dawson 
2007; Yanamandram & White 2010) it is less likely to distort or miss information, which could 
lead to adversely impact the measurement errors (Beal & Dawson 2007) and lead to problems 
with interpretation (Rossiter 2002). It is also well-known although Likert scale response 
categories have a rank order, the intervals between the categories are unequal (Jamieson 2004).  
Given a scale measuring perceptions should have a number of characteristics (Yusoff & Mohd 
Janor 2014), modified RO scale of this study reflects these characteristics. For example, it is 
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continuous and metric, vis-à-vis scaled from zero to 100 percent level of agreement. Thus, with 
its measurement unit of a percentage provided options to respondents to avoid ambiguity of the 
status of respondents who rate the middle point. This scale also included a zero point for no 
agreement, with a clearly defined operational procedure as the basis for measurement. 
Additionally, a clear description of the operations involved was included.   
 
Figure 4.6 Ruler-option scale for the pilot study 
 
Figure 4.7 Ruler-option scale for the extended main study 
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Figures 4.6 and 4.7 shows the proposed scale developed by Yusoff and Mohd Janor (2014), 
which Qualtrics support team customised for this study. Here, the RO scale consisted of a 
continuous straight line with 100 points and three options, ‘I don’t know’, ‘I don’t care’, and 
‘Not applicable’ for the pilot study. For the main study illustrated in Figure 4.7 the options 
were changed to ‘I don’t understand the question’, ‘I don’t know’, and ‘Not applicable’. The 
second part of the survey asked respondents for their unidentifiable demographic information.  
This formed the nominal data of this research providing information about the context in 
which these advisers have answered the questions. 
The researcher wanted to determine the representativeness of the sample, because the 
respondents to the survey may differ from the population they are supposed to represent. The 
researcher avoided using any audio nor video nor photographic resources during the data 
collection phase of the research project. Therefore, anonymity, privacy and confidentiality of 
all personal information during and after completion of the project to protect respondents was 
strictly enforced.  
4.5.4 Method of data collection 
To ensure the data on adviser licensing is collected systematically, data collection happened in 
two phases: a pre-test pilot study and then the extended main study. The timeline of the data 
collection is illustrated in Figure 4.8 below.  
4.5.4.1 Ethics approval 
Flinders University’s Social and Behavioural Sciences Ethics Committee’s Low Risk Sub-
Committee granted conditional ethics approval on 4 July 2014 [Project number 6459]. 
Submission of a full ethics application to the Business College Human Ethics Advisory 
Network [BCHEAN] transpired from 25 August 2015. Subsequently, the final approval was 
granted through ethics approval number 19784 where the main window for data collection was 
run from 23 February 2016 to 7 May 2018.  Note details in a letter of ethics approval granted 
by the RMIT’s [BCHEAN] is in Appendix 4.1. Please refer to the data analysis flowchart in 
Figure 4.9 summarising the data analysis process of the study. 
4.5.4.2 Pre-test pilot study  
To increase the main study’s probability of success, a pre-test pilot study was conducted (Leon, 
Davis & Kraemer 2011). A ‘pilot study’ was defined by van Teijlingen and Hundley (2002) as 
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a feasibility study or mini-version of the main study. They discussed the reasons for its 
importance, such as for example to increase the likelihood of research success and to convince 
funding agencies to fund the research project. As part of the thesis, the pre-test pilot study was 
part of a bigger project examining the legitimacy of the current authorised representative 
licensing model, which followed a sequential approach. It identified problems with the 
quantitative research design, particularly biases in the questions (van Teijlingen & Hundley 
2002; Van der Stede, Young & Chen 2005; Fain 2010), weaknesses in the sampling techniques 
(Fain, 2010), as well as issues in the preliminary data collection and analysis. Janghorban, 
Roudsari and Taghipour (2014) claimed pre-test pilot studies improve a novice researcher’s 
data collection, analytical skills, research competence and knowledge. Thus, the pilot study 
helped improve the data collection process, data entry by respondents and coding of the items 
for analysis (Dolnicar, Grün & Leisch 2011; Dolnicar 2013). 
The construction, ease of use, access, language, wording, comprehension, adequacy, 
appropriateness of the questions and content (Dolnicar, Grün & Leisch 2011; Dolnicar 2013) 
of the survey questionnaire, including its content and scale was tested for suitability of purpose, 
reliability and validity, specifically content validity (Rossiter 2008). This face and content 
validity of the study design was especially important, because the current financial adviser-
licensing model is a relatively unexplored area in financial planning research. Thus, in this way 
minimal misleading empirical results is assured, notwithstanding decreasing the risk of 
incorrect theories or hypotheses (Rossiter 2008). This is particularly important, because the 
survey questionnaire was newly designed. Its content was based on the theory discussed in 
Chapter 3.   
The pre-test pilot study comprised two stages: namely survey questionnaire stage, followed by 
an interview phase of 15 minutes to 30 minutes in total. Pilot data collection commenced on 
31 March 2016. For the survey questionnaire stage, the researchers selected 40 prospective 
participants comprising 32 males and eight females, to represent the gender distribution. 
During this stage, the pilot web-based semi-structured survey questionnaire [copy in Appendix 
4.1], together with supporting documents with embedded URL links105 to the secure Qualtrics 
website hosting the survey, were emailed to initially 30 authorised representatives. The 
supporting documentation comprised a letter of introduction, semi-structured telephonic 
                                                 
105 <https://rmit.au1.qualtrics.com/SE?SID=SV_eQbVnZbfBsr4tcV&Q_CHL=email&Preview=Survey>. 
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interview consent form, interview questions and the participant information sheet [copy in 
Appendix B]. Note respondents accessed the questionnaire using their mobile smart phones, 
notepads or computers. Two reminder emails were sent to the unresponsive participants to 
increase the survey response rate. The reminders were sent in case the respondents deleted, 
missed or forgot about the survey. Although the survey was initially meant to close on 29 April 
2016, the second phase of the pilot study was at risk of failing. Only one respondent consented 
to participate in the second telephonic interview phase of the pilot study. Subsequently, to 
improve the success of the pilot study, an additional 10 potential participants were randomly 
selected from the ASIC Adviser Register. Thus, it increased the total pilot sample to 40. 
Therefore, on 13 May 2016, as before, these 10 were emailed same survey questionnaire and 
supporting documents following the same process as explained before.  Data collection 
concluded 31 May 2016. 
For the second stage, the additional 10 participants were contacted telephonically, by email and 
LinkedIn to determine their willingness to participate in the second half-an-hour semi-
structured telephonic interview phase. This avoided raising any ethical concerns about using 
more follow-up or reminder emails. Those interviewees who volunteered were emailed the 
confirmed personal interview dates and times, an interview consent form, an interview protocol 
form with open-ended questions, as well as a copy of the pilot survey questionnaire they had 
completed. This was to ensure a reliable process of data collection across all interviews 
occurred (Janghorban, Roudsari & Taghipour 2014). To ensure compliance with BCHEAN 
ethics requirements and privacy the ‘Show my Caller ID’ was disabled on the mobile phone 
used. Moreover, instead of using an audio recorder, to maintain anonymity, privacy and 
confidentiality of the interviewees, their telephonic feedback was transcribed manually by the 
researcher as they spoke. Their names were excluded in the transcriptions. 
4.5.4.3 Extended main study  
After the pre-test pilot study was finalised 30 June 2016, the extended main study phase 
commenced on 1 July 2016. This stage included preparation, data collection, data analysis, and 
the write-up of the findings as scheduled in the timeline in Figure 4.8.  Given Van der Stede, 
Young and Chen (2005) claimed to obtain valid inferences using structural equation modelling 
technique depended on the sample size of useable data, the investigator began with considering 
the minimum sample size and response rate needed for this study. Although arguably, the pilot 
study may anticipate some idea of the probable response rate likely in the main full-scale 
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5. Pilot survey second reminder on 22 April 2016 
3. Pilot study survey data collection commenced 31 
March 2016 
4. Pilot survey first reminder, emailed 14 April 2016 
8. Pilot survey data collection closed 31 May 2016  
7. Pilot interviews 11 May-8 June 2016 
13. Main study survey data collection commenced 30 August 2016
 
11. Emails verification 28 August 2016 
18. Data analysis commenced on 10 October 
2016 with first Qualtrics download  
19. Second Qualtrics downloaded 13 
December 2016 to restart data after 
corrupt SPSS data files were 
discovered 
21. Data analysis and results finalised 30 June 2017 
2. Downloaded ASIC Adviser Register 21 March 2016 
16. Successful main survey second reminder emailed 20 September 2016 
14. Main survey first reminder emailed 6 September 2016 
10. Pilot data analysis finalised 30 June 2016  
 
1. RMIT BCHEAN ethics approval 19784 23 February 2016 - 7 May 2018 
6. Recruited pilot interviewees 11-25 May 2016 
22. Reviewing, writing & finalising research thesis manuscript 1 July 2017 – May 2018 
Figure 4.8 Timeline of the data collection and analysis phase 
 
9. Pilot data analysis commenced 3 May 2016 
after downloading responses from Qualtrics 
server 
12. BCHEAN Amendment Approval form 30 August 2016 
15. Failed main survey second reminder emailed 13 September 2016 
20.Third Qualtrics downloaded 13 January 2017 to 
repeat & double check data analysis  
 
 
17. Main survey data collection closed 1 October 2016 
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survey, the investigators made the decision to avoid using the pilot study to determine the 
sample size for the main study. This is based on Leon, Davis and Kraemer (2011) 
recommendation that pilot studies do not have a statistical foundation nor is a small sample 
size with a small data set sufficient to determine the sample size of the main study. 
Furthermore, Teo (2010) and Schmitt (2011) noted when determining the sample size for any 
SEM study, one should consider model size in terms of indicators per factor, estimation 
procedures, the possibility of model misspecification, as well as departures from a normal 
distribution with regards to degree of multivariate normality. Additionally, Shah and Goldstein 
(2006) contended that sample size has a major impact on reliability of parameter estimates, 
model fit and statistical power. According to them the larger, the size of the model when using 
maximum likelihood estimation procedures, together with the likelihood of misspecification or 
departures from normality, requires larger sample sizes. Thus, determining an appropriate 
sample size for a SEM study can be challenging. The size of the sample for the main study and 
performing power analysis for SEM is important to obtain enough data so where relationships 
exist they can be estimated (Bacon 1997). Past literature mistakenly recommend rules of 
thumb, which could lead to incorrect conclusions about the defensibility of a model (Jackson, 
Voth & Frey 2013). Also overestimations are a waste of research resources (Jackson, Voth & 
Frey 2013). Therefore, instead of using rules of thumb, a more acceptable scientific approach 
was used, vis-à-vis, an online sample size and power (MacCallum & Hong 1997; Chin 1998; 
Shah & Goldstein 2006) analysis software calculator developed by Soper (2016) based on the 
works of Cohen (1988) and Westland (2010). This mathematical approach is also documented 
in a manuscript by Schumacker and Lomax (2010). Consequently, given an initial a priori 
model of 21 observed and four latent constructs [Figure 4.4 above] in my empirical model, 
with a desired probability of 0.05 and statistical power level of 0.8, Soper’s (2016), online 
calculator, calculated a recommended minimum sample of 137 participants for anticipated 
effect sizes above the acceptable minimum for this study of .300. When increasing the effect 
size to .700, the sample size required went down to 116.  
Note, a factor loading of .300 according to Harrington (2009) is interpretable. Van der Stede, 
Young and Chen (2005) regarded a response rate of 80 to 90 per cent increased the 
representativeness and generalisability of the survey results. Thus, it makes for better 
inferences about the population. However, a paper by Aguinis and Edwards (2014) predicted 
it is a mistake to think increasing response rates or findings from a large sample were always 
generalisable. Furthermore, the Akaike information criterion and Bayesian information 
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criterion, which are measures of fit for models in SEM, adjusts with sample size and number 
of parameters to evaluate generalisability (Pitt & Myung 2002; Lubke & Muthen 2005). To 
clarify, generalisability is the ability of Figure 4.4 “to fit all data samples, not just the observed 
sample” (Pitt & Myung 2002, p. 422). Although, ideally a high response rate is desirable in 
any study (Van der Stede, Young & Chen 2005), a response rate of at least 3.5 per cent [137 
participants] of the sample size of 4,000 would be sufficient to perform estimation procedures 
in this enquiry. Consequently, with some idea of the minimum sample size required for this 
SEM study the data collection phase proceeded.  
On 30 August 2016, an invitation letter of introduction was emailed to 4,000 potential 
respondents. The email invitation provided the research background and objectives. The letter 
of introduction invited the selected participants to click on an embedded URL link106 to 
Qualtrics securely hosting the survey instrument for the main study [Appendix 4.3]. Once they 
accessed the survey form, they could download the participant information sheet as well as 
provide their electronic consent. Unsurprisingly, the response rate was initially below the 
required 137 respondents. Therefore, implementation of follow-up procedures included a 
reminder emailed on 6 September 2016 to those who had not completed the survey. To provide 
potential participants with a third opportunity to participate in the survey, on 20 September 
2016 as illustrated on the timeline in Figure 4.8 a second reminder invitation was successfully 
emailed to the respondents who were unresponsive, in case they deleted, missed or forgot about 
the survey. The survey closed on 1 October 2016. 
4.5.5 Data transfer, preliminary analysis and storage 
After collection, importation of the data occurred electronically into password protected csv 
files onto both the researcher’s laptop and RMIT server from the Qualtrics server. Conversion 
of these files into Microsoft® Excel [Microsoft® Office 365 ProPlus suite] ready for data 
screening as per timeline in Figure 4.8 for both the pre-test pilot and extended main study 
occurred. Three downloads were made for the extended study, so the data could be 
crosschecked and cross validated to ensure it had not been corrupted at any stage during the 
analysis. All files relating to the data analysis for this study were secured with password 
protection throughout the analysis.  
                                                 
106 <https://rmit.au1.qualtrics.com/SE?SID=SV_0HDad4R5UzZgaod&Q_CHL=preview&Preview=Survey>. 
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The statistical software of choice for the analysis was IBM SPSS v24, IBM AMOS for SPSS 
v24, Microsoft® Excel [Microsoft® Office 365 ProPlus suite] and G*Power 3.1.9.2 software. 
These are relatively simple software to use for a beginner SEM researcher compared to other 
SEM software (Al-Shirawi, El-Hajjar & Charles 2014). The researchers selected IBM SPSS 
AMOS version 24, because it was also available as an additional module within IBM SPSS 
Statistics for Windows version 24. For both the pilot and extended main study, data was 
reported in non-identifiable format in associated publications. For instance, pseudonyms by 
referring to participants as respondent, participant or informant A, B, C, etcetera, were used in 
place of actual names for the respondents’ qualitative commentary. Once the project was 
finalised, apart from any personal identifiable information, all data collected, data analysis and 
supporting files were securely stored for the required period of five years on the RMIT server. 
After five years, RMIT will obliterate the data. All other copies of data on the Qualtrics Server 
and supplementary hardware used by the student researcher was deleted and expunged after 
examination of the thesis and publication of the results. The final research paper/s will remain 
online indefinitely.  
4.6 QUANTITATIVE METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS  
The analyses for both the pilot and main study were initially pre-planned prior to data collection 
with the purpose of making amendments as required as the data analyses, interpretation and 
reporting stage progressed. The timeline of the data analysis depicted in Figure 4.8, indicated 
downloading the pilot data from Qualtrics occurred once and three times for the main study.  
4.6.1 Pre-test pilot phase 
The purpose of the pilot study was mainly to try a few data screening techniques and use a 
descriptive exploratory study (Cooper & Emory 1995), rather than to assess the proposed 
structural equation modelling techniques to test hypothesis with statistical significance [p-
values] to make inferences (Leon et al., 2011). Not only is little known about the problem, but 
also the sample size was considered too small [n=40] to test hypotheses. However, the pilot 
study attempted to test the viability of the methodology, identify any adjustments needed in the 
design of the larger extended study (Leon, Davis & Kraemer 2011) as well as to test feasibility 
of doing a full-scale study (Fain, 2010). This was achieved by using quantitative descriptive 
data analysis and the qualitative (Cooper & Emory 1995) interviewees responses to test for the 
non-significant effects for internal validity and reliability of the questionnaire’s content to 
ensure it measured what it actually intended to measure (Al-Shirawi, El-Hajjar & Charles 
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2013). Data analysis for this part of the study was concluded at the end of June 2016 [Figure 
4.8]. The pilot study qualitative data collected was analysed using descriptive exploratory 
analysis techniques (Cooper & Emory 1995) to identify problems in survey questionnaire 
design, collection, content and process  (Van der Stede, Young & Chen 2005; Dolnicar 2013). 
This was done to test for the non-significant effects in internal validity and reliability of the 
questionnaire content to ensure it measured what it intended to measure (Al-Shirawi, El-Hajjar 
& Charles 2014) and the interviewees understood the questions. This was particularly 
important, because the survey questionnaire was newly designed, and the content was based 
on multiple disciplines integrated within a financial planning context for the first time as 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
4.6.2 Extended main study phase 
As recommended by Leon, Davis and Kraemer (2011), to avoid any corruption of data during 
the main study, none of the data from the pilot study nor any of the pilot participants was 
included in the main study. New data was collected from a new randomly selected list of 
potential participants (Leon, Davis & Kraemer 2011). The data analysis process illustrated in 
Figure 4.9 below started with data screening. Before going onto empirically testing the model 
for goodness of fit, the cases were examined for electronic consent, invalid responses, 
unengaged responses, any data needing recoding into appropriate format for analysis, missing 
data for cases and outliers on the continuous data. Unfortunately, it was impossible to follow 
Cooper and Schindler’s (2014) recommendations to contact the respondents to obtain the 
missing information, because both surveys in this study were completed anonymously. 
Dropping any outliers was not an option either, because it will affect the generalisability of the 
findings (Harrington, 2009). With regards to missing data for each variable, Harrington (2009) 
wrote it can cause problems in SEM. For example, it can result in insufficient data points to 
run the analyses and compute the estimates, or it might reflect bias common to the respondents. 
The pattern of missing data was examined, because Harrington (2009) claimed this was more 
important than the amount of missing data. In the event reviewers or examiners questioned the 
methods used,  several approaches offered by Lynch (2003) were considered to deal with the 
missing data in this research. The variables were also screened for skewness and kurtosis. 
Multivariate normality is more restrictive than univariate normality (Tomarken & Waller 
2005).  In addition, the ‘Other’ option in RO Scale was addressed using an imputation method 
(Lynch 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell 2007).   
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Figure 4.9 Flowchart of the data analysis phase  
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“Nonlinearity occurs when the change in the dependent variable associated with a one-unit 
change in the independent variable depends on the value of the independent variable” (Menard 
2002, p. 72). “Non-additivity occurs when the change in the dependent variable associated 
with a one-unit change in the independent variable depends on the value of one of the other 
independent variables” (Menard 2002, p. 72). To ensure the outcome [independent] variable is 
linearly related to the predictor [dependent] variable and the data does not violate this 
assumption (Field 2014), the ANOVA test in SPSS was applied (Field 2014, p. 43; Gaskin 
2016c).  To determine the extent of the non-linearity an ordinal least square regression 
and  curve-linear regression [‘curve estimation’] was performed to see if the relationship is 
more linear than non-linear (Gaskin 2016c). Violations of additivity and linearity means the 
model will be invalid, therefore the researcher used robust methods, specifically bootstrapping 
(Field 2014). 
Homoscedasticity tests were also completed, because it tests whether the residual [error] values 
of the variables are consistent across different levels of the variable (Hair et al. 2010). With 
heteroscedasticity, standard errors are overstated making statistical significance inaccurate 
(Menard 2002). Thus high standard errors is a symptom of non-additivity or non-linearity (Hair 
et al. 2010).  Heteroscedasticity can lead to serious distortion of findings and gravely weaken 
the analysis, thus increasing the possibility of a Type one error (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). 
So, to determine the homogeneity [small standard deviations] and heteroscedasticity [large 
standard deviations] of the variances, the ratio of the range to standard deviations was 
calculated. The range of the variables fell between a minimum value of zero per cent and a 
maximum of 100 per cent level of agreement. Notable, Gaskin (2016d) claimed he does not 
test for heteroscedasticity, unless specifically asked for by a reviewer, because the debate on 
the matter is still inconclusive. On the grounds of possible inconclusive results and in case a 
reviewer wants this test it was also conducted. 
Well-documented, multicollinearity, where the variance of the independent variable to explain 
the variance in the dependent variable overlap each other (Gaskin 2016d), is undesirable. In 
this case the dependent variable’s variance is thus common (Gaskin 2016d). In addition, the 
independent variables are highly correlated with each other. Multicollinearity of the ith 
independent variable with the other independent variables in the model is checked using the 
variable inflation factor [VIF] and tolerance value for each independent variable after running 
a multivariate regression (O’Brien 2007; Gaskin 2016d). “The VIF [hence tolerance] is based 
on the proportion of variance the ith independent variable shares with the other independent 
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variables in the model” (O’Brien 2007, p. 684). Perfect multicollinearity is indicated by the 
coefficient of multiple determination for multiple regression [r2] equals one for each of the 
independent variables (Menard 2002). Using SPSS regression collinearity was checked where 
the tolerance statistic is 1 − r2 [independent variable], where r2 [independent variable] is the 
variance in each independent variable explained by all of the other independent variables 
(Menard 2002). Menard (2002) claimed a tolerance of less than .20 is a concern, but a tolerance 
of less than .10 is more concerning, because it indicates serious collinearity issues. Whereas 
O’Brien (2007) claimed greater than four to 10 shows potential problems. Prominent, this study 
is disinterested in the effect of multi-collinearity on the ith regression coefficient, but instead 
whether the regression coefficient is statistically significant despite the limitation of 
multicollinearity issues (O’Brien 2007). Consequently, no attempt was made to delete any 
variables and risk changing the theory. Instead bootstrapping was applied, because it is a 
common approach to correct standard errors for multivariate non-normality in MLE (Hancock 
& Nevitt 1999). Bootstrapping  is a method estimating the parameters of a model and their 
standard errors from the sample, without reference to a theoretical sampling distribution 
(Aguinis, Gottfredson & Joo 2013). In other words, the estimates of the expected value and the 
variability of the statistics from an empirical sampling distribution was planned. This technique 
is particularly useful, especially if the sample is large (Menard 2002). Large sample sizes are 
defined as sample sizes greater than or equal to 250 (Hu & Bentler 1999). Also, the results of 
the central limit theorem in large sample sizes is considered inconsequential given the 
distribution of the regression coefficients in repeated sampling for large enough samples will 
approach a normal distribution with known mean [equal to the population mean] and variance 
(Menard 2002). However, it is argued in the literatures the normally distributed error 
assumption is ignored by bootstrapping the confidence intervals (Field 2014). Notable, a 
limitation of bootstrapping is some cost to power (Nevitt & Hancock 2001). For bootstrapping 
the 95 per cent, confidence interval for both percentile and bias corrected confidence interval 
was applied. Based on the pre-test pilot study findings, as well as recommendations by Kline 
(2010), no questions were phrased in the opposite direction or in reverse order to the other 
questions. Kline (2010) viewed reverse coded items as an unnecessary additional problem for 
researchers. Therefore, unlike the pre-test pilot study, no reverse coding was necessary prior to 
handling the data for analysis.  
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Once the data was screened and the sample of useable cases established, descriptive data 
analysis proceeded as planned. This included analysing the response rate, nomenclature and 
biographical details of the respondents.  
4.6.2.1 Exploratory/confirmatory factor analysis tests  
Although the preliminary indicator-factor relationships modelled in Figure 4.5 was specified, 
based on the normative theory discussed in Chapter 3, Menard (2002) wrote the most important 
assumption in linear regression analysis is the model is correctly specified. This he explained 
was vital to ensure unbiased regression coefficients are not systematically overestimated or 
underestimated. Although, the initial plan at the beginning of this project was to move straight 
into a CFA framework, to do so was premature.  Kline (2010) recommended when one is 
developing a theory for the first time using a new data set, an exploratory factor analysis [EFA] 
should be done first. Besides, most studies are to some extent both exploratory and 
confirmatory (Joreskog 1978). The a priori model, shown in Figure 4.4, was based on an 
untested conceptualised model developed by combining numerous disciplines for the first time. 
Well-documented in this thesis, the measures in this research were newly-developed with no 
evidence of any existing measures (Harrington 2009) available to test legitimacy of the 
licensee-adviser licensing model. Thus, EFA made sense because the associations, as 
conceptualised theoretically within the model, was unknown. The model in Figure 4.4 seasoned 
SEM researchers, such as Bentler (2006), would likely consider incomplete, rather than biased, 
because only a normative sense of the number of common factors and the hypothesised pattern 
of item-factor relationships, based on investigative theory-driven development was evident 
(Brown 2006). Consequently, validation of the appropriateness of the observed variables and 
factors for the population took place before making inferences from the data.   
Keeping the integrity of theory in mind and taking into consideration the theories’ content  
(Anderson & Gerbing 1988), EFA was used to explore the possible underlying factor structure 
to test for construct validity of the priori model within the CFA framework to obtain 
preliminary valid model fit. Before examining the associations among variables within the 
model, the correct and appropriate number of common factors and pattern of indicator-factor 
relationships to minimise any gross misspecifications was established (Brown 2006). Thus, the 
scope during data analysis was extended to include exploratory factor analysis incorporated 
within the CFA framework [E/CFA] (Brown and Brown, 2006) prior to the main CFA analysis 
(Mulaik & Millsap 2000; Maslowsky, Jager & Hemken 2015) as illustrated in Figure 4.9. 
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Starting with EFA dimension reduction in IBM SPSS the investigator considered the size and 
differential magnitude of the factor loadings, to produce a refined conceptualised model. The 
researcher used pattern matrixes and Cronbach alpha estimates to indicate removal of the 
appropriate measurement variables from further analysis where they did not meet EFA’s 
statistical criteria or to determine if substitution made more statistical and theoretical sense 
(Brown 2006; Yanamandram & White 2010; Al-Shirawi, El-Hajjar & Charles 2014). EFA was 
implemented only to determine the appropriate number of common factors, and appropriate 
pattern of indicator-factor relationships, by the size and differential magnitude of the factor 
loadings, to minimise gross misspecifications (Brown 2006). Poorly behaved items were 
identified and gross misspecifications were respecified before the model was re-estimated 
(Anderson & Gerbing 1988). This led to revisions of the model, which provided a more realistic 
confirmatory solution (Brown and Brown, 2006) in line with the theory. During EFA, the 
scientist did preliminary tests, goodness of fit, convergent validity, discriminant validity and 
scale reliability. 
4.6.2.2 Confirmatory factor analysis maximum likelihood estimation 
After E/CFA, simple confirmatory factor analysis technique (Kline 2010), which is common 
in many structural equation modelling studies (Anderson & Gerbing 1988; Yanamandram & 
White 2010; Chiandotto & Masserini 2011; Awasthi & Sangle 2013; Al-Shirawi, El-Hajjar & 
Charles 2014) was applied. During this phase the associations were evaluated using MLE to 
determine if they were consistent, supported the theoretical expectations, and hence ensuring 
the measurement model was valid (Al-Shirawi, El-Hajjar & Charles 2014). The aim was to 
have a model producing an estimated population covariance matrix fitting as closely as possible 
the sample [observed] covariance matrix. Then the parameters, including path coefficient, 
variance, and covariance, of the  model were used to assess the population covariance matrix 
(Ullman & Bentler 2012). To address violation of the assumptions, such as linearity and 
multivariate normality violations, which may invalidate the model (Aguinis, Gottfredson & Joo 
2013), bootstrapping MLE at the 95 per cent bias corrected confidence interval was the most 
feasible choice (Brown 2006; Kline 2010; Byrne 2013; Brown & Moore 2016). Kline (2010) 
and Bryne (2013) recommended using bootstrapping as a nonparametric distribution free 
technique where no normality assumption is present. However, Bryne (2013) warned it 
assumes the sample and the population distributions have the same shape. To check the 
correctness of the model the estimated parameters using Bollen-Stine bootstrapping (Bryne, 
2013) was calculated. Other methods proposed by Byrne (2013) were considered, but found 
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impractical. For instance, asymptotically distribution free [ADF] could not be used, because it 
requires a minimum sample (Byrne 2013) of at least 480. Another solution was to correct the 
test statistic rather than change the mode of estimation (Chou, Bentler & Satorra 1991; Hu, 
Bentler & Kano 1992). Byrne (2013) indicated the Satorra-Bentler χ2-square is such a test.  
However, this correction procedure for non-normal samples is unavailable in AMOS. 
Furthermore, both AMOS bootstrapping and the Satorra-Bentler scaled χ2-square tests produce 
the same p-value for large sample sizes. Simulation results (see, Fouliadi 1998; Nevitt & 
Hancock 1998) found bootstrapping may be better than the Satorra-Bentler scaled χ2-
square. Bootstrapping was used, because χ2-square is sensitive to linearity, additivity, 
multicollinearity and normality (Joreskog 1978).  
4.6.2.3 Face validity, model fit and specification searches 
After every application of MLE, the goodness of fit statistics was checked first, followed by 
checking the data for non-convergence (Chen et al. 2001),  Heywood cases (Bryne, 2013), any 
missing constraint errors and indications the estimation was unable to reach its iteration limit 
(Gaskin 2016e). Also checked was evidence of inadmissible solutions, such as non-positive 
factor variance estimates and/or non-positive-definite sample or model-implied  and covariance 
matrices [correlations smaller than one or larger than negative one] (Raykov 2004). This 
included evidence values greater than one for factor correlations,  or evidence of negative factor 
loadings [regression weights] (Blunch 2008), any identification issues (Harrington, 2009) and 
model misspecification errors (Brown 2006). Factor loadings were scrutinized to determine if 
they were greater than 0.30, because these values are interpretable if sample size is ignored 
(Tabachnick & Fidell 2007; Harrington 2009). Then the standard errors of the parameter 
estimates, which measures how much sampling error is operating in the model’s parameter 
estimates or how closely the model’s parameter estimates approximate the true population 
parameters (Brown 2006) was checked. Next the investigator examined the squared multiple 
correlations, which provides the proportion of explained variance in the indictors and hence 
information about whether the measures are meaningfully related to their purported latent 
dimension  (Brown 2006), were examined. Squared multiple correlations is an indicator’s 
reliability (Brown 2006). The variance-covariance matrix and the model-implied variance-
covariance matrix was checked to ensure they were positive definite, which is indicated by 
eigenvalues all greater than zero (Brown and Brown, 2006). Then the goodness of fit indices 
of MLE of the raw data, which represented the average discrepancy between the sample 
observed and hypothesised correlation matrices (Byrne 2013) were scrutinised.  
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Undoubtedly well-documented (Anderson & Gerbing 1988; Hox & Bechger 1998; Herda 
2013) an initial model never fits the data well when solving a set of structural or regression 
equations.  Good fit was vital before the researcher proceeded with interpreting the results 
(Tabachnick & Fidell 2007; Jackson, Gillaspy & Purc-Stephenson 2009; Hair et al. 2010; 
Yanamandram & White 2010; Hair, Ringle & Sarstedt 2013).  In other words, if the data did 
not fit the model adequately, no inferences and accurate testing of the hypotheses was possible, 
because misspecified models produce biased parameter estimates. Therefore, model fit was 
addressed to increase the chance of replication of the findings by following some of  the best 
practice recommendations of Aguinis, Gottfredson and Joo (2013). Thus, resulting in more 
accurate interpretation and conclusions. Given all the regression lines between latent and 
observed variables were already in place [Figure 4.4], they were unfeasible to correct model fit  
(Hermida 2015, p. 6).  
Instead, the model’s misspecifications were corrected by using modification indices to covary 
the measurement errors forming part of the same factor. Data driven modification indices 
(Raykov 2004) provide specific information for how the fit of the model can be improved 
(Hermida 2015). When measurement errors, which are estimates of the “other unique sources 
of variance” (Hermida 2015, p. 6) or referred to in the literature as “a true score unique 
variance” (Hermida 2015, p. 6) and “unsystematic error variance” (Hermida 2015, p. 6) are 
present, then correlation or regression analysis might lead to biased parameter estimates (Yuan 
& Bentler 2004). Although Hermida (2015) cautioned against specification searches using 
modification indices, based on current practice modification indices [MI] with cut-off threshold 
greater than 4.0 (Raykov 2004; Brown 2006) was used to sequentially modify the model post 
hoc until adequate fit was achieved, seemed appropriate (Maccallum & Necowitz 1992). 
Furthermore, no clear guidelines as to what are and what are appropriate error correlation 
practices were found in the literature. If you recall, initially in the hypothesised model [Figure 
4.4] the covariance’s among measurement errors were fixed to zero, because measurement 
errors were considered unique to each indicator (Hermida 2015, p. 6). By correlating the unique 
variance, the observed relationship between any two indicators loading on the same factor is 
then not only due to shared influence of the latent variable, but other external factors (Brown 
& Moore 2016). Correlated errors demonstrate the indicators are related, because of something 
other than the shared influence of the latent factor. Correlated errors could result from method 
effects, such as using a common measurement method, such as the case of this research self-
report survey. Alternatively, similar wording of items and positive or negative phrasing can 
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also cause correlated errors. MI can also indicate systematic error based on respondent 
characteristics such as the nay-saying respondents who may have been stressed answering the 
questions and/or answering in ways considered socially desirable (Byrne 2013). Given the 
sensitive and controversial nature of the topic, as well as the overlapping central theme of the 
questions (Byrne 2013),  modification indices greater than four were expected during this 
study’s data analysis.  Hermida (2015) claimed other authors have demonstrated if indicator 
variables share components, then it is appropriate to covary the error terms. Furthermore, Cole, 
Ciesla and Steiger (2007b) claimed leaving out MI driven correlated residuals can result in not 
detecting model misspecifications. This they claimed resulted in latent variables 
misrepresenting the constructs being examined. Therefore, the scientist continued to retest and 
respecify the measurement model [Figure 4.4] using modification indices several times until 
achieving adequate model fit.   
Note though, model respecification is a controversial issue in the literature (Shook et al. 2004; 
McCoach, Black & O'Connell 2007). For instance, Maccallum (1986) warned, the process of 
examining and modifying must be conducted very judiciously, with the outcome viewed with 
great caution. Thus, respecification was only pursued if they were justified on empirical and 
conceptual grounds (Maccallum & Necowitz 1992) and they were significant at p<.05 level 
(Harrington, 2009). It is dangerous to correlate measurement errors after post-hoc specification 
searches without theoretical justification, Hermida (2015) cautioned, results in model fit 
improvement due to capitalisation of chance. Theoretical specification searches, namely 
revising the model solely based on large statistical standardised residuals or modification 
indices, could result in further model misspecification and overfitting. Overfitting occurs when 
parameter estimates are superfluous or due to chance associations in the sample data (Hermida 
2015). Therefore, no additional paths were added to improve fit, because this would 
compromise the theory and reduce replication of the parameter estimates, notwithstanding  
theoretically unjustifiable (Hermida 2015). Thus, the modifications were only made to 
represent the true model producing the data (Raykov 2004).  
The standardised residual covariance [SRCs], much like modification indices, pointed out 
where the discrepancies between the proposed and estimated models were evident. Thus, these 
values were inspected to determine whether the developed model is a good model with small 
residuals on average with thresholds no greater than 1.96 [for p < 0.05] or 2.58 [for p < 0.01] 
(Bentler 2006). The SRCs greater than 2.5 (Matsunaga 2010) to 4.0 with one degree of freedom 
at alpha level of .05 (Brown 2006) were investigated, because they indicated whether or not 
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those discrepancies were significant enough to delete to improve model fit (Brown 2006). The 
investigator also looked for positive standardised residuals, which indicated the model’s 
parameters underestimated the relationship, whereas negative standardised residuals indicated 
the model’s parameters overestimated the relationship. If the fit statistics indicated the data 
fitted the model adequately, the SRC estimates were merely noted, rather than used to produce 
better-fit statistics by deleting violators of the SRC thresholds. Mainly, for the reason,  deleting 
variables would threaten the integrity of the data to solve the statistical problems of explaining 
the factors (Clark & Watson 1995; Osborne & Costello 2005).  Therefore, specification 
searches were performed using modification indices only, because it provided 
recommendations to correct discrepancies or differences between the proposed and estimated 
model (Hermida 2015, p. 6). Respecifying the model did not rely entirely on the modification 
statistics, but also using the relevant theory and research findings as recommended in SEM 
literature to justify the respecification (Brown & Moore 2016). 
Acknowledged, SEM goodness of fit [GOF] is a confusing and contentious issue (Refer to (Ke-
Hai 2005; Bentler 2006; Hayduk et al. 2006; Barrett 2007). For instance, Byrne (2013) claimed 
the plausibility of a model cannot be determined merely by chi-square fit indices, namely 
CMIN, CMIN p-value and relative or normed CMIN [CMIN/DF], which measures discrepancy 
between the population’s true covariance structure and the target model (Ke-Hai 2005; Bentler 
2006; Hayduk et al. 2006; Barrett 2007; Byrne 2013). CMIN is criticised for generally being 
unreliable for large sample sizes greater than 250 (Matsunaga 2010). Consequently, as 
recommended by many SEM researchers (Marsh, Kit-Tai & Zhonglin 2004; Markland 2007; 
Byrne 2013) other fit statistics, tabled in Table 4.1, were considered important in for this 
enquiry to overcome the limitations of each one (Kline 2010).  
Specifically, the root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] measures the extent the 
population matrix is the same as the sample matrix within the bounds of a 90 per cent 
confidence interval (Byrne 2013). If PCLOSE [closeness of fit] is less than the .05, then 
RMSEA fails the test of minimal discrepancy between the observed and predicted covariance 
matrix. The GFI [goodness of fit index] measures the relative amount of variance and 
covariance in the sample matrices jointly explained by the population matrices (Byrne 2013). 
Whereas AGFI is the adjusted GFI for the degrees of freedom value (Byrne 2013). Both GFI, 
AGFI, Normed fit index [NFI], and Tucker-Lewis fit index [TFI] or non-normed fit index 
[NNFI] compares the hypothesised model with null [no] model (Byrne 2013). TFI is usually 
lower than the GFI (Hu & Bentler 1999).  
189 
 
Table 4.1 Goodness of fit statistics and their thresholds 
 
Measure 
 
Meaning 
 
Thresholds for good fit 
 
CMIN  Sample matrix and estimated matrix are the same Compare obtained χ2-square value with tabled chi-square 
value for given degrees of freedom [DF]  DF   
P   p>.05 or p>.01 
CMIN/DF   <3 
GFI   >.95; >.90 permissible; 0 [no fit] to 1 [perfect fit] 
AGFI   >.95 to>.80 [adjusted for DF); 0 [no fit] to 1 [perfect fit] 
CFI Over identification condition is met >.95 good; >.90 permissible; 0 [no fit] to 1 [perfect fit] 
TLI/NNFI Over identification condition is met value close to .95 reflects good fit; 0 [no fit] to 1 [perfect fit] 
NFI   value close to .95 reflects good fit; 0 [no fit] to 1 [perfect fit] 
PCFI Estimated parameter is robust against other samples (Mulaik 1998) Compare alternative models; 0 [no fit] to 1 [perfect fit] 
AIC  A value as low as possible Compare alternative models and should be smaller than the 
saturated and independence model, smaller the better 
BIC  A value as low as possible Should be smaller than the saturated or independence model 
for the model to be more generalisable, Smaller the better 
(Myung, Tang & Pitt 2009) 
SRMR Average error in the model is minimal <.09; 1 [poor fit] to 0 [perfect fit] 
RMSEA Population matrix and estimated matrix are the same.  <.05; .05-.10 moderate; >.10 poor 
PCLOSE   >.05 
Adapted from various sources: (Hu & Bentler 1999; Hair et al. 2010; Kline 2010; Byrne 2013; Pittayachawan 2013) 
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Comparative fit index  [CFI], is an incremental fit index that compares the hypothesised model 
against some standard baseline [independence and null] model (Byrne 2013). In independent 
models, the variables are uncorrelated. Thus the value of the index is the amount the target 
model improves the fit relative to the null or independence models (Byrne 2013). Of interest 
in this research were models approaching the value of one to indicate they are better than the 
independence models. Now the information theory indices are the Akaike information criterion 
[AIC] and consistent Akaike information criterion [CAIC], Bayesian Information Criterion 
[BIC] and sample size-adjusted BIC [aBIC] (Byrne 2013). They explain the extent the observed 
covariance matrices differs from the predicted covariance matrices by comparing the target 
model to the saturated and independence models (Byrne 2013). Therefore, smaller or lower 
values for AIC and CAIC, BIC and aBIC  (Lubke & Muthen 2005) are preferred. Also their 
values should be less than either the independence or saturated models (Byrne 2013). Byrne 
(2013) recommended current practice incorporates GOF thresholds, but cautions these 
thresholds are an unnecessary and insufficient basis to establish validity of a model.  Especially 
given GOF is inversely related to sample size (Byrne 2013). They recommended the 
researcher’s judgement around adequacy and interpretability of parameter estimates, model 
complexity and a priori theory should be considered when looking at the fit indices. So, 
together with the latter recommendations, for this study the various GOF indices guidelines 
[see Table 4.1] proposed by various scholars were used to help evaluate the extent to which the 
model is supported by the data (Blunch 2008). Namely, how far the GOF indices of this 
investigation’s model deviated from the implied model before making a judgement call as 
scientifically as possible.  
4.6.2.4 Cross-validation test 
Once respecification  of the model led to acceptable goodness of fit results of MLE (Kline 
2010) in AMOS for the respecified model’s parameter estimates could be interpreted. To 
confirm the improved model fit was not due to capitalisation of chance and the results were 
generalisable (Hermida 2015), the next step was cross-validation [Figure 4.9] using another 
sample drawn from the same population. Therefore, to cross-validate the model, multigroup 
confirmatory factor analysis [MCGFA] was used, because it is the most widely used 
methodology (Cheung & Rensvold 2009; Steinmetz et al. 2009) involving constrained models 
nested within less constrained models (Harrington 2009). The multiple group gender [male and 
female] formed the new sample from the same population to estimate freely measurement 
parameters and compared these results to constrained measurement parameter estimates 
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(Anderson & Gerbing 1988). The χ2 difference test was used to cross-validate the data of these 
two samples. Seemingly, it is the difference in χ2 values rather than the absolute χ2 values 
themselves determining whether the model in the empirical study is realistic, because chi-
square is sensitive to linearity, additivity, multicollinearity and normality (Joreskog 1978).  
Recommended by Byrne (2013), the χ2 difference test can be used to test whether adding 
constraints significantly worsens the fit of the model. In other words, the χ2 statistic and 
associated degrees of freedom of the constrained models were subtracted from the base 
unconstrained model (Byrne 2013). Evidence of cross-validation was claimed if χ2 difference 
was statistically non-significant  (Byrne 2013). In other words, a non-significant χ2 difference 
value indicated the unconstrained model fits the data better than the constrained model in which 
the parameters were fixed. If the χ2 difference value was significant, then the improvement in 
chi-square was significantly larger, and hence the constrained model fails the cross-validation 
test  (Byrne 2013).   Put another way, if the null hypothesis of equal distributions could not be 
rejected, namely the results were non-significant, the chi-square increase was also not 
significant compared to its degrees of freedom, the groups had equivalent covariance structures 
(Byrne 2013) and have been cross-validated.  
4.6.2.5 Invariance tests 
 Invariance tests [Figure 4.9] followed cross-validation. Raykov (2004) claimed a scale can 
only be accepted if it assessed the same latent variable in different populations as well as the  
scale’s factorial structure is invariant in all groups [configural invariance] “and the baseline-
level performance on each of its components is on average equal in the groups” (Raykov 2004, 
p. 308). Like cross-validation, to test for invariance MCGFA was used (Cheung & Rensvold 
2009; Steinmetz et al. 2009) involving constrained models nested within less constrained 
models (Harrington, 2009). Seven models were tested comprising configural, metric, latent 
factor mean differences test for scalar and equality of uniqueness [residual variance] associated 
with observed variables invariance to determine measurement invariance. For structural 
invariance, the researcher tested for equivalence of factor means, equivalence of factor 
covariance and variance (Brown 2006, pp. 269-270; Schmitt & Kuljanin 2008). In the MGCFA 
framework, invariance of parameter matrices was tested by constraining cross-group equality 
of these matrices. Then the models were compared statistically using the difference in the χ2 
statistics and degrees of freedom (Steinmetz et al. 2009).  Evidence of invariance was claimed 
if χ2 difference was statistically non-significant  (Byrne 2013). In other words, a non-significant 
χ2 difference value indicated the unconstrained model fits the data better than the constrained 
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model in which the parameters were fixed. If the χ2 difference value was significant, then the 
improvement in chi-square was significantly larger and hence the constrained model failed the 
invariance test (Byrne 2013). Put another way, if the null hypothesis of equal distributions 
could be accepted, namely the results were non-significant, the chi-square increase was also 
not significant compared to its degrees of freedom, the groups had equivalent covariance 
structures and were invariant (Byrne 2013). Consequently, if the chi-square value for each 
model was much larger than the degrees of freedom, the baseline model adequately explained 
the observed data on statistical grounds [p > .10, .05 or 01] (Reise, Widaman & Pugh 1993). 
Another practical approach to test for invariances was to report the difference in CFI [CFI 
difference tests] (Byrne 2013), rather than χ2 difference values only (Cheung & Rensvold 2002; 
Steinmetz et al. 2009; Locander et al. 2015). Cheung and Rensvold (2002) proposed evidence 
of invariance was based on difference in CFI values exhibiting probability greater than 0.01 
cut off. Although Locander et al. (2015) made use of this approach in their research,  Byrne 
(2013) claimed the change in CFI was still unsanctioned. Hence, both methods were thus 
implemented. Notable, where the two disagreed the χ2 statistic value decision in the first 
instance was followed, because this method permit testing for invariance easily by setting 
cross-group constraints and comparing more restricted with less restricted models. The χ2 
statistic difference test argues for non-invariance if significant and the CFI indifference tests 
argues for invariance if changes in CFI is less than .01 and significant (Bryne, 2013).  
The first step in invariance assessment involved establishing configural invariance by 
computing covariance among the observed variables for each group without any constraints. 
The three conditions for factorial structure invariance to be met included each population 
measured the same number of factors, the same predictors load onto the same factors, and 
factor loadings were identical in each group (Raykov 2004). Here no constraints were present, 
meaning the same pattern of fixed and non-fixed parameters and thus the model is the same 
across groups (Steinmetz et al. 2009). This is the baseline model to aid as a benchmark against 
which fit of more restricted models is compared (Reise, Widaman & Pugh 1993). To ensure 
comparability of factor loadings across groups, the variance of the latent variable is fixed at 
unity rather than using one observed variable per construct as a marker variable (Reise, 
Widaman & Pugh 1993). To measure configural invariance data was split along gender [male 
and female] lines in this study to determine whether the factor structure achieve reasonable fit 
when two groups are tested together and freely, namely no cross-group path constraints were 
evident. Although Schmitt and Kuljanin (2008) confirmed in the literature, if configural 
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invariance is establish then no further need to carry on with additional tests is necessary. 
However, to see how restricting the model more affects the results, additional tests of 
invariance were applied too. 
Measurement invariance was added to the well-established criteria of reliability, homogeneity 
and validity (Bryne, 2013). Measurement invariance determines whether the questionnaire 
assesses identical or different latent variables in more than one group or both the indicator 
loadings and manifest variable intercepts are equal across groups (Raykov 2004). Testing 
measurement invariance assume the numerical values under consideration are on the same 
measurement scale. Thus they are assumed comparable across groups for the purpose to 
uncover population heterogeneity (Steinmetz et al. 2009). It is an important aspect of scale 
development, as this determines whether the study’s testing instrument was appropriate for use 
in various groups. In multigroup application, invariance of a single measurement instrument 
(Bryne, 2013) across gender was tested, because it determined whether the questionnaire 
assessed identical or different latent variables in more than one group (Raykov 2004). Thus, it 
determined whether both the indicator loadings and manifest variable intercepts are equal 
across groups (Raykov 2004). Thus, measurement invariance examines the similarities and 
differences in covariance patterns of item-factor relations (Reise, Widaman & Pugh 1993) and 
variance-covariance matrices across gender. Thus, predictors must be adequately equivalent 
and measure the identical underlying latent construct of the two groups (Schmitt & Kuljanin 
2008). By validating whether the factor structure and loadings were equivalent across groups 
ensured, the composite variables measured the same underlying latent constructs for different 
groups within the same sample. Therefore, it validates the generalisability of the model across 
population (Vandenberg & Lance 2000). The construct scales should demonstrate full 
invariance to prevent biased and potentially misleading indicators of individual and group 
difference of a common set of factor loadings used to estimate factor scores within each group 
(Reise, Widaman & Pugh 1993). Only then can the researcher make meaningful comparisons 
across populations or measurement cases (Raykov 2004). Metric invariance is a stronger form 
of measurement invariance, whereby values of factor loadings of each variable on each factor 
are fixed to be the same across groups (Schmitt & Kuljanin 2008). The loadings for factors are 
constrained to equality for each of the groups compared (Byrne 2013).  Thus  the factor 
structure and loadings are equivalent across groups, which means the composite variables 
measure the same underlying latent constructs for different groups within the sample, and 
hence are generalisable across population (Vandenberg & Lance 2000).  
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Structural covariance invariance tests for factor covariance equivalence (Bryne, 2013) or the 
factor covariance are equivalent across groups and hence displays invariance (Byrne, 
Shavelson & Muthen 1989). Strict invariance tests the equality of indicator residual variances 
by computing the equality of reliability of an assessment scale across groups (Bryne, 2013). 
Thus, the equality of uniqueness associated with each observed variable is tested when the 
residuals of the regression equations are equivalent across groups (Schmitt & Kuljanin 2008). 
Notable, testing the equality of indicator residual variances is optional because it rarely holds 
in real data and is highly restrictive according to Brown (2006). If the restricted, nested model 
results in a non-significant increase in chi-square over that for the less restricted model, then 
the hypothesis of full measurement invariance is tenable. (Brown 2006) 
Structural invariance is divided into three tests of equality, namely latent means, factor 
variances and tests of equality of covariance. Structural invariance tests for population 
heterogeneity (Brown 2006). To assess population heterogeneity, the invariance of the 
measurement and structural part of the MGCFA across two gender groups was tested. 
Differences between measurement errors, factor loadings and latent means among gender 
groups given measurement invariance is expected. Equivalence of factor means [scalar 
invariance] differences test for scalar invariance is done when the intercepts of regression 
equations of observed variables on latent factors are equivalent across groups (Schmitt & 
Kuljanin 2008). In other words, it tests the equality of indicator intercepts (Byrne 2013). By 
equally constraining vector with item intercepts, results in the same systematic response bias 
in the groups prerequisite for latent mean comparison. Scalar invariance refers to invariance of 
the item intercepts in the regression equations linking the indicators’ item intercepts to interpret 
systematic biases in the responses of a group to an item. As a result, the manifest mean can be 
systematically higher or lower [upward or downward biased] than one would expect due to the 
groups’ latent mean and the factor loading. Scalar invariance is present if the degree of up- or 
downward bias of the manifest variable is equal across groups. To test for scalar invariance, 
one constrains the tau-vectors to be equal across groups (τA = τB = ... = τG). This check 
involves equally constraining vector with latent means invariance of the latent means if equal 
intercepts with the same latent means in the groups (Brown 2006). Equivalence of factor 
covariance test evaluates a further constraint, namely the equality of the factor covariance 
(Schmitt & Kuljanin 2008). This examination determines whether equivalence of factor 
covariance occurs and whether all items are related in the same way across groups (Schmitt & 
Kuljanin 2008). Equivalence of factor variance test of invariance of the error variances is less 
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important in SEM, because relationships between latent variables are corrected for 
measurement error (Steinmetz et al. 2009). In this case one mean is set to zero and the 
significance of the other model parameters represents a test of differences of latent means 
(Byrne 2013). Therefore, equivalence of factor variance across groups is present. 
4.6.2.6 Validity and reliability tests 
Next the convergent, discriminant and scale reliability were evaluated using the appropriate 
tests such as Cronbach alphas, composite reliability [CR], average variance extracted [AVE], 
average shared variance extracted [ASV], factor correlations, tau- and parallel equivalent tests 
(Brown 2006; Harrington 2009). Although CFA does assess convergent and discriminant 
validity (Curran, West & Finch 1996), EFA is the better technique to assess validity, especially 
discriminant validity (Farrell & Rudd 2009). So, both methods were used to test for validity. 
Convergent validity evaluated whether the variables in the model correlate well with their latent 
factor (Hair et al. 2010). To reliably interpret the estimates (Campbell & Fiske 1959) 
acceptable estimates of a given indicator loaded onto an underlying latent variable had to be 
above threshold of 0.35, which is based on a sample size greater than 250 (Gaskin 2016b). 
Although Harrington (2009) claimed a threshold of .30 is interpretable. A model achieves 
convergent validity if for all items in the measurement model, AVE  is greater than .5 for all 
the factors (Harrington 2009). Furthermore, if MLE parameter estimates in AMOS are 
statistically significant p < .001 or p< .05, then the indicator has a large degree of true score 
common variance (Harrington 2009). 
Discriminant validity is the degree concepts, which should have no theoretical relationship, 
show they were not interrelated (Campbell & Fiske 1959; Gaskin 2016b). In other words, 
discriminant validity considers the degree variables should relate more strongly to their own 
factor than to another factor. This is important to avoid the possibility of a Type two error, 
namely accepting a poor model, because this error could result in the incorrect interpretations 
and conclusions of the factor analysis (Farrell & Rudd 2009). Type two error occurs when it is 
believed there is no effect in the population, when there is (Field, 2014). Gaskin (2016b) 
proposed numerous methods to determine discriminant validity during an EFA. The first 
method was to examine the EFA pattern matrix (Table 5.29) and check for cross loadings where 
indicator variables load on multiple factors (Gaskin 2016b). No cross-loadings should occur 
and they must not differ by less than 0.2, or else shared variance occurs (Gaskin 2016b). The 
second method is to examine the factor correlation matrix (Gaskin 2016b). In the factor EFA 
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correlation matrix, correlations between factors should be less than 0.7 to ensure discriminant 
validity (Gaskin 2016b). A third method proposed in the literature (Fornell & Larcker 1981; 
Hair et al. 2010) is to use CFA by calculating average variance extracted, which is the average 
amount of variance in measured variables explained by a latent construct. Also examining 
average shared variance [ASV], representing the amount of variance in measured variables 
relating to another construct explained by a latent construct. Finally, to determine discriminant 
validity the maximum shared variance [MSV] values were calculated and assessed. Each 
structural equation model represents only one possible fit to the data; therefore, the AVE of 
each construct is compared with the ASV between constructs. If the AVE for each construct is 
greater than its ASV with any other construct, discriminant validity is supported (de Almeida 
et al. 2014). A fourth method proposed by Harrington (2009) to establish discriminant validity 
is to assess whether the CFA correlations between latent factors is less than .85. In other words, 
the indicators of the theoretical distinct constructs are not highly intercorrelated (Harrington 
2009). 
Before the results of the respecified model can be trusted, reliability tests are critical to any 
research, because the presence of errors in the scores and inconsistency in the measurement or 
proportion of true individual differences of the observed variables can lead to incorrect 
conclusions (Harrington 2009). Consequently, three methods were used in this study. Cronbach 
alpha (Field 2014) was the first test. Field (2014) confirmed when dealing with psychological 
constructs values, Cronbach alphas of 0.8 is appropriate and in the early stages of research, 
which is evident of this thesis. Furthermore, values as low as 0.5 will suffice and values greater 
than 0.7 is usually expected. Interestingly, Raykov (2004) showed Cronbach alpha under-
estimates reliability in a multicomponent measuring instrument like a multiple item 
questionnaire. Therefore, interpreting Cronbach’s alpha should be done with caution (Field 
2014), Consequently, the composite reliability for congeneric measures model [CRCMM] 
(Raykov 1997, 2004) was a useful online statistics tool (Colwell 2016) based on the works of 
Raykov (1997) to test reliability further. Composite reliability was considered an appropriate 
test for this investigation, because it is more reliable for large samples (Raykov 1997). To pass 
the reliability test CR should be greater than 0.7 (Hair et al. 2010; Malhotra & Dash 2011). 
Further tests for reliability in this project included congeneric, tau equivalent and parallel 
equivalent (Kline 2010). Tau-equivalent tests have equal true score variances [έ1= έ2, etc.], but 
possibly different error variances [ɛ1 ≠ ɛ1] (Brown & Moore 2016). It assumes the components 
of an instrument [scale] are measures of the same latent constructs in the same units of 
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measurements with different precision [tau-equivalent] (Raykov 1997, 2004).  Indicators have 
equivalent relationships with the underlying factor they measure. Thus, a one-unit change in 
the latent variable is associated with a one-unit change in each indicator loading on that factor. 
In other words, indicators measure the same units of measurement (Harrington, 2009). More 
restrictive is parallel where observed measures have equal factor loadings [έ1= έ2, etc.] and 
equal error variances [ɛ1 = ɛ1, etc.]. They measure the latent construct with the same level of 
precision (Harrington, 2009), namely equivalent error variances. It is also assumed to measure 
the latent construct with the same level of precision [equivalent error variance ɛ] this study 
used the χ2-square difference test to evaluate nested model comparisons for tau and parallel 
equivalents (Yuan & Bentler 2004). 
4.6.2.7 Common methods bias tests 
On the recommendation of Gaskin (2013) the researcher then tested the responses for common 
method bias. Common method bias refers to a bias in the dataset when something external to 
the question or measure may have resulted in influencing the responses given (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie & Podsakoff 2012). As was mentioned before, measurement error threatens the 
validity of the interpretations about the relationships between measures, which can lead to 
potentially misleading conclusions (Campbell & Fiske 1959). Also mentioned earlier when 
discussing specification searches, the specification of correlated errors may be justified based 
on method effects. For instance, additional indicator covariation may have resulted from 
common assessment methods, for example participant ratings and survey questionnaires. 
Reversed or similarly worded test items; differential susceptibility to other influences; and 
response bias effects such as: the response set; demand characteristics; acquiescence; reading 
difficulty; sensitive or emotional topic; or social desirability can cause common method bias.  
Method effects, which is a common research problem, creates a correlation between two 
measures which cannot easily be identified - as either the result of a true relationship or the 
result of shared methods. Thus, different methods, wording or the type of response options 
available, may result in a lower than expected correlation between constructs or may result in 
two or more constructs when there is only one (Harrington, 2009). This is a problem, because 
it affects hypothesis tests, can lead to Type one or Type two errors, result in incorrect 
conclusions about how much variance is accounted for by a latent construct and provide 
incorrect discriminant validity findings (Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff 2012).  
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On the recommendations in the literature (Gaskin 2013) three tests were identified as most 
suitable for this study. They included the Harman test (Nebojsa 2014; Choi, Ullah & Kwak 
2015), common latent factor test (Podsakoff et al. 2003; Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff 
2012) and common latent factor marker test (Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff 2012; 
Williams & O’Boyle 2015). When measuring perceptions, Podsakoff, MacKenzie and 
Podsakoff (2012) recommended researchers should make sure a subset of all the measures do 
not measure a single latent factor. This is the Harman’s single factor test. Although this test has 
been shown to display inconsistent reliability, it is still allegedly used in current research 
(Nebojsa 2014; Choi, Ullah & Kwak 2015); while allegedly, many reviewers still publish it 
(Nebojsa 2014; Kang & Jindal 2015). To see if most of the variance can be explained by a 
single factor, and hence the model has significant common method bias (Gaskin 2016a), all the 
variables in the study were loaded into EFA (Gaskin 2013). The number of factors extracted in 
the model in SPSS were constrained to equal one in an unrotated solution, rather than extracting 
via eigenvalues (Gaskin 2013).  
Another method used by various researchers (Groza, Locander & Howlett 2016; Kuzucu 2016) 
to assess the common method bias in the measurement and structural model the investigator 
also implemented, namely common latent factor [CLF] method (Podsakoff et al. 2003; 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff 2012). When the specific source of the common method 
bias cannot be identified, the CLF serve as a solution. In this method, a common latent factor 
to capture the common variance among all observed variables in the model was used. To do 
this, a single latent factor was simply added to the respecified CFA model, and then connect it 
to all observed items in the model. Then the standardised regression weights from this model 
was compared to the standardised regression weights of a model without the CLF. If the results 
of the latent methods model are consistent with the structural model, then this indicates the 
relationships are unaffected by common method bias (Groza, Locander & Howlett 2016). If 
large differences [like greater than 0.200] occurs, then the CLF must be retained after the 
regression weights were estimated (Podsakoff et al. 2003).  
Another widely used technique is the common latent factor marker technique, zero-constrained 
test or the CFA marker technique (Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff 2012; Williams & 
O’Boyle 2015). Here one includes a marker variable, such as a common latent factor as the 
previous method. The difference this time is all the factor loadings loading onto the CLF are 
firstly unconstrained and then constrained to zero (Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff 2012). 
This approach controls for the portion of the variance attributable to gathering all the measures 
199 
 
with the same method (Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff 2012). Then after performing 
maximum likelihood estimation for both the constrained and unconstrained models, a chi-
square difference test between the unconstrained model and the zero-constrained model is 
undertaken (Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff 2012; Williams & O’Boyle 2015). This 
approach tests whether the amount of shared variance across all variables was significantly 
different from zero based on chi-square difference test (Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff 
2012; Williams & O’Boyle 2015). If the chi-square is significant, then it was concluded method 
bias does exist in my measures. Strengths of this approach included, it modelled the effects of 
method biases at the indicator level, rather than at the construct level. It also provided a 
statistical test of method bias based on model comparisons. Furthermore, it is a test determining 
whether method biases affect all measures equally or differently (Podsakoff, MacKenzie & 
Podsakoff 2012; Williams & O’Boyle 2015).  
Common method bias was solved by retaining the CLF, namely the unmeasured common latent 
method factor to estimate the model parameters (Podsakoff et al. 2003). Mainly for the reason, 
it was the most common, simplest and most feasible solution, to control all systematic sources 
of bias during hypotheses testing of relationships between constructs (Podsakoff, MacKenzie 
& Podsakoff 2012). Other statistical remedies were considered, such as correlation-based 
and/or regression-based marker variable technique. However, they were considered 
inappropriate, because a suitable marker variable completely unrelated to the indicators could 
not be identified, notwithstanding they came with several other limitations (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie & Podsakoff 2012). Furthermore, the instrumental variable technique was also 
inappropriate, because the researcher could not identify the possible sources of method bias 
potentially affecting the indicators and latent variables.  
The common factor analysis marker technique is too complex. It was overlooked, because it 
may include steps required to fix parameters, which has the shortcoming of providing incorrect 
standard errors and goodness of fit statistics. Furthermore, notable are the findings by Meade, 
Watson and Kroustalis (2007), who claimed common method bias may be in many cases 
inconsequential. They claimed common method bias does not necessarily threaten the validity 
of study conclusions in every project. Consequently, to confirm or deny this claim, this thesis 
reported both results in Chapter 5 by retaining and excluding the common latent factor. 
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4.6.2.8 Structural path model 
CFA in this study was the main component of this SEM analysis. To close the data analysis for 
interpretation and discussion of the results, the structural model was finalised using the 
correlation results to confirm the relationship and hypotheses β1 to β6 between the factors b1, 
b2, b3 and b4. Qualitative analysis proceeded after the hypotheses were tested.  
4.7 QUALITATIVE PHASE OF DATA ANALYSIS 
Given the quantitative data was given priority; analysis of the qualitative data was kept minimal 
and relatively simple. Therefore, for the qualitative data, a constant comparative technique 
(Glaser 1965; Maykut & Morehouse 1994; Kolb 2012) with a focus on content analysis (Smith 
2009; Steen, McGrath & Wong 2016) of the specific respondents’ written words only was 
applied. To generate common concepts, dimensions and categories, as well as emerging 
patterns and themes, frequency, meanings, together with relationships of words the survey 
informants quoted were inspected, sorted and analysed (Webb, Sweet & Pretty 2002; Sonpar, 
Pazzaglia & Kornijenko 2010). These commonalities were integrated into the overall 
interpretation of the quantitative results using insight and judgement by following some of the 
approaches used by Maykut and Morehouse (1994).  Following the guidelines offered by Baran 
and Jones (2016), the collected data was organised. Thoughtfully, the transcript of each case 
was read in isolation of the quantitative data several times to obtain a general sense of the 
qualitative responses. This led to the emergence of themes or categories for each quantitative 
survey question. Then the data was coded into a list of themes for each question using the 
words emerging from the data. Coding took place manually, utilising Microsoft® Word and 
Excel to sort, organise, code and create the categories. Thus, the rate of recurrence, 
connotations and associations of the words (Webb, Sweet & Pretty 2002) respondents used to 
express themselves were analysed. This analysis was followed by categorising several overall 
themes, which is supported by the repetitive words and themes of each question. According to 
Baran and Jones (2016) themes create categories, which in turn summarises the findings for 
presentation making sense. Next, each quantitative result in conjunction with the qualitative 
findings considering interesting, yet important phrases or categories was analysed. 
Furthermore, other meanings, ideas or interpretations associated with the data were also 
considered. Thus, the constant comparative method was purposely used with the main aim to 
understand the phenomenon under investigation with minimum of interpretation (Maykut & 
Morehouse 1994). Consequently, respondents’ actual words quoted were used, which included 
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how they felt about an issue to validate the themes emerging from their responses. This form 
of content analysis has the main purpose to find specific words, concepts or categories within 
the text, which allowed us to make interpretations with regards to the quantitative results 
(Webb, Sweet & Pretty 2002).  
4.8 CONCLUSION  
The project was approached from a post-positivist [realism] paradigm using a quantitative 
research methodology. Structural equation modelling was the quantitative methodology used, 
because this project was about validating a theoretical perspective by means of exploratory 
factor analysis within a confirmatory factor analysis framework. This analysis was followed 
by confirmatory factor analysis to calculate structural relationships simultaneously between the 
above-mentioned four constructs. A sample of 4,000, with an 80/20 split between male and 
females, was drawn from the ASIC Adviser Register using probability random sampling. The 
study used a Qualtrics, web-based, cross-sectional designed, semi-structured survey 
questionnaire during both the pre-test pilot and extended main study using a continuous data 
Ruler/Option scale. During the pilot study, personal telephonic interviews were also conducted 
with participants, who consented, to make improvements to the scale of the instrument.  
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APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 4 
Appendix 4.1 Extended main study survey questionnaire 
Main Study | Legitimacy of Current 'AR' Licensing Model -  Final 
 
 
LEGITIMACY OF THE CURRENT 'AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE' 
LICENSING MODEL FOR INDIVIDUAL AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL ADVISERS   
 
    
PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH   
    
The purpose of this project is to examine your views on the legitimacy of the current 
'authorised representative' licensing model for individual financial advisers. 
     
This research is important because there has been much hype, myths, disagreements, 
overlaps, gaps and shortcomings regarding the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) regulating the appointment, authorization, regulation and cessation 
(henceforth, licensing) of individual financial advisers through third-party licensees.    
 
     
YOUR PARTICIPATION IS IMPORTANT   
    
By participating in this survey, you make your voice heard to debunk or confirm some of the 
literature and media myths exposed to the Australian public. This study may also help shape 
the future of the financial planning emerging profession. 
  
We invite you to participate in this full-scale study by completing an 'anonymous' structured 
survey questionnaire by 1st October 2016 to help us understand your personal thoughts 
and opinions regarding some of the media statements and literature commentary on ASIC 
licensing individual financial advisers through third-party licensees.   
    
It requires you to check or drag a few radio buttons, answer a few open-ended questions 
and complete biographic details that will not identify you in your web browser or on your 
mobile phone.     
 
 
TIME TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY   
 
It will take you no more than thirty-five (35) minutes to complete. You do not have to 
complete the survey in one sitting. Your answers are saved automatically as you progress 
through the survey. You can come back where you left off at any time until the 1st October 
2016. After this expiration date your responses will be lost.     
 
Navigating the survey:   
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To proceed to the next screen, please click the Next button (>>)   
To go back to the previous screen/s, please click the Back button (<<)   
  
Sometimes you may need to scroll down to answer questions or click the Next button (>>)    
       
Before proceeding to the next screen, please read the Participant Information Form by 
clicking on its link below 
 
Participant Information Form 
 
 
Page Break  
 
SECURITY OF THE DATA   
     
This project will use an external site to create, collect, store and analyze data collected in a 
survey format. The site we are using is on the Qualtrics website.   
    
No personal identifiable information will be collected in the survey, so none will be stored as 
data. In other words, the Qualtrics web-based survey software we use for this study allows 
your IP address to be masked from the researcher and others.   
    
Once we have completed our data collection and analysis, we will import the data we collect 
to the RMIT server where it will be stored securely for a period of five (5) years.    
    
The data on the Qualtrics host server will then be deleted and expunged.   
    
PARTICIPANT COMPLAINTS   
 
If you have any concerns about your participation in this project, which you do not 
wish to discuss with the researchers, then you can contact the Ethics Officer, 
Research Integrity, Governance and Systems, RMIT University, GPO Box 2476V VIC 
3001. Tel: (03) 9925 2251 or email human.ethics@rmit.edu.au     
    
To proceed to the next screen, please click the (>>) button ... 
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HOW DO I COMPLETE THIS SURVEY?   
    
This research comprises two main sections.    
    
Section A addresses the licensing of financial advisers through third-party licensees.   
    
Section B obtains biographic information that does not identify you.   
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All questions in Section A are single choice asking you to indicate your level of agreement 
anywhere on a scale from 0% (zero percent agreement) to 100% (hundred percent 
agreement) using the measurement scale called a Ruler & Option scale. See the illustration 
below. 
  
For each question in Section A you can EITHER click your mouse pointer anywhere on the 
ruler to indicate your level of agreement OR check the 'Other' radio button. A mark on the 
ruler indicates your percentage of agreement to the sentences based on your level of 
agreement with the statement.    
    
For example, the mark on the ruler below indicates your level of agreement is at 63% 
agreement.    
    
A mark on 0% indicates no agreement at all based on your current perception, namely you 
totally disagree with the statement.    
    
Please click on 50% if you neither agree or disagree.    
    
100% indicates full agreement, this means that based on your current perception, you fully 
agree with the statement.  
  
If you don’t know, don’t understand the question or the statement is not applicable to 
you, please click on radio button 'Other'.   
    
You are able to change your selection by clicking in another position on the scale or 
dragging the indicator to a different position or going back. After your selection, there is 
an optional comment box if you wish to add any further comments.  There are spaces 
provided for the open-ended questions.   
 
Just make your selection on the Ruler Option scale that looks like this example:    
   
 
EXAMPLE 1) 'Authorised representatives' face an uncertain future.  
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
EXAMPLE 2) If you click on radio button 'Other', a pop-up will appear looking like this:   
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You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which ONE of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
 
 
EXAMPLE 3) Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 100 
words) 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Section B comprising biographic information are a combination of multiple and single choice 
questions. Please select the appropriate radio button for the single choice questions.  Where 
applicable there are spaces provided to type in your answers. Scroll down to the next 
question until the end.   
 
Please check all the boxes that apply for the multiple-choice questions that looks like 
this example:   
    
EXAMPLE 4) Describe your licensee 
o Aligned licensee (1)  
o Independent licensee (as defined by the Act) (2)  
o Other (Please enter details in in the space below) (3) 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
It is important to note that there are no right or wrong answers to any of the questions.   
 
If you wish, you may skip any questions that you do not feel comfortable answering.        
 
PLEASE NOTE:  Once you have completed the survey and you have come to the end 
of it, before closing your browser and in order for all your answers to be sent, please 
click the (>>) to finish.   
    
206 
 
      
Please click the (>>) button to proceed ... 
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ELECTRONIC CONSENT   
    
In order to participate in this survey clicking on the 'Agree' button below confirms that you:   
 
 have read and understood the information provided 
 are an 'authorised representative' currently registered on the ASIC Adviser Register  
 are at least 18 years of age 
 are completing this survey individually 
 voluntarily agree to participate in this research 
 have not completed this particular survey before 
 consent to the publication and dissemination of the results in a student thesis, paper 
for publication, conference, the RMIT Repository (a publicly accessible online library 
of research papers) and any other specific websites 
 understand the results will be re-produced in hard copy format and/or digitally online 
via the internet with the understanding that anonymity, privacy and confidentiality will 
be preserved 
 understand that at any time you may withdraw from the research, including 
withdrawing any information that you have provided, prior to the publication of the 
project report and/or examination of the thesis 
 understand that the data will be retained for five (5) years after publication of the 
thesis/project: Legitimacy of the Current ‘Authorised Representative’ Licensing Model 
 understand the project is for the purpose of PhD research 
 understand it may not be of direct benefit to you 
 understand the security of the research data will be protected during and after 
completion of the study    
  
   
If you do not wish to participate in this research, please decline participation by 
clicking on the 'Disagree' button.   
 
    
o Agree (1)  
o Disagree (2)  
 
Once you have made your selection, please click the (>>) to proceed ... 
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SECTION A    
  
AUSTRALIAN ADVISER LICENSING   
    
The following questions will give us an opportunity to examine the legitimacy of the current 
'authorised representative' licensing model from your perspective.   
    
 Thank you for agreeing to participate. Your opinion is important. 
   
 To start Section A of the survey, please click the (>>) button ...   
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Q1. Advisers authorised through third party licensees face a dual agency relationship, 
namely an adviser-licensee relationship and an adviser-client relationship. 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q2. Licensing advisers through third party licensees results in advisers serving the interests 
of their clients and licensees, simultaneously. 
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 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q3. While serving the best interest of their clients, advisers also generate revenue for their 
licensees.  
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q4. Licensing advisers through aligned licensees (e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and 
AMP) results in conflicts of interest from association.  
  
For purposes of this survey:   
 
Conflicts of interest from association is defined as the conflicts that arise when the 
licensee is either directly or indirectly affiliated to financial product issuers, retail 
superannuation or aligned platforms. These include, but are not limited to, for example, 
 
 Financial product issuers: Commonwealth Bank (CBA), National Australian 
Bank (NAB), Westpac and AMP aligned groups; 
 Retail superannuation: BT Super (Westpac), MLC (NAB), Colonial First State 
(Commonwealth Bank) and OnePath (ANZ Bank); 
 Aligned Platforms: BT Wrap (Westpac) or Macquarie Wrap (Macquarie), 
Colonial First State FirstChoice Wrap (CBA) and North® (AMP).    
 
 
 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q5. Licensing advisers through aligned licensees (e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and 
AMP) sometimes makes it difficult for these advisers to align their interests with the best 
interests of their clients.  
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
 
 
Page Break  
 
Q6.  Advisers authorised through aligned licensees (e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and 
AMP) face unavoidable conflicts of interest from association by being affiliated to 
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product issuers.  
 
 For purposes of this survey:   
 
Conflicts of interest from association is defined as the conflicts that arise when the 
licensee is either directly or indirectly affiliated to financial product issuers, retail 
superannuation or aligned platforms. These include, but are not limited to, for example, 
 
 Financial product issuers: Commonwealth Bank (CBA), National Australian 
Bank (NAB), Westpac and AMP aligned groups; 
 Retail superannuation: BT Super (Westpac), MLC (NAB), Colonial First State 
(Commonwealth Bank) and OnePath (ANZ Bank); 
 Aligned Platforms: BT Wrap (Westpac) or Macquarie Wrap (Macquarie), 
Colonial First State FirstChoice Wrap (CBA) and North® (AMP).   
 
 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
      
       
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q7. Licensing advisers through aligned licensees (e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and 
AMP) puts their advisers at greater risk of unintentionally breaching their best 
interest duty obligations to clients due to their close affiliation to product issuers. 
 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q8. Licensing advisers through aligned licensees (e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and AMP) 
limits advisers from competing on a level playing field within the industry.  
 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
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________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q9. Licensing advisers through aligned licensees (e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and 
AMP) can lead to unintentional compliance breaches by their advisers as a 
consequence of their affiliation to product issuers. 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q10. Licensing advisers through aligned licensees can lead to the commercial interests of 
these aligned licensees (e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and AMP) sometimes 
compromising their advisers' best interests duty obligations. 
  
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q11. Licensing advisers through aligned licensees (e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and 
AMP) sometimes results in sales policies, procedures, and practices designed by 
licensees to give the appearance (window dressing) of complying with the regulatory 
requirements. 
 
 
  
  
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
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Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q12.  Licensing professionally qualified advisers through third party licensees means that 
when they leave their licensee, unless they sign up with another licensee, they lose 
their right to work as a professional financial adviser.  
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words) 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
 
 
Page Break  
 
Q13. Contributions by specific individual leaders of aligned licensees (e.g. ANZ, Westpac, 
NAB, CBA and AMP) to the debate with government surrounding the licensing of 
advisers are aimed to protect their product distribution channels. 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q14. Licensing advisers through third party licensees is one of the reasons why the 
Australian public cannot clearly distinguish between advisers who provide independent 
advice (as defined by s923A of the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001) and those 
who provide advice that may be conflicted by product bias.  
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 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q15. Since the media has exposed the financial planning scandals, financial advisers have 
had to defend their relationship/association/affiliation with their licensee to clients. 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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 You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q16. Clients would have more confidence and trust in financial advisers if advisers were 
licensed under a single individual license with professional standards of education, 
appointment, registration, regulation, discipline and cessation. 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q17. A single individual license for individual advisers will promote independence from those 
licensees who may be conflicted by product bias. 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q18. It is 'appropriate' to license advisers with an individual license in line with other 
professions, such as the accounting, legal and medical professions. 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
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________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q19. You would prefer an individual license that is regulated through a single independent 
registration, competency, education, conduct, standards and disciplinary board. 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q20. Strategic independent advice is being taken over by the accounting profession as 
accountants redefine and re-position financial planning within their self-regulatory 
model. 
 
 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't understand the question (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
 
 
Page Break  
Q21. Individual licensing of advisers through a single independent professional standards 
board will eliminate conflicts of interest from association.   
     
For purposes of this survey:   
 
Conflicts of interest from association is defined as the conflicts that arise when the 
licensee is either directly or indirectly affiliated to financial product issuers, retail 
superannuation or aligned platforms. These include, but are not limited to, for example, 
 
 Financial product issuers: Commonwealth Bank (CBA), National Australian 
Bank (NAB), Westpac and AMP aligned groups; 
 Retail superannuation: BT Super (Westpac), MLC (NAB), Colonial First 
State (Commonwealth Bank) and OnePath (ANZ Bank); 
 Aligned Platforms: BT Wrap (Westpac) or Macquarie Wrap (Macquarie), 
Colonial First State FirstChoice Wrap (CBA) and North® (AMP).    
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 0 25 50 75 100 Other 
 
Your level of Agreement (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Please state any comments in the space below (optional and limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
You have selected 'Other'. Please indicate which of the following applies. 
o I don't care (1)  
o I don't know (2)  
o Not applicable (3)  
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Q22. What is the difference in advice provided by aligned advisers, non-aligned advisers and 
independent advisers as defined by s923A of the Commonwealth Corporations Act 
2001? (Limited to 100 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Q23. What are the benefits to licensees appointing, authorizing and regulating ‘authorised 
representatives’? (Limited to 100 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Q24. Have you ever prepared a SOA (Statement of Advice) without any product 
recommendations? 
o Yes (1)  
o No (2)  
 
 
Why or why not? Please state your answer in the space below (Limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Q25. Have you ever applied for one-off approvals for financial products or investments not 
on you licensees’ approved product list?  
o Yes (1)  
o No (2)  
 
 
Why or why not? Please state your answer in the space below (Limited to 50 words). 
________________________________________________________________ 
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SECTION B    
BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION   
    
We are nearly there.  
 
In order for us to breakdown the overall survey response data into meaningful results that 
has a context, please complete this section. 
  
To start Section B of the survey, please follow the (>>) button and scroll down 
through the questions ...   
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Your gender 
o Male (1)  
o Female (2)  
 
 
 
  
Your age group 
o Gen Y/Millennial (Born 1981-2001) (1)  
o Gen X (Born 1965-1980) (2)  
o Baby Boomers (Born 1946-1964) (3)  
o Traditionalists (Born prior to 1946) (4)  
 
 
 
Your state in which you are based to work from 
o New South Wales (1)  
o Queensland (2)  
o Tasmania (3)  
o Western Australia (4)  
o South Australia (5)  
o Victoria (6)  
o Australian Capital Territory (7)  
o Northern Territory (8)  
 
 
 
Total number of years you have been an 'authorised representative'  
________________________________________________________________ 
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Your highest level of education achieved no matter in what field  
o Certificate I: Some high school, no diploma or equivalent (1)  
o Certificate II: High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (2)  
o Certificate III: Some college credit, no degree or equivalent (3)  
o Certificate IV: Trade/technical/vocational training or equivalent (4)  
o Diploma (5)  
o Advanced Diploma, Associate Degree (6)  
o Bachelor Degree (7)  
o Bachelor Honors Degree, Graduate Certificate, Graduate Diploma (8)  
o Master Degree (9)  
o Doctoral Degree (10)  
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Your highest level of financial planning qualification achieved 
o Certificate I: Some high school, no diploma or equivalent (1)  
o Certificate II: High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (2)  
o Certificate III: Some college credit, no degree or equivalent (3)  
o Certificate IV: Trade/technical/vocational training or equivalent (4)  
o Diploma (5)  
o Advanced Diploma, Associate Degree (6)  
o Bachelor Degree (7)  
o Bachelor Honors Degree, Graduate Certificate, Graduate Diploma (8)  
o Master Degree (9)  
o Doctoral Degree (10)  
o None of the above (12)  
 
Your professional accreditation or qualifications (Check all that apply) 
o Certified Financial Planning (CFP®) (1)  
o Certified Financial Analyst (CFA®) (2)  
o Chartered Accountant (CA®) (3)  
o Chartered Life Practitioner (ChLP®) (7)  
o Certified Practicing Accountant (CPA®) (4)  
o Fellow Chartered Financial Practitioner (FChFP®) (5)  
o SMSF Association SMSF Specialist Advisor (SSA®) (8)  
o Life Risk Specialist (LRS®) (12)  
o None (10)  
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o Other (Please enter details in the space) (6) 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
Your membership of Professional Associations include: (Check all that apply)  
 
o Financial Planning Association (FPA) (1)  
o Association of Financial Advisers (AFA) (2)  
o Self-Managed Super Fund Association (SMSF) (3)  
o Independent Financial Advisers Association of Australia (IFAAA) (4)  
o Financial Services Institute of Australasia (FINSIA) (5)  
o Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (ICAA) (6)  
o Certified Practicing Accountants (CPA) (7)  
o Not a member of any professional body (10)  
o Other (Please enter details in the space) (8) 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
Your authorised representative (AR) status is 
o Employee ‘AR’ employed by an Australian Financial Services License licensee (1)  
o Self-employed 'AR' under the licensee's Australian Financial Services License (2)  
o Other (Please enter details in the space below) (3) 
________________________________________________ 
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Describe your licensee: 
o Aligned licensee (1)  
o Non-aligned licensee (4)  
o Independent licensee (as defined by the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001) (2)  
o Other (Please enter details in in the space below) (3) 
________________________________________________ 
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Before closing your browser, please click (>>) in order for your response to be 
recorded and to close this survey.   
 
Thank you for participating and for sharing your valuable knowledge.   
 
If you want a copy of a summary of the main findings, please email 
s3567385@student.rmit.edu.au your contact details.   
   
Have a nice day.   This is the end of the survey. 
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ELECTRONIC CONSENT DECLINED   
    
As you have selected the 'Disagree' button for the Electronic Consent you cannot 
proceed with the survey.     
    
If you have changed your mind and wish to participate, please click (<<) in order to go back 
to the Electronic Consent.   
  
Otherwise, before closing your browser, please click (>>) in order for your response 
to be recorded, to avoid any future reminder emails and to close this survey.   
 Thank you and have a nice day.    This is the end of the survey.   
 
 
 
 
 
229 
 
CHAPTER 5: CONTEXTUALISING THE CURRENT 
LICENSING MODEL OF FINANCIAL 
ADVISERS: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS USING 
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
After the development of an empirical model in Chapter 4 based on the theoretical construct of 
the legitimacy of the current AFSL-AR licensing model in Chapter 3, this chapter reports the 
empirical results of the pilot study. Next, a dialogue is provided on the main difficulties 
encountered when developing the theory, as well as when collecting and analysing the data 
during the extended main study. Thereafter, the results of screening the data are presented, 
while performing exploratory factor analysis applied within a confirmatory factor analysis 
framework. Subsequently, the results are offered before and during confirmatory factor 
analysis. Then after respecification, the model is tested for contraventions of any statistical 
assumptions, so that the data can be interpreted accurately in the next chapter.  
5.2 PRELIMINARY PRE-TEST PILOT STUDY RESULTS 
By examining the pre-test pilot study results, it was clear some internal validity issues required 
modifications to the research instrument. The pilot study also revealed when advisers 
considered the licensee-adviser-client relationship their perceptions indicated some significant 
differences between financial planning scholarly theory, the intent of the legislation and 
financial planning practice. Further exploration of this issue occurred in the interviews to 
improve the main survey instrument to obtain a better understanding of the underlying 
challenges the financial planning discipline faces. 
5.2.1 Pilot data collection, response rate and data screening results 
Problems with response rates for the pre-test pilot study were evident. By 14 April 2016, 
response rate was below the desired 30 per cent [6.67 per cent], whereby a reminder email with 
a link was sent out to the selected 30 prospective respondents, providing them with a second 
opportunity to complete the survey to participate. A week before the survey closed the response 
rate was sitting at 10 per cent and below the desired 30 per cent. Consequently, on 22 April 
2016, a third email was sent out to the selected sample providing them with a third opportunity 
to participate in the survey. Recall that during the pre-test pilot phase an additional 10 
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respondents were surveyed. Initially, this survey was to close on the 20 May 2016 [see timeline 
in Figure 4.8], but this date was extended to 31 May 2016, because despite testing the survey 
prior to emailing it from Qualtrics, a respondent notified the researcher by email on 13 May 
2016 the survey was inaccessible. In addition, the webpage gave the error message the survey 
had expired. After discovering the expiry date settings within Qualtrics were incorrect, this 
problem was rectified by changing the date settings to 31 May 2016. Then another problem 
was identified while this pilot data collection was underway. On 26 May 2016, a technical 
coding problem was discovered with the ruler-option scale, which, as mentioned in Chapter 4, 
Qualtrics had customised specifically for this research. Qualtrics Technical Support Team 
rectified this problem by 27 May 2016 when they discovered a software update affected the 
coding of this customisation. Fortunately, this incident occurred during the pre-test to avoid 
this issue in the extended main study. 
Although a more time-consuming and difficult approach, it was evident from the pilot study, 
the probability random sampling technique was effective, but at the cost of low response rates. 
The overall response rate during phase one [survey questionnaire] was 32.5 per cent [13/40]. 
Two or 15.38 per cent of the 13 survey recruits gave up in the early stages of the survey and 
were discarded. Except for Cognitive [𝑎13] and Defend [𝑎14], 18 out of the 20 questions had 
no missing data. Six questions elicited ‘I don’t know’ responses, while four chose ‘not 
applicable’. No adviser indicated they did not care. Adjustments to the coding of the data was 
needed for three questions, namely Align [𝑎4], Competition [𝑎7]  and Cognitive [𝑎13]. Their 
scores were reversed to void negative factor loadings, which will hence affect alpha when 
testing the reliability of the measurement scale (Field, 2014). In contrast to the other questions, 
they were phrased in the opposite direction or in reverse order.  
Of the 10 contacted for the interview phase, connections were made with eight prospective 
participants by phone, while two remained uncontactable. Of the eight, one declined to 
participate due to a heavy workload. Therefore, with a response rate of 17.5 per cent, seven 
semi-structured open-ended telephonic interviews were conducted over 29 days from 11 May 
2016 to 8 June 2016 with two females and five male volunteers. Although the pilot study 
interview volunteers agreed telephonically to participate in the interview phase, sending them 
a follow-up email to arrange consent forms for their signatures and return by email prior to the 
interviews being conducted took a few attempts. In some instances, encouraging them to 
complete the consent forms required a telephone call. Some were unaware the written consent 
for the pilot study was important and others apologetically claimed to be too busy. 
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5.2.2 Quantitative pilot findings 
Noteworthy, given the small survey sample size [n = 11], representativeness could not be 
established with certainty. Nonetheless, the pilot study indicated recruiting participants by 
direct email might not produce the required response rate for a study of this nature. 
Consequently, as a back-up plan to ensure an appropriate sample for the extended main study, 
if a low response rate should potentially occur, consideration was given to recruit survey 
participants from the member list of financial planning professional associations with their 
consent.  
When considering outliers, it was clear from Graph 5.1 evidence of outliers are present on 
variables Association [𝑎2], Personal [𝑎12] and Professions [𝑎17]. These outliers were retained, 
especially given reasons behind them all were difficult to establish.   
 
Graph 5.1 Boxplot of the effect of outliers on the pilot data in terms of level of agreement 
232 
 
Table 5.1, below, indicate Cognitive [𝑎13] had the highest mean value of 79.45 per cent with a 
standard deviation [SD] equal to 30.24 and 95 per cent confidence interval [CI] of 59.14 to 
99.77 for the survey sample of 11. While Takeover [𝑎19] had the lowest mean [M] value of 
41.64 per cent with SD = 45.61 and 95 per cent CI of 10.99 to 72.28.  For variables Association 
[𝑎2] M = 78.18 with SD = 34.67 and 95 per cent CI from 54.89 to 101.47. While for Professions 
[𝑎17] M = 77.00 with SD = 35.91 and 95 per cent CI from 52.87 to 101.13 where the upper 
boundary for the CI exceeded 100. From Graph 5.1, the mean scores of most estimates fell 
within the centre of the confidence interval boundary of the population. The standard deviations 
and standard errors [refer to Table 5.1] were small relative to the mean. Therefore, not a cause 
for concern for the future extended study.  
Using z-scores, PP-plots, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests, the data showed some 
violations of normality. Except for Personal [𝑎12], Cognitive [𝑎13] and Professions 
[𝑎17] negative kurtosis indicated a flat and light-tailed distribution. Although expected in a 
small sample size, except for Takeover [𝑎19], they were within the acceptable range between 
negative and positive two.  Low scores in the distribution was evident in the negative skewness 
statistics with the exceptions of Takeover [𝑎19] and Unconflicted [𝑎20]. Further evidence 
suggested most variable distributions were moderately symmetrical with skewness values 
between negative one and negative a half or positive a half and positive one. Highly skewed 
values less than negative one or greater than positive one were also evident. These violations 
of the assumptions of normality led to considering the robust method of bootstrapping to reduce 
bias (Field 2014) in the extended main study.  
Using the Levene’s test for a small sample size to determine whether the distribution may show 
potential heteroscedasticity [or homogeneity of variance], it was evident for both males and 
females the variances were unequal and significant at the p < 0.05 for variables Fiduciary 
[𝑎6] where variance ratio for Levene’s test F with degrees of freedom [df1, df2] one and nine 
[1,9] equals 12.64 where p = 0.006, Regulative [𝑎8] F [1, 9] = 12.686 p = 0.006, Consequential 
[𝑎9] F [1, 9] = 51.104 p= 0.000, Procedural [𝑎10] F [1, 9] = 21.86 p= 0.001, Structural [𝑎11] F 
[1, 9] = 48.765 p = 0.000 and Defend [𝑎14] F[1, 9] = 7.387 p = 0.024.  
On the whole, the survey responses produced a Cronbach alpha (Field 2014) value of 0.945, 
which was greater than the threshold of .70 (Field 2014). Thus, overall scale reliability is 
questionable. However, overall the quantitative results of the pilot were positive, with the bias 
of data not too serious.  
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Table 5.1 Pre-test pilot descriptive statistics 
 N 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper Mean Std. Error 
Serve2  11 28.83 79.54 54.18 11.379 
Association 11 54.89 101.47 78.18 10.454 
Eliminated 11 29.10 89.26 59.18 13.499 
Align 11 53.88 96.31 75.09 9.522 
Conflicts 11 21.51 75.21 48.36 12.051 
Fiduciary 11 33.01 90.62 61.82 12.928 
Competition 11 54.31 97.51 75.91 9.696 
Regulative 11 35.62 93.83 64.73 13.062 
Consequential 11 31.73 92.18 62.45 13.788 
Procedural 11 35.46 94.26 65.36 12.970 
Structural 11 25.63 84.46 54.55 12.976 
Personal 11 46.80 97.93 72.36 11.474 
Cognitive 11 59.14 99.77 79.45 9.119 
Defend 11 30.61 82.85 56.73 11.722 
Trust 11 26.47 74.08 50.27 10.683 
Independence 11 38.61 93.57 66.09 12.334 
Professions 11 52.87 101.13 77.00 10.828 
Takeover 11 29.26 80.56 54.91 11.510 
IPFPSB 11 10.99 72.28 41.64 13.753 
Unconflicted 11 22.34 68.20 45.27 10.291 
 
The quantitative exploratory descriptive analysis indicated globally the estimates for most 
variables were acceptable. Whereas Cognitive [𝑎13] measuring whether ASIC outsourcing 
adviser licensing to product-aligned licensees provides the Australian public a clear distinction 
between those advisers who provide independent advice [as defined by the Act] and those 
advisers who provide conflicted-product advice produced problematic results. This issue 
seemingly posed the most problems of potential bias based on evidence of missing data, outliers 
and violations of the normality assumptions necessary for parametric testing using CFA. 
Despite this one problematic variable, overall, the pilot study found most variables measured 
what they intended to measure to answer the main research question. 
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5.2.3 Qualitative pilot findings 
The interviewees comprised three aligned advisers, including an ex-bank employee, and four 
who claimed to be non-aligned despite not meeting s923A of the Act. Two advisers were in 
the process of changing licensees. Although no independent advisers were interviewed, one 
interviewee was in advanced stages of self-licensing with the objective to market their services 
in the future as an s923A ‘independent’. The full transcripts of the interviews, in de-identifiable 
format, totalled 15,750 words of transcription. On the grounds of an initial emotive email and 
first interviewee’s responses, the interview times increased from the planned fifteen to thirty 
minutes to an average of one hour and forty-five minutes’ duration, where each survey question 
was explored in-depth with the interviewees.   
Distributing and collecting the questionnaires online was the most preferred method for many 
pilot study interviewees. After evaluating the success of data collection and retention of 
participants, it was evident the questionnaire content needed some further refinement. 
Specifically, the preamble of the questionnaire was shortened for the extended study to ensure 
it was clear to advisers their perceptions were being measured. Participants claimed they did 
not like the negatively worded questions, because they were difficult to understand. Therefore, 
these were removed for the extended study. Although two interviewees wanted to see some 
changes to the structure, sequence and organisation of the questionnaire, this suggestion was 
not implemented because, per the research findings by Dunn, Jordan and Croft (2003, p. 14) 
“chronologically structured questionnaire had significantly quicker returns and higher 
response than a traditionally structured questionnaire.” Thus, the survey questions for the 
extended study were numbered and continued to follow the sequence of the literature review. 
Although the order of the questions was maintained, amendments included adding additional 
questions [hence, variables] to the variable Dual, increasing it from three to four variables. Two 
irrelevant questions were also deleted after amendments were made to the literature review 
chapter. These deletions aimed to mitigate the probability of respondents not responding to any 
of the questions, leading to more missing data. Attempts were made to make the objective of 
the questions clearer by re-phrasing questions. The additional questions are discussed in more 
detail below. To the majority of interviewees, barring Interviewees C and E, the overall 
personal impressions of the ease of use of the ruler-option scale developed by Yusoff and Mohd 
Janor (2014) and custom-designed and coded by Qualtrics Technology Support team for this 
study were favourable. It was found appropriate and provided an adequate range of responses 
for the closed-ended questions. Hence, it was retained in the full-scale extensive study, with 
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one modification. The option ‘I don’t care’ was replaced with ‘I don’t understand’, because 
none of the pilot participants used this option.   
In the foregoing section, the actual words of the interviewees are reported in double quotation 
marks. Two aligned advisers [Interviewees A and G] felt all the questions appeared biased. 
Interviewee A, who wanted to give up part way through the survey, claimed: “to me, an aligned 
adviser, it came across as biased”107. Interviewee G concurred: “As I went through the 
questionnaire, I found it to be very biased towards advisers doing the wrong thing.” 
Accordingly, where possible, some of the questions were reworded to be more neutral for the 
extended study. Interviewees B and C wanted to see definitions of certain terms.  Based on the 
feedback from interviewees, the content of most of the questions were reworded into simpler 
language, with definitions. For example, the term ‘Statutory Fiduciary’ [𝑎6] duty is not a word 
most interviewees were familiar with or generally used in practice. Therefore, as requested by 
the interviewees, it was replaced with the term ‘best interest duty.’  
Interestingly, during the pilot interviews and data analysis of the interview transcriptions, 
unexpected themes emerged (Polukhina 2015) around the licensing of advisers and how they 
viewed their identity, role and performance. Identifying these themes resulted in further 
amendments to the survey questionnaire. One interesting emergent theme mirrored in media 
reports (Vickovich 2015; Santacruz 2016c), which was surmised would affect the extended 
main study, included the misunderstanding, misinterpretation and consequently misapplication 
of the legal terms of s923A of the Act. For instance, the terms “independent as defined by Act”, 
“independent”, “product-aligned” and “non-aligned” were specifically mentioned by the 
interviewees but not within the context as s923A intended. At the time of the pre-test pilot 
study, the terms “non-aligned”, “non-institutionally owned” and “independently-owned” were 
used in circumstances when advisers did not meet s923A.  Participant B asked, “In the study 
make it clearer are you dealing as an independent as defined by the Act, or an independent 
licensee that has affiliations with product distributors. Make the definition much more clear. 
Not clear whether the study is aiming for advisers to meet the Corp Act definition of the study. 
Product-aligned can be conflicted (banks and industry super funds) and non-conflicted (AMP, 
MLC), independent, non-aligned.” In practice at the time of the pilot, it was clear advisers had 
various permutations of the term independent, not just the one s923A version. These variations 
                                                 
107 Please note about the qualitative results, the thesis reports the actual words of the participants in italics 
within double quotation marks when combining the qualitative results with the quantitative results. In addition, 
to maintain the integrity of the comments, correction to the respondents’ typographical and grammatical errors 
did not occur. 
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made it difficult for five of the seven interviewees to understand and interpret some of the 
survey questions within the context of the current licensing model of financial advisers. 
Indication of the misunderstandings were reflected in Respondent C’s commentary: “When I 
first entered the industry the biggest challenge was the terminology and acronyms. Get your 
head around all of that and definitions?” Aligned Respondent G claimed “Independent versus 
aligned? No difference.” Whereas non-aligned adviser F, who claimed to deliver independent 
advice without meeting all the requirements of s923A: “We operate as independent, but reason 
we cannot be... there are advisers of Dover who still receive commission.” Then as the 
interview progressed s[he] explained: “Australians don’t differentiate (independent from 
aligned).” Nevertheless, as already noted in Chapter 2, after obtaining legal advice, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2017b) confirmed any terms related to the 
words ‘independent’, ‘impartial’ or ‘unbiased’ cannot be used to describe the services offered 
by advisers. The respondents were clearly sensitive to the issue of product affiliations and 
ownership of licensees and advisers. Noteworthy, were the unexpected emotional responses 
from three interviewees [A, D, F] when reflecting on each question and discussing how they 
understood these terms. Non-aligned advisers’ A and D who claimed non-alignment while 
indirectly affiliated to product issuers, were especially sensitive around advisers who they 
referred to as “so-called independents.”  For aligned adviser A: “So-called independents call 
themselves independent…ASIC have not made these independents accountable for being 
aligned & conflicted.” Unlike non-aligned Interviewee E, non-aligned Interviewee D was 
aware of only a handful of independents meeting s923A’s definition. S[he] provided the 
following examples of “…so-called independents…non-aligned…PIS, Synchron & Patron…” 
when they were aligned. This respondent thinks non-aligned cannot be independent unless 
“they widen their APL and go through the process of due diligence of all products.”  
Evidence of misapplications came from comments by for example aligned C: “…with product-
aligned, use examples…AMP & Westpac…in my mind independent advisers are advisers who 
work for AMP…product-aligned advisers are the banks”. Interviewee E explained, 
“…product-aligned advisers are bank advisers & AMP. PIS advisers are non-aligned and 
IFAs.” Interviewee E verbally reflected on the matter demonstrating further confusion: “AMP 
and banks are product-aligned, because the APL is narrow and they only have the one FLS 
platform with the majority of AMP products on it. PIS is a badge of BT-wrap, a product-aligned 
situation, but not paid more than a Macquarie-wrap or Colonial or whoever. We can use any 
admin platform with many investment options…PIS is a badge of BT-wrap, a product-aligned 
237 
 
situation”. With a play on words, services were being referred to as independent, even though 
the requirements of s923A of the Act were not being met. A disgruntled non-aligned adviser D 
stated, “whether product-aligned or ‘so-called independent’…receiving kick-backs for their so 
called ‘white label’ products.” This confusion seems to lead to perceptions as expressed by 
non-aligned adviser F, “…so we show value of being different…reasons why Dover, they are 
independent financial planners to the client”. Some advisers indicated two, others three and 
participant B identified four categories of licensees and advisers, namely (1) conflicted product 
aligned, (2) non-conflicted product aligned, (3) independent and (4) non-aligned. A respondent 
of an aligned licensee as non-conflicted product-aligned viewed even aligned advisers. 
Possible reasons for the misunderstanding, misinterpretation and misapplication, it seems, may 
be because non-aligned B claimed, “Many advisers do not know what is required to meet the 
independence rule of the Act. Conflicted product-aligned are advisers who cannot recommend 
other products on the APL that are not bank products. Then there are product-aligned who can 
recommend other sponsors products.” Respondent non-aligned E confirmed Participant B’s 
aforementioned commentary about s923A when they admitted despite using Google search 
engine they did not really get a simple explanation for “independent as defined by the Act” and 
“could not find any info about what you are getting at. So, ended up reading the section of the 
Act and found it difficult to understand.” After their admission s[he] asked, “What’s the right 
interpretation of the laws?” Interviewee aligned A felt it was “difficult to understand the 
legislation”. Respondent aligned C commented: “It’s not the advisers, it is the legislated stuff 
that caused the complications.” Upon further reflection, Interviewee C claimed: “… 
Government involvement, make it complicated.” From these findings, clearly this topic was 
more complex than the literature review revealed. Thus, from the foregoing, the quantitative 
results in the extended main study would have been difficult to interpret if additional 
information was not obtained. Especially information about how survey respondents 
understood the question within the context of the above definitions of independence. All the 
interviewees felt the closed ended “survey questions are restrictive” [Interviewee A] and they 
wanted a “comment section that is not mandatory [optional]” [Interviewee G] to explain their 
answers. Subsequently, interviewees’ recommendations of including optional open-ended 
questions was implemented to provide some of this detail. Therefore, the range of answers on 
each multiple-choice question in the survey was increased to include an optional open-ended 
comments option for the extended study. Especially when it is well-known closed-ended 
questions in surveys are conducive to bias and may be confining (Sekaran 2000). 
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The pilot’s preliminary interview phase findings, and recommendations from experts attending 
presentations at various conferences on this topic, highlighted the need to explore the extent of 
the misunderstanding, misinterpretation and misapplication of the Corporations Act within the 
context of licensing further in the main full-scale study. Thus, the following four additional 
open-ended questions were included: 
Question 1: What is the difference in advice provided by aligned advisers, non-aligned 
advisers and independent advisers as defined by s923A of the Commonwealth 
Corporations Act 2001? 
Question 2:  What are the benefits to institutional licensees appointing, authorising and 
regulating authorised representatives? 
Question 3: Have you ever prepared a SOA [Statement of Advice] without any product 
recommendations? [Why or why not?] 
Question 4: Have you ever applied for one-off approvals for financial products or 
investments not on you licensees’ approved product list? Why or why not? 
Despite Interviewees expressing each question did not have the correct level of detail, 
specifically definitions and examples for the terms used in the survey, it was decided only the 
definition for conflict of interest from association would be included. Advisers needed to be 
clear on the type of conflicts of interest of concern in this study, to avoid them focussing on 
the already well-documented conflicts from remuneration or other types of conflicts. How 
advisers understood other terminology within the survey form will reveal the extent theory and 
practice differ. Thus, the following statement was added to three questions in the survey:  
‘For purposes of this survey: Conflict of interest from association is defined as the conflicts 
arising when the licensee is either directly or indirectly affiliated to financial product issuers, 
retail superannuation or aligned platforms. These include, but are not limited to, for example,  
 Financial product issuers:  Commonwealth Bank [CBA], National Australian Bank 
[NAB], Westpac and AMP aligned groups;    
 Retail superannuation: BT Super [Westpac], MLC [NAB], Colonial First State 
[Commonwealth Bank] and OnePath [ANZ Bank];   
 Aligned Platforms: BT Wrap [Westpac] or Macquarie Wrap [Macquarie], Colonial 
First State FirstChoice Wrap [CBA] and North® [AMP).’ 
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All the above amendments lengthened the questionnaire substantially. Even though the survey 
form was revised, it was not piloted again. In conclusion, it was important based on the findings 
of the pilot study, the extended main study, on an increasingly topically delicate issue, should 
be conducted.  
5.2.4. Pilot limitations 
A major limitation in the pilot stage of the analysis was the issue of restricting the pre-test pilot 
study to only twenty closed-ended questions in the survey questionnaire, limiting the 
interpretation of the findings. This constrained a thorough analysis of the results. Thus, open-
ended questions were included in the extended main study to obtain a richer understanding of 
the quantitative results.  
In retrospect, in terms of recruiting participants for interviews, the survey questionnaire could 
have been administered better. Nonetheless, for the main study it was a non-issue, because no 
interviews were included in its research design. 
During the interview phase of data collection of this pilot study, the researcher telephonically 
collected self-reported qualitative data from interviewees. This was a limitation, because it was 
difficult to validate and verify the data independently (Brutus, Aguinis & Wassmer 2013). 
According to Brutus, Aguinis and Wassmer (2013) the biases of this self-reported data could 
potentially include selective memory bias, telescoping bias, attribution and exaggeration. No 
evidence of any qualified accountants among the authorised representative respondents 
recruited was found. Thus a limitation of this pilot study is it did not cover the full spectrum of 
qualifications and experts evident in the financial planning advice population. Furthermore, 
other financial planning stakeholders were excluded from the population; because of concern 
in this study is advisers’ views on the current and proposed future licensing. The study also 
only included potential respondents with publicly available email addresses. Thus, authorised 
representatives who did not have an online presence with searchable emails addresses available 
on the first page of the Google search results were excluded from the study.   
The presence of outliers, plus the violations of the normality, linearity or additivity and 
homoscedasticity assumptions for some of variables made any preliminary non-significant 
confirmatory factor analysis and interpretations impossible.  Given the sample size was small 
[n = 40] with a response of 11 cases of useable survey questionnaires, the pilot study could not 
assess the proposed structural equation modelling techniques to uncover potential problems 
using IBM AMOS v24. Even so, the aim of this pilot study was not to test hypotheses with 
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statistical significance [p-values] and make inferences (Leon et al., 2011), because the sample 
size was too small. With the small size of the sample, an acceptable caveat was some significant 
relationships, representative distribution of the population and generalisability [whether the 
model provides a good predictor of future observations] (Myung, Tang & Pitt 2009) could not 
be established from the pre-test data. However, the pilot study attempted to test the viability of 
the methodology, identify any adjustments needed in the design of the larger extended study 
(Leon, Davis & Kraemer 2011) as well as to test feasibility of doing a full-scale study (Fain, 
2010). By switching on the functions ‘Allow non-positive definite covariance matrices’ and 
‘try to fit unidentified models’ in AMOS the a priori model ran. Therefore, it confirmed with 
a large enough sample size structural equation modelling was a feasible approach to use in this 
enquiry. This was important to increase the main study’s probability of success (Leon, Davis 
& Kraemer 2011). By making the necessary changes to the extended main study survey 
questionnaire, it assisted in improving its success. The interviewees comments helped 
improved the questions (Dolnicar, Grün & Leisch 2011) with the intention of minimising 
misleading empirical results and erroneous hypothesis decisions or theories (Rossiter 2008) in 
the main survey questionnaire. Still, it was impossible to solve all the participants’ problems.  
5.2.5. Pilot summary 
In closing, the pre-test pilot study survey and interviewees’ feedback were both frustrating and 
time-consuming. For instance, the collection process produced some trying challenges and 
unforeseen problems during the research process. Even so, some of the research processes and 
outcomes from it were useful, especially in terms of making the necessary adjustments to the 
research instruments structure, content and wording. Notwithstanding administering the survey 
questionnaire and ensuring the survey, variables and the content were realistic and workable. 
Encouraging was the finding most interviewees reported the survey made them think about 
licensing in a way they had not really thought about before. A surprising discovery was how 
emotive some of the interviewees felt about conflicts of interest within the context of the 
present licensing regime. The constructive and harmful comments of the interviewees were 
useful indicating the survey is not only topical, but also controversial. Despite the above 
limitations, this pilot study was intended to lay the groundwork for the future extensive main 
research project, as well as to generate initial critical discussion on the issue of licensing 
financial advisers in Australia. Critical discussion was achieved based on media reports (Hoyle 
2016, 2017g, 2017a, 2017c, 2017b, 2017e; Professional Planner 2017b) at the time the main 
full-scale study was being conducted.  Hence, the pilot study demonstrated this was a viable 
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and worthwhile area to explore in further extensive research using a representative sample size 
with more detailed empirical analysis to guide the future of financial planning. 
5.3 MAIN STUDY RESULT ANALYSIS 
Of the respondents who satisfied the eligibility criteria of the questionnaire, a total of 608/4,000 
[15.2 per cent] authorised representatives responded. Longstanding, it is typical for survey 
response rates to be generally low (Sekaran 2000). Next, these cases were screened to 
determine the useable and valid data suitable for SEM technique. 
The survey was closed on 1 October 2016.  Prior to downloading the data from Qualtrics, the 
researcher deleted all the preview tests prior to the main study going live. About 10 responses 
downloaded, with dates and times falling outside of the start date of 30 August 2016 and time 
of 1.00pm when the survey was emailed. Therefore, any surveys completed prior to 1.00pm 
were deleted. When electronic consent and invalid responses were considered, among the 
incomplete responses were those who provided their consent to participate. Yet, they did not 
proceed with the survey,  were answering dropouts or lurkers (Cooper & Schindler 2014). 
These, together with the four who declined to participate, were all dropped from the dataset. 
Before proceeding with handling the missing data, some cases of respondent answers to open-
ended questions’, especially in Section B of the survey, were recoded in line with the format 
for the variable specified in SPSS.  For example, when asked to offer details of the number of 
years the respondent was an authorised representative, some would respond with “In practice 
since 1987, DFP 1993, licenced under FSR since 2004”, “Thirty years” or “Twenty”. These 
responses were converted into a number.  
Turning to questions on Professional Qualifications, Professional Associations, AR and 
Licensee Status, as well as the open-ended ‘Other’ options, were also recoded into appropriate 
formats. Only 17.94 per cent [47/262] in 98 instances [Table 1 in Appendix 5.1] claimed the 
questions in Section A of the survey were irrelevant to them or they misunderstood the 
question. Even so, it only involved a negligible 1.78 per cent [98/5,502] of all the possible data 
points for modelling in AMOS. Without a doubt, 68 per cent [67/98] of the other responses 
making up 1.22 per cent [67/5502] of the data points for section A answered did not know, 
with only 16 per cent [16/98] and 15 per cent [15/98] finding the question inapplicable or 
difficult to understanding, respectively. So, with these small percentage, plus applying 
solutions by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) and Lynch (2003, 2006) to missing data where less 
than five per cent of the data points were missing for large samples, the best approach was to 
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impute the neutral value of 50 per cent on the ruler-option scale. This neutral value is most 
suitable compared to other remedies proposed in the literature, and hence should not bias the 
findings in terms of responses. Especially given the respondents were uncommitted to either 
agreeing or disagreeing. Some respondents provided the following explanation for this 
uncertainty: “Cant score this one either, it would be misleading.” “I have never worked in that 
environment so I do not know.” “Unsure as I am not in, nor ever been in that situation.” “I 
have no experience of this personally…” “I don’t understand the question.” “I find this difficult 
to answer.” “I have no way to substantiate this.” For reasons explained in Chapter 4, using a 
value of 50 per cent adjustment to the empty fields for 𝑎1 to 𝑎21 who selected ‘Other’ was 
considered more appropriate substantively. Especially given, alternative methods have the 
disadvantage of providing a value that commits the respondent to agree or disagree, when they 
were undecided, non-committal or unsure or had no experience, were indifferent, nor had an 
opinion about the matter. Additionally, given a neutral value of 50 per cent is available on the 
ruler-option scale. Especially if one of the main aims of this study is to answer the research 
question of the extent or level of agreement of the legitimacy of the current AR model, which 
should include those who neither agree or disagree, which is not a useless response.  
 
Figure 5.1 Overall summary of missing values for Section A of the questionnaire 
The missing data in the survey questionnaire was also negligible [Figure 5.1 above]. Section A 
of the survey produced evidence of five [1.90 per cent] cases out of 262 cases with missing 
data and about half [47.62 per cent] of the number of variables with missing data. Only 0.2 per 
cent [11] missing values in the entire sample as illustrated in Figure 5.1. When data was 
examined in terms of the pattern of missing data in the Table 2 in Appendix 5.2 at the end of 
the chapter, case 171 had missing data of less than five per cent. Although Lynch (2003) 
proposed to just list wise delete the missing observations if less than five per cent missing, and 
243 
 
AMOS automatically addresses missing data for list wise deletion when using MLE, this 
remedy was not implemented to avoid losing efficiency. Furthermore, Harrington (2009) 
claimed any list wise deletion can result in a loss of power by reducing the sample size leading 
to inefficiency in estimating SE of a parameter. Cases 165 and 108 in Table 2 in Appendix 5.2 
had missing values greater than five per cent, but less than 10 per cent. A method recommended 
for these cases is a regression-based imputation method whereby the missing data is replaced 
with regression means for missing values between five per cent and 10 per cent (Lynch 2003). 
This remedy was also rejected, because Lynch (2003) claimed a limitation of this approach 
found during their simulation it produces mean imputation or correction biases. Cases 198 and 
261 had missing data greater than 10 per cent, but less than 20 per cent. Thus, Lynch (2003)  
endorsed using a selection model or sophisticated technique for handling the missing data for 
data clearly not missing at random [MAR]. If MAR, then one can then either list wise delete 
or use some method of imputation, for example, multiple, hot decking and expectation-
maximization. Although, all these proposed solutions seem reasonable, the dummy variable 
adjustment method was used, whereby the missing values on a variable are replaced with the 
neutral value of 50 per cent, signifying undecided or unsure [neither agree or disagree], non-
committal, inapplicable, or misunderstanding the question. This remedy was considered more 
appropriate for this research than other methods, because it will least likely bias the findings.  
 
Figure 5.2 Overall summary of missing values for Section B of the questionnaire 
Figure 5.1 and the pattern of missing data [Table 2 in Appendix 5.2] shows, combined with a 
negligible 11 out of 5,502 [.2 per cent] data p identified as missing overall, the dummy variable 
imputation method should not bias the parameters, nor importantly, the standard errors (Lynch 
2003). As Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) recommended if five per cent  or less of the data points 
were missing at random for large samples, then any method to handle missing data can be used. 
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The small percentage [and number] of ignorable missing data in Section B of the questionnaire 
[see Figure 5.2 above], were only reported without any modification (Cooper & Schindler 
2014). This approach of tolerating the missing data was appropriate, because they form a small 
percentage of the total data points, did not exist in critical areas and were not worth the time, 
cost and effort to correct (Cooper & Schindler 2014, p. 378). Furthermore, the survey’s Section 
B questions were not used in the modelling of the data, except during multi-group analysis for 
cross-validation and invariance testing. This data provided the context and to assist with some 
of the interpretation of the results to answer the research question (Cooper & Schindler 2014).  
 
Graph 5.2 Boxplots of univariate normality and outliers 
When the data for outliers were inspected, 21 or 0.382 per cent [21/5,502] univariate outliers 
for model fit and prediction (Aguinis, Gottfredson & Joo 2013) were detected in the box plots 
in Graph 5.2. These box plots generated in SPSS indicated just a small number of responses 
were away from the mean and heavily weighted toward the upper half of the ruler-option scale.  
Three variables, namely Dual [9 outliers], BestRev [6 outliers] and Personal [6 outliers] show 
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outliers [Graph 5.2] in SPSS analysis. The responses collected did not fall into a normal 
distribution. Violations of univariate normality is confirmed by the SPSS generated histograms 
and PP-plots which was clearly indicated by s-shape skewness, resulting in the distributions 
being significantly different from a normal distribution.   
To detect model fit outliers in the space of the predictors that stands distinctly apart from all 
the other, Mahalanobis d-squared (Stevens 1984; Gaskin 2011; Byrne 2013) was used. A 
review of  Table 3 in the Appendix 5.3 shows in p1 column108  and p2 column109 the correlations 
between the variables for these responses are abnormal or significantly different to the rest of 
the data set for this model (Byrne 2013). However, there was no theoretical or empirical 
justification to remove these records just because they did not fit the theory or to achieve more 
accurate beta or regression weights, and hence a better fitting model. Therefore, they were 
retained for further analysis and interpretation.  
Furthermore, the multivariate kurtosis value of 87.028 in Table 5.2 referred to the Mardia’s 
coefficient (Byrne 2013) confirmed non-normality of the data. In this table, negative skewness 
statistics for all variables, except for Regulative [𝑎9], was evident. Evidence of highly skewed 
distributions [values less than minus one or greater than plus one] occurred for variables Dual 
[𝑎1], BestIRevenue [𝑎3], CoIAssociation [𝑎4] and Personal [𝑎13]. Evidence of distributions 
moderately symmetrical [skewness values between minus one to minus a half and plus a half 
to plus one] include CoIAct [𝑎6], Consequential [𝑎10], Procedural [𝑎11] Structural [𝑎12], 
Cognitive [𝑎14], Trust[𝑎16], Independent [𝑎17], Professions (𝑎18), and IPFPSB [𝑎19].    
Likewise, negative kurtosis scores seem evident for most variables, apart from Dual [𝑎1], 
BestIRevenue [𝑎3]  and Personal [𝑎13]. Nonetheless, the kurtosis values, which indicated a 
fairly flat and light-tailed distribution were within the acceptable range of minus two and plus 
two (Sposito, Hand & Skarpness 1983). Although no clear consensus in the literature as to how 
large the values should be,  only variables with skew index absolute values greater than three 
(Kline 2010) and kurtosis index absolute values greater than seven (Byrne 2013) or 10 were 
considered troublesome (Kline 2010). Therefore, visibly none of the reported skewness and 
kurtosis indicated problematic levels of concern.   
                                                 
108 p1 is the probability of any observation exceeding the squared Mahalanobis distance of that observation. 
Problematic is when the Mahalanobis distance is high or shows a larger difference compared to any of the 
other variables in the same table.  Small numbers of p1 less than 0.05 are generally expected. 
109 p2 shows the probability that the largest squared distance of any observation would exceed the Mahalanobis 
distance computed. However, small numbers of less than 0.01 in the p2 column, on the other hand, indicate 
observations that are improbably far from the centroid under the hypothesis of normality (Arbuckle 1997). 
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Table 5.2 Assessment of normality [Group number 1] 
              
Variable Min Max Skewness C.r. Kurtosis C.r. 
a1 0 100 -1.381 -9.126 0.728 2.405 
a2 0 100 -0.453 -2.996 -1.237 -4.086 
a3 0 100 -1.329 -8.779 0.808 2.669 
a4 0 100 -1.130 -7.467 -0.093 -0.307 
a5 0 100 -0.413 -2.728 -1.421 -4.696 
a6 0 100 -0.673 -4.450 -1.100 -3.634 
a7 0 100 -0.406 -2.680 -1.312 -4.334 
a8 0 100 -0.062 -0.406 -1.465 -4.841 
a9 0 100 0.091 0.600 -1.485 -4.905 
a10 0 100 -0.635 -4.193 -1.081 -3.573 
a11 0 100 -0.508 -3.357 -1.278 -4.224 
a13 0 100 -1.294 -8.550 0.641 2.118 
a14 0 100 -0.567 -3.749 -1.140 -3.768 
a16 0 100 -0.587 -3.882 -1.203 -3.976 
a17 0 100 -0.687 -4.538 -0.975 -3.221 
a18 0 100 -0.818 -5.404 -0.812 -2.683 
a19 0 100 -0.779 -5.145 -0.815 -2.692 
a21 0 100 -0.118 -0.778 -1.318 -4.354 
Multivariate         87.028 26.249 
 
Additionally to guard against overall Type one errors, whereby an effect in the population is 
statistically mistakenly identified, when none was present (Field 2014), Cook’s direction [D] 
(Stevens 1984) was plotted on a scatter plot (Gaskin 2012) to identify the outliers. From Cook’s 
D clearly the outliers were neither errors nor influential. Instead, they were consider interesting 
outliers (Aguinis, Gottfredson & Joo 2013), because each individual outlier case appeared 
engaged based on the amount of time spent on the survey. They also attempted to complete the 
optional comments box. These comments are tabled in Tables 4a, b and c in the Appendix 5.4. 
Furthermore, the Cook’s distance for each case [and their variables too] were less than the 
highest value of 0.26143 as illustrated in the scatterplot in Graph 5.3 above. Hence, all the 
Cook’s D were less than the threshold of one and thus not influential on the regression of the 
variable (Stevens 1984; Gaskin 2012). 
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Graph 5.3 Scatterplot of highest Cook’s difference on variable Procedural [a11] 
From advisers’ comments, the main reasons behind the outliers were how they understood or 
interpreted the survey questions about their role within the licensee-adviser-client relationship, 
as well as their perceptions of leaders’ influence when lobbying government during 
consultation phases of proposed legislative changes. According to Aguinis, Gottfredson and 
Joo (2013) interpretations and understandings of survey questions will change the model fit 
and the substantive parameter estimates. Despite this, there was no need to remove these global 
prediction outliers (Stevens 1984), because they formed part of the population of interest (Chan 
& Bishop 2013). This is further supported in a paper by Aguinis, Gottfredson and Joo (2013) 
who argued to exercise caution before deleting outliers, because in doing so ends up potentially 
supporting the hypothesis being tested. According to them, when researchers define, identify 
and handle outliers that may impact the parameter relationships, effect sizes, directions and 
existence, this has significant implications and conclusions for a project. 
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Based on the multivariate kurtosis value [87.028] in Table 5.2 above and their critical value 
[referred to as the “normalised estimate of multivariate kurtosis” (Byrne 2013, p. 123)] of 
26.249, which was greater than five, the data in the sample was clearly non-normally 
distributed (Byrne 2013). Notable, the critical ratio can be interpreted as a z score (Harrington 
2009).  Therefore, evidence of multivariate non-normality was found, because critical ratio 
[c.r.] value of 23.763 is greater than the z statistic threshold of 1.96 (Byrne 2013). Although 
the multivariate assumption is violated, using the criteria provided by some authors (Harrington 
2009), skewness and kurtosis do not appear problematic in this study.  
Especially when Wang and Wang (2012) explained maximum likelihood parameter estimates 
are less likely to be biased in the presence of non-normality. However, they cautioned to be 
aware, standard errors of maximum likelihood parameter estimates and model fit indices were 
underestimated when non-normality was evident. They claimed non-normality inflates the 
model χ2 statistics. As solutions they endorsed adjusting the normal theory ML χ2 and standard 
errors using rescaling methods or to use the bootstrap method. A technique they claimed 
provide robust standard errors and mean-adjusted χ2 test statistic equivalent to Satorra & 
Bentler [SB] χ2. During this analysis, the bootstrap method was applied, because of its 
accessibility in AMOS.  
With regards to linearity the values in the ANOVA Table 5.3 below were significant for CoIAss 
* FiducAct [p=.002] and for Professions * IPFPSB [p= .029], which indicated these 
relationships deviated from linearity (Gaskin 2016c). Whereas the rest of the relationships had 
desired significance values greater than 0.05. 
Next the values of heteroscedasticity were considered, which occurs when residuals at each 
predictor variable level have unequal variance or where the distribution of residuals is different 
at each point along a predictor variable. Fortunately the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance, which is the opposite of heteroscedasticity was not violated, because estimates of the 
data range divided by their standard deviations all fell between acceptable thresholds two and 
six (Field 2014) with all estimates less than 3.496. See Appendix 5.5 Table 5 for the estimates 
for all the variables in the model. If these values were greater than six, then heterogeneity issues 
would have been present. Therefore there was no need to reduce this particular bias using the 
robust method of bootstrapping (Field 2014). This outcome was also confirmed by a second 
test to assess homogeneity.  
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Table 5.3 ANOVA table to test deviation from linearity 
   
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Structural * 
FiducAct 
Between 
Groups 
[Combined] 184119.9 56 3287.856 6.629 0 
  Linearity 136020.5 1 136020.5 274.226 0 
  
Deviation 
from 
Linearity 
48099.41 55 874.535 1.763 0.002 
 
Within 
Groups 
 101683.5 205 496.017   
 Total  285803.4 261    
Professions 
* IPFPSB 
Between 
Groups 
[Combined] 203755.9 52 3918.383 5.821 0 
  Linearity 152887.2 1 152887.2 227.114 0 
  
Deviation 
from 
Linearity 
50868.74 51 997.426 1.482 0.029 
 
Within 
Groups 
 140693.2 209 673.173   
 Total  344449.1 261    
Using SPSS regression linear graph scatterplot function [see an example of variable Structural 
variable 𝑎4 in Graph 5.4 below] for each relationship the researcher plotted the variables’ 
regression standardised error residual value on the y-axis against the regression standardised 
independent or predictor variables on the x-axis and added a fit line (Gaskin 2015). In all the 
variables cases there is homoscedasticity, because the fit line appeared relatively flat and the 
data was roughly consistent around the fit line (Gaskin 2015).  Given the sample size was large 
the Levene’s test to determine whether the variance is potentially heteroscedastic or there is 
homogeneity, was considered inappropriate (Field 2014). 
Next, multicollinearity errors test was performed by running a multivariate regression. Here it 
was found all variables’ tolerance statistic of  1 − r2, where r2 is the variance in each independent 
variable explained by all of the other independent variables, were greater than the threshold of 
.1 and .2 (Menard 2002) in Table 6 in Appendix 5.6. Additionally, from evidence in Table 6 in 
the Appendix 5.6,  no serious multicollinearity problems occurred (Gaskin 2016d), because for 
most of the independent variables the VIF is below three, with only a handful of variables with 
VIFs greater than 5.206. Thus the statistics verifies VIFs were not violated to a great extent, 
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but were tolerable, and hence, should not invalidate the confidence intervals and significance 
tests (Field 2014). It was concluded the variables did not correlate too highly and there were 
non-zero variances, thus the confidence intervals or boundaries within which the population 
values of estimates are likely to fall are reliable and valid. Thus, the model can be generalised 
to the population and the significance tests accepted as valid (Field 2014).  
 
Graph 5.4 Scatterplot to test homogeneity of variable Structural [𝐚𝟒] 
Despite the limitation of multicollinearity issues, this research is disinterested in the effect of 
multi-collinearity on the ith regression coefficient, but instead whether the regression 
coefficient is statistically significant (O’Brien 2007). Therefore, there was no specific need to 
solve for multicollinearity and independent errors. Furthermore, the literature on this issue  
authenticated it safe to focus on the combined effects of all of the variables in the model 
(Menard 2002). Furthermore for large samples, as is the case of this study, the lack of normality 
of distributed errors [not predictors] will not invalidate confidence intervals and significance 
tests, because of the central limit theorem (Field 2014).  
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In closing, to address additivity and linearity violation by  CoIAss * FiducAct [p=.002] and for 
Professions * IPFPSB [p= .029] evident in Table 5.3 above, and multivariate non-normality, 
as proposed in the literature (Aguinis, Gottfredson & Joo 2013) the analysis utilised 
bootstrapping in AMOS at a 95 per cent confidence interval for bias corrected confidence 
interval, rather than some of the numerous approaches evident in research practice (Byrne 
2013).  
In summary, overall, the quantitative screening statistical results of this investigation were 
positive, with the bias of data and any assumption violations defensible and hence manageable. 
Consequently, the main study research methodology of using structural equation modelling 
was proven feasible.  
5.3.1 Descriptive statistical analysis results 
Disappointingly, after data screening only 6.55 per cent [262/4,000 respondents] of the 
responses on the legitimacy of the current licensing model contained useful data for analysis, 
as illustrated in Table 5.4 below. This level of participation was disappointing, because it was 
evident, from discussions held with professional media, academics, senior members of the 
emerging financial planning profession, some financial planning practitioners, attendees at 
three (2014, 2015 and 2016) Annual Personal Finance and Investment Symposiums and a 
representative of the Professional Standards Authority, this controversial matter of the current 
adviser licensing model is [or should] be important to all financial planning stakeholders.  
Although not everyone expressed joy with the study’s topic and survey, evidently during these 
discussions, as well as during the survey itself, the study’s survey was timely given 
government’s attempt at driving for professionalising financial planning.  
Despite the low useable data response rate, recruiting more participants was sidestepped. 
Recruiting more, would have potentially caused additional sampling bias. It was also 
unnecessary, because there were more than enough cases and data to perform maximum 
likelihood estimation in AMOS110.  
 
 
                                                 
110 Recall in Chapter 4 we mentioned using an online SEM sampling calculator (Soper 2016) to calculate a 
minimum sample size of 137 cases with anticipated effect size .3, statistical power .8 and probability level 
.05 as sufficient to perform MLE analysis given the a priori model in Figure 4.4 [page 161 of this thesis]. 
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Table 5.4 Types of responses 
Types of Responses Frequency Percent 
Qualtrics email failed to send 1 0.03% 
Opt out [Unsubscribed] 272 6.80% 
Consents declined 4 0.10% 
Non-responses 3,391 84.78% 
Incomplete responses 70 1.75% 
Complete responses (Data analysis useable responses) 262 6.55% 
Total probability random sample selected 4,000 100.00% 
Graph 5.5 below and Table 7 in Appendix 5.7 indicate the gender split. Two respondents failed 
to offer details of their gender. 
 
Graph 5.5 Frequency of gender split of respondents 
From the bar chart in Graph 5.6 below and Table 8 in Appendix 5.8 most survey respondents 
were unsurprisingly Baby Boomers [approximately 55.7 per cent] born between 1946 and 1964 
followed by Gen X, then GenY or Millennials and finally a handful of Traditionalists. Only 
one respondents evaded providing details of their age.  
82.4%
16.8%
0.8%
Male
Female
Missing
Percent [n = 262]
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Graph 5.6 Frequency of age of survey respondents [n = 262] 
From Table 9 in the Appendix 5.9 and Figure 5.3 below it is apparent the recruits covered the 
whole of Australia, with the majority [nearly a third] from NSW, followed by Queensland, 
Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania, Act and then Northern Territory. 
Everyone offered their locations of work.  
 
Figure 5.3 Frequency of the location of respondents [n = 262] 
5.3%
37.4%
55.7%
1.1%
Gen Y/Millennial (1981-2001)
Gen X (1965-1980)
Baby Boomers (1946-1964)
Traditionalists (Born prior 1946)
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From the histogram in Graph 5.7 below and Table 10 in Appendix 5.10, it was evident the 
frequency of the number of years’ respondents have been ARs followed a normal distribution 
reasonably closely. Only, four [1.5 per cent] respondents failed to provide details of the length 
they have been ARs. 
 
Graph 5.7 Histogram of number of years holding AR status  
As far as the highest Australian Qualifications Framework [AQF] of qualifications are 
concerned, no matter in which field, and illustrated in Graph 5.8 [Table 11 in Appendix 5.11], 
no doctorates among the recruits was evident.  In addition, 27.1 per cent [70] had a financial 
planning degree and postgraduate financial planning qualifications, with 69.7 per cent [180] 
claiming they held other forms of financial planning qualifications. Most [63.7 per cent] had 
degrees covering various disciplines with only 26.7 per cent with specifically financial 
planning degrees. Interestingly, six recruits held no AQF recognized financial planning 
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qualifications. Four respondents evaded providing any details of their financial planning 
qualifications.  
 
Graph 5.8 Frequency of the highest and financial planning AQF qualifications [n = 262] 
When advisers were asked about their professional association membership, evident from 
Table 12 in the Appendix 5.12, survey respondents claimed membership of a diverse range of 
professional associations. Unsurprisingly, the majority were members of the Financial 
Planning Association, followed by the Self-Managed Super Find Association and Association 
of Financial Advisers. Interestingly, 8.8 per cent represented those advisers who were not 
members of any association. One participant indicated they were a member of six associations, 
with five claiming membership of three professional associations and 50 claiming membership 
of two associations listed in Table 12 in the Appendix 5.12. Although 53.8 per cent of survey 
respondents claimed to hold a CFP® qualification, 25.6 per cent of the recruits held no 
professional qualifications [see Table 13 in Appendix 5.13]. Just as interestingly, of the 67 who 
held no formal professional qualifications, four claimed they were studying towards a CFP®. 
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47.7%
37%
14.9%
0.4%
Aligned licensee
Non-aligned licensee
S923A Independent licensee
Other licensee
One AFA adviser claimed they were completing the FChFP® professional qualifications. About 
16.4 per cent indicated they were professionally qualified accountants.  
 
Graph 5.9 Frequency of authorised representative [AR] status [n = 262] 
Most respondents were self-employed ARs [Graph 5.9] and Table 14 in Appendix 5.14. No 
missing responses in this part of the survey after data screening was found. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 5.10 Frequency of licensee status [n = 262] 
Table 15 in Appendix 5.15 and Graph 5.10 illustrated, 47.7 per cent of cases perceived 
themselves to be aligned. Most striking a smaller proportion, 14.9 per cent, considered 
themselves affiliated to s923A independent licensees. The non-aligned, nearly made up 37 per 
cent of respondents, yet were not s923A independent, because at this stage the use of the term 
‘non-aligned’ was not limited to s923A independent licensees and advisers. One respondent 
who used the other option, without specifying what the ‘Other’ might be happened. Many 
24% [63]
76% [199]
Employee AR Self-employed AR
F
re
q
u
en
cy
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respondents referred to themselves as CARs [Corporate Authorised Representatives], which 
surprisingly indicated they viewed this as a licensee category too. 
The biographic details indicate the survey covered a broad range of advisers of various ages, 
from a diverse range of backgrounds, operating across Australia and included s923A 
independents. On these grounds, this research is important to advisers based on their 
willingness to participate in a lengthy survey regarding licensing financial advisers. 
5.3.2 Structural equation modelling results 
5.3.2.1 Exploratory/confirmatory factor analysis results 
Evident from the initial results of maximum likelihood estimation, the researcher realised there 
may have been a theoretical conceptual basis for the a priori model illustrated in Figure 4.4 in 
Chapter 4, but initially not an empirical one. Furthermore, from the goodness of fit results in 
Column 1 of Table 5.7 below, noticeably this a priori model is misspecified. It is well-
documented, any initial specified measurement models almost invariably fail to deliver 
acceptable fit (Anderson & Gerbing 1988). Acceptable fit meaning the most variance is 
accounted for by the best fit (Myung, Tang & Pitt 2009). Consequently a data-driven EFA 
approach within a CFA MLE method (Brown & Moore 2016) disclosed the first initial source 
of misspecification was too many factors, because the inter-item correlations were greater than 
.85 (Clark & Watson 1995). This over-factoring confirmed further evidence of 
multicollinearity (Byrne 2013). The higher the correlations between two factors, the greater the 
discrepancy between the pattern loadings and the structure loadings on some variables 
(Matsunaga 2010).  Consequently, factors 𝑏2 and 𝑏3 were collapsed into one factor [𝑏3]. Thus 
indicators, AlignAct [𝑎5], CoIAct [𝑎6], CompAct [𝑎7] and FiducAct [𝑎8], were merged into 
the Legitimacy factor [𝑏3].  This merge was also confirmed appropriate per the initial pattern 
matrix during EFA analysis in SPSS [see Table 16, Appendix 5.16]. Coefficients of the pattern 
matrix are the unique loads of the given factor into variables, namely regression coefficients 
(Gaskin, 2016b). To simplify and clarify the data and confirm the above conclusions Promax 
rotation, an oblique rotation, using SPSS’s default kappa 4, was performed, because it allowed 
the factors to correlate (Osborne & Costello 2005). It also produced a more accurate 
reproducible solution with more information compared to other methods (Osborne & Costello 
2005). Employing an oblique-rotation approach assists with conceptual consistency across the 
EFA and CFA analysis (Matsunaga 2010). EFA using oblique rotation helps identify unrelated 
factors and irrelevant indicators (Matsunaga 2010). The higher the kappa the higher the 
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correlations (Matsunaga 2010). Therefore, it was decided to use the default low kappa value of 
four. 
The EFA structure matrix was used to determine which variables to drop and which to select. 
Matsunaga (2010) claimed this was a better method to use than pattern matrix.  Although the 
initial structure matrix analysis [see Appendix 5.17, Table 17] indicated most items on each 
question adequately represented the constructs to which they were associated, three variables 
were identified problematic and needed attention. Firstly, EFA structure matrix in Table 17 
[Appendix 5.17] indicated CoIAss [𝑎4] loaded significantly better onto construct legitimacy 
[𝑏3] compared to latent factor dual [𝑏1]. After careful re-evaluation of its theoretical 
explanation and content, it was concluded substantively the definition of Structural legitimacy 
[𝑎12] was better explained by the variable CoIAss [𝑎4] is based on reconsidering the theoretical 
conceptualisation of the theory. Instead of conflict of interest from association being explained 
by the agent-principal relationship, it arguably made more sense to apply it as a structural issue 
within the current licensing model regime, because by being licensed via third-party licensees 
is structurally debase if it leads to conflict of interest from association. Subsequently, based on 
EFA pattern matrix, the financial planning theory for structural legitimacy was normatively 
and empirically re-evaluated and replaced with a more appropriate theoretical underpinning, 
sourced from the secondary theory, concurrent with an appropriate measure. Thus, the measure 
CoIAss [𝑎4] which initially loaded onto the factor dual [𝑏1] in the a priori model [𝑎4] with its 
financial planning theoretical underpinnings, was renamed Structural [𝑎4] and replaced 
Structural [𝑎12]. After careful thought and consideration, this the new measure for structural 
legitimacy was better explained, both theoretically and empirically, by the latent factor 
legitimacy [𝑏3]. Furthermore, comments made by some respondents for the Structural variable 
𝑎12 indicated their interpretation and understanding of the question was not as it was intended 
in the survey, thus invalidating the responses.  For example, one respondent, which reflect 
other’s views, claimed for the statement, meant, this excluded self-licensed advisers, “Surely 
the option is there to apply for your own licence?”; “They can get their own license”. The 
intention of this statement was to include self-licensed advisers. The objective of this account 
was to find out whether it was structurally legitimate for advisers to lose their right to work 
when they have been no longer an authorised representative.  Thus from the above analysis, it 
was confirmed in this study the view of Brown and Moore (2016), EFA was useful in 
improving flaws in the theory too. Especially concerning how the various theories from other 
disciplines were conceptualised, applied and integrated with financial planning theory. 
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Additionally, based on the EFA pattern matrix Structural [𝑎12], Defend [𝑎15], and Takeover 
[𝑎20], were eliminated from latent factors 𝑏3 and 𝑏4 respectively. Not only did they have factor 
loadings less than .30, but also their cross loadings differed by less than .2.  With regards to the 
Takeover [𝑎20] statement ‘Strategic independent advice is being taken over by the accounting 
profession, as accountants redefine and re-position financial planning within their self-
regulatory model,’ was also not interpreted in terms of the intent of the of the statement and 
context of the topic. This view was reflected in comments such as, “That's laughable” and 
“This is rubbish I've got a lot of my clients from accountants as they would not give advice”. 
“In my experience accountants do not have the knowledge to provide appropriate advice 
regarding areas such as Centrelink and aged care”; “No. Accountants do not have the 
necessary expertise in the eyes of the clients.” Therefore, not only on quantitative [very low 
loadings], but also on qualitative statistical grounds [comments] this measure was deleted, 
because it was unexplained by the latent factor individual licensing model. Variable Defend 
[𝑎15] [‘Since the media has exposed the financial planning scandals, financial advisers have 
had to defend their relationship/association/affiliation with their licensee to clients’] also 
indicated some statistical issues, with unacceptable low factor scores.  Once again, advisers 
were answering the statement from their practice’s experience, emotional or from a desirability 
point of view, rather than as the question tried to elicit, namely advisers in general. For 
example, “The answer to this question is both yes and no.  There have been some scandals 
however the majority of financial advisers and their clients have not been involved and/or 
impacted.  Not all advisers are bad.  I have a large business [when compared to the market), I 
have never had to defend a relationship.” Some found the question offensive, others responded 
defensively, which affected the results. For example, “Again, I am offended by the tone of these 
questions.  This appears to be a witch hunt against licensees and advisers. Storm Financial 
had been ticked off as compliant by ASIC in 2007 - they were self licensed?”  Some other 
examples include, “NOT ME- I HAVE NEVER BEEN LINKED TO ANY OF THOSE ISSUES” 
and “Not me!” The obvious unclear wording, misunderstanding by respondents or multiple 
comprehensions or interpretations and perhaps perceived tone of question may have ultimately 
invalidated the measure as an indicator of the latent factor Legitimacy [𝑏3]. These deletions did 
not jeopardise the integrity of the theory or data but improved it. Instead it solved the statistical 
problems of explaining the factors (Osborne & Costello 2005) so the main research question 
and investigative questions were better answered. Furthermore, deleting these measures 
ensured a more parsimonious model for confirmatory factor analysis, which structural equation 
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modelling writers claim was preferred (Kline 2010; Byrne 2013). A fourth problematic variable 
evident in the a priori model was Cognitive [𝑎14]. It displayed a higher estimate when loading 
onto 𝑏4than the a priori model. Despite this anomaly, it was decided to retain this variable in 
factor 𝑏3, because no theoretical substantive reason to move it or remove it could be justified. 
In addition, no replacement variable was available to substitute it. Furthermore, its loading was 
greater than .30 and hence interpretable and persuasive enough.  
Table 5.5 Pattern matrixa after E/CFA 
  Factor 
  1 2 3 
Dual 
  
0.532 
Simult 
  
0.611 
BestRev 
  
0.508 
CoIAss 0.711 
  
AlignAct 0.921 
  
CoIAct 0.821 
  
FiducAct 0.958 
  
CompAct 0.580 
  
Regulative 0.767 
  
Consequential 0.932 
  
Procedural 0.850 
  
Personal 0.483 
  
Cognitive 0.358 0.378 
 
Trust 
 
0.866 
 
Independence 
 
0.767 
 
Professions 
 
0.759 
 
IPFPSB 
 
0.811 
 
EliminateCoI 
 
0.689 
 
Note: Coefficients were suppressed above an absolute value of .35 during SPSS EFA estimation.  
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
 Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
The scree plot [Figure 5.15] also confirmed the respecification as summarised in the pattern 
matrix after E/CFA shown in Table 5.5. Thus, as illustrated in Table 18 in the Appendix 5.18, 
three hypotheses and survey questions, and hence variables, were discarded. Hence, only three 
factors out of the original pre-conceived four factor-model and 18 out of the original 21 
measures remained for further analysis. Uni-dimensionality was achieved in the CFA model, 
because all measuring items have acceptable factor loadings for the respective latent construct 
and all factor loadings were positive. Therefore, by using EFA within the CFA MLE 
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framework resulted in the appropriate number of factors and correct measures for each latent 
construct (Brown 2006) illustrated in Figure 5.4 below. Significant cross-loadings were fixed 
when evaluating the initial model against the pattern matrix. Subsequently, poorly selected 
indicators and error covariance were fixed to zero to see if they would further produce a refined 
conceptual model for CFA after MLE. 
 
Graph 5.11 Scree plot after E/CFA indicating three factors after the kink 
5.3.2.2 Confirmatory factor analysis maximum likelihood estimation results 
After E/CFA was conducted, confirmatory factor analysis using the EFA modified model in 
Figure 5.4 below proceeded.  
During MLE there were no incidences of non-convergence, Heywood cases, improper 
solutions (Byrne 2013), any ‘missing constraint’ errors nor indications the estimation was  
unable to reach its iteration limit (Gaskin 2016e). The standardised estimates indicated both 
the latent variable and indicators, where the mean was equal to zero and the standard deviation 
was equal to one, were all positive. 
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Figure 5.4 CFA measurement model prior to respecification using modification indices 
 
263 
 
Table 5.7 Goodness of fit statistics of the bootstrapped MLE a priori model, after 
E/CFA and after CFA respecification 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3  Column 4 
Measure 
A priori 
model before 
E/CFA and 
CFA 
After E/CFA 
before 
respecification 
using MIs 
 
After CFA respecified using MIs 
  
Bootstrap  
ex CLF 
Bootstrap 
ex CLF 
Bootstrap 
ex CLF 
Bootstrap 
cum CLF 
CMIN 536.537 374.725 222.131 128.339 
DF 183 132 119 101 
P 0 0 0 0.034 
CMIN/DF 2.932 2.839 1.867 1.271 
GFI 0.831 0.859 0.915 0.95 
AGFI 0.787 0.817 0.878 0.915 
CFI 0.884 0.916 0.964 0.991 
TLI 0.866 0.902 0.954 0.986 
NFI 0.835 0.877 0.927 0.958 
PCFI 0.77 0.79 0.75 0.654 
AIC 632.537 452.725 326.131 268.339 
[Saturated; 
Independent] 
[462; 
3,287.878] 
[342.725; 
3,073.337] 
[342;  
3,073.37] 
 [342; 
3,073.337] 
BIC  803.818 591.891 511.685 518.123 
[Saturated; 
Independent] 
[1286.288; 
3,362.813] 
 [952.187; 
3,137.567] 
 [952.187; 
3,137.567] 
[952.187; 
3,137.567] 
SRMR 0.793 0.0692 0.0688 0.0318 
RMSEA 0.086 0.084 0.058 0.032 
[90% CI] [0.078; 0.095] [.074; .094]  [.046; .069] [.009; .048] 
PCLOSE 0 0 0.139 0.971 
 
Although the EFA model fit had improved after E/CFA, it was not meeting the thresholds 
expected to achieve good fit. For instance, in column 2 of Table 5.7, the CMIN p-value is less 
than .05, an indication the model is different from the population’s true covariance structure 
(Ke-Hai 2005; Bentler 2006; Hayduk et al. 2006; Barrett 2007). Given CMIN has been 
criticised for generally being unreliable for large sample sizes greater than 250  (Matsunaga 
2010) like this study of n=262, on recommendations in the literature (Byrne 2013), the 
plausibility of the model was determined by including other goodness of fit indices. For 
example, RMSEA indicated the model explained the correlations to within an average error of 
(Byrne 2013) .084. PCLOSE [closeness of fit] is less than the .05, which indicated the test that 
‘RMSEA is good in the population’ failed. In addition, the AIC values of 452.725 is greater 
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than the saturated model estimate of 342. Even so, it is smaller than the independence model 
of value 3,073.337, which is desirable. Also desirable is the BIC value 591.891 is smaller than 
both saturated [952.187] and independence [3,073.337] models. The expected cross-validation 
index [ECVI] is 1.735 [1.528; 1.971 at the 90% CI], was greater than the saturated model’s 
value of 1.310 at 90 per cent CI [1.310;1.310]]. However, it was less than the independence 
model’s value of 11.775 at 90% CI [11.103; 12.475]. The absolute fit index critical N [CN] is 
103 [p<.05] and 10 [p<.01], which is below the threshold sample size for accepting the model 
is correct (Schreiber et al. 2006). Therefore, together with the Hoelter at alpha .05 of 112 and 
at .01 of 121 results, it was concluded the model inadequately represent the sample data. 
Furthermore, the Bollen-Stine bootstrap p = .005 for testing the null hypothesis of a correct the 
model is correct confirmed the model is mis-specified. So, the model is a misfit and 
misrepresents a reasonable approximation to the population, which means it requires 
modifications (Byrne 2013).  
On the grounds of inadequate fit, before making inferences and testing the hypotheses, CFA 
specification searches were performed using modification indices with a cut-off threshold 
greater than 4.0 (Brown 2006), because it provided recommendations to correct discrepancies 
or differences between the proposed and estimated model (Hermida 2015, p. 6). Clearly, the 
modification indices showed systematic error based on respondent characteristics such as nay-
saying, respondents who may have been stressed answering the questions and answering in 
socially desirable ways (Byrne 2013). A degree of overlap in item content (Byrne 2013) may 
arguably also have been perceived by some respondents. Thus, starting with the covariance’s 
among measurement errors fixed to zero for the reason they were initially assumed unique to 
each indicator, it was evident several modification indices estimated at more than four was 
present. Consequently, after limiting modifications to 13 of the larger modifications greater 
than four, goodness of fit was achieved within the thresholds specified in Table 5.7 columns 
three and four above. The modifications were justified on empirical and conceptual grounds 
(Maccallum & Necowitz 1992) to minimise what Hermida (2015) referred to as data driven 
specifications searches that can lead to further model misspecification and overfitting. They 
claimed this avoids the inclusion of unnecessary parameter estimates due to chance 
associations in the sample data. Therefore, adding the covariance between the errors to the 
model in Figure 5.4, above, to produce Figure 5.5 below, made sense and were reasonable 
(Harrington, 2009) for reasons tabled in Table 19 in the Appendix 5.19. They were found to be 
all significant at p<.05 level.  
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Figure 5.5 Respecified CFA measurement model 
Given the fit statistics indicated, the data fits the model adequately after respecification 
[Columns three and four in Table 5.7 above] using modification indices, the standardised 
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residual covariance estimates were, only scrutinised, not used to produce better-fit statistics. It 
appeared the model did not account for the relationship between Cognitive [𝑎14] and 𝑎16 
[Trust] [SRC=4.069] and 𝑎18 [Professions] [4.415], because their SRCs were greater than the 
SRC critical value of 3.84 for one degree of freedom at the alpha level of 0.05 (Brown 2006). 
The data driven EFA indicated Cognitive [𝑎14] would better load on [𝑏4] individual licensing, 
where individual licensing would facilitate a shared understanding of the difference between 
s923A independent advice and conflicted advice could explain this problem. Nevertheless, 
moving this variable could not be justified, nor was deleting it an option, because it is key to 
the conceptualised theoretical basis for Cognitive [𝑎14] legitimacy in this study. While, this 
predictor was of value to the theoretical construct (Byrne, 2010) no other measure to measure 
cognitive legitimacy was found. Unlike the original Structural [𝑎12], it could not be replaced 
with another measurement value, because none was available. As only two out of 171 SRCs 
showed values larger than four in the matrix, which amounted to only 1.17 per cent of the 
covariance matrix, it was unnecessary to change the model, unless further problems were found 
down the track (Matsunaga 2010). Fortunately, no further problems were identified for these 
variables further down the track and thus, were retained. Furthermore, further deletions were 
not an option, because the variables left in the model added significant value to the theoretical 
construct (Byrne, 2010) and were all significant at the p<.05 alpha level.  Deleting anymore 
variables would threaten the integrity of the data to solve the statistical problems of explaining 
the factors (Clark & Watson 1995; Osborne & Costello 2005). After model respecification to 
produce the model in Figure 5.5, the minimum sample required for MLE increased to 200 cases 
with effect size of .3, power of .8 and probability level .05. This was established by 
recalculating the minimum sample size using the online calculator developed by Soper (2016), 
which recall from Chapter 4, he based on the works of Cohen (1988) and Westland (2010). 
This number was still below the sample size of 262, which indicated the sample size for this 
study was sufficient.  
5.3.2.3 Cross-validation results 
Thus, with tentative support for the notion the evolving theoretical model was properly 
specified (Myung, Tang & Pitt 2009); the next step in the progression was cross-validation 
using another sample drawn from the population. The multiple group gender [male and female] 
formed the new sample from the same population specified and estimated in  the same model, 
with freely estimated measurement parameters compared to measurement parameter estimates 
constrained (Anderson & Gerbing 1988). Table 5.8 provides the results of the constrained 
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models nested within less constrained models (Harrington, 2009).  Bootstrapping was used to 
generate the estimates, because χ2 is sensitive to linearity, additivity, multicollinearity and 
normality (Joreskog 1978). 
Table 5.8 Model specification cross-validation of multi-group [male/female] [n = 216] 
Model Unconstrained Constrained 
χ 2  404.903 424.564 
df 238 253 
p 0 0 
χ 2-square diff 19.661 
df diff 
 
15 
χ 2-square diff p Insignificant 0.185 
critical χ 2 -square p<.05 ♣ 24.996 
critical χ 2 -square p<.01 ♣ 30.578 
critical χ 2 -square p<.001 ♣ 37.697 
CFI 0.943 0.942 
CFI diff 
 
0.001 
♣ Values of the Chi-squared distribution sourced from https://www.medcalc.org/ manual/chi-square-table.php 
Table 5.8 indicate the χ2 difference value is insignificant, therefore the unconstrained model 
fits the data better than the constrained model in which the parameters were fixed (Joreskog 
1978). Consequently, the computed χ2 statistic was less than the critical value111 in the χ2 table 
value for a 0.05 probability level. Thus, the null hypothesis verifying cross-validation is lacking 
could not be rejected. Consequently, the model in Figure 5.5 has real significance and meaning 
(Yuan & Bentler 2004). With the data cross-validated, it can be generalised (Myung & Pitt 
2003), because it is not as a result of capitalisation of chance (Hermida 2015). Then, the model 
provides a good predictor of future observations (Myung, Tang & Pitt 2009).  
5.3.2.4 Invariance results 
Table 5.9 summarising the invariance tests, in conjunction with Table 5.10 the invariance test 
goodness of fit results below proves the model displayed: configural [model 1], metric [model 
2], latent factor mean difference test for scalar invariance [model 3] and equality of uniqueness 
[residual variance] associated with observed variables [model 4]. Simply, a parameter was 
invariant across both male and female groups and the factor loadings were equal across the 
male and female groups resulting in metric invariance. For structural invariance the 
                                                 
111 All critical χ2 values were sourced online from MedCalc Software (2016).  A modified copy of their table of 
the critical chi-square values is available in Appendix 5.20 Table 20 below. 
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equivalence of factor means [model 5], equivalence of factor covariance [model 6] and 
variance [model 7] as recommended by various writers (Brown 2006, pp. 269-270; Schmitt & 
Kuljanin 2008) were tested.  From Table 5.10 empirically MLE generated reasonable GOF for 
the unconstrained [model 1] CFA solutions for male and female [χ2 404.903; df 238; p .000; 
CMIN/df 1.701; GFI .862; AGFI .802; CFI .943; TLI .927; PCFI .734; RMSEA .052; 90% CI 
.043, .061; PCLOSE .335]. In this solution, the freely estimated unstandardised factor loadings 
were all statistically significant p<.001 [males] and p<.05 [females] apart from 𝑎1, 𝑎2 and  𝑎3  
loading on  𝑏1. The standardised regression weights were all greater than this study’s threshold 
of .35, except for 𝑎1, 𝑎2 and  𝑎3. Recall from Chapter 4, χ
2 is influenced by sample size and 
hence model fit. Thus, different sample sizes will affect interpretability of the results. For 
instance, the female sample size is a small n=44 and so will affect the results. Nonetheless, for 
male respondents n=216, all the unstandardised regression weights were statistically significant 
at the p<0.001 level with standardised regression weights all being greater than this research’s 
threshold of 0.35. Therefore overall invariance was proven, whereby the factor structure and 
loadings are equivalent across groups ensuring the variables measures the different underlying 
latent constructs for different groups within the sample and are thus generalisable across 
population (Vandenberg & Lance 2000).  Configural [baseline] invariance has been proved 
based on the results of the χ2 difference test for configural invariance [the p-value for the chi-
square difference test for the configural model is insignificant at the p<0.05 level]. Although, 
it was unnecessary to go ahead with the metric invariance test (Schmitt & Kuljanin 2008), 
additional tests of invariance were performed in this study out of curiosity with results in Table 
5.9. The purpose was to see how restricting the model more affected the results, as well as in 
case reviewers and examiners wanted these tests performed. 
According to the χ2 difference test, the model has metric invariance, because the p-value for 
the chi-square difference test is insignificant at the p<0.05 level [Table 5.9 below]. The χ2 
difference of 19.661 with 21 degrees of freedom is less than the critical χ2 of 32,671 and it is 
insignificant with a p-value of .456 [Table 5.9]. This invariance is confirmed by the difference 
in CFI, because the value of 0.001 for Model 2 [Figure 5.10] was less than .01 threshold 
(Cheung & Rensvold 2002). The factor loadings were considered equal across gender groups 
and shows the two groups have the same metrics. Thus, factor structure and loadings are  
equivalent across groups, which means the composite variables measure the same underlying 
latent constructs for different groups within the sample and are therefore generalisable across 
the population of  interest (Vandenberg & Lance 2000).  
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Table 5.9 Model specification invariance tests of multi-group [male and female] 
   
Critical χ 2 χ 2 Invariance CFI Invariance 
Invariance Model χ 2 df χ 2 diff df 
diff 
p<.05♣ p<.01♣ p<.001♣ Significance p-value CFI CFI diff 
 
Configural [Model 1] 404.903 238 
       
0.943 
  
Metric [Model 2] 424.564 253 19.661 15 28.869 34.805 42.312 N.S.  p = .185 * 0.942 0.001 # 
Structural covariance 
[Model 3] 
425.945 259 21.042 21 32.671 38.932 46.797 N.S.  p = .456 * 0.943 0 # 
Measurement Residual 
[Model 4] 
467.982 290 63.079 52 69.832 78.616 89.272 N.S.  p = .140 * 0.94 0.003 # 
Configural of the latent 
mean [Model 5] 
404.9 238 
       
0.943 
  
Structural equity of factor 
means [Model 6]  
440.509 271 35.606 33 50.998 58.619 67.985 N.S. p = .347 * 0.943 0 # 
Structural equity of factor 
covariance [Model 7] 
442.348 277 37.445 39 54.572 62.428 72.055 N.S.  p = .541 * 0.944 -0.001 # 
Structural variance 
[Model 8] 
486.791 308 81.888 70 90.531 100.42 112.317 N.S.  p = .157 * 0.939 0.004 # 
* χ2 invariant where p > .05 threshold   
# CFI invariant where CFI difference < .01threshold 
♣ Values of the Chi-squared distribution sourced from https://www.medcalc.org/ manual/chi-square-table.php 
N.S. Not significant 
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From Table 5.9 empirically the data does display structural covariance invariance, because the 
χ 2 difference for gender of 21.042 with degrees of freedom of 21 is less than the critical χ2 of 
32.671 [Model 3] and therefore non-significant for the male/female group. Thus, covariance is 
equal across gender groups meaning the two groups exhibited similar covariance. This result 
is further confirmed by the difference in CFI, which indicated invariance, because 0.000 was 
less than .01 threshold (Cheung & Rensvold 2002). From Table 5.9 clearly model 4 also passes 
the strict invariance or equality of residual invariance test, because the χ2 difference is non-
significant [p = .140] and its difference of 69.079 with degrees of freedom of 52 is less than 
the critical χ2 of 69.832. The residuals were equal across gender groups meaning the two groups 
presented similar residuals. This result is further confirmed by the difference in CFI, because 
0.003 was less than .01 threshold (Cheung & Rensvold 2002). 
Table 5.10 Goodness of fit for invariance test for gender 
Measure Free 
Estimate 
Constrained  
Estimate 
  Models 
1 and 5 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
CMIN 404.903 424.564 425.945 467.982 441.512 442.348 486.791 
DF 238 253 259 290 274 277 308 
P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CMIN/DF 1.701 1.661 1.645 1.614 1.611 1.597 1.58 
GFI 0.862 0.858 0.856 0.843 
   
AGFI 0.802 0.809 0.81 0.815 
   
CFI 0.943 0.942 0.943 0.94 0.943 0.944 0.939 
TLI 0.927 0.931 0.933 0.936 0.936 0.938 0.94 
NFI 0.875 0.869 0.869 0.856 0.864 0.864 0.85 
PCFI 0.734 0.788 0.798 0.89 0.844 0.854 0.945 
RMSEA 
90% CI 
0.052 
.043;.061 
0.051 
.043;.060 
0.05 
.041;.058 
0.049 
.041;.057 
0.049 
.04;.057 
0.048 
.04;.056 
0.047 
.039;.055 
PCLOSE 0.335 0.394 0.491 0.59 0.594 0.638 0.696 
 
Recall, structural invariance is divided into three tests of equality, namely equivalence of factor 
variances, tests of equality of factor covariance and latent means. Structural invariance test the 
population heterogeneity (Brown 2006). To assess population heterogeneity, the invariance of 
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the measurement and structural part of the MGCFA across two gender groups was tested. 
Differences between measurement errors, factor loadings, and latent means among gender 
groups was expected, given measurement invariance was proven. Thus, in terms of equivalence 
of factor means [Model 6] the difference in χ2 observed across gender groups is insignificant 
[p = .347] [Table 5.18], because once again χ2 difference of 35.606 with degrees of freedom 
36 is less than the critical χ2 of 50.998. This estimate point toward residual invariance, namely 
all items are related in terms of their unique traits in the same way across groups. Furthermore, 
the results in Table 5.18 is confirmed by the CFI difference test. In addition, for equivalence 
of factor covariance [Model 7], the difference in χ2 observed across gender groups is 
insignificant [p=.541], because χ2 difference of 37.445 with degrees of freedom of 39 is less 
than the critical χ2 of 54.572. Finally, the equivalence of factor variance [Model 8] across 
gender groups is proven with the difference in χ2 observed as insignificant [p=.157], because 
χ2 difference of 81.888 [degrees of freedom 70] is less than the critical χ2 value of 90.531. The 
results from the respective fit indices for each model indicated a reasonably adequate fit, 
illustrated in Table 5.10, in all invariance test cases. As shown in Table 5.10, the differences 
between fit indices were negligible when the unconstrained models [Models 1 and 5] were 
compared to the constrained models [Models 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8]. This measure provides support 
for both the equivalency of factor loadings and the invariance of factor variance-covariance 
(Hewett, Money, and Sharma 2006), validating the two groups of gender may be analysed as 
one sample (Locander et al. 2015). Thus, it was unnecessary to explore and respecify the 
model, but to continue with model verification starting with validity and reliably tests. 
5.3.2.5 Validity and reliability results 
Convergent validity is evident in the EFA pattern matrix in Table 5.5 above, because the 
estimates of a given indicator loaded onto an underlying latent variable are above threshold of 
0.35 [n> 250] and large and significant. Recall values above .30 (Harrington, 2009) are 
interpretable. Additionally, the average variance extracted is greater than .5 (Harrington, 2009) 
for all the factors according to my calculations and recorded in Table 5.11 below. This outcome 
means the indicators have large degrees of true score common variance (Hermida 2015). For 
instance, AVE for the latent variables were estimated for: Dual [0.548]; Legitimacy [0.772]; 
and Individual licensing [0.771]. Further evidence of convergent validity is the statistically 
highly significant p = .001 and p<.001 [ex CLF] [Table 20a in Appendix 5.20], and p = .007 
and p<.05 [cum CLF] [Table 20b in Appendix 5.20], reflected in CFA MLE estimates in 
AMOS.  
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Table 5.11 Reliability and validity 
Factor Cronbach alpha CR AVE MSV ASV 
Dual 0.563 0.622 0.548 0.233 0.186 
Legitimacy 0.937 0.885 0.772 0.121 0.177 
Individual licensing 0.880 0.794 0.771 0.138 0.129 
 
To assess discriminant validity, both EFA and CFA tests were considered. The first EFA 
method was to examine the factor correlation matrix (Gaskin 2016b). Overall discriminant 
validity was established, because the EFA generated factor correlation matrix, in Table 5.12 
below, whereby the correlation estimates, in Table 21 in Appendix 5.21, indicated the 
correlations between factors were less than .85 (Harrington, 2006). Thus, the indicators of the 
theoretical distinct constructs are not highly intercorrelated (Harrington, 2006).  Therefore, 
shared variance between factors is absent, which proved discriminant validity (Gaskin 2016b).  
Table 5.12 EFA factor correlation matrix with square root of the AVE on the 
diagonal 
 Dual Legitimacy Individual 
Dual 0.740 
  
Legitimacy 0.483 0.879 
 
Alternative licensing 0.371 0.348 0.878 
 
A second method was applied, namely examining the pattern matrix [Table 5.5 above] to 
establish any cross loadings. With the exceptions of variable Cognitive [𝑎14] no shared 
variance where most variables loaded significantly onto one factor occurred (Gaskin 2016b). 
However, variable Cognitive [𝑎14] shows ‘cross-loadings’ by loading onto both 𝑏3  and 𝑏4 
factors. Furthermore, the Cognitive [𝑎14]  loadings between these two factors differed by less 
than 0.02, which is of some concern for discriminant validity at indicator level, because it is 
less than the threshold of .20. A third method applied was to examine the AVE and ASV 
generated using CFA results in Table 5.11 above. If the AVE is greater than average shared 
variance, which it is for all three factors then the model displays discriminant validity (de 
Almeida et al. 2014).  
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Figure 5.6 Tau-equivalent model to test reliability 
Finally, Harrington (2009) proposed another method useful during CFA to establish 
discriminant validity, namely the CFA MLE correlations do not exceed .85 (see Table 5.23 
below). Hence, from Table 21 in Appendix 5.21, the indicators of the theoretical distinct 
274 
 
constructs are not highly intercorrelated (Harrington 2009). Note, although CFA does assess 
convergent and discriminant validity (Curran, West & Finch 1996), Farrell and Rudd (2009) 
claimed EFA is the better technique to assess discriminant validity. Overall based on EFA 
analysis discriminant validity was proven. 
Before the results of the respecified model were trusted, three methods of reliability tests were 
performed. Cronbach alpha (Field 2014) was the first test and composite reliability the second. 
A third test for reliability in this study included congeneric, tau equivalent and parallel 
equivalent (Kline 2010) χ2-square difference test (Yuan & Bentler 2004). Evident from the CR 
values in Table 5.11, they are not far off the Cronbach alphas values. Field (2014) 
recommended when dealing with psychological constructs values, Cronbach alphas of 0.8 is 
appropriate especially during the early stages of research. Thus, for purposes of this thesis, 
values as low as 0.5 were considered sufficient and values greater than 0.7 was expected. 
Consequently, except for Dual latent variable, CR and Cronbach alphas of the other two latent 
variables were greater than 0.8. Even though, the Dual latent factor estimate was above 0.5,  it  
was considered an acceptable alpha value for pioneering research according to Field (2014).  
Table 5.13 Reliability and validity of multigroup gender  
Estimate 
Congeneric 
[Baseline] 
Tau-equivalent Parallel 
Chi-squared 404.903 441.868 467.982 
df 238 272 290 
p 0 0 0 
chi-square diff 
 
36.965 63.079 
df diff 
 
34 52 
critical chi-square p<.05♣ 
 
48.602 69.832 
critical chi-square p<.01♣ 
 
56.061 78.616 
critical chi-square p<.001♣  65.247 89.272 
Significance 
 
N.S. p>.05 N.S. p>.05 
RMSEA 0.052 0.049 0.049 
RMSEA low 0.043 0.041 0.041 
RMSEA high 0.061 0.057 0.057 
PClose 0.335 0.553 0.59 
SRMR 0.0727 0.0735 0.0732 
CFI 0.943 0.942 0.94 
PCFI 0.734 0.838 0.89 
♣Values of the critical Chi-squared distribution sourced from https://www.medcalc.org/ manual/chi-square-
table.php 
N.S. Not significant 
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Figure 5.7 Parallel-equivalent model to test for reliability 
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Congeneric tests are unrestricted [Figure 5.5], unlike parallel and tau-equivalent (Curran, West 
& Finch 1996) when testing for scale reliability. Tau-equivalent tests have equal true score 
loadings [λ1 = λ2, etc.], but possibly different error variances [ɛ1 ≠ ɛ1, etc.] [Figure 5.6]  (Brown 
& Moore 2016). More restrictive is parallel where observed measures have equal factor 
loadings [λ1 = λ2, etc.] and equal error variances [ɛ1 = ɛ1, etc.] and measure the latent construct 
with the same level of precision, namely equivalent error variances [Figure 5.19]  (Brown & 
Moore 2016).  Applying the the χ2-square difference test to evaluate the number the nested 
model comparisons for tau and parallel equivalents (Yuan & Bentler 2004) from Table 5.13 
below, clearly, the model displays both convergent and discriminant validity. The congeneric 
model fit is better than the other tau and parallel-constrained models. In addition, scale 
reliability was found, because this likelihood ratio test indicates at 34 degrees of freedom, chi 
square difference of 36.965 is less than the critical 48.602 in Table 5.13. The chi-square and 
degrees of freedom value increase was insignificant by constraining the parameters.  
Thus, the reliability of the measures used does not compromise the statistical conclusions 
drawn at the end of this and forthcoming chapters. 
5.3.2.6 Common methods bias results 
To test for a common method bias a few different tests, recommended by Gaskin (2013), were 
implemented, namely the Harman test (Nebojsa 2014; Choi, Ullah & Kwak 2015), common 
latent factor test (Podsakoff et al. 2003; Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff 2012), and 
common latent factor marker test (Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff 2012; Williams & 
O’Boyle 2015). From the results, in Table 5.14 below, empirically a single factor accounts for 
approximately 43 per cent of the variance in the model in terms of how much of the 
variance/covariance matrix can be explained, rather than how much of the variance in latent or 
observed endogenous variables is explained (Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff 2012). Thus, 
CMB is a non-issue, because a single factor does not account for more than 43 per cent of most 
the variance in the model. No single factor emerged in the results, and general factor did not 
account for most of the variance. An unrotated factor analysis extracted three distinct factors 
accounted for 65.148 per cent. From Table 5.14 obviously, the three latent variables explained 
65.148 per cent of the total variation, leaving 34.852 per cent variation unexplained. These 
results showed common method bias was unlikely a significant problem in the data.  
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Table 5.14 Total variance explained  
Factor Initial Eigenvalues 
 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings  
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 7.828 43.488 43.488 7.126 39.587 39.587 
2 2.445 13.583 57.071 
   
3 1.454 8.077 65.148 
   
4 0.827 4.595 69.743 
   
5 0.684 3.800 73.543 
   
6 0.661 3.673 77.216 
   
7 0.596 3.31 80.526 
   
8 0.544 3.021 83.546 
   
9 0.477 2.650 86.197 
   
10 0.437 2.429 88.626 
   
11 0.367 2.038 90.664 
   
12 0.333 1.851 92.515 
   
13 0.302 1.677 94.191 
   
14 0.295 1.639 95.830 
   
15 0.238 1.323 97.153 
   
16 0.200 1.111 98.264 
   
17 0.169 0.941 99.205 
   
18 0.143 0.795 100.000 
   
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
  
 
Next, the common latent factor method [CLF] (Podsakoff et al. 2003; Podsakoff, MacKenzie 
& Podsakoff 2012) was applied. When the specific source of the common method bias cannot 
be identified, the CLF serve as a solution. In this method, the researchers utilised a common 
latent factor to capture the common variance among all observed variables in the model, by 
adding a single latent factor to the respecified CFA model indicated in Figure 5.8.  
When the standardised regression weights from this model is compared to the standardised 
regression weights of a model without the CLF [Table 5.15], undoubtedly differences 
between the model cum CLF and model ex CLF were less than .2.  
Thus, based on this test it was unnecessary to retain the CLF when estimating the results 
(Williams & O’Boyle 2015), because the relationships are unaffected by common method 
(Groza, Locander & Howlett 2016). However, this test is not automatically considered the 
most reliable test, and thus additional tests were performed. 
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Figure 5.8 Common latent factor model 
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Table 5.15 Comparison of standardised regression weights: [Group number 1 - 
Default model]    
Estimate 
 
   
cum CLF ex CLF Absolute 
Difference 
a1 <--- b1 0.604 0.585 0.019 
a2 <--- b1 0.689 0.686 0.003 
a3 <--- b1 0.375 0.372 0.003 
a10 <--- b3 0.794 0.875 0.081 
a11 <--- b3 0.781 0.831 0.050 
a13 <--- b3 0.679 0.623 0.056 
a14 <--- b3 0.682 0.560 0.122 
a4 <--- b3 0.740 0.748 0.008 
a5 <--- b3 0.810 0.884 0.074 
a6 <--- b3 0.773 0.831 0.058 
a7 <--- b3 0.821 0.909 0.088 
a8 <--- b3 0.679 0.700 0.021 
a9 <--- b3 0.727 0.793 0.066 
a16 <--- b4 0.745 0.858 0.113 
a17 <--- b4 0.662 0.742 0.080 
a18 <--- b4 0.711 0.816 0.105 
a19 <--- b4 0.695 0.801 0.106 
a21 <--- b4 0.536 0.629 0.093 
 
Subsequently, the common latent factor marker technique [zero constraint method/CFA marker 
technique] was performed. In this test a marker variable, which is the CLF is added as 
illustrated in Figure 5.9. Each factor loading loading onto the CLF are initially unconstrained 
as in Figure 5.5 and then constrained as in Figure 5.9 (Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff 
2012). 
Table 5.16 Common methods bias tests: CLF marker technique/zero constraint 
method/CFA marker technique 
Model CLF unconstrained CLF constrained to zero 
χ2 128.339 222.131 
df 101 119 
χ2 difference 
 
93.792 
df difference 
 
 18 
Critical chi-square p<.05♣ 
 
28.869 
Critical chi-square p<.01♣ 
 
34.805 
Critical chi-square p<.001♣ 
 
42.312 
Significance 
 
S. p<.001 
CMB if p<.05 
 
Yes  
♣ Values of the Chi-squared distribution sourced from https://www.medcalc.org/ manual/chi-square-table.php     
S. Significant 
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Figure 5.9 Common latent factor marker with zero constraints model 
The results of this re-estimation are provided in the right-most column of Table 5.16 above. 
Note, in this new model, zero constraints were imposed on the loadings from the methods factor 
to its indicators to obtain convergence. This procedure is consistent with the approach used by 
other researchers employing this approach (Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff 2012). As can 
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be seen from Table 23 in Appendix 5.23, the chi square difference test came out as significant 
for difference in chi-squared 93.792 and difference in degrees of freedom 18, which indicated 
significant shared variance. In the case of this study, it is surmised, although one cannot be 
sure, the common methods variance may be likely and probably due to using a single 
questionnaire, rather than a multi-method approach (Brown 2003). Furthermore, common 
method bias might be a reflection of some advisers faking their responses (Biderman et al. 
2011) on the grounds of  the defensiveness and emotional responses of some of the respondents 
on the matter around licensing of financial advisers, based on the comments such as  “Again 
the RMIT should know better than to ask such a question.”  “Duh! That's big business for you. 
They're not charities.”  
Interestingly the common method bias was greatest for professions, followed by trust and 
IPFPSB. Thus, with the presence of common method, the researcher opted for retaining the 
common latent factor, namely the unmeasured common latent method factor during MLE 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003), because it controlled all systematic sources of bias during hypotheses 
testing of relationships between constructs (Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff 2012).   
Furthermore, on the grounds of a non-significant p-value of .310 for the common latent factor 
variance in Table 22 in the Appendix 5.22, it was surmised common method bias should not 
threaten the validity of this enquiry’s conclusions. Moreover, findings by Meade, Watson and 
Kroustalis (2007) showed common method bias may be in many cases be inconsequential and 
not impede the validity of the study’s conclusions. As further evidence, this is the case for this 
research project, the results were reported by including and excluding the common latent factor.  
5.3.2.7 Finalised confirmatory factor analysis model 
Thus, after applying the remedy for common method bias, the most important goodness of fit 
indices, namely the χ2 test, RMSEA, GFI, AGFI, SRMR and PCLOSE, were analysed. The χ2 
was not larger than three times its degrees of freedom, which means the model has relatively 
good fit. The SRMR and RMSEA in in Table 5.7 were within the specified limits of 
acceptability, satisfying the goodness of fit criteria specified by numerous authorities.  The GFI 
and AGFI are well above the .90 threshold and are both close to unity and close to perfect fit. 
Although overall GOF [Columns three and four of Table 5.7] validates reasonable approximate 
fit for this complex congeneric model with many indices, some relationships, particularly 𝑎3 
[BestRev] displayed the lowest loadings [Tables 5.17]. Despite this low loading, further 
evidence suggests the sample matrix is produced reasonably well, overall, because all the  
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Table 5.17 Standardised regression weights: [Group number 1 - Default model] 
 
Bootstrapped ex CLF 
Bootstrapped cum 
CLF112 
        95% confidence interval   
Parameter Estimate p SE 
SE-
SE 
Mean Bias 
SE-
Bias 
Lower Upper Range p Estimate p 
Dual a1 [b1] 0.585 0.001 0.215 0.011 0.616 0.031 0.015 0.232 1.132 0.900 0.01 0.604 0.007 
BestRev a3 [b1] 0.372 *** 0.109 0.005 0.338 -0.034 0.008 0.103 0.590 0.487 0.01 0.375 *** 
Regulative a9 [b3] 0.793 *** 0.029 0.001 0.791 -0.001 0.002 0.734 0.850 0.116 0.01 0.727 *** 
Consequential a10 [b3] 0.875 *** 0.026 0.001 0.872 -0.003 0.002 0.817 0.916 0.099 0.01 0.794 *** 
Procedural a11 [b3] 0.831 *** 0.031 0.002 0.829 -0.001 0.002 0.766 0.884 0.118 0.01 0.781 *** 
Personal a13 [b3] 0.623 *** 0.039 0.002 0.626 0.003 0.003 0.535 0.698 0.163 0.01 0.679 *** 
Cognitive a14 [b3] 0.560 *** 0.047 0.002 0.567 0.007 0.003 0.469 0.657 0.188 0.01 0.682 *** 
Independence a17 [b4] 0.742 *** 0.047 0.002 0.75 0.008 0.003 0.653 0.831 0.178 0.01 0.662 *** 
Professions a18 [b4] 0.816 *** 0.042 0.002 0.816 0.000 0.003 0.736 0.895 0.159 0.01 0.711 *** 
IPFPSB a19 [b4] 0.801 *** 0.039 0.002 0.804 0.003 0.003 0.719 0.872 0.153 0.01 0.695 *** 
Simult a2 [b1] 0.686 marker 0.280 0.014 0.714 0.028 0.020 0.313 1.264 0.951 0.01 0.689 marker 
Structural a4 [b3] 0.748 *** 0.035 0.002 0.749 0.001 0.003 0.674 0.805 0.131 0.01 0.740 *** 
AlignAct a5 [b3] 0.884 *** 0.020 0.001 0.883 -0.001 0.001 0.835 0.923 0.088 0.01 0.810 *** 
CoIAct a6 [b3] 0.831 *** 0.029 0.001 0.833 0.002 0.002 0.772 0.885 0.113 0.01 0.773 *** 
FiducAct a7 [b3] 0.909 marker 0.016 0.001 0.908 -0.001 0.001 0.871 0.937 0.066 0.01 0.821 marker 
CompAct a8 [b3] 0.700 *** 0.039 0.002 0.699 -0.001 0.003 0.620 0.772 0.152 0.01 0.679 *** 
EliminateCoI a21 [b4] 0.629 *** 0.051 0.003 0.636 0.007 0.004 0.542 0.738 0.196 0.01 0.536 *** 
Trust a16 [b4] 0.858 marker 0.035 0.002 0.857 -0.001 0.003 0.780 0.920 0.140 0.01 0.745 marker 
 
                                                 
112 We were unable to generate standardised regression weight’s 95% confidence intervals in AMOS using bootstrap cum CLF. 
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estimates are significant at p<.001, apart from 𝑎1 [Dual] with a significance value p= .001 in 
the case of ex CLF and p=.007 in the case of cum CLF.   
From standardised regression weights estimates in Table 5.17, and the unstandardised factor 
loading estimates in Tables 21a and 21b in Appendix 5.20, it is clear the model’s scale is 
reflective, rather than formative, because no proof of negative factor loadings [regression 
weights] was evident. Thus, from this AMOS MLE solution the direction of the parameter 
estimates was in accordance with the prediction of the theory. Namely, the indicators all have 
positive relationships with the latent constructs (Gaskin 2016b). Therefore, it was unnecessary 
to discard (Blunch 2008) any relationships during this phase of the CFA analysis. For example, 
predictors 𝑎1, 𝑎2 and 𝑎3 are positively related to the construct Dual [𝑏1]. Their direction of 
causality was from construct to predictor. In Table 5.17 no evidence of any standardised 
regression weights below 0.35 was found, which the investigator considered acceptable 
thresholds for sufficient or significant factor loadings based on sample sizes of 250 (Gaskin 
2016b). The lowest bootstrapped cum CLF standardised regression weight was 0.375 for 
indicator BestRev [𝑎3]. The loadings meeting the excellent threshold of above 0.71 were  𝑎4, 
𝑎5,  𝑎6, 𝑎7, 𝑎9, 𝑎10, 𝑎11, 𝑎16 and 𝑎18. The very good loadings above 0.60 included 𝑎13, 𝑎14, 
𝑎17, 𝑎19, 𝑎2, 𝑎8 and 𝑎1. In addition, only one variable 𝑎21 scored fair for being above 0.45, but 
not quite good [above .55]. Based on the literature’s rules of thumbs, no poor loadings below 
0.32 (Tabachnick & Fidell 2007; Harrington 2009) was evident. However, these rules of thumb 
ignore sample size.  For this study’s sample size of 262, a loading of more than .35, based on 
a sample size of 250, is considered acceptable. Refer to Table 22 in the Appendix 5.22, to 
obtain estimates of the variance in the unstandardised solution of all the indicators accounted 
for by the latent factors. The parameters in the CFA model include factor variance in the 
unstandardised solution, which is the variance for a factor in the sample data. It also includes 
error covariance, which are correlated errors demonstrating the indicators are related. In both 
these cases, these estimates measured influences other than the shared influence of the latent 
factor. Correlated errors could result from method effects, such as common measurement 
method of self-report or similar wording of items when testing for common methods bias, 
which was found earlier. Overall, the variances are all highly significant, except for the CLF. 
When measuring the precision or statistical accuracy, in other words the standard errors, in the 
estimates of the parameters, the overall SEs were considered reasonable as they are not too 
close to zero or too large. None of these parameters appeared statistically insignificant. 
However, dual-agency indicators’ SE magnitudes were inconsistent with the other variables 
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SE magnitudes. Thus, some concern for the SEs of the bootstrapped indicator estimates 𝑎1 and 
𝑎2 forming part of factor Dual-agency 𝑏1 was identified. The standard errors for 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 
were particularly high compared to the other estimates in the model. The high SE has led to 
upper limits greater than one for the 95 per cent CI. For instance, from Table 5.17 the 95 per 
cent CI of the indicator 𝑎1 factor loading [.585] verifies 95 per cent certainty the true population 
value of parameter is between .232 and 1.132 [cum bootstrap, ex CLF]. Obviously the 95% 
confidence interval for particularly 𝑎2  [Simult], 𝑎1  [Dual] is quite wide for the bootstrapped 
data, followed to a lesser extent by 𝑎3  [BestRev], which all load on the same factor Dual-
agency. This result confirms the variable dual-agency shows some problematic results, which 
will be investigated further during the discussion in Chapter 6 of the Dual-agency role factor. 
Thus 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 were problematic issues for survey respondents. Thus caution is advised when 
considering these variables estimates, because the statistical significance tests of path 
coefficients may result in Type one errors with a risk of rejecting the models in error, if the 
chi-square is large (Menard 2002). The chi-square estimates for this model was not considered 
large, which minimises the possibility of Type one errors. As far as the Dual-agency factor [𝑏1] 
is concerned no error covariance was specified for its indicators during CFA MLE 
respecification using modification indices. Thus, all the covariation among its indicators was 
due to the shared influence of the latent variables. In other words the measurement error was 
considered random (Brown 2006). Yet, expectedly after considering the modification indices, 
thirteen error covariance indicators covary. The comments of some respondents confirmed 
these indicators are related in some way, whereby some of their covariation is due to sources 
other than the shared influence of the latent factor (Menard 2002; Brown 2006). In addition, 
interesting, eight indicator error covariance for both legitimacy and alternative licensing factors 
produced negative values [Tables 24a and 24b in Appendix 5.23]. This means these estimates 
were out of range after modification. Generally, the presence of an error covariance indicates 
two indicators share systematic variance, which is unexplained by their common factor (Brown 
2006). A negative covariance between error variables may indicate the relationship between 
two indicators is overestimated by the factor113. Evident in this research, the empirical 
covariance is smaller than the model-implied covariance. A reason for this outcome is the 
possible presence of two correlated factors instead of one. Recall, two correlated factors, 
namely Objectives of the Act factor 𝑏2 with Legitimacy factor 𝑏3 were merged. Yet E/CFA 
                                                 
113 Negative covariance in CFA? - ResearchGate. Available from: 
<https://www.researchgate.net/post/negative_ covariance_in_CFA [accessed Nov 26, 2016]>. 
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discounts this reason. Another reason found in the literature (Brown 2006) explained a method 
effect occurs when a positive effect on the first indicator and an undesirable effect on the second 
indicator is found. Based on the qualitative results in this research, this latter reason is likely, 
that this study’s measurement model involved a multiple-item questionnaire similarly worded, 
and given the controversial nature of the topic, hence emotional responses of some respondents, 
differentially prone to social desirability. According to Gaskin (2016a) other reasons include a 
measurement issue deeper down, like skewness or kurtosis problems, or too much missing data, 
or a variable that is nominal. These were considered unlikely, because skewness and kurtosis 
were not a problem, missing data was minimal nor were there any nominal variables. Literature 
recommended remedies were applied to address the negative covariance estimates, including 
moving the latent variable path constraint of one to another path. Unfortunately, they failed to 
fix the problem. Another approach applied was to rectify these improper negative indicator 
covariance (Anderson & Gerbing 1988) by re-specifying the model by fixing improper 
estimates to zero and performing a chi-square difference test [Table 24 in the Appendix 5.24]. 
According to this chi-square test, fixing parameters to zero significantly worsened the goodness 
of fit and χ2 value. Then the investigator applied Anderson and Gerbing (1988) proposed 
approach to preserve the confirmatory factor model, namely to fix these improper estimates to 
an arbitrarily small positive number, such as .005 [Table 24 Appendix 5.24]. This remedy also 
worsened the model fit (Joreskog 1978). As the drop in chi-square was large compared to the 
difference in degrees of freedom, it indicated the negative covariance represents a real 
improvement and the drop in chi-square means the improvement in fit is not obtained by chance 
or sampling error and so these negative covariance parameters have real significance or 
meaning in this model (Joreskog 1978). Thus, this difficult negative error covariance was 
retained in the model. The relationship between these indicators was further confirmed from 
the comments made by survey respondents, notwithstanding it significantly helped with model 
specification and/or model fitting. Therefore, key to model specification were the positive and 
negative covariance between them. When the reliability of the responses was measured, Graph 
6.12 below and Table 25 in Appendix 5.25 provide the squared multiple correlations of the 
data. Focusing on the cum CLF estimates in Graph 6.2, plainly only 14 per cent and 31 per cent 
of the variance of 𝑎3 [BestRev] and 𝑎21, [EliminateCoI] are accounted for by the latent factor 
Dual and latent factor Individual licensing, respectively. This outcome means 86 per cent and 
69 per cent, estimates of e3 ande21, respectively are accounted for by unique variance or other 
factors.  
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Graph 5.12 Cum CLF square multiple correlations (r2) in percent 
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Consequently, the estimated reliability of 𝑎3 is only 14 per cent, which is very low and puts a 
question mark on the reliability of the responses from the survey participants. 
Furthermore, 𝑎8 [CompAct], 𝑎2 [Simult], 𝑎13[Personal] and 𝑎1 [Dual] also have square 
multiple correlation estimates below 50 per cent. An interesting statistic, in Graph 5.12 below 
and Table 25 in Appendix 5.25, is the confidence interval of Simult [𝑎3], which is quite large 
and inconsistent with the other indicators in the model’s r2 95 per cent confidence intervals. 
Thus, indicators EliminateCoI, CompAct, Personal and particularly adviser’s dual-agency role 
factor with low reliability values for Dual, Simult, and BestRev, seemed problematic topics for 
the survey respondents. On the grounds of an analysis of the respondents’ comments explained 
why the reliability for these five indicators were possibly so low. When some advisers 
considered the survey statement measuring 𝑎1 [Dual]: Advisers authorised through third-party 
licensees face a dual-agency relationship, namely an adviser-licensee relationship and an 
adviser-client relationship, it seems they failed to see themselves as agents of licensees, but 
agents of clients only.  “My understanding of dual agency is where the agent represents the 
interests of both the buyer and the seller. As an adviser, we represent the interests of the client 
(buyer) but the interests of the licensee are not as a 'seller'. The licensee authorises/licenses 
advisers, they don't 'sell' advice which is what the client is 'buying'.”  “Almost all advisers will 
tell you that their responsibility is to their clients.  The fact that the law says there must be a 
relationship between licensee and adviser in the eyes of most advisers I know is purely because 
it has to be.  I consider myself bound to my client before bound to the Licensee.”  Others viewed 
licensees merely as providing support services, authorise them to work and/or in some cases 
they feel licensees did not control them. “Factually correct but I see the licensee as a 
servant/tool rather than a commander/controller.” “Not true. Licensees provides the 
framework for the adviser to service their clients on a day to day basis. The interest of the 
client always come first.” Although not everyone agreed, because there were comments where 
advisers claimed they act as agents to distribute product of particularly aligned licensees or 
were limited and controlled by their licensees, depending on the licensee. “It depends on who 
you are licensed with.  An adviser who is licensee of a bank or a specific dealer group that 
does not have a wide authorised product list definitely do have a dual agency relationship and 
tend to be limited on the product offerings available to their clients.  They also tend to be 
restricted in relation to processes and systems.” Some did not seem to think any relationship 
with the licensee exists. While another added, they neglected to consider the licensee-client 
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relationship. “Licensees are required to ensure that the client's best interest is considered by 
its authorised representatives. Therefore Licensees also have a Licensee - client relationship.” 
When reflecting on the survey statement of 𝑎2 [Simult]: Licensing advisers through third-party 
licensees’ results in advisers serving the interests of their clients and licensees, simultaneously, 
seemingly advisers were very much focused on prioritising their relationship with the clients. 
With only a few giving any thought with regards to their relationship with their licensees. 
“Clients interest come first and foremost - and that is absolute. If there is a benefit to the 
licensee's interests and its not detrimental to the client, then I am happy to also benefit the 
licensee.” Many did not see themselves serving the interests simultaneously; because the best 
interest duty is seen to override the interests of licensees. Whereas others did see themselves 
serving “…2 masters in this equation but this doesn't mean a licensee gets 'served' over the 
client. It depends so much on the licensee involved as to what their 'interests' are.” When 
talking about interests, some respondents ignored the licensees’ interests as if they are 
unimportant, non-existent, or irrelevant. “Not really; I don't give the licensee a second thought. 
I am not required to recommend their product or meet any quotas or targets.” Whereas others 
seem to indicate the relevance, importance and existence of the interests being served 
simultaneously. “Again, an undeniable fact, but the question makes no distinction to the 
relative % of service to and importance of each. My experience is that advisers serve their 
clients as close to 100% as the law allows, and their Licensee whatever % that leaves on the 
table.” “If licensee is a member of a dealer group that is an organisation listed on the stock 
exchange, then the there is a greater probability that the adviser will be working in the interests 
of the licensee and hence shareholder…Privately run dealer groups may be less inclinded to 
do the above and cover costs only. Hence serve clients interests more.” “The adviser must 
service clietn's interests. / The adviser only needs to serve the licensse's compliance interests.” 
“Whilst advisers need to be mindful of their licensee's interests, the client's needs must take 
priority, even where this may not "suit"the licensee.” Thus, an open-ended question in the man 
survey about the benefits licensees derive from authorising individual advisers was asked. A 
constant theme found for this question was the view the relationship between adviser-licensee 
is the licensee not only authorises advisers but also serves advisers. “We are clients of the 
licensee and so they have to service me although I have to abide by their rules as they are 
responsible for the advice that I give. However, I can choose to change licensee's or make sure 
I utilise one that provides sufficient breadth to provide the types of advice and use the prodcuts 
that I deem to be suitable.”  “Many licensees have no interests other than compliance and 
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reporting. It is important to separate out these two issues rather than assuming all licencees 
are the same.” No clear consensus was present as to whether the adviser and licensee are 
assumed a unit acting on behalf of the client, or two separate units acting independently of each 
other. “The interests of the Licensee should be to ensure the interests of the clients come first. 
Authorised Representatives activities are an extension of the Licensee's activities”   
Advisers also produced inconsistent responses to comments pertaining to 𝑎3 [BestRev] 
measured by the statement: While serving the best interest of their clients, advisers also 
generate revenue for their licensees. For instance, not all licensees were in business “to make 
money” or “make money” from funds under management of product distribution based on a 
few comments: “Thankfully my dealergroup doesnt operate like this. They have a flat fee and 
there is absolutely no pressure to "grow your business" to make more revenue for the dealer. 
Having done reseacrh back before I joined this group I can see from many others this is not 
the case.”  Licensee revenues were viewed as a means for advisers to pay their licensees for 
services rendered to support them in their roles or businesses. “Revenue is required in order to 
cover expenses.  Particularly given the high cost of ongoing education and compliance.”  
“…only in as much as we pay a fee for the licensee to provide us with a service, being research, 
technical, compliance etc.  As a small business owner I contract with a lot of people to provide 
me with services: Telstra; Landlord; Mechanic etc.” “We certainly pay our licensee for 
services provided, however most dealer groups do not generate a profit, they simply 
breakeven.” Whereas other licensees seem to use their advisers to distribute product for them. 
“Yes, but overall most licences do not make a substantial profit, it is more to complement other 
services and other benefits of having distribution.” “Most licensees have preferred product 
lines that generate income for the licensee, and in may cases the adviser through share 
allotments in the licensee based on product volumes.” “Where licensees charge a % this may 
be true. My licensee charges a flat fee. So the licensee income is not tied to income generated 
by the adviser. However this is a relatively new system and mainly applies to new clients. 
Grandfathering provisions and the Approved Product List can create issues with serving the 
best interest of the client.” Thus, the level of licensee control over their advisers, variety of 
business models, licensee-adviser agreements and remuneration arrangements were some of 
the other factors advisers thought about when reflecting on their response. “Only if I select their 
products which I am not compelled to do.” “My practice is basically fixed fee with my AFSL. 
My AFSL doesn't make any more or less money from me irrespective of the source of my fees. 
That's why I am with them. If I worked for an Industry Fund or bank then I am in trouble. The 
290 
 
answer would be maybe 75%.”  “Yes this is true, depending on what the adviser makes money 
from. We generate money for the dealership, however the dealership gets volume rebates if we 
use thier products. See where this is going?” Licensee revenues was a touchy subject, because 
some advisers felt compelled to defend or rationalise licensees' revenues. “Licencees are in the 
business of making money, but this has to be done transparently with the client, so that they 
understand the services they're paying for.” “I see no problem with that. all other professionals 
also generate revenue for themselves and /or an umbrella entity, and thta has to be so that they 
are recompensed for their services.” “dah. …  The Licensee is a business.  They are not the 
enemy.  They are there to provide a service, to assist us in our business, to be there if things go 
wrong. They provide our APL, the rules and the sandpit we need to play in.  They are also the 
buffer between us and ASIC.  Thank goodness they are there for us.” Thus, from the foregoing 
the issue of licensee revenues is a difficult issue for advisers. 
The low squared multiple correlation for 𝑎8 [CompAct] measured by the question: Licensing 
advisers through aligned licensees [e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and AMP] limits advisers 
from competing on a level playing field within the industry indicating problems with reliability. 
From the comments, the advisers had different experiences or views concerning the issue of 
competition within the financial planning industry. Their lack of clarity on the topic of 
competition is reflected in their answers, which was also influenced by whether they considered 
him/herself aligned, non-aligned or s923A independent. For example, advisers seem to 
perceive competition as sales versus advice: “The real distinction is advice vs. selling 
"products". Aligned advisers are driven/encouraged to sell products as a solution to clients' 
needs. Advice may result in no action at all e.g. aligned adviser encourages a client to 
mortgage the family home and invest in the stock market or managed funds. Best advice may 
be to do nothing.”  Some looked at the question from the perspective of product offered versus 
quality/suitability of advice: “This assumes that advisers are competing in terms of their 
product offering not quality or suitability of advice.  Surely it is the quality of advice that is 
important not the make or model of the product (if a product is offered)?” On the other hand, 
others answered the question on competition from a marketing perspective. “They have a huge 
brand advantage.” Whereas one respondent looked at competition from the perspective of size 
or number of advisers or concentration of advisers within the industry.  “Bank advisers consist 
of 70% of the industry advisers. The IFA, we are 10-15% approx. Remainder is industry funds. 
It is not level. The IFA advice model has consistently ranked superior but the average consumer 
does not know this, or if they do, don't have the budget, where banks subsidise their advice 
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delivery from vertical integration.” Another adviser considered the size of the licensees: 
“Alignment may seriously increase the competitive position of aligned advisers due to the 
strength of branding, systems & infrastructure, marketing resources and existing clientele. 
Nobody cares about  level playing field. As an independent I have a serious disadvantage by 
comparison. Sometimes I wish I wasn't so conscientious.” While another considered economies 
of scale: “Only partly true. some platforms pass on some of their economies of scale to end 
clients and this is an area where our business, for example cannot readily compete. On the 
other hand our fee model tends to result in lower overall costs because of the fact we do not 
take income from the platform.” Whereas another looked at the capability of licensees to 
subside costs. “Yes, the field is tilted in their favour as the licensee can afford to defray the 
costs or running the licensee onto other parts of their business, hence it is much easier for them 
to invest sufficiently into the very difficult compliance regime. Their large size also is a big 
advantage.” Another ignored the intent of the question and offered an alternative explanation 
for their view, particularly approaching the question from a compliance point of view. “Agree 
but for different reasons than intended by the question:  The high licensee compliance standard 
places me at a competitive disadvantage against practitioner not subjected to such stringent 
standards. (And I DO understand the question and the intention of it!).” Consequently, these 
different angles of answering the question may explain the low r2 value. 
The low squared multiple correlations for the survey question: Contributions to the debate with 
government surrounding the licensing of advisers by specific individual leaders of aligned 
licensees [e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and AMP) are aimed to protect their product 
distribution channels, measuring 𝑎13 [Personal] may be explained by the following comments. 
The answers to Personal [𝑎13] moral legitimacy clearly does not explain the latent factor 
legitimacy completely, because other factors are at play, such as: 1) licensees “…hoping to 
protect their turf. But they are also trying to reduce the increase increase in administrative 
burden placed on financial advisers - raising the cost of advice to clients.”  2) “Contributions 
to the debate are around educating government and other interested parties in the profession 
and options for continual improvement. I disagree more to protect the advisers who look after 
the clients.  With recent legislation changes some advisers have passed on the costs increased 
by the changes.” 
Respondents’ comments also explained the low squared multiple correlation for 𝑎14 
[Cognitive] variable, which is measured by the statement: Licensing advisers through third-
party licensees is one of the reasons why the Australian public cannot clearly distinguish 
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between advisers who provide independent advice [as defined by the Act] and those who 
provide advice possibly conflicted by a product bias.  It seems “this is too simplistic. There are 
other factors”. For instance, one adviser claimed, “independent advice also has bias to some 
extent, while there may be a wider investment choice / selection available the planner is 
inherently biased towards funds / products they have already used and have a relationship 
with.” “The reason for confusion includes the rules that govern the use of certain banned words 
(independent, unbiased, etc.).  However I also believe confusion would reduce if there was 
clarity in relation to the legal provider of the advice (i.e. the licensee).” For another adviser, 
“There is no "independent advice".” Whereas another adviser disagrees, “There is no conflict. 
Again, what would you suggest - if I was licensed with CBA, and then sold an AMP product, 
and an AMP adviser sold a CBA product -both products are still owned by someone.  Would 
you prefer I set up my own managed fund for my clients to invest in? where is the safety in 
that.” “I agree that the public has difficulty but not because of the existence of third party 
Licensees. I think the distinction should be about quality of advice. Product bias is a minor, 
secondary consideration.  It is not the source of all evil.  Bad advice can be delivered by any 
adviser; independent, self licensed; aligned or in the employ of a bank.” Also, the emotional 
response in this example explains the lower r2, “The industry can't even work out what 
independent is. We have advisers who can receive an Independent Financial Adviser Award 
(IFA Magazine)  yet who operate businesses as conflicted as a Banks.The AFSL then leverages 
that publicity to appear as something they are not - appalling!!  Is it any wonder the public has 
no trust.” “Really dont think most Australians would know the difference as it is not usually 
openly disclosed to them” For another, they “Hadn't thought of it that way before. / Quite 
possibly. / Need to make it easier to handle compliance of own AFSL?”  
Many respondents also answered the survey in terms what should be the case, rather than 
answering the question in terms of what is the case, which may explain the low squared 
multiple correlations and regression weights for these variables. In other words, the model may 
fit the data, but does not reproduce some indicator relationships well. It also does not produce 
uniformly interpretable parameter estimates, because the matter is more complex than was at 
first theoretically conceptualised. Even so, the model was not re-specified to improve the 
parsimony and interpretability of the CFA model, because based on the evidence from the 
comments made by the respondents, advisers are unclear about their role and identity. This lack 
of a clearly defined identity and role is also evident in the financial planning literature, which 
is an important finding. As far as the estimates for the seven indicators with lower than 50 per 
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cent r2 values are concerned perceptibly, advisers’ identity, role and performance is still 
evolving and/or in an evolutionary, if not in a revolutionary phase. 
Therefore, based on the overall results discussed above the model is properly specified and 
plausible (Kline 2010). It is not different from the population’s true covariance structure (Kline 
2010). Furthermore, all the fit indices for ex and cum CLF, led to the same conclusion for the 
hypotheses. Hence, an interpretation and discussion of the findings was proceeded with 
confidently in the next chapter.  
5.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the findings of the pilot study indicated respondents misunderstood many of 
the survey questions, and mainly because of the manner they interpreted and used terminology 
prevalent in financial planning practice. Pilot study respondents highlighted numerous 
terminologies used in practice, which seemed move away from the intent of s923A of the Act. 
Many were unmotivated to respond, because the survey was considered long. Additionally, 
much of the financial planning literature on this issue was rather damaging, making designing 
survey questions a difficult matter. The limitation of an unbalanced view in the literature led 
some survey invitees to perceive the survey questions as biased.  Despite these limitations and 
difficulties during the pilot study, it served to improve the main survey instrument and confirm 
the importance and feasibility of conducting the main study. Therefore, the extended main 
study went ahead to produce some interesting results as reported in this and the forthcoming 
chapter.  
To sum up the extended main study, the raw data was screened utilising Microsoft® Excel and 
IBM SPSS software. After analysing the demographics, a data driven exploratory factor 
analysis technique was applied within a confirmatory factor analysis framework. The 
assumptions were tested using a data-driven EFA approach within a CFA method (Brown & 
Moore 2016) using MLE. EFA was important to implement, because as noted earlier, this study 
pioneered a new theoretical framework combining several different theories for the first time 
defining, modelling and measuring legitimacy. Beginning with the a priori model, the first 
initial misspecification source was too many factors. Consequently, the four indicators of the   
Objective of the Act factor were collapsed into one factor per the pattern matrix during EFA 
analysis by merging them into the legitimacy factor [𝑏3].  Three indicators were deleted, due 
to unacceptable low loadings during initial E/CFA. Then one of the measures was replaced 
after it was validated appropriate per the pattern matrix during EFA analysis combined with 
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interpreting the substantive theory. Thus, E/CFA provided the model a more realistic solution 
in line with the theory. Once the correct number of indicators and factors were identified, the 
analyses proceeded with CFA bootstrapped MLE specification searches using modification 
indices by adopting current practice in SEM. Sequentially the model was modified thirteen 
times until adequate fit was achieved.  This respecification resulted in a more parsimonious 
model for CFA. Notably, SEM experts (Kline 2010; Byrne 2013) claimed simpler models are 
preferred. Then, using chi-square difference test between the multi-group containing males 
[n=218] and females [n=44], the data was cross-validated successfully. This positive result 
meant the data was generalisable and not because of capitalising on chance.  The results also 
passed all the invariance tests using the same male/female multigroup CFA MLE χ2 difference 
test approach (Schmitt & Kuljanin 2008). Convergent together with discriminant validity was 
established using common statistical techniques. Scale reliability was proven using tau 
equivalent tests and the more restrictive parallel tests.  High power and p-values confirmed 
little evidence of any Type two errors among the indicators. Type one errors based on the 
standard error values were also not of concern. However, common method bias was observed 
when the well-known Harman test was applied. This test was further validated with more 
reliable tests, such as the common latent factor [CLF] and CLF marker tests using χ2 
differences. Although, the mean values may be distorted, common method bias was 
inconsequential and observed not to threaten the validity of this research’s conclusions. With 
or without the remedy for common method bias [namely, adding a CLF], all the estimates led 
to the same conclusions for the hypotheses. So, both the bootstrapped MLE results with [cum] 
and without [ex] CLF starting with the fit statistics were reported. To conclude, the respecified 
hypothesised model seemed a good fit for the data collected. For example, Comparative Fit 
Index value showed the over-identification condition was met when comparing the estimated 
model to an independent and null model. Bayesian information criterion indicated the estimates 
are generalisable. The root mean-square error of approximation indicated the population matrix 
model was the same as the estimated or sample model’s matrix. PClose value verified the 
estimated model [sample] is a good fit to the population. Thus, given the goodness of fit 
thresholds have been identified, remedied and met, the interpretation of the model’s parameter 
estimates together with testing the hypotheses proceeds in the next chapter. 
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APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 5 
Appendix 5.1 
Table 1 Frequency use of ‘Other’ option on the ruler-option scale 
Variable  
I don’t understand 
the question 
I don’t know Not applicable 
 N Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
a1 3 1 0.4 1 0.4 1 0.4 
a2 3 1 0.4   2 0.8 
a3 3 1 0.4 1 0.4 1 0.4 
a4 2     2 0.8 
a5 5   4 1.5 1 0.4 
a6 5 1 0.4 4 1.5   
a7 6   5 1.9 1 0.4 
a8 8 2 0.8 5 1.9 1 0.4 
a9 8 1 0.4 6 2.3 1 0.4 
a10 3 1 0.4 2 0.8   
a11 8   8 3.1   
a12 8 2 0.8 5 1.9 1 0.4 
a13 6 1 0.4 5 1.9   
a14 2 1 0.4 1 0.4   
a15 5   4 1.5 1 0.4 
a16 3   2 0.8 1 0.4 
a17 3 1 0.4 2 0.8   
a18 3   2 0.8 1 0.4 
a19 6 1 0.4 4 1.5 1 0.4 
a20 6 1 0.4 5 1.9   
a21 2   1 0.4 1 0.4 
 Total 98 15  67  16   
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Appendix 5.2 
Table 2 Missing Patterns [cases with missing values] for Section A of the 
questionnaire 
Case 
Missing      
No.        % 
Missing and Extreme Value Patterns# 
a12 a21 a14 a15 a16 a17 a3 a8 a2 a4 
171 1 4.8   S        
165 2 9.5         S S 
261 3 14.3       S S S  
108 2 9.5 S S         
198 3 14.3    S S S     
No.: Number of missing cases %: percentage of missing cases 
# Cases and variables are sorted on missing patterns. 
 
Appendix 5.3 
Table 3 Observations farthest from the centroid [Mahalanobis distance] [Group 
number 1] 
Observation number 
Mahalanobis d-
squared 
p1 p2 
Difference in 
Mardi d 
89 54.485 0 0.004 2.546 
90 51.939 0 0 1.067 
65 50.872 0 0 0.776 
222 50.096 0 0 0.456 
86 49.640 0 0 1.385 
109 48.255 0 0 0.945 
164 47.310 0 0 1.887 
112 45.423 0 0 0.179 
64 45.244 0 0 0.425 
230 44.819 0 0 0.176 
136 44.643 0 0 0.839 
174 43.804 0.001 0 1.717 
99 42.087 0.001 0 0.892 
123 41.195 0.001 0 1.627 
197 39.568 0.002 0 0.081 
232 39.487 0.002 0 2.516 
69 36.971 0.005 0 0.555 
134 36.416 0.006 0 0.015 
43 36.401 0.006 0 1.571 
202 34.830 0.010 0 0.061 
94 34.769 0.010 0 0.561 
71 34.208 0.012 0 0.008 
203 34.200 0.012 0 0.739 
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Observation number 
Mahalanobis d-
squared 
p1 p2 
Difference in 
Mardi d 
173 33.461 0.015 0 0.090 
117 33.371 0.015 0 0.503 
150 32.868 0.017 0 0.066 
88 32.802 0.018 0 0.649 
93 32.153 0.021 0 0.452 
13 31.701 0.024 0 0.019 
95 31.682 0.024 0 0.028 
25 31.654 0.024 0 0.115 
58 31.539 0.025 0 0.469 
215 31.070 0.028 0 0.008 
160 31.062 0.028 0 0.260 
177 30.802 0.030 0 0.002 
237 30.800 0.030 0 0.073 
40 30.727 0.031 0 0.092 
132 30.635 0.032 0 1.049 
84 29.586 0.042 0 0.696 
85 28.890 0.050 0 0.072 
246 28.818 0.051 0 0.265 
92 28.553 0.054 0 0.107 
252 28.446 0.056 0 0.154 
61 28.292 0.058 0 0.537 
209 27.755 0.066 0 0.246 
1 27.509 0.070 0 0.090 
242 27.419 0.071 0 0.149 
157 27.270 0.074 0 0.051 
156 27.219 0.075 0 0.296 
184 26.923 0.080 0 0.243 
12 26.680 0.085 0 0.032 
182 26.648 0.086 0 0.016 
20 26.632 0.086 0 0.401 
139 26.231 0.095 0 0.013 
133 26.218 0.095 0 0.077 
253 26.141 0.097 0 0.123 
155 26.018 0.099 0 0.213 
191 25.805 0.104 0 0.785 
126 25.020 0.124 0 0.053 
50 24.967 0.126 0 0.499 
97 24.468 0.140 0 0.220 
127 24.248 0.147 0 0.182 
52 24.066 0.153 0 0.092 
185 23.974 0.156 0 0.143 
198 23.831 0.161 0 0.051 
54 23.780 0.162 0 0.030 
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Observation number 
Mahalanobis d-
squared 
p1 p2 
Difference in 
Mardi d 
18 23.750 0.163 0 0.188 
189 23.562 0.170 0 0.400 
3 23.162 0.184 0.001 0.122 
120 23.040 0.189 0.001 0.026 
79 23.014 0.190 0.001 0.293 
217 22.721 0.202 0.003 0.116 
131 22.605 0.206 0.003 0.451 
81 22.154 0.225 0.018 0.237 
227 21.917 0.236 0.034 0.350 
213 21.567 0.252 0.089 0.040 
32 21.527 0.254 0.079 0.088 
152 21.439 0.258 0.082 0.024 
66 21.415 0.259 0.068 0.069 
74 21.346 0.262 0.067 0.081 
82 21.265 0.266 0.068 0.094 
103 21.171 0.271 0.073 0.048 
34 21.123 0.273 0.067 0.026 
119 21.097 0.275 0.056 0.170 
38 20.927 0.283 0.08 0.132 
208 20.795 0.290 0.098 0.040 
180 20.755 0.292 0.088 0.066 
178 20.689 0.295 0.087 0.011 
72 20.678 0.296 0.07 0.021 
259 20.657 0.297 0.059 0.057 
241 20.600 0.300 0.056 0.005 
214 20.595 0.300 0.044 0.237 
233 20.358 0.313 0.082 0.001 
194 20.357 0.313 0.065 0.119 
6 20.238 0.32 0.078 0.017 
19 20.221 0.32 0.065 0.141 
192 20.080 0.328 0.085 0.149 
104 19.931 0.337 0.113 0.138 
257 19.793 0.345 0.143 0.037 
76 19.756 0.347 0.131 0.037 
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Appendix 5.4 
Table 4a Outlier Dual [a1] comments  
Case Score Comment by respondent 
29 2 This question is not entirely reflective of a relationship between FA and Licensee. A Licensee who is not aligned directly 
or indirectly with a product manufacturer, is unlikely to interfere with the client - adviser relationship. There is a very 
important distinction between belonging to an aligned and non-aligned licensee. 
44 10 The real agency is with the client. The relationship with the third-party licensee is one of a service provided. 
158 11 I do not see any conflict. In offering an adviser- client relationship, the adviser is still undertaking a commercially 
rewarding enterprise, as does any other professional, including medical practitioners. 
166 9 Our greatest relationship is to our clients and as long as the approved list is wide it should not be a problem. 
194 0 My understanding of dual agency is where the agent represents the interests of both the buyer and the seller. As an 
adviser we represent the interests of the client [buyer] but the interests of the licensee are not as a 'seller'. The licensee 
authorises/licenses advisers, they don't 'sell' advice which is what the client is 'buying'. 
197 0 Adviser relationship is empirical to the client 
227 0 This would depend entirely on the type of licencee.  / In the proper world, the client-adviser relationship is paramount, the 
licensee would expect and respect that.  / The licensee should be merely facilitating the service the adviser provides to 
client, not influence it. 
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Table 4b Outlier BestRev [a3] comments  
Case Score Comment by respondent 
25 1 Only to pay for services provided...Audits, Research. Technical etc.  / Licensees do not normally provide product 
however the licensee can be owned by a product provider. 
182 0 My practice is basically fixed fee with my AFSL. My AFSL doesn't make any more or less money from me irrespective 
of the source of my fees. That's why I am with them. If I worked for an Industry Fund or bank then I am in trouble. The 
answer would be maybe 75%. 
215 0 Licensees should charge a fee which is independent of what an adviser does for a client. 
242 0 Advice quality suffers 
253 0 Only to pay for services provided...Audits, Research. Technical etc.  / Licensees do not normally provide product 
however the licensee can be owned by a product provider. 
 
Table 4c Outlier Personal [a13] comments  
Case Score Comment by respondent 
147 5 I disagree more to protect the advisers who look after the clients.  With recent legislation changes some advisers have passed 
on the costs increased by the changes. 
179 0 I am comfortable that AMPs intentions and involvement at a government level is genuinely intentioned to actually tell these 
bureaucrats how things actually work in reality, not via some cookie cutter approach where one set of guidlines will provide 
the panacea to everybody's financial planning issues. 
194 0 As far as I know, leaders of aligned licensees don't debate on this. The professional bodies FPA and AFA do this as bodies that 
represent adviser interests. Adviser don't recommend products unless they are competitive. The product providers protect their 
distribution channels by making their products competitive in the first place. 
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Appendix 5.5 
 Table 5 Test for homogeneity of variance 
 N Range Std. deviation Range/std. 
deviation 
Dual [a1] 262 100 30.942 3.232 
Simult [a2] 262 100 35.417 2.824 
BestRev [a3] 262 100 28.602 3.496 
CoIAss [a4] 262 100 33.091 3.022 
AlignAct [a5] 262 100 38.252 2.614 
CoIAct [a6] 262 100 37.456 2.670 
FiducAct [a7] 262 100 37.031 2.700 
CompAct [a8] 262 100 37.314 2.680 
Regulative [a9] 262 100 37.780 2.647 
Consequential [a10] 262 100 36.670 2.727 
Procedural [a11] 262 100 38.140 2.622 
Structural [a12] 262 100 38.034 2.629 
Personal [a13] 262 100 29.044 3.443 
Cognitive [a14] 262 100 36.719 2.723 
Defend [a15] 262 100 34.066 2.935 
Trust [a16] 262 100 37.670 2.655 
Independence [a17] 262 100 36.096 2.770 
Professions [a18] 262 100 36.328 2.753 
IPFPSB [a19] 262 100 35.573 2.811 
Takeover [a20] 262 100 30.384 3.291 
EliminateCoI [a21] 262 100 35.082 2.850 
Valid N (listwise) 262   
 
302 
 
Appendix 5.6 
Table 6 Collinearity statistics 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Relationships Tolerance 
VIF 
>3<4 
Relationships Tolerance 
VIF 
>4<5 
 
Relationships 
 
Tolerance 
VIF 
>5<10 
Dual*CoIAct 0.278 3.593 Dual*AlignAct 0.232 4.312 Dual*FiducAct 0.198 5.038 
Dual*Procedural 0.28 3.572 Dual*Consequential 0.244 4.098 
Simult*FiducAct 
 
0.197 5.066 
Simult*CoIAct 0.278 3.598 Simult*AlignAct 0.233 4.291 BestRev*FiducAct 0.192 5.201 
Simult*Procedural 0.281 3.558 Simult*Consequential 0.244 4.092 CoIAss*FiducAct 0.193 5.191 
BestRev*CoIAct 0.278 3.599 BestRev*AlignAct 0.232 4.314 CompAct*FiducAct 0.195 5.128 
BestRev*Procedural 0.283 3.54 BestRev*Consequential 0.244 4.098 Procedural*FiducAct 0.193 5.186 
CoIAss*CoIAct 0.331 3.026 CoIAss*AlignAct 0.232 4.314 Structural*FiducAct 0.194 5.162 
CoIAss*Procedural 0.282 3.54 CoIAss*Consequential 0.246 4.062 Personal*FiducAct 0.198 5.05 
AlignAct*Consequential 0.26 3.839 AlignAct*FiducAct 0.212 4.706 Cognitive*FiducAct 0.194 5.158 
AlignAct*CoIAct 0.294 3.403 CoIAct*FiducAct 0.207 4.842 Defend*FiducAct 0.195 5.12 
AlignAct*Procedural 0.287 3.487 CoIAct*Consequential 0.244 4.093 Trust*FiducAct 0.192 5.195 
CoIAct*Procedural 0.282 3.54 CoIAct*AlignAct 0.245 4.075 Independence*FiducAct 0.192 5.206 
FiducAct*Consequential 0.258 3.87 CompAct*Consequential 0.244 4.098 Professions*FiducAct 0.192 5.206 
FiducAct*Procedural 0.281 3.558 CompAct*AlignAct 0.237 4.225 IPFPSB*FiducAct 0.192 5.199 
FiducAct*AlignAct 0.256 3.905 Regulative*Consequential 0.248 4.025 Takeover*FiducAct 0.192 5.201 
FiducAct*CoIAct 0.298 3.355 Regulative*AlignAct 0.237 4.218 EliminateCoI*FiducAct 0.192 5.2 
CompAct*Procedural 0.28 3.566 Regulative*FiducAct 0.208 4.816         
CompAct*CoIAct 0.287 3.485 Consequential*AlignAct 0.247 4.046         
Regulative*Procedural 0.304 3.288 Consequential*FiducAct 0.203 4.916         
Regulative*CoIAct 0.278 3.591 Procedural*AlignAct 0.237 4.218         
Consequential*Procedural 0.313 3.194 Structural*AlignAct 0.233 4.299         
Consequential*CoIAct 0.278 3.603 Structural*Consequential 0.245 4.082         
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Relationships Tolerance 
VIF 
>3<4 
Relationships Tolerance 
VIF 
>4<5 
 
Relationships 
 
Tolerance 
VIF 
>5<10 
 
Procedural*Consequential 0.273 3.665 Personal*Consequential 0.244 4.092         
Procedural*CoIAct 0.28 3.576 Personal*AlignAct 0.232 4.319        
Structural*CoIAct 0.278 3.602 Cognitive*AlignAct 0.232 4.309         
Structural*Procedural 0.282 3.552 Cognitive*Consequential 0.244 4.099         
Personal*CoIAct 0.279 3.583 Defend*AlignAct 0.232 4.316         
Personal*Procedural 0.282 3.541 Defend*Consequential 0.246 4.06         
Cognitive*CoIAct 0.28 3.567 Trust*AlignAct 0.232 4.31         
Cognitive*Procedural 0.282 3.552 Trust*Consequential 0.245 4.088         
Defend*CoIAct 0.279 3.587 Independence*AlignAct 0.233 4.284         
Defend*Procedural 0.282 3.551 Independence*Consequential 0.244 4.099         
Trust*CoIAct 0.277 3.606 Professions*AlignAct 0.232 4.316         
Trust*Procedural 0.28 3.572 Professions*Consequential 0.244 4.096         
Independence*CoIAct 0.279 3.591 IPFPSB*AlignAct 0.233 4.293         
Independence*Procedural 0.282 3.542 IPFPSB*Consequential 0.244 4.096         
Professions*CoIAct 0.277 3.607 Takeover*AlignAct 0.235 4.26         
Professions*Procedural 0.281 3.563 Takeover*Consequential 0.246 4.065         
IPFPSB*CoIAct 0.277 3.604 EliminateCoI*AlignAct 0.237 4.225         
IPFPSB*Procedural 0.28 3.57 EliminateCoI*Consequential 0.245 4.088         
Takeover*CoIAct 0.277 3.606                 
Takeover*Procedural 0.292 3.426                 
EliminateCoI*CoIAct 0.278 3.593                 
EliminateCoI*Procedural 0.282 3.544                 
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Appendix 5.7 
Table 7 Gender split of survey respondents 
  Frequency Percent 
 
Valid 
Male 216 82.4 
 Female 44 16.8 
 Total 260 99.2 
Missing System 2 0.8 
Total  262 100 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.8 
Table 8 Frequency of age of survey participants 
  Frequency Percent 
 
 
 
Valid 
 
Gen Y/Millennial [1981-2001] 
 
14 
 
5.3 
Gen X [1965-1980] 98 37.4 
Baby Boomers [1946-1964] 146 55.7 
Traditionalists [Born prior 1946] 3 1.1 
Total 261 99.6 
Missing System 1 0.4 
Total 262 100 
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Appendix 5.9 
Table 9 Frequency of location of survey respondents 
State Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
New South Wales [NSW] 78 29.8 29.8 29.8 
Queensland [QLD] 55 21.0 21.0 50.8 
Tasmania [TAS] 7 2.7 2.7 53.4 
Western Australia [WA] 30 11.5 11.5 64.9 
South Australia [SA] 32 12.2 12.2 77.1 
Victoria [VIC] 53 20.2 20.2 97.3 
Australian Capital Territory [ACT] 5 1.9 1.9 99.2 
Northern Territory [NT] 2 0.8 0.8 100.0 
Total 262 100 100  
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Appendix 5.10 
Table 10 Frequency of the number of years of AR status of survey respondents 
Years Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 3 1.1 1.2 1.6 
2 7 2.7 2.7 5.5 
3 3 1.1 1.2 5.0 
4 2 0.8 0.8 5.8 
5 6 2.3 2.3 8.1 
6 5 1.9 1.9 10.1 
7 4 1.5 1.6 11.6 
8 5 1.9 1.9 13.6 
9 9 3.4 3.5 17.1 
10 19 7.3 7.4 24.4 
11 6 2.3 2.3 26.7 
12 7 2.7 2.7 29.5 
13 8 3.1 3.1 32.6 
14 10 3.8 3.9 36.4 
15 13 5.0 5.0 41.5 
16 15 5.7 5.8 47.3 
17 6 2.3 2.3 49.6 
18 12 4.6 4.7 54.3 
19 5 1.9 1.9 56.2 
20 19 7.3 7.4 63.6 
21 7 2.7 2.7 66.3 
22 9 3.4 3.5 69.8 
23 13 5.0 5.0 74.8 
24 6 2.3 2.3 77.1 
25 9 3.4 3.5 80.6 
26 9 3.4 3.5 84.1 
27 5 1.9 1.9 86.0 
28 5 1.9 1.9 88.0 
29 5 1.9 1.9 89.9 
30 12 4.6 4.7 94.6 
31 1 0.4 0.4 95.0 
32 6 2.3 2.3 97.3 
33 2 0.8 0.8 98.1 
35 2 0.8 0.8 98.8 
38 2 0.8 0.8 99.6 
40 1 0.4 0.4 100.0 
Missing 4 1.5  
 
Total 262 100 100 
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Appendix 5.11 
Table 11 Frequency of the highest and financial planning qualifications achieved 
 Highest qualification achieved Financial Planning qualification 
 N Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent N Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Certificate I: Some high school, no diploma 3 1.1 1.1 1.1 
    
Certificate II: High school graduate, diploma 
or the equivalent 5 1.9 1.9 3.1 
    
Certificate III: Some college credit, no degree 1 0.4 0.4 3.4 
    
Certificate IV: Trade/technical/vocational 
training 1 0.4 0.4 3.8 2 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Diploma 33 12.6 12.6 16.4 87 33.2 33.7 34.5 
Advanced Diploma 52 19.8 19.8 36.3 93 35.5 36 70.5 
Bachelor Degree 65 24.8 24.8 61.1 14 5.3 5.4 76 
Bachelor Honours degree, Graduate 
Certificate, Graduate Diploma 43 16.4 16.4 77.5 33 12.6 12.8 88.8 
Master Degree 59 22.5 22.5 100 23 8.8 8.9 97.7 
None of the above 
    
6 2.3 2.3 100 
Missing 
    
4 1.5 
  
Total 262 100 100  262 100 100  
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Appendix 5.12 
Table 12 Frequency of professional association membership 
 
Frequency Valid 
Percent 
Missing Valid 
Percent 
Financial Planning Association [FPA] 186 71.0 76 29.0 
Self-Managed Super Fund Association [SMSF] 45 17.2 217 82.8 
Association of Financial Advisers [AFA]  41 15.6 221 84.4 
Not a member of any association 23 8.8 239 91.2 
Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand [CA ANZ]  21 8.0 241 92.0 
Certified Practicing Accountants [CPA]  19 7.3 243 92.7 
Financial Services Institute of Australasia [FINSIA]  18 6.9 244 93.1 
The Tax Institute [TTI]  7 2.7 255 97.3 
Asian Institute of Chartered Bankers [AICB]  6 2.3 256 97.7 
Independent Financial Advisers Association of Australia [IFAAA]  5 1.9 257 98.1 
Mortgage & Finance Association of Australia [MFAA]  3 1.1 259 98.9 
Stockbrokers Association Australia [SAA]  2 0.8 260 99.2 
Boutique Financial Planner Principals' Group [BFP]  2 0.8 260 99.2 
Australian and New Zealand Institute of Insurance and Finance [ANZIIF]  2 0.8 260 99.2 
Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia [ASFA]  1 0.4 261 99.6 
Responsible Investment Association Australasia [RIAA]  1 0.4 261 99.6 
Association of Independently Owned Financial Professionals [AAIOFP]  1 0.4 261 99.6 
Finance Brokers Association of Australia Limited [FBAA]  1 0.4 261 99.6 
Institute of Certified Management Accountants [ICMA]  1 0.4 261 99.6 
International Academy of Collaborative Professionals [IACP]  1 0.4 261 99.6 
Control and click to follow the link to the association’s webpage 
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Appendix 5.13 
Table 13 Frequency of professional qualifications of survey respondents 
 Valid Missing 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Certified Financial Planner [CFP] 141 53.8 121 46.2 
No professional qualifications 67 25.6 195 74.4 
Self-Managed Super Specialist [SSA] 40 15.3 222 84.7 
Certified Practicing Accountant [CPA] 22 8.4 240 91.6 
Chartered Accountant [CA] 21 8.0 241 92.0 
Other professional qualifications 11 4.2 251 95.8 
Fellow Chartered Financial Practitioner [FCHFP] 9 3.4 253 96.6 
Life Risk Specialist [LRS] 9 3.4 253 96.6 
Accredited Estate Planning Strategist [AEPS] 5 1.9 257 98.1 
Chartered Life Practitioner [CHLP] 3 1.1 259 98.9 
Certified Financial Analyst [CFA] 1 0.4 261 99.6 
Stockbrokers and Financial Advisers Association of Australia Professional Diploma 
in Stockbroking™ 1 0.4 261 99.6 
Certified Management Accountant [CMA] 1 0.4 261 99.6 
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Appendix 5.14 
Table 14 Frequency of authorised representative status of survey participants 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Employee AR 63 24 24 24 
Self-employed AR 199 76 76 100 
Total 262 100 100 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.15 
Table 15 Frequency of licensee status of survey respondents 
 
Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Aligned licensee 125 47.7 47.7 
Non-aligned licensee 97 37.0 84.7 
S923A independent licensee 39 14.9 99.6 
Other licensee 1 0.4 100 
Total 262 100 
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Appendix 5.16  
Table 16 Initial pattern matrixa during E/CFA analysis 
 
Factor 
Parameter 1 2 3 4 
Dual [a1] 
 
0.250 0.558 
 
Simult [a2] 
  
0.647 
 
BestRev [a3] 
  
0.461 
 
CoIAss [a4] 0.544 
  
0.284 
AlignAct [a5] 0.850 
   
CoIAct [a6] 0.450 
  
0.703 
FiducAct [a7] 0.897 
   
CompAct [a8] 0.525 
   
Regulative [a9] 0.786 
   
Consequential [a10] 0.987 
   
Procedural [a11] 0.934 
   
Structural [a12] 
 
0.217 
  
Personal [a13] 0.501 0.260 
  
Cognitive [a14] 0.312 0.397 
  
Defend [a15] 0.248 0.293 
  
Trust [a16] 
 
0.874 
  
Independence [a17] 
 
0.775 
  
Professions [a18] 
 
0.769 
  
IPFPSB [a19] 
 
0.818 
  
Takeover [a20] 
 
0.214 
  
EliminateCoI [a21] 
 
0.699 
  
Extraction method: Maximum likelihood.  
 Rotation method: Promax with Kaiser normalization. 
a Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
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Appendix 5.17 
Table 17 Initial structure matrix during E/CFA 
 
Factor 
Parameter 1 2 3 4 
Dual [a1] 
 
0.366 0.586 
 
Simult [a2] 0.343 
 
0.665 
 
BestRev [a3] 
  
0.419 
 
CoIAss [a4] 0.754 0.454 0.35 0.605 
AlignAct [a5] 0.870 0.406 0.262 0.530 
CoIAct [a6] 0.800 0.400 0.312 0.928 
FiducAct [a7] 0.900 0.395 0.301 0.530 
CompAct [a8] 0.660 0.393 0.397 0.422 
Regulative [a9] 0.780 0.374 0.332 0.388 
Consequential [a10] 0.890 0.381 0.254 0.401 
Procedural [a11] 0.854 0.412 0.269 0.356 
Structural [a12]  0.264 0.210 
 
Personal [a13] 0.614 0.500 0.289 0.286 
Cognitive [a14] 0.571 0.598 0.354 0.361 
Defend [a15] 0.386 0.423 0.261 
 
Trust [a16] 0.376 0.824 
 
0.214 
Independence [a17] 0.394 0.788 0.314 0.209 
Professions [a18] 0.374 0.763 0.243 0.218 
IPFPSB [a19] 0.362 0.783 
 
0.231 
Takeover [a20] 0.236 0.298 0.233 
 
EliminateCoI [a21] 0.302 0.687 0.267 0.216 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Appendix 5.18 
Table 18   Hypotheses and/or related survey question discarded during E/CFA 
Variable Empirical test Respecification Reason 
H1(d): Financial advisers significantly agree licensing advisers through aligned licensees leads to conflict of interest from association. 
a4 [b1] 
Licensing advisers through aligned licensees (e.g. ANZ, 
Westpac, NAB, CBA and AMP) results in conflict of 
interest from association.       
Hypothesis deleted 
Based on substantive theoretical reasons and 
reviewing the original conceptualisation of the 
theory, reconceptualising the theory, the data 
responses for this statement was moved to 
measure H3(d): Financial advisers significantly 
agree the current ‘authorised representative’ 
licensing model does not have structural 
normative legitimacy  
H3(d): Financial advisers significantly agree the current ‘authorised representative’ licensing model does not have structural normative legitimacy.  
a12 [b3] 
Licensing professionally qualified advisers through third-
party licensees means that when these advisers leave their 
licensee, unless they sign up with another licensee, they 
lose their ability to work as a professional financial adviser. 
a12 replaced by a4 
Data not interpretable, because factor loadings 
for a12 were below .30. Therefore, removed 
from analysis.  
H3(g) Financial advisers significantly agree that a financial adviser of product-aligned licensees must defend their relationship/association/affiliation 
with their licensee to clients 
a15 [b3] 
Since the media has exposed the financial planning 
scandals, financial advisers have had to defend their 
relationship/association/affiliation with their licensee to 
clients. 
Hypothesis deleted 
Data not interpretable, because factor loadings 
were below .30. Therefore, removed from 
analysis. 
H4(e): Financial advisers significantly agree the lack of independence from conflicted licensees exposes the financial planning industry to a ‘takeover’ 
by the accounting profession as the accountants redefine or reposition financial planning within their self-regulatory model. 
a20 [b4] 
Strategic independent advice is being taken over by the 
accounting profession, as accountants redefine and re-
position financial planning within their self-regulatory 
model. 
Hypothesis deleted 
Data not interpretable, because factor loadings 
were below .30. Therefore, removed from 
analysis. 
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Appendix 5.19 
Table 19 Argument for the reasonableness of including thirteen covariances in the model 
Parameter Reason 
CoIAct e6 <>Structural e4 If there are structural legitimacy whereby licensing advisers through aligned licensees [e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, 
CBA and AMP) does not result in conflicts of interest from association then the objective of the Act to minimise 
conflicts of interests is achieved. Therefore, these two measures are related. 
Personal e13 <>Cognitive e14 If contributions to the debate with g vernment surrounding the licensi g of advisers by specific individual leaders 
of aligned licensees [e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and AMP) are not primarily aimed to protect their product 
distribution channels, then this should have some influence on the identity, role and performance of authorised 
representatives. Therefore, these measures are related. 
Independence e17 <>EliminateCoI e21 Where there is no conflict of interest from association, there is independence, vice versa. Therefore, these 
measures are related. 
AlignAct e5 <>Regulative e9 If licensing advisers through aligned licensees [e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and AMP) leads to unintentional 
compliance breaches by their advisers, such as for example providing product biased advice because of their 
affiliation to product issuers then the objective of the Act to align the interests of the adviser to the client is 
breached. Therefore, these measures are related. 
CoIAct e6 <>Procedural e11 If licensing advisers through aligned licensees [e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and AMP] results in sales policies, 
procedures, and practices is designed by licensees to give the appearance [window dressing) of complying with the 
regulatory requirements, then the objective of the Act to eliminate or reduce conflicts of interest is 
breached. Therefore, these measures are related. 
FiducAct e7 <>CompAct e8 If the objective of the Act of the best interest duty obligations to clients is achieved, then this should assist in 
achieving the objective of the Act to encourage competition within the financial planning/services industry. 
Therefore, these measures are related. 
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Consequential e10 <>Procedural e11 There is a relationship between the commercial interests of licensees [any business in general) and their sales 
policies, procedures, and practices  
CoIAct e6 <>Consequential e10 If the commercial interests of aligned licensees [e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and AMP) does not compromise 
their advisers' best interest duty obligations, then it can be argued the objective of the Act of eliminating or 
minimizing conflicts of interest has been achieved. Therefore, these measures are related. 
Cognitive e14 <>Structural e4 If the Australian public can clearly distinguish between advisers who provide independent advice [as defined by 
the Act) and those who provide advice that may be conflicted by a product bias then licensing advisers through 
aligned licensees [e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and AMP) should not result in conflict of interest from 
association. Therefore, these measures are related. 
CompAct e8 <>Consequential e10 If the commercial interests of aligned licensees [e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and AMP) does not compromise 
their advisers' best interest duty obligations, then it can be argued the objective of the Act of encouraging 
competition within the financial services industry is achieved. Therefore, these measures are related. 
Trust e16 <>Professions e18 Professions such as the accounting, legal and medical are considered trusted professions. Therefore, these 
measures are related.  
CoIAct e6 <>Personal e13 The objective of the Act to encourage authorised representatives to eliminate or reduce conflicts of interest would 
influence the role of leaders to lobby government to retain [or not] their product distribution channels. These 
measures are related. 
Regulative e9 <> Personal e13 Unintentional compliance breaches by advisers because of their affiliation to product issuers may be the result of 
specific individual leaders of aligned licensees [e.g. ANZ, Westpac, NAB, CBA and AMP] primarily lobbying 
government to protect their product distribution channels. Therefore, these measures are related. 
  
316 
 
Appendix 5.20 
Table 20a Unstandardised regression weights ex common latent factor: [Group number 1 - Default model] 
  
ex and cum 
Bootstrap1 
ex Bootstrap1  cum Bootstrap 
         95% confidence interval 
Parameter Estimate 
p-
value 
S.E. C.R. SE 
SE-
SE 
Mean Bias 
SE-
Bias 
Lower Upper Range 
p-
value 
Dual [a1] 0.746 0.001 0.229 3.256 0.683 0.034 0.94 0.194 0.048 0.175 3.166 2.991 0.01 
BestRev [a3] 0.438 *** 0.123 3.555 0.186 0.009 0.43 -0.008 0.013 0.063 0.831 0.768 0.01 
Regulative [a9] 0.891 *** 0.051 17.456 0.038 0.002 0.89 -0.001 0.003 0.807 0.966 0.159 0.01 
Consequential [a10] 0.953 *** 0.044 21.607 0.039 0.002 0.952 -0.002 0.003 0.87 1.021 0.151 0.01 
Procedural [a11] 0.941 *** 0.049 19.091 0.04 0.002 0.942 0 0.003 0.856 1.016 0.16 0.01 
Personal [a13] 0.538 *** 0.046 11.698 0.048 0.002 0.546 0.007 0.003 0.448 0.645 0.197 0.01 
Cognitive [a14] 0.611 *** 0.06 10.186 0.058 0.003 0.623 0.012 0.004 0.521 0.749 0.228 0.01 
Independence [a17] 0.829 *** 0.065 12.752 0.063 0.003 0.842 0.014 0.004 0.71 0.969 0.259 0.01 
Professions [a18] 0.917 *** 0.07 13.098 0.063 0.003 0.92 0.003 0.004 0.818 1.037 0.219 0.01 
IPFPSB [a19] 0.882 *** 0.063 13.961 0.065 0.003 0.888 0.006 0.005 0.74 1.019 0.279 0.01 
Simult [a2] 1       0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 ... 
Structural [a4] 0.735 *** 0.047 15.771 0.047 0.002 0.738 0.003 0.003 0.647 0.83 0.183 0.01 
AlignAct [a5] 1.004 *** 0.045 22.309 0.035 0.002 1.006 0.002 0.002 0.938 1.076 0.138 0.01 
CoIAct [a6] 0.925 *** 0.048 19.169 0.045 0.002 0.93 0.005 0.003 0.839 1.017 0.178 0.01 
FiducAct [a7] 1       0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 ... 
CompAct [a8] 0.775 *** 0.06 12.815 0.056 0.003 0.775 0 0.004 0.668 0.88 0.212 0.01 
EliminateCoI [a21] 0.682 *** 0.066 10.374 0.068 0.003 0.695 0.012 0.005 0.545 0.833 0.288 0.01 
Trust [a16] 1       0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 ... 
1including Bollen-Stine bootstrap 
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Table 20b Unstandardised regression weights cum common latent factor: [Group number 1 - Default model] 
Parameter 
ex and cum 
Bootstrap1 
ex Bootstrap 1 cum Bootstrap 
      95% confidence interval 
Estimate p-value S.E. C.R. Lower Upper Range p-value 
Dual [a1] 0.766 0.007 0.286 2.676 0.051 1.574 1.523 0.039 
BestRev [a3] 0.439 *** 0.121 3.642 0.054 0.889 0.835 0.01 
Regulative [a9] 0.903 *** 0.059 15.207 0.747 0.987 0.24 0.01 
Consequential [a10] 0.957 *** 0.049 19.416 0.829 1.097 0.268 0.01 
Procedural [a11] 0.98 *** 0.071 13.844 0.781 1.077 0.296 0.01 
Personal [a13] 0.649 *** 0.125 5.193 0.338 0.866 0.528 0.01 
Cognitive [a14] 0.824 *** 0.216 3.817 0.22 1.228 1.008 0.01 
Independence [a17] 0.852 *** 0.077 11.035 0.087 1.302 1.215 0.027 
Professions [a18] 0.92 *** 0.082 11.211 0.357 1.269 0.912 0.01 
IPFPSB [a19] 0.881 *** 0.073 12.075 0.341 1.679 1.338 0.01 
Simult [a2] 1    1 1 0  
Structural [a4] 0.805 *** 0.089 9.073 0.545 1.021 0.476 0.01 
AlignAct [a5] 1.019 *** 0.053 19.14 0.915 1.141 0.226 0.01 
CoIAct [a6] 0.952 *** 0.063 15.101 0.805 1.101 0.296 0.01 
FiducAct [a7] 1    1 1 0  
CompAct [a8] 0.833 *** 0.091 9.162 0.59 1.015 0.425 0.01 
EliminateCoI [a21] 0.67 *** 0.078 8.625 0.082 1.019 0.937 0.037 
Trust [a16] 1       1 1 0   
1including Bollen-Stine bootstrap 
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Appendix 5.21 
Table 21 Correlations of indicator variables: [Group number 1 - Default model] 
  
cum Bootstrap & ex CLF 
cum Bootstrap & 
cum CLF 
                  95% Confidence interval  
Parameter Estimate SE 
SE-
SE 
Mean Bias 
SE-
Bias 
Lower Upper p-value Estimate p-value 
e6 <> e4 0.343 0.078 0.004 0.339 -0.004 0.006 0.164 0.499 0.01 0.35 *** 
e13 <> e14 0.275 0.061 0.003 0.276 0.001 0.004 0.152 0.399 0.01 0.119 0.316 
e17 <> e21 0.338 0.083 0.004 0.331 -0.007 0.006 0.172 0.491 0.01 0.35 *** 
e5 <> e9 -0.294 0.07 0.004 -0.287 0.007 0.005 -0.426 -0.151 0.01 -0.294 *** 
e6 <> e11 -0.222 0.105 0.005 -0.239 -0.016 0.007 -0.444 -0.039 0.033 -0.211 0.001 
e7 <> e8 -0.261 0.087 0.004 -0.267 -0.006 0.006 -0.448 -0.107 0.01 -0.265 *** 
e10 <> e11 0.184 0.103 0.005 0.18 -0.004 0.007 -0.02 0.394 0.071 0.199 0.012 
e6 <> e10 -0.213 0.087 0.004 -0.214 -0.001 0.006 -0.386 -0.051 0.013 -0.202 0.003 
e14 <> e4 0.154 0.062 0.003 0.15 -0.004 0.004 0.034 0.279 0.018 0.075 0.276 
e8 <> e10 -0.181 0.087 0.004 -0.176 0.005 0.006 -0.358 -0.004 0.047 -0.173 0.018 
e16 <> e18 -0.373 0.207 0.01 -0.378 -0.005 0.015 -0.884 -0.065 0.013 -0.492 *** 
e6 <> e13 -0.169 0.071 0.004 -0.171 -0.002 0.005 -0.33 -0.034 0.01 -0.133 0.04 
e9 <> e13 -0.148 0.054 0.003 -0.15 -0.002 0.004 -0.271 -0.06 0.011 -0.131 0.056 
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Appendix 5.22 
Table 22 Variances bootstrapped ex and cum CLF: [Group number 1 - Default model] 
 Bootstrapped ex CLF Bootstrapped cum CLF 
 Estimate S.E. C.R. P Lower Upper P Estimate S.E. C.R. P Lower Upper P 
b1 587.673 193.722 3.034 0.002 124.469 1909.519 0.01 593.552 202.065 2.937 0.003 -309.289 2639.257 0.14 
b3 1128.062 118.886 9.489 *** 948.423 1293.762 0.01 920.795 315.515 2.918 0.004 348.358 1266.734 0.01 
b4 
1040.192 130.995 7.941 *** 825.423 1268.077 0.01 784.721 266.638 2.943 0.003 -
1769.751 
1094.179 0.331 
e1 
627.000 114.994 5.452 *** -
283.944 
896.793 0.116 526.230 117.738 4.469 *** 172.600 842.038 0.015 
e2 
661.896 179.660 3.684 *** -
722.675 
1123.446 0.199 648.138 171.316 3.783 *** -
1424.758 
941.175 0.203 
e3 702.158 68.389 10.267 *** 518.060 864.655 0.01 698.405 67.186 10.395 *** 489.767 854.846 0.01 
e5 319.743 33.488 9.548 *** 222.435 427.546 0.01 316.230 33.878 9.334 *** 212.767 421.132 0.01 
e6 432.923 43.871 9.868 *** 299.874 561.788 0.01 435.759 43.647 9.984 *** 287.569 561.680 0.01 
e7 238.029 26.491 8.985 *** 172.207 321.971 0.01 220.033 26.897 8.181 *** 140.478 303.601 0.01 
e8 706.449 65.820 10.733 *** 544.577 859.943 0.01 702.116 65.316 10.750 *** 531.287 814.238 0.01 
e9 529.790 50.945 10.399 *** 393.928 652.832 0.01 529.011 50.977 10.378 *** 378.158 653.750 0.01 
e10 312.399 33.739 9.259 *** 214.727 429.892 0.01 309.897 33.947 9.129 *** 202.484 437.386 0.01 
e11 449.588 44.790 10.038 *** 313.789 603.058 0.01 453.562 44.866 10.109 *** 308.859 605.073 0.01 
e13 515.544 46.822 11.011 *** 399.181 630.719 0.01 452.324 53.817 8.405 *** 275.171 598.510 0.01 
e14 921.024 81.833 11.255 *** 734.703 1095.086 0.01 669.111 107.249 6.239 *** 297.773 912.250 0.01 
e16 373.386 63.122 5.915 *** 218.672 548.864 0.01 347.496 61.404 5.659 *** 140.157 564.890 0.039 
e17 583.908 60.611 9.634 *** 404.636 744.806 0.01 595.592 60.511 9.843 *** 381.495 736.097 0.011 
e18 440.116 63.350 6.947 *** 244.966 616.633 0.01 401.777 61.129 6.573 *** 223.918 579.930 0.01 
e19 450.885 51.006 8.840 *** 290.567 626.904 0.01 474.902 50.501 9.404 *** 179.529 628.223 0.02 
e21 741.617 70.500 10.519 *** 556.669 892.213 0.01 748.486 70.755 10.579 *** 540.359 894.448 0.01 
e4 478.564 43.888 10.904 *** 371.255 585.924 0.01 464.577 43.289 10.732 *** 349.473 574.844 0.01 
CLF 
       
79.046 77.799 1.016 0.31 7.512 381.920 0.01 
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Appendix 5.23 
Table 23a Factor and indicator covariance: [Group number 1 - Default model] 
   Bootstrapped ex CLF 
            95% confidence interval 
Parameter Estimate S.E. C.R. P SE SE-SE Mean Bias 
SE-
Bias 
Lower Upper  P 
b1 <>  b4 230.357 68.838 3.346 *** 79.734 3.987 197.015 -33.342 5.638 22.468 351.541 0.035 
b1 <>  b3 315.377 94.774 3.328 *** 127.179 6.359 289.678 -25.699 8.993 38.387 516.798 0.01 
b3 <>  b4 487.600 80.375 6.067 *** 77.426 3.871 493.280 5.680 5.475 357.843 657.646 0.01 
e6 <>  e4 156.129 33.458 4.666 *** 41.008 2.050 151.925 -4.205 2.900 63.577 241.192 0.01 
e13 <>  e14 189.176 45.327 4.174 *** 47.005 2.350 188.940 -0.236 3.324 95.350 275.796 0.01 
e17 <>  e21 222.379 50.432 4.409 *** 69.007 3.450 215.215 -7.164 4.880 91.695 355.171 0.01 
e5 <>  e9 -120.940 29.964 -4.036 *** 31.671 1.584 -117.120 3.821 2.239 -181.110 -57.103 0.01 
e6 <>  e11 -98.067 28.838 -3.401 *** 43.352 2.168 -101.62 -3.550 3.065 -196.180 -14.875 0.033 
e7 <>  e8 -107.150 30.110 -3.559 *** 35.184 1.759 -107.900 -0.750 2.488 -176.610 -45.774 0.01 
e10 <>  e11 69.008 29.486 2.340 0.019 43.870 2.193 69.793 0.784 3.102 -5.492 164.776 0.071 
e6 <>  e10 -78.244 25.548 -3.063 0.002 32.089 1.604 -77.263 0.981 2.269 -140.440 -17.239 0.013 
e14 <>  e4 101.913 37.805 2.696 0.007 39.309 1.965 97.165 -4.747 2.780 22.369 182.874 0.018 
e8 <>  e10 -84.935 33.283 -2.552 0.011 38.776 1.939 -80.785 4.149 2.742 -157.760 -2.137 0.047 
e16 <>  e18 -151.120 47.476 -3.183 0.001 63.370 3.169 -143.130 7.987 4.481 -278.570 -33.429 0.013 
e6 <>  e13 -80.065 29.442 -2.719 0.007 33.897 1.695 -79.552 0.512 2.397 -153.400 -14.897 0.01 
e9 <>  e13 -77.235 34.607 -2.232 0.026 27.969 1.398 -77.541 -0.306 1.978 -138.470 -27.410 0.011 
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Table 23b Factor and indicator covariance: [Group number 1 - Default model] 
 
 Bootstrapped cum CLF 
     95% confidence interval 
Parameter Estimate S.E. C.R. P Lower Upper P 
b1 <>  b4 182.050 103.529 1.758 0.079 -1309.800 285.035 0.856 
b1 <>  b3 338.064 107.862 3.134 0.002 -199.040 480.896 0.178 
b3 <>  b4 667.935 113.358 5.892 *** -198.260 810.914 0.261 
e6 <>  e4 157.537 33.393 4.718 *** 74.618 223.590 0.01 
e13 <>  e14 65.264 65.081 1.003 0.316 -135.420 213.704 0.431 
e17 <>  e21 233.544 50.810 4.596 *** 90.648 336.901 0.017 
e5 <>  e9 -120.140 29.852 -4.025 *** -180.650 -48.485 0.01 
e6 <>  e11 -93.911 28.802 -3.261 0.001 -187.140 -13.326 0.031 
e7 <>  e8 -104.040 31.025 -3.353 *** -170.510 -28.201 0.01 
e10 <>  e11 74.699 29.707 2.514 0.012 -3.999 178.976 0.058 
e6 <>  e10 -74.233 25.307 -2.933 0.003 -140.110 -17.668 0.01 
e14 <>  e4 41.827 38.404 1.089 0.276 -60.281 147.282 0.29 
e8 <>  e10 -80.769 34.024 -2.374 0.018 -156.450 1.992 0.055 
e16 <>  e18 -183.810 45.725 -4.020 *** -279.700 -39.051 0.018 
e6 <>  e13 -58.997 28.711 -2.055 0.04 -127.800 -1.043 0.048 
e9 <>  e13 -64.255 33.588 -1.913 0.056 -133.050 -2.013 0.045 
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Appendix 5.24 
 
 
♣Values of the Critical chi-squared distribution sourced from https://www.medcalc.org/ manual/chi-square-table.php 
 
Table 24 Error covariance constraint chi-square difference test [Bootstrapped ex and cum CLF] 
ex CLF 
Model Chi-square df p chi-square diff 
df 
diff 
p<.05♣ p<.01♣ p<.001♣ CFI CFI diff 
Unconstrained 222.131 119 0 Significant 
 
critical chi-square threshold 0.964 
 
Zero error covariance 
constraint 
290.565 127 0 68.434 8 15.507 20.09 26.124 0.943 0.021 
Small positive value of 
.005 error covariance 
constraint 
290.57 127 0 68.439 8 15.507 20.09 26.124 0.943 0.021 
cum CLF 
Model Chi-square df p chi-square diff 
df 
diff 
p<.05♣ p<.01♣ p<.001♣ CFI CFI diff 
Unconstrained 128.339 101 0.034 Significant 
 
critical chi-square threshold 0.991 
 
Zero error covariance 
constraint 
188.8 109 0 60.461 8 15.507 20.09 26.124 0.972 0.019 
Small positive value of 
.005 error covariance 
constraint 
188.8 109 0 60.461 8 15.507 20.09 26.124 0.972 0.019 
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Appendix 5.25 
Table 25 Squared multiple correlations: [Group number 1 - Default model] 
 Bootstrapped ex CLF Bootstrapped cum CLF 
       95% Confidence interval  95% Confidence interval 
Parameter Estimate SE 
SE-
SE 
Mean Bias 
SE-
Bias 
Lower Upper P Range Estimate Lower Upper P Range 
Structural a4 .560 .052 .003 .562 .002 .004 .454 .648 .01 .194 .574 .458 .669 .01 .211 
EliminateCoI a21 .395 .065 .003 .407 .012 .005 .294 .545 .01 .251 .390 .311 .555 .01 .244 
IPFPSB a19 .642 .062 .003 .648 .006 .004 .516 .760 .01 .244 .623 .501 .834 .01 .333 
Profession a18 .665 .069 .003 .668 .003 .005 .542 .801 .01 .259 .694 .554 .833 .01 .279 
Independence a17 .550 .069 .003 .564 .014 .005 .426 .691 .01 .265 .541 .417 .693 .01 .276 
Trust a16 .736 .060 .003 .735 0 .004 .609 .847 .01 .238 .754 .588 .902 .01 .314 
Cognitive a14 .314 .054 .003 .324 .010 .004 .220 .431 .01 .211 .502 .322 .752 .01 .430 
Personal a13 .388 .049 .002 .393 .005 .003 .286 .487 .01 .201 .463 .335 .669 .01 .334 
Procedural a11 .690 .051 .003 .688 -.001 .004 .586 .782 .01 .196 .687 .576 .784 .01 .208 
Consequential a10 .766 .045 .002 .762 -.005 .003 .668 .838 .01 .170 .768 .663 .851 .01 .188 
Regulative a9 .628 .046 .002 .627 -.002 .003 .538 .722 .01 .184 .628 .530 .728 .01 .198 
CompAct a8 .490 .055 .003 .490 0 .004 .384 .596 .01 .212 .494 .398 .625 .01 .227 
FiducAct a7 .826 .029 .001 .824 -.002 .002 .759 .878 .01 .119 .839 .775 .898 .01 .123 
CoIAct a6 .691 .048 .002 .695 .004 .003 .596 .783 .01 .187 .688 .607 .791 .01 .184 
AlignAct a5 .781 .035 .002 .779 -.001 .002 .697 .852 .01 .155 .783 .707 .856 .01 .149 
BestRev a3 .138 .078 .004 .126 -.012 .005 .011 .348 .01 .337 .143 .025 .350 .01 .325 
Simult a2 .470 .773 .039 .588 .118 .055 .098 1.598 .01 1.500 .481 .245 2.173 .01 1.928 
Dual a1 .343 .294 .015 .425 .082 .021 .054 1.282 .01 1.228 .448 .099 .812 .02 .713 
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CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT 
AFSL-AR LICENSING REGIME AND THE 
EXISTING LICENSEE-ADVISER 
RELATIONSHIP 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Once the thresholds of the most important goodness of fit indices were met, the next step was 
to identify, explain and/or remedy any bias in the data, run the final bootstrapped maximum 
likelihood estimation ex and cum CLF, and proceed with interpreting the results. Thus, this 
chapter homes in on the major quantitative results114 within the context of some of the key 
qualitative115 results to address the four investigative questions, which served to answer the 
main research question. It will be evident in the foregoing analysis; the current AFSL-AR 
licensing model is significantly illegitimate.   
6.2 OVERALL RESULTS OF THE AFSL-AR LICENSING MODEL 
Accordingly, in the CFA models, depicted in Figure 6.1 below, all the estimated bootstrapped 
standardised regression weights in the respecified model are highly significant, except factor 
𝑏1 adviser dual-agency role. The critical ratios of all the unstandardised factor loadings far 
exceeded the threshold critical values of 1.96 [alpha .05] or 1.65 [alpha .01] or 2.58 [alpha 
.001], displayed in Tables 6.1 to 6.5 below. The correlation coefficients were highly significant, 
except those between 𝑏1 [dual-agency] and 𝑏4  [individual licensing] cum CLF model [Figure 
6.1]. However, this exception was interpreted with caution, its insignificant p = .079 value is 
good news. Advisers cannot be dual agents, while concurrently being licensed via a single 
independent professional financial planning standards board. Overall, the results indicated, all 
the theories in this model were useful in evaluating the licensee-adviser licensing’s legitimacy. 
Although not ideal, the negative covariance for factor 𝑏3  [legitimacy] indicated 
overestimations of the relationships between its indicators. These relationships were retained, 
because as discussed in Chapter 5 they were central to the model. 
                                                 
114 Recall, we give priority to the quantitative results, while merely using the qualitative results to understand 
and interpret the quantitative results. 
115 Please note concerning the qualitative results, the thesis reports the actual words of the participants in italics 
within double quotation marks when combining the qualitative results with the quantitative results. In 
addition, to maintain the integrity of the comments, corrections to the respondents’ typographical and 
grammatical errors did not happen. 
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z = 3.346  
p = *** 
 ex CLF 
 
z = 1.758  
p = .079 
 cum CLF 
Insignific
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Significa
nt 
 
Figure 6.1 Confirmatory factor analysis model standardised regression weights after bootstrapped MLE ex and cum CLF 
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Graph 6.1 Respondents’mean level of agreement with 95% confidence interval
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Furthermore, from Table 28 in the Appendix 6.1 and Graph 6.1 above, visibly the mean values 
indicated the extent of the level of agreement was close to undecided [a neutral value of 50 per 
cent] for (1) Regulative illegitimacy [𝑎9] with a mean level of agreement of 48 per cent, (2) 
CompAct [𝑎8] with mean of 51 per cent and (3) EliminateCoI [𝑎21] with mean of 52 per cent. 
Whereas the highest mean level of agreement of 78 per cent for both BestRev [𝑎3] and Personal 
illegitimacy [𝑎13] indicated advisers strongly agree they earn revenues for licensee, while 
serving their best interest duty, while their leaders of aligned licensees focus to protect product 
distribution. Four variables scored a mean level above 70 per cent, namely Dual [𝑎1], BestRev 
[𝑎3], Structural illegitimacy [𝑎4] and Personal illegitimacy [𝑎13]. Interestingly, the mean level 
of agreement above 50 per cent, but below 60 per cent, included FiducAct [𝑎7], CompAct [𝑎8] 
and EliminateCoI [𝑎21]. Apart from EliminateCoI [𝑎21], Simult [𝑎2], AlignAct [𝑎5], CoIAct 
[𝑎6], Consequential [𝑎4], Procedural [𝑎11], Cultural-cognitive [𝑎14], while the rest of the 
indicators for the factor individual licensing [𝑏4] had mean values between 60 per cent and 70 
per cent. From Graph 6.1 above, noticeably the mean scores of the indicators for individual 
licensing factor [𝑏4] were consistent. Overall, the bootstrap 95 per cent confidence intervals 
were narrow in range and had CI p-values of .01 for all the estimates. For instance, the smallest 
value for the 95 per cent CI 6.962 for indicator Dual [𝑎1].  Whilst the largest range value 
amounted to 9.821 for indicator AlignAct [𝑎5]. 
Table 6. 1 Structural part of the conceptualised theoretical model 
Outcome Parameter 
Evidence 
β; SE [95% CI] CR p-value [ex CLF] 
β; CR p-value [cum CLF] 
Dual-agency role and the 
legitimacy of the current licensing 
model are significantly correlated. 
𝑏1<>𝑏3  
.387 .102 [.112, .503] 3.326 p = *** [ex CLF] 
.257; 3.134 p = .002 [cum CLF] 
Illegitimacy of the current 
licensing model and the individual 
licensing model is significantly 
correlated. 
𝑏3<> 𝑏4  
.45 .061 [.335, .571] 6.067 p = *** [ex CLF]  
.786; 5.892 p = *** [cum CLF] 
No significant correlation 
between dual-agency role and 
individual licensing 
𝑏1<> 𝑏4 
 
.295 .128 [.016, .504] 3.346 p = *** [ex CLF] 
.267; 1.758 p = .079 [cum CLF] 
Correlation (β) Standard error (SE) CI [Confidence interval] Critical ratio (CR)  
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Figure 6.2 Structural part of the model a priori model and the finalised model with their 
correlation estimates 
 
Furthermore, the structural part as conceptualised in Chapter 4, depicted on the left in Figure 
6.2, ended up looking like the structural path on the right with its bootstrapped maximum 
likelihood estimates. Recall the indicators of factor 𝑏2 was merged into 𝑏3, thus the beta [β] 
estimates between 𝑏1and 𝑏2, 𝑏2 and 𝑏3, as well as 𝑏2 and 𝑏4 were lost. Thus, leaving β’s 
between 𝑏1and 𝑏4, 𝑏1 and 𝑏3, as well as 𝑏3 and 𝑏4 in the respecified CFA model of Figure 6.1 
in this chapter. From Table 6.1 above, there is no significant relationship between 𝑏1 and 𝑏4 
after adding the CLF. The dual-agency role [𝑏1] and individual licensing [𝑏4] relationship was 
insignificant at the p<.05 level scoring a p-value of .079. Thus, this relationship was discarded 
in the final structural part of the model 
  
 
β1 =.387 p = *** [ex CLF] 
β1 = .257 p = .002 [cum CLF] 
 
β3 = .450 p = *** [ex CLF] 
β3 = .786 p = *** [cum CLF] 
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Table 6.2 Summary of findings for adviser dual-agency role [𝐛𝟏] 
Q1: To what extent do financial advisers agree licensing via third-party licensees creates a dual-agency role, whereby they serve the commercial 
interests of licensees and the best interests of clients simultaneously, leading to conflict of interest from association? 
H1: Financial advisers on the ASIC Adviser Register significantly agree licensing via third-party licensees creates a dual-agency role, whereby they 
serve the commercial interests of licensees and the best interests of clients simultaneously, as specified in the Act, which leads to conflict of 
interest from association. 
PAR LITERATURE REVIEW                                               SUB-HYPOTHESES SUPPORTED EMPIRICAL TEST 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
λ SE [95% CI] CR p-value (ex CLF) 
λ CR p-value (cum CLF) 
 M [95% CI] MSE CR p-value 
a1 
Licensee-adviser (Gor 
2005; Smith & Walter 
2001) and   adviser-client 
relationship (Corones & 
Galloway 2013). 
H1 (a): Financial advisers significantly 
agree advisers authorised via third-party 
licensees face a dual-agency role, namely 
an adviser-licensee relationship and an 
adviser-client relationship. 
Advisers authorised through 
third-party licensees face a 
dual-agency relationship, 
namely an adviser-licensee 
relationship and an adviser-
client relationship. 
.585 .215 [.232, 1.132] 3.256 p = 
.001 .604; 2.676 p = .007                            
77 [73, 80] 1.912 40.266 p = *** 
a2 
Advisers serve the interests 
of licensees & clients, 
simultaneously (Kingston 
& Weng 2014). 
H1 (b):  Financial advisers significantly 
agree licensing advisers through third-
party licensees, results in advisers serving 
the interests of their clients and 
licensees, simultaneously. 
Licensing advisers through 
third-party licensees results 
in advisers serving the 
interests of their clients and 
licensees, simultaneously. 
.686 .280 [.313, 1.264] marker p = 
*** .689 marker p = ***                            
62 [57, 66] 2.188 28.234 p = *** 
a3 
Dual role creates conflicts 
of interest (Kingston & 
Weng 2014). 
H1 (c): Financial advisers significantly 
agree while serving the best interests of 
their clients, advisers also generate 
revenue for their licensees. 
While serving the best 
interest of their clients, 
advisers also generate 
revenue for their licensees. 
.372 .109 [.103, .59] 3.555 p = ***   
.375; 3.642 p = ***                              
78 [75, 82] 1.767 44.416 p = *** 
Parameter (Par) Question (Q) Hypothesis (H) Standardised regression weight (λ) Standard error (SE) Critical ratio (CR) Mean (M) Mean standard error (MSE)  
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From the foregoing Tables 6.1 and subsequent Tables 6.2 to 6.5116, empirically all the 
investigative questions hypotheses and their sub-hypotheses were supported. Consequently, a 
synopsis of the overall finalised model’s statistical results and hypotheses tests attests overall 
advisers support the notion licensing advisers via multiple third-party licensees creates a dual-
agency role. They also claimed licensing advisers via third parties is inconsistent with four of 
the objectives of the Act. Linked to the objectives advisers confirmed the current licensing 
model lacks legitimacy based on Suchman’s theoretical legitimacy framework. Not only does 
this illegitimacy of the AFSL-AR licensing model strengthen arguments for individual 
licensing through a single independent professional body, like other professions, but also 
advisers seem to support this latter concept. In sequence of the theoretical model discussed in 
the literature review, a more detailed account of these overall findings is presented.  
6.3 DUAL-AGENCY ROLE UNCERTAINTY 
Summarised in Table 6.2 above, mean [Table 28 in Appendix 6.1] agreement levels distributed 
from 62 per cent to 78 per cent confirmed the prevailing licensing model created a dual-agency 
role between licensee-adviser (Smith & Walter 2001; Gor 2005) and adviser-client (Corones 
& Galloway 2013). Additionally, results confirmed Kingston and Weng’s (2014) claim, 
serving both principals simultaneously leads to conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the moderate 
standardised regression weights [Table 5.17], substantiate mixed perceptions, which meant 
uncertainty is evident among respondents when reflecting on the licensee-adviser-client agency 
role. This mixed response reflected in the commentary informants offered. However, when 
evaluating these results in conjunction with the results of unavoidable conflict of interest from 
association in Table 6.3 below and structural illegitimacy in Table 6.4 below, it was clear 
advisers do perceive licensing advisers via third-party licensees leads to a conflict of interest 
from association. Interestingly, the moderate SE for predictor dual-agency role, differed from 
the SE magnitudes of the indicators for factors  𝑏3 and 𝑏4 in the model. Based on the comments 
                                                 
116 Please note the first column of Tables 6.2 to 6.5 refers to the parameter, while the second column describes 
normative theory, followed in column three by the hypotheses. In column four we provide the statistical 
empirical test and column five the evidence as follows:  
Column 5 Row 1: the bootstrapped standardised regression weights [RW], their standard errors [SE] 95% 
confidence intervals [95% CI] critical ratios or z-values [CR] with significant p-values ex CLF, 
Column 5 Row 2: the bootstrapped [RW] critical ratios or z-values [CR]  and p-values cum CLF 
Column 5 Row 3: the advisers’ mean agreement level, mean 95% CI and mean standard errors [MSE] with 
critical ratios or z-values [CR] and significant p-values.   
 
331 
 
by survey respondents, their view of their role compared to what the theory implied, and the 
law intended differed significantly.  This is explained further by evaluating each indicator. 
6.3.1 Licensee-adviser and adviser-client relationship issues 
Although advisers agreed with high cum CLF, mean level of agreement of 77 per cent [73 per 
cent, 80 per cent], the moderate cum CLF regression weight of .604 in Table 6.2 above tells us 
a licensee-adviser and adviser-client agency relationships exists. However, their dual-agency 
role is definitively unclear in practice for advisers compared to perhaps what the legislation 
intended, and financial planning literature describes.  
Empirically advisers in practice considered the legal adviser-licensee relationship as 
unimportant or a “purely legal, compliance related” definition. In their view for “almost all 
advisers...their responsibility is to their clients.” The empirical results also revealed agency 
theory, models and propositions produced in textbooks of personal financial planning in 
Australia (for example, Beal & McKeown 2009; Banister et al. 2013) were mainly incorporated 
into the client-adviser relationship. “The real agency is with the client. The relationship with 
the third-party licensee is one of a service provided,” because “the client relationship is distinct 
from and trumps the Licensee relationship in all cases.”   
Seemingly, the “Best Interest Duty overrides the dual agency relationship, as the adviser is left 
in no doubt about the fact his fiduciary duties are to the adviser-client relationship.” However, 
this matter is complicated, because the evidence suggests: “It depends on who you are licensed 
with. An adviser who is licensee of a bank or a specific dealer group that does not have a wide 
authorised product list do have a dual agency relationship and tend to be limited on the product 
offerings...if the licensee is unaligned then the dual agency is not relevant. If the licensee is 
aligned with a product provider, then there is a stronger relationship with the product 
provider.”  
Apparently, advisers are “...bound by the licensee rules and regulations,” whereas licensees 
are merely seen “as a servant/tool,” “supplying compliance, audit and PD training”, “relevant 
legislation; education” and “assesses the products available in the market.” These last points 
of view were more evident among the non-aligned and s923A independent advisers. Also, 
evident in the commentary of respondents there are both direct and indirect licensee-client 
relationships affecting the adviser-client and the licensee-adviser relationship. 
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6.3.2 Advisers serve licensees and clients simultaneously 
Although advisers seem to agree, they are “...TRYING to serve the interests of both parties, in 
practice it is often one or the other.” Thus, with a mean of 12 per cent above the neutral 
agreement level of 50 per cent, together with a moderately high cum CLF effect size of .689, 
licensing advisers through third-party licensees results in advisers serving the interests of their 
clients and licensees, simultaneously (Kingston & Weng 2014, p. 294). “One eye is forward 
towards our clients (best interests) and one eye in the rear-view mirror, as we get audited and 
queried on both sides. The AFSL restricts for example the products we can recommend,” 
according to one commentator.  
Yet, when the investigator considered the squared multiple correlation value of .481 [.245, 
2.173], which indicated how much this indicator is explained by the factor dual-agency role 
detectably 52 per cent is unexplained by the dual-agency role.  There are other issues at play 
as per the comments of survey respondents. For instance, “Irrespective of my Licensee and 
their alignment to a parent company, I have always served the interest of my client first and 
foremost. The interest of my licensee does not even come in to it.” A sentiment expressed by 
several advisers. “We are clients of the licensee and so they have to service me although I have 
to abide by their rules as they are responsible for the advice that I give.” Following the “rules” 
of the licensees was a term used by several informants. “Serving the interests of clients is the 
only consideration for advisers. Licensees provide tools and services to advisers to assist them 
to best serve the interests of their clients.”  
Once again, advisers point to the best interest duty having changed the relationship between 
licensee-adviser from advisers as agent acting on behalf of licensees to advisers being serviced 
by licensees. Combine some of the adviser comments here with the results from asking the 
question to survey respondents: ‘What are the benefits to institutional licensees appointing, 
authorising and supervising authorised representatives?’ Control product distribution, in Table 
30 in Appendix 6.3 below, seems a key agenda issue for licensees. Although, advisers “Should 
always serve their clients. however licensees have there own agenda depending who they are 
aligned to.”  
Predominant sentiments indicated simultaneously serving licensees’ and clients’ interest is 
evident “where the third party licensee is also a product provider and/or has financial 
relationships with product providers to promote to the authorised representative. Where the 
licensee is itself independent and operates in the interests of clients then the relationship is 
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much different.” Thus, serving both parties simultaneously “depends on whether the licensee 
is independent or not.” Furthermore, “it is possible to have a conflicted / product aligned AFSL 
and still give good advice from a limited solution set, provided, the products meet a certain 
quality or performance standard. However, my experience is that there remains an expectation 
from employer/AFSLs for an internal product bias.” Serving the interests of the licensee 
“depend on the extend of the control exerted by the Licensee.” Threats made to advisers by 
licensees of “Do what the AFSL says or lose your job.” While others argued, the quality of 
advice is adversely influenced by remuneration conflicts. “The power of the licensee completely 
overwhelms the best interests of the client. With live computerised reviews the licensee is now 
more closely monitoring to ensure advise is provided in the nest commercial interests of the 
licensee.” Furthermore, remuneration models are also key, because “this would not be the case 
should the FA be with a non-aligned licensee and pays a fixed flat fee to the licensee. In other 
words, no commissions or percentage based fee income.” Additionally, listed public companies 
versus private companies is also another matter to consider with regards to serving licensees 
interest according to one respondent: “if licensee is a member of a dealer group that is an 
organisation listed on the stock exchange, then the there is a greater probability that the 
adviser will be working in the interests of the licensee and hence shareholde Privately run 
dealer groups may be less inclinded to do the above and cover costs only. Hence serve clients 
interests more.” “Totally serving interests of clients BUT within guidelines,” of licensees 
dictated to by the Act. Notwithstanding, “Where licencees are product providers there is an 
inherent conflict of interest. This is generally played out in the Approved Product LIst which 
limits products that may be appropriate. Advice is also limited to the level of risk a licencee is 
prepared to accept.” For some serving the interests of the licensee and client simultaneously, 
“sometimes confuses” and makes for "a bad model”, because it “reduce the quality of advice.” 
Interestingly, included in the types of licensee interests articulated by some advisers were 
“compliance interests,” “reporting” and “commercial interests of the licensee,” or in other 
words “to make money.” This is further confirmed from the detailed description of the 
comments, in Appendix 6.3 and further summarised in Table 30 in Appendix 6.3, when 
considering the benefits AFS licensees derive by licensing advisers. 
6.3.3 Tension between licensees’ revenues and clients’ best interest 
Despite scoring jointly with personal illegitimacy [a13] the overall highest mean level of 
agreement of 78 per cent [75 per cent, 82 per cent], the regression weights of .375 and the 
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squared multiple correlation, measuring the reliability of the responses, of .143 [.025, .35] were 
the lowest compared to all the other indicators in the CFA model. Further investigation of the 
qualitative data revealed earning revenues for the licensees, while serving clients best interests 
was a difficult conundrum for the advisers. In their commentary licensee revenues was 
something they chose not to think about or want to think about. Based on the emotional 
responses of some, it is clear this topic was confronting and difficult for several advisers to 
reflect upon.  
The most interesting quantitative combined with the qualitative results was the low squared 
multiple correlation values for hypothesis H1 (c) [.138 ex CLF and .143 cum CLF in Table 25 
Appendix 5.25] reflecting the discomfort to openly address this issue of licensee revenues. Yet 
the 0.9999 observed statistical power confirmed its statistical significance, especially as 
“commercial interests of the licensee” “to make money” ranked in the top three benefits 
advisers felt licensees received by authorising them as recorded in Table 30 [Appendix 6.3]. 
Some advisers even presented nonsensical qualitative data to deflect or avoid committing an 
opinion when reflecting on the survey question: ‘What are the benefits to licensees appointing, 
authorising and regulating ‘authorised representatives’?’  
Combining the findings of this question with informants’ comments explained the reasons for 
this low reliability in conjunction with its moderate effect size. From the qualitative evidence, 
advisers’ explanation points to oblivion, ignorance, conflict, emotionality, myopia, lack of 
interest, notwithstanding even discomfort when they were asked about licensees’ benefits. 
Unexpectedly, for some advisers, “The revenue of the licensee is never a consideration.” 
Whereas for others, “Licencees are in the business of making money.” However, “this must be 
done transparently with the client, so that they understand the services they're paying for.” Not 
everyone agrees that “it is a compulsory part of the process that advisers generate revenue for 
licensees as licensees can be the only party that legally collects revenue and therefore they are 
empowered to deduct their fees with or without adviser permission.” “Without the Planner the 
Dealer group gets no revenue,” because how and whether advisers generate revenue for 
licensees, “depends on the licencee model, flat fee or percentage of revenue”, “on the product 
sold, or any dealer split of fees charged for advice”, “product and platform fees from the 
companies” and/or whether the “dealership gets volume rebates if we use thier products,” 
notwithstanding “how they charge advisers to use their services.” If a licensee charges a flat 
fee, then “the licensee income is not tied to income generated by the adviser.”  
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Table 6.3 Summary of findings for objectives of the Act [b2] 
Q2: To what extent do financial advisers perceive the current ‘authorised representative’ licensing model achieve four objectives of the Act? 
H2: Financial advisers on the ASIC Adviser Register significantly agree the current ‘authorised representative’ licensing model does not achieve the four 
identified objectives of the Act. 
PAR LITERATURE REVIEW SUB-HYPOTHESIS SUPPORTED EMPIRICAL TEST 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
λ SE [95% CI] CR p-value (ex CLF) 
λ CR p-value (cum CLF) 
M [95% CI] MSE CR p-value 
a5 
Encourage aligning advisers’ 
interests with their clients’ 
best interest (Goedecke 2001) 
H2 (a): Financial advisers 
significantly agree the current 
‘authorised representative’ licensing 
model, as specified in the Act, makes 
it difficult for advisers to align their 
interests with the best interests of the 
client. 
Licensing advisers through aligned 
licensees sometimes makes it 
difficult for these advisers to 
align their interests with the best 
interests of their clients.   
.884 .020 [.835, .923] 22.309 p = ***          
   .810, 19.14 p = ***                                            
60 [55, 65] 2.363 25.528 p = ***  
a6 
Manage, control or avoid 
conflicts of interest (Tuch 
2005; Pearson 2006; 
Schwarcz 2009; Valentine 
2008, 2013) 
H2 (b): Financial advisers 
significantly agree the current 
‘authorised representative’ licensing 
model, as specified in the Act, results 
in conflict of interest from association 
because they are affiliated to product 
issuers. 
Advisers authorised through aligned 
licensees face unavoidable conflict 
of interest from association by 
being affiliated to product issuers. 
.831 .029 [.766, .884] 19.169p = ***                 
.773, 15.101.169 p = ***                                           
65 [61, 69] 2.315 28.137 p = ***  
a7 
Ensure compliance of the 
statutory fiduciary duty 
(Banister et al. 2013; 
Bateman & Kingston 2014) 
H2 (c): Financial advisers 
significantly agree the current 
‘authorised representative’ licensing 
model, as specified in the Act may 
lead to unintentional breaches of 
advisers’ statutory fiduciary duty 
obligations. 
Licensing advisers through aligned 
licensees puts their advisers at 
greater risk of unintentionally 
breaching their best interest duty 
obligations to clients due to their 
close affiliation to product issuers. 
.909 .016 [.871, .937] marker p = ***               
.821, marker p = ***                                            
59 [54, 63] 2.288 25.717 p = ***  
336 
 
a8 
Promote competitive 
behaviour between financial 
service providers (Steen, 
McGrath and Wong 2016)  
H2 (d): Financial advisers 
significantly agree that the current 
‘authorised representative’ licensing 
model limits fair competition within 
the financial planning sector. 
Licensing advisers through aligned 
licensees limits advisers from 
competing on a level playing field 
within the industry.  
.700 .039 [.62, .772] 12.815 p = ***               
.679, 9.162 p = ***                                            
51 [47, 55] 2.303 22.267 p = ***  
Parameter (Par) Question (Q) Hypothesis (H) Standardised regression weight (λ) Standard error (SE) Critical ratio (CR) Mean (M) Mean standard error (MSE)  
 
Table 6.4 Summary of findings for Suchman's legitimacy criteria [b3] 
Q3: To what extent do financial advisers agree the current Australian Financial Services licensee-authorised representative licensing model is legitimate based on the 
criteria of Suchman’s theoretical legitimacy framework? 
H3: Financial advisers registered on the ASIC Adviser Register significantly agree the current Australian Financial Services licensee-authorised representative licensing 
model is illegitimate based on the criteria of Suchman’s (1995) theoretical legitimacy framework.  
 PAR LITERATURE REVIEW SUB-HYPOTHESIS EMPIRICAL TEST 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
λ SE [95% CI] CR p-value (ex CLF) 
λ CR p-value (cum CLF) 
M [95% CI] MSE CR p-value 
a9 
Perception of compliance with 
laws operating within some 
socially acceptable system 
(Suchman 1995).                                                                                                                                                                              
H3 (a): Financial advisers 
significantly agree the current 
licensee-adviser licensing model 
does not have regulative 
legitimacy. 
Licensing advisers via aligned licensees can 
lead to unintentional compliance breaches by 
their advisers, because of their affiliation to 
product issuers (Bitekline 2011; Chelli et al., 
2014). 
.793 .029 [.734, .850] 17.456 p = ***             
.727, 15.207 p = ***                                            
48 [43, 52] 2.337 20.365p = *** 
a10 
Acceptable specified ethics of 
socially value outputs/ outcomes 
(Suchman 1995).              
H3 (b): Financial advisers 
significantly agree the current 
licensee-adviser licensing model 
does not have consequential 
normative legitimacy. 
Licensing advisers via aligned licensees leads 
to the commercial interests of these aligned 
licensees compromising their advisers' best 
interest duty obligations (Smith 2009, p.62; 
Pain, 2013; Moran 2014; Maclean & Behnam 
2010). 
.875 .026 [.817, .916] 21.607 p = ***           
.794, 19.416 p = ***                                            
63 [59, 58] 2.264 28.111p = *** 
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a11 
Perception of socially acceptable 
practices, standards & procedures 
(Suchman 1995). 
H3 (c): Financial advisers 
significantly agree the current 
licensee-adviser licensing model 
does not have procedural 
normative legitimacy. 
Licensing advisers via aligned licensees 
sometimes results in sales policies, procedures, 
and practices designed by licensees to give the 
appearance [window dressing] of complying 
with the regulatory requirements (Valentine & 
Hollingworth 2015; Valentine 2013; Newnham 
2012; Sampson 2010; West 2009). 
.831 .031 [.766, .884] 19.901 p = ***           
.781, 13.844 p = ***                                            
61 [56, 66] 2.356 25.956 p = *** 
a4 
Adopting acceptable formal 
structures acceptable to society 
(Suchman 1995). 
H3 (d): Financial advisers 
significantly agree the current 
licensee-adviser licensing model 
does not have structural 
normative legitimacy.  
Licensing advisers via aligned licensees results 
in conflict of interest from association (Steen, 
McGrath and Wong 2016; Valentine 2013; 
Smith 2009, p. 317; PJC on Corps & Fin. Sers. 
2009). 
.748 .035 [.674, .805] 15.771 p = ***           
.740, 9.073 p = ***                                            
75 [70, 78] 2.041 36.477 p = *** 
a13 
Perception of acceptable leader's 
role to exert personal influence to 
dismantle/create existing/new 
entities (Suchman 1995; Goretzki 
et al. 2013; Carnegie & 
O’Connell 2012).                                             
H3 (e): Financial advisers 
significantly agree the current 
licensee-adviser licensing model 
does not have personal 
normative legitimacy. 
Contributions by specific individual leaders of 
aligned licensees to the debate with government 
surrounding the licensing of advisers are aimed 
to protect their product distribution channels 
(Bird &Gilligan 2015; Sampson 2010). 
.623 .039 [.535, .698] 11.698 p = ***             
.679, 5.193 p = ***                                            
78 [75, 82] 1.797 43.594 p = *** 
a14 
Perception of a shared 
understanding of actors' identity, 
role and performance to 
perpetuate an institutional order 
based on cognition or awareness 
(Santana 2012; Kury 2007; Meyer 
2007; Suchman 1995; 
Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002, p. 
420; Scott 2014a).                                                                                                                                                                    
H3 (f): Financial advisers 
significantly agree the current 
licensee-adviser licensing model 
does not have cultural-cognitive 
legitimacy. 
Licensing advisers via third-party licensees is 
one of the reasons why the Australian public 
cannot clearly distinguish between advisers 
who provide independent advice (as defined by 
s923A of the Commonwealth Corporations Act 
2001) and those who provide advice may be 
conflicted by product bias (Morris, 2013).  
.560 .047 [.469, .657] 10.186 p = ***           
.682, 3.817 p = ***                                             
62 [58, 66] 2.268 27.401 p = *** 
Parameter (Par) Question (Q) Hypothesis (H) Standardised regression weight (λ) Standard error (SE) Critical ratio (CR) Mean (M) Mean standard error (MSE)  
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“Some dealer groups aim to cover costs only.” “My licencee takes less than 2% of the income 
I generate.”  Thus, “overall most licences do not make a substantial profit, it is more to 
complement other services and other benefits of having distribution.” For example, they “make 
money out of providing the services like compliance, research, software, that they get cheaper 
than an individual planner can get it.” “The majority of licencees though do expect their 
advisers to generate revenue through” “preferred product lines.” “And that's the conflict.” 
Surprisingly, despite compliance requirements, the revenues earned by their licensees is non-
transparent “marginal revenue for any product placement (information to which I am not privy) 
depends on what we actually do.” 
6.4 INFRINGEMENTS OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ACT 
With overall moderate cum CLF mean levels of agreement, strong squared multiple 
correlations [reliability] and standardised regression weights, the current licensing model is 
perceived as failing to achieve the four objectives of the Act. Evident from the results of the 
indicators for the factor objectives of the Act 𝑏2 in Table 6.3 above were high reliability, 
because the squared multiple correlations were high [Appendix 5.25, Table 25]. Licensing 
advisers via third-party licensees makes aligning adviser-client’s interests, eliminating conflict 
of interest from association, non-violations of the statutory best interest duty, and fair 
competition, challenging. Based on scoring the overall highest squared multiple correlation 
values [.826 ex CLF and .839 cum CLF], as tabled in Appendix 5.25, Table 25, and overall 
highest regression weight [.909 ex CLF and .821 cum CLF] in Table 6.3, a key finding in this 
research was advisers claimed unintentional [including “intentional”] best interest duty 
contraventions were the key variable delegitimising the licensee-adviser licensing model. The 
second highest overall estimate was the misalignment of adviser-client interests evident under 
the present licensing regime.  
6.4.1 Unintentional breaches of the best interest duty 
Advisers agree at a 59 per cent [54 per cent, 63 per cent] mean level of agreement, a strong 
regression weight of .821 in Table 6.3 and the highest overall  reliability score [r2] of 83.90 per 
cent [77.50 per cent, 89.80 per cent] [Appendix 5.25 Table 25], licensing advisers through 
aligned licensees  puts their advisers at greater risk of unintentionally [and in some instances 
“intentionally”] breaching their best interest duty obligations. Although, “Best Interest Duty 
should override these conflicts. Great in theory, but not always implemented in practice.”  
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Furthermore, although licensees manage conflicts of interest, qualitative data indicated 
otherwise, because “aligned dealer groups spend most of their money working out ways to 
legally argue that their advisers are not at risk, or that they are satisfying best interest. their 
SoAs are littered with statements to this effect and are fairly standard to all their clients, 
regardless of how different the circumstances.” Even though the “Licensee has rigorous 
standards and an uncompromising audit regime,” compliance “is all about protecting the 
licensee and adds no value to the client. It also adds cost and complexity, so the adviser and 
client lose out.”  
Allegedly, “aligned licensees have a business model that deliberately breaches the best interest 
duty obligations. It is not the advisers that breach the obligations it is the licensee.” If “an 
organisation has a poor culture, then this could occur.” With regards culture “pressure from 
BDM's may influence new advisers.” Especially, aligned licensees “pressure the Planners to 
sell products.” This is a problem. “When there is pressure to use a particular product there is 
a much higher risk of breaching best interest duty.”  “The major banks have the greatest 
influence as their advisers are also employees and if they do not achieve targets their job is in 
jeopardy.” Advisers face ethical dilemmas, based on “examples where aligned advisers by 
direct employment have had their employment directly and repeatedly threatened if they did 
not put the employers interest first and only.” Seemingly, advisers are powerless in some 
instances to prevent infringements of the best interest duty when licensed via third parties.  
Additionally, an unlimited APL may also not necessarily be the answer, because “the 
practicality of relatively small 'non aligned' businesses being capable of representing the full 
universe of investment options…can be misleading as well. Finite resources often demand that 
independent advisers narrow their focus to 'favourites!”  Also, evident when advisers are faced 
with one-off approval applications, “it just makes their business inefficient by having to apply 
for one off approval.”  Whereas others denies affiliation to product issuers results in 
unintentional best interest duty. “There is clarity around what is required to meet the best 
interest duty and if a licensee has structured their business in a way that the adviser is unable 
to meet this standard advisers will exit and that licensee's business will fail.” This issue of best 
interest duty is a thorny matter, because “this depends more on the processes they have to 
follow in making their recommendations - rather than the affiliation. For example, it depends 
more on the wording in the Statement of Advice and whether they have the freedom to alter the 
words and therefore the intent. To some degree they are limited by the products they can offer.”  
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If this issue of serving the best interest of their clients is considered in combination with the 
qualitative results from the question asking advisers if they ever prepare SOAs without product 
recommendations, then it is clear most of the respondents [77 per cent] do not always make 
product recommendations in every SOA. Sometimes they provide only strategic advice. More 
details about this issue can be found in Appendix 6.4 below.  A solution proposed “to act in 
the clients best interests is via an Independent (as defined by the Act) AFSL.” “The product 
makers should be separate from the product sellers.”  
6.4.2 Misalignment of adviser-client interests 
Advisers agree at a mean level of 60 per cent [55 per cent, 65 per cent] agreement, with strong 
r2 of .783 [.707, .856] and effect size in the regression weight .810 [Table 6.3], licensing 
advisers through aligned licensees “sometimes,” if not “in most cases” made it difficult to align 
adviser-client interests. With the second highest r2 and regression weight overall, it was clear 
transgression of this objective is the second highest reason delegitimising licensing advisers 
via third parties.  
Apparent, “it is more the licensee that has the conflict rather than the planner. The licensee 
has no relationship with the client and only with the planner so the relationship is driven by 
money.” Although, it seems the “ethics of the adviser will determine this.” To the contrary, 
misalignment results in “even for the most ethical advisers trying to fit a client into one of the 
aligned products.”  Whereas another did not think it was that simple: “There are many levels 
to this. They all have aligned AFSL's that place AR's somewhere from almost independent to 
tightly limited. Best Interests applies to everyone equally. The only difference is the Approved 
Product List and level of authorisation.”  
The success of aligning adviser-client interests “depends on their model of business”. For 
instance, “major banks and not so much AMP”, were cited as the main culprits of causing this 
misalignment. Misalignment of interests depended “on the licensee. AMP has a very open 
APSL and has had for many years, whereas I don't think a bank aligned planner would write 
non bank alined products. Very common for an AMP planner to be advising on industry / 
external funds from the AMP group.” Thus, advisers confirmed declarations by Goedecke 
(2001), Australian “major banks” are the main culprits. “Having worked for NAB, I would say 
in general that it is extremely difficult for these advisers to align their interests with the best 
interests of the client.”  “The Bank aligned practices would be 100%. I was offered MLC/ NAB 
and the terms are pretty bad.” “Bank advisers would certainly have incentives to recommend 
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their own products.” “The banks talk about putting clients first, but all procedures are designed 
to put themselves first.” “Especially when you have sat in a room and heard a distribution 
manager plead with advisers to support the upstream owner's product to ensure the 
continuation of the dealer group without any reference to best interest.” 
Furthermore, there “is a difference between an employee adviser and a licensee adviser.” “It 
depends because if they are in house, then they have to be employees. However, if they own 
their own practices, even though they are licensed through AMP, they try to provide best advice 
to their clients - usually these FPs are fee for service.”  Despite the legislation dealing with 
conflicts of interest from remuneration between licensee and adviser, seemingly remuneration 
models continue to influence advisers based on the claim, it is “All about how the advisers are 
remunerated / incentivized.” Specifically, the licensee-adviser relationship is “driven by 
money”, by a “'Share of wallet' and 'sales' culture proven to be a conflict”, which arises from 
ownership structures. 
“The pressures within aligned licensees to use the 'in-house' product is very high, and bonuses 
are often predicated upon certain percentages of 'in-house' products being utilised.” However, 
uncertainty concerning this matter of sales pressure is prevalent. There are claims advisers “do 
not know what other licencees do, but my licensee places no pressure or suggestions to use 
aligned products. From what I have read I believe this may be an issue with some.” In other 
instances, instead of remuneration incentives, “Advisers are KPI to write the aligned product.” 
“Whilst some aligned licensees have removed sales/ income targets for their FAs, the FA is still 
captured under a 'performance review' which determines their employment.” “The pressure is 
always there to get the sale as this is how the Bank makes its' money. ( This is from experience 
- not heresay). The banks like it when their employees have personal debt and are hungry to 
"write the business". Making a no action recommendation to the client does not pay, and in 
fact costs money if you have to write an SOA.”  
Disturbing is advisers are encouraged to incur personal debt through their employer, which 
seems a strategy banks use to control their advisers.  Advisers are also controlled by “restricted 
choice (ie "cookie cutter model") means advice may not be in the client's best interests.” 
“Limited APL prevents choice for the client.” Consequently, “it is impossible to satisfy the 
client's best interest where product providers require advisers to use their approved product 
lists on which only their own products sit.” Yet approved product lists does not limit every 
adviser. Licensees “Apogee, RI advice, Charter etc (true aligned licensees) have wide 
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Approved Product Lists, limiting the conflict. The adviser can pay more in licensee fees to have 
the licensee research more products for them, but most adviser choose not to. if you work for 
a bank, or AMP directly, the APL is smaller and limited and you can't increase it.” 
Furthermore, “there is an APSL that we follow but we've had successful approvals for products 
outside of this list”. 
Surprisingly, not everyone is able to apply for or is granted one-off approvals, because an 
adviser claimed: “There are times I would like to use a strategy or give product advice that my 
Licensee and PI insurer will not allow me to do”. This latter issue is confirmed if analysed in 
conjunction with the results from the open-ended survey question: ‘Have you ever applied for 
one-off approvals for financial products or investments not on you licensees’ approved product 
list? Why or why not?’ Referring to Appendix 6.5, note, 79 per cent of the survey respondents 
said they have done so, when dealing with government backed super funds, industry super 
funds, life insurance companies, new exchange-traded funds, ethically responsible funds or life 
insurance bonds for aged care clients or when it was in the clients’ best interest. Reasons why 
one-off approvals were unnecessary, included the APL was sufficient to meet the clients’ 
needs, as well as the APL was sufficiently broad, extensive and/open especially among the 
self-licensed who managed their own APLs. Some advisers experienced one-off approvals to 
be “Difficult, time consuming and not always productive” and they were “not interested in the 
PI hassle”.  
6.4.3 Unavoidable conflict of interest from association 
The evidence indicated a decent mean level of agreement of 65 per cent [61 per cent, 69 per 
cent] with high regression weight of .773 [Table 6.3] and a high reliability r2 of .688 [.607, 
.791], in Table 25 in Appendix 5.25, licensing advisers through third-party licensees who are 
product biased does lead to unavoidable conflict of interest from association.  
Licensees control over advisers, with a culture geared towards product distribution is a 
problem. Instead of obvious product sales targeted KPIs, some licensees have moved to 
performance reviews or “cultural pressure from the parent company, in many instances” as a 
method to influence advisers’ recommendations to specific product solutions, which for a 
salaried “employee” advisers is forcing them into ethical dilemmas they may not be able to 
control. These “employee” advisers face inducement to mis-sell, because it “difficult to reatin 
their job or obtain bonuses” for non-performance of increasing volumes of “writing product 
not strategy/optimal product for the client.”  
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Once again, advisers point the finger at “the limitation of product (APL).” Thus, “the 
application of APLs and the level of control from overseers” and “One off approval for 
products not on APSL,” linked to PI creates a problem. “There will always be conflicts as it is 
not possible to have every product available in the market on an approved product list due to 
PI insurance reasons as well as other compliance reasons.” Thus, “the licencees choose to 
impose the conflicts by not having open approved product lists”.  
Again, advisers confirming the difficulty of achieving this objective of the Act seems more 
evident amongst those who “work for a product manufacturer”, especially if they are 
“employee” advisers or own financial planning practices with “BOLR” terms. Yet, those who 
disagreed felt: “All conflicts of interest are "avoidable" - sometimes an extra administrative 
step is required to justify it is within the client's best interest.” “Conflicts can often be managed. 
Depends largely on the integrity of the Adviser” was a response by the dissenters with regards 
to this topic. Ultimately, it seems “it is up to the adviser to avoid conflicts of interest and ensure 
clients best interests are paramount. that has become easier in recent years but not with all 
licensees.”  The solution to these unavoidable conflicts offered by advisers included, “Less of 
an issue with a very open/Broad APL” and “One off approval for products not on APSL help 
meet Best Interest.” “This conflict is unavoidable unless it is very clearly and publicly stated 
that the advisers only have one master - the client. This has not happened in Australia but has 
happened at least once in the UK (until that bank was taken over by RBS).”  
Concerning was the comment in some cases, licensees set a “minimum requirements for certain 
% of business to be placed through the product manufacturer.” Disturbing was the same theme 
evident in the other objectives, namely it is “All about how the adviser is remunerated, how the 
licensee is remunerated.” Particularly “employee” advisers were particularly incentivised, 
influenced or coerced to promote the licensees’ products. Interestingly, despite legally banning 
conflicts of interest from remuneration, advisers still claimed, “remuneration model is far more 
likely an indication of a conflict of interest from association. It is not a 'moral' choice on the 
part of the adviser. If AFSLs wanted to demonstrate Best Interests they would remove all 
conflicted remuneration models. They never will.” Allegedly, “Best Interest Duty should 
override these conflicts. Great in theory, but not always implemented in practice.” A surprising 
comment was: “These conflicts can be avoided but if all advisers avoid them, the dealer groups 
will fold.” 
 
344 
 
6.4.4 Anti-competitive behaviour between financial services providers 
Concerning the question stating authorising advisers through aligned licensees limits advisers 
from competing on a level playing field within the industry, generally, advisers seem close to 
undecided with a mean level of agreement at 51 per cent [47 per cent, 55 per cent] with a 
moderate regression weight of .679 as tabled in Table 6.3 above. Its reliability r2 is .494 [.398, 
.625] [Appendix 5.25, Table 25].  
While the licensing model's failure on the first three objective is clear, less clear is its failure 
about competition. One explanation for this close to neutral level of agreement is the view “Its 
the Licensees that are competing not the advisers.” In addition, an adviser claimed, “the 
question assumes the licensee dictates terms.” In addition, the context advisers answered the 
question varied, which could explain this lack of clarity in the responses: “This assumes that 
advisers are competing in terms of their product offering not quality or suitability of advice. 
Surely it is the quality of advice that is important not the make or model of the product (if a 
product is offered)?”; “There is more to financial advice than recommending a product. 
Product is only a solution or tool, the strategy is the important thing and the adviser must have 
the knowledge and understanding required of strategies in order to compete on a level playing 
field within the industry”; and “My experience suggests that getting numbers through the door 
is more important. Competition in this space appears minimal when it comes to the client 
relationship selling.”  
Despite the lack of clarity on the issue of competition, others were clearer in terms of the 
context: “Uneven playing field exists between commercial advisers and those that work for 
Industry Superannuation funds as Industry planners do not have the same level of disclosure 
on fees and the industry funds mask their fee structure by applying no advice fees then charge 
huge SOA fees and consultation fees.” In addition, “Alignment may seriously increase the 
competitive position of aligned advisers due to the strength of branding, systems & 
infrastructure, marketing resources and existing clientele…an independent…have a serious 
disadvantage by comparison.” Thus, “marketing budgets and support from aligned dealer 
groups are substantial…these institutions providing outstanding support services, including 
advertising and referrals.” Once again, support services provided by the larger aligned 
licensees afford greater “access to training, conferences, fund managers, resources, research 
materials etc.” “When you are not aligned the cost of PI is huge.” Additionally, “aligned 
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adviser has generally the power of third line forcing. Eg to get you loan you have to have 
insurance and you need to see our financial adviser before the loan can proceed.”  
Although it was conceded, a disadvantage of being licensed via a large licensee is the “high 
licensee compliance standard places”, the adviser is “at a competitive disadvantage against 
practitioner not subjected to such stringent standards.” Particularly, “banks rely on the use of 
their products to generate more revenue from their networks.”  
Then the “banks subsidise their advice delivery from vertical integration.” The “large size” 
means, “the licensee can afford to defray the costs or running the licensee onto other parts of 
their business, hence it is much easier for them to invest sufficiently into the very difficult 
compliance regime.” “The ability of aligned licensees to subsidise their advice channels from 
product margin can actually make the independent licensees uncompetitive.”  
In addition, “aligned advisers will sell this to clients as an advantage saying that they are 
backed by some of the largest institutions in the country. Unfortunately what they don't tell the 
clients that they are also backed by some of the largest legal teams in the country protecting 
the Licensee and not the client.” Therefore, “Advisers licensed through aligned licensees 
actually have a competitive advantage due to price that independents cannot compete against.” 
This contrasts with “the non aligned advisers who aren't on a level playing field.” 
Consequently, “many clients and potential clients think they are safe with the perceived 
security.” 
 Once again, the data revealed remuneration models is an issue contributing to anti-competitive 
behaviour. Some respondents proposed solutions. “Best practice for client outcome would, in 
my view, be an open APL with highly experienced advisers who can truly tailor an insurance 
portfolio. For advisers? Aligned advisers get trusting customers directed to them as 'targets', 
independent advisers have to find their own.”  
6.5 AFSL-AR LICENSING MODEL FAILS SUCHMAN’S LEGITIMACY 
TESTS 
Further assessment of the existing licensing’s legitimacy was grounded on Suchman’s (1995) 
complete legitimacy theoretical framework. On the grounds of overall moderate to strong mean 
scores, regression weight values and squared multiple correlations, from the adviser’s 
perspective, the current licensing model using criteria from Suchman’s model combined with 
the objectives of the Act, is illegitimate. Overall, advisers felt licensing via third parties failed 
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the tests of achieving the objectives of the Act and failed the tests for regulative, consequential 
moral, procedural moral, structural moral, personal moral and cultural-cognitive legitimacy.   
The significant high regression weights, in Table 6.4 above, prove the current licensing model 
is illegitimate from a regulative point of view, because unintentional compliance infringements 
are problematic. Additionally, consequential moral illegitimacy is evident, because licensees’ 
commercial interests do compromise advisers’ best interest duty as anticipated in several 
financial planning studies (Smith 2009, p. 62; Maclean & Behnam 2010; Finke & Langdon 
2012; Pain 2013; Moran 2014). Combining the results of hypothesis H3(b) with H1(c), 
empirically advisers acknowledge licensee revenues as a problem, but find contemplation of 
the matter difficult. Furthermore, the strong results in Table 6.4 attests licensees’ sales 
procedures, standards and practices are designed to reinforce product distribution, while giving 
the appearance of satisfying regulatory compliance requirements. Thus, confirming the 
inferences during the literature review (West 2009; Sampson 2010; Newnham 2012; Valentine 
2013; Valentine & Hollingworth 2015), the AFSL-AR licensing model lacks procedural moral 
legitimacy. Also Valentine’s (2013) claim, conflict of interest from association is present, was 
validated by the results in Table 6.4. Thus, this confirmed multiple third-party licensing is 
structurally debase and illegitimate. The findings in Table 6.4 above found further the licensing 
model is deficient in personal moral legitimacy too. Additionally, individual leaders of aligned 
licensees do aim, as claimed by several authors (Sampson 2010; Bird & Gilligan 2015a) during 
the secondary study, to protect their distribution channels. Advisers agree with mixed feelings, 
the Australian public cannot clearly distinguish between advisers who are defined as s923A 
independent and those who are not. This outcome of cultural-cognitive illegitimacy is in line 
with Roy Morgan’s survey findings (Morris 2013; Vickovich 2013; Boutique Financial 
Planners 2014).  
From the foregoing discussion, none of the legitimacy tests was met. Hence, the licensee-
adviser licensing structure is convincingly illegitimate. Next, each legitimacy criteria are 
unpacked in more detail, using the qualitative data, to understand the quantitative findings of 
the illegitimacy of the current licensee-adviser licensing model. 
6.5.1 Regulative illegitimacy  
Although strong evidence suggested the licensing model is shown to not have regulative 
legitimacy based on the effect size of .727, based on the mean level of agreement, noticeably 
financial advisers were on average unsure [close to undecided at a 47 per cent mean level of 
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agreement] whether the legally socially constructed licensing via third parties caused financial 
advisers to unintentionally breach regulatory compliance when dealing with clients.  
Surprising was the mixed close to 50 per cent, which is the neutral or undecided mean 
agreement level score. The explanation of this mixed response is evident in the emotional 
comments of survey informants. For some it was “impossible not to breach” unintentionally. 
Although the focus of this research was on unintentional violations, seemingly “those breaches 
you read about from bank-aligned advisers are NOT unintented!!!!!!”  Even though 
compliance contraventions by aligned advisers were “often intentionally as well!”, apparent “it 
depends upon the adviser and the culture of his superiors. Sales pressure can be extreme in 
some of those larger institutions.” Not everyone agreed it was a problem for only the aligned 
advisers, because one adviser stated, “All advisers from all Licensees have this problem.”   
Purportedly, “the pressure to earn income…causes the unintentional compliance breach and 
not the product.” A “pressure the licensee brings to bear on the adviser to generate income for 
the licensee which may lead to shortcuts which breach compliance.” Among several reasons 
blamed were “the business models of the aligned licensees” and “their remuneration models 
encourage intentional compliance breaches.”   
Respondents offered many examples of such pressure leading to the contraventions, for 
instance, “those who have to meet sales target can misunderstand directions they receive (or 
they did not misunderstand and did exactly what they were told).” Troubling “some aligned 
advisers thrive in this environment and are condoned for their actions despite many clients 
paying for inappropriate advice. eg an aligned adviser switching super to licensee's product 
and to get unnecessary insurance that costs more than the clients annual contributions.” 
“Especially where product sales volumes are rewarded in various ways.”  
Additionally, the “legislative demands are what cuases accidental breaches. they are 
draconian.”  Aligned employee “in house Advisers” were cited to be at higher risk than self-
employed aligned advisers or independents of unintentional infringements.  
The approved product list was also provided as a reason for the unintentional compliance 
contraventions. “If it is not on yuor APL you can't write it and I have seen numerous time clients 
in expensive products written by an aligned adviser where a more cost effective option with a 
different provider would do the same - how does this relate to best interest.” Additionally, 
“breaches will be at the licensee level (e.g. via limited APLs, etc.) and not likely to come from 
the adviser who spends most of his or her day on compliance.”   
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Furthermore, compliance infringements were not limited to product only, but other compliance 
demands such as “didn't file note a conversation in time, or they accidentally provided verbal 
'hold' advice not realising it was advice and therefore didn't provide an advice document”.  
Contrary views explained, “a compliance breach is the Advisers responsibility. It is up to the 
Adviser to ensure that the advice is compliant.” Besides, “large licencees have very strict and 
comprehensive compliance checks. Moreso than “independents”. “Compliance managers make 
sure that advisers will not be uncompliant”. Seemingly, there is the perception that “under the 
big licensees there are less compliance breaches, due to strict compliance audits.” 
Consequently, “breaches from the adviser are actually less likely because of the strict controls 
imposed upon them.”  
6.5.2 Consequential illegitimacy 
Additionally, consequential moral illegitimacy was evident, because advisers with the third 
highest reliability [squared multiple correlation, namely .766 and .768, ex CLF and cum CLF 
respectively, see Table 25 in the Appendix 5.25], and the third overall highest standardised 
regression weights [.875 and .794, ex CLF and cum CLF respectively in Table 6.4] strongly 
confirmed the theory. Licensees’ commercial interests do compromise advisers’ best interest 
duty (Smith 2009, p. 62; Maclean & Behnam 2010; Finke & Langdon 2012; Pain 2013; Moran 
2014). The mean level of agreement was moderate scoring 64 per cent [59 per cent, 68 per 
cent] by advisers; the current licensing model does not display consequential moral legitimacy.  
Advisers clearly see tension between the commercial interests of aligned licensees and their 
advisers’ best interest duty obligations. Combining the results of hypothesis H3(b) with H1(c), 
empirically advisers acknowledge licensee revenues as a problem, but find contemplation on 
the matter difficult. For instance, some argue “fee for service eliminates this former problem,” 
which once again implies remuneration models plays a role. Although, Adviser RR claimed 
there is no tension by penning: “Not anymore. Client's best interests are key. Perhaps the big 
banks provide sales pressure.” It seems tension is “more likely if the adviser is a direct 
employee representative of a financial product provider/bank.” In line with shareholder wealth 
maximisation theory, “instos are there to serve shareholders…they want returns and money.” 
“The profits of the company are put ahead of the clients best interests as the licensee makes up 
only part of the company's profit. The Funds Management business makes far more money than 
the Advice business but both are only part of the companies profits and the large financial 
institutions concentrate on shareholder profit.” Additionally, it is claimed “commercial 
349 
 
interests control the content of the APL”. Furthermore, licensee commercial interests 
compromising best interests “can potentially happen if performance and KPI is linked to funds 
under advice and remuneration, number of new clients.”  For instance, “the bank financial 
advisors ( those who operate from branches or branded offices) …are sales people meeting 
KPIs.” However, “not all aligned licensees push their commercial interests on to their 
advisers.” Furthermore, this commercial-best interest tension “depends on the type of 
Practice.” Seemingly, “the institution is to blame not the planner. Our system blames the 
Planner.” Although, it is argued, this “is a problem from licensees end not advisers” 
contentiously, “a strong willed, well credentialed adviser can still resolve these issues when 
they arise.” From the evidence in this research, some advisers feel “it comes down to ethics.” 
Another argued, “as a professional ...ethics training plus a higher moral ethical overlay ... 
means the licensee cannot control me against my client.”  
Also, when considering the above results in conjunction with the qualitative data, reported in 
Appendix 6.3 below, about benefits licensees gain from authorising advisers, profit is in the 
top three benefits, after the benefit of controlling product distribution. 
6.5.3 Procedural illegitimacy 
The evidence shows, with a strong regression weight of .781 [Table 6.4] and moderately strong 
squared multiple correlation of .687 [.576, .784] [Appendix 5.25, Table 25], the current 
licensing model lacks procedural legitimacy. At a mean of 61 per cent [56 per cent, 66 per cent] 
level of agreement among advisers, licensing advisers through aligned licensees sometimes 
results in sales policies, procedures and practices designed by licensees to give “on paper 
appearance of compliance.”  
“Verbally, or in practice, advisers encouraged to act in ways which do not comply.” For 
example, “recent cases of some aligned licensees have shown that the companies concerned 
have not been driven by the ethos that is embedded in the regulatory requirements.” 
Experienced by an adviser, it was “often in the best interest of area managers to push advisers 
to use in-house products and override the best interest duty.” Advisers are expected to jump 
“hurdles…daily to make the best choices combined with the culture and the 'education' would 
make it incredibly difficult. But this is magnified by the 'unethical' advisers being feted and the 
ethical ones seen as 'non-performing' because they do the extra paperwork, rather than just 
sell.” Commentary suggests there is “a growing list of advisers receiving poor audit results for 
process (not advice) reasons.” Alarming “newer advisers will not be able to tell these processes 
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from a structured 'advice' process.” While “experienced advisers may simply choose to use a 
successful and 'compliant' sales process to generate themselves more revenue. ie. "if it comes 
from the Licensee, it must be fine with compliance and my auditor.” Respondents would explain 
from the perspective of their experience:- “I have worked in management with AFSL's. I have 
seen aligned AFSLs dress-up as independents (Financial Wisdom - owned by CBA and 
Colonial) but set an internal sales budget of $1,billion in platform recruitment to CFS 
FirstChoice. Same at MLC with specific targets for product placement from it's more 
'independent' AFSL's.”  
Worrying the practices “are hidden. I have recently taken on a client who is a friend, sold 
duplicated insurance by the CBA with no advice. how they get away with this is quite frankly 
disgusting, and we find it hard to compete against this fraudulent efficiency.” Using the 
legislation to window dress product distribution is an alarming finding: - “Compliance is all 
about window dressing. The licensee makes it so strict so as to protect themselves against the 
charge of pushing product.”  “Compliance is all about lip service and covering your arse. The 
client never ever reads the provided documentations. FSG, SOA, PDS are all about protecting 
the licensee and the adviser. 'But we disclosed everything'. [Subtext; not my fault you are stupid 
enough to require advise and can't or won't read.”  
Despite licensees providing “'open' APL but really internally the approach is to use the aligned 
product.” Then there are situations where “some licensees focus on compliance but overlook 
instances where advisers only use inhouse products.”  
However, the minority counter-arguments seem to offer hope based on the comment: “many of 
the aligned licensors believe that they are seeking to act in client interest. However they also 
have a duty to their stakeholders..there is a genuine objective to provide the client with a good 
outcome, within a profit model.”  Allegedly these practices do not go unnoticed and should not 
be of any concern according to some respondents, because “licensees are well aware of the 
scrutiny of ASIC and Adele Ferguson, so no window dressing is applied.” Notwithstanding the 
scrutiny by “ASIC to ensure regulatory compliance.” 
6.5.4 Structural illegitimacy 
Furthermore, this research proves strong support at a mean level of 75 per cent agreement and 
regression weight of .740 [Table 6.4] and judicious squared multiple correlations of .574 [.458, 
.669] [Appendix 5.25, Table 25] the current licensing model does not display structural moral 
legitimacy.  
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The frequency of comments was the highest in this part of the survey responses. Conflict of 
interest from association by licensing advisers via third-party licensees “is what is causing most 
of the problems in the Financial Planning industry.” “This is the cancer that has led to the 
current situation of advisers being attacked from all political corners.” It is a “major 
confliction” “This is the crux of the problem with financial planning.”  
Questionable, according to one adviser is, “How can best interest possibly be served with these 
conflicts.” Apparently, “The advisers fight very hard against the conflicts and aim to serve 
their clients first, but the licensees are able to use compliance as a tool to put themselves ahead 
of the client. The advisers are then scared of their licensee burning them and are forced to 
choose between the client and the licensee.” This implies licensees have power to control 
adviser behaviour, rather than advisers having the power to self-control their own behaviour. 
From experience, an adviser wrote “having come from this system originally we were pressured 
to sell the product. If your advice didn't match the product that you had available they made 
life very difficult.” However, he was not the only one who shared this experience: - “Worked 
for a major bank for 9 years.  This is DEFINITELY a conflict of interest.  Aligned advisers are 
under pressure and inducement to use aligned products and services.” Thus, “under a sales 
culture … the pressure on managers to perform is very high.” “Where an individual adviser 
has specific KPI triggers to use products owned by their licensee there is a huge conflict 
between what is best for the client and what is best for the adviser/licensee to reach 
bonuses/profit etc.” Thus, “aligned advisers put their licensee before the clients best interest.  
/ They are conflicted by their ownership and their own products.” One adviser observed, 
affiliation or ownership is “only a conflict if you use the aligned licensee's product.” Another 
adviser acknowledged although “Most Licensees will encourage their advisers to use their 
products, however under our best interest duty we can only use our licensees products if they 
are suitable for our clients.” However, they are in the minority. Some advisers “chose to leave 
the dealership… because of its bias towards its own platform.” It is also claimed licensing 
advisers via licensees ensures the “client is not aware of these associations. If they go to a 
Holden dealership they only expect to buy a new Holden . Clients do not understand they are 
walking into a dealership when they walk into an aligned business - they do not know that the 
adviser has a limited suite of platform to choose from ( not investments) there is a difference.”   
The few who held contrary views, by disagreeing conflict of interest from association is the 
problem, pointed at other possible reasons. For instance, it “is more about disclosure than 
affiliation.  If the affiliation is disclosed the conflict is minimal. Unfortunately, that disclosure 
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is usually hidden deep in small print.” In addition, “the Licensee does own a product issuer 
license and has aligned platforms.  However Advisers can use other products and platforms if 
on the APSL or also can seek one off approval to use off-APSL products and platforms.” Yet, 
it was found in this research mentioned earlier one off-approvals were not always readily 
granted.  
Interestingly although “Licensing through aligned licensees does create conflicts of interest…it 
would be a mistake to believe that a non-aligned licensee doesn't have a conflict, it simply has 
different conflicts.” Therefore, “Conflicts apply across all industries and regardless of whether 
a planner is aligned or not.” Advisers named specific licensees in their responses. “Licensees 
will encourage their advisers to use their products, however under our best interest duty we 
can only use our licensees products if they are suitable for our clients.”  
Once again it seems “Employee reps conflicted” and self-employed “Auth reps limited conflict” 
when it comes to conflict of interest from association. Likewise, “Wherever there is vertical 
integration there are inherent conflicts of interest. I have seen a number of studies that shows 
that advice from vertically integrated advisers is extremely heavily biased towards the parent 
company.” However, not everyone agrees: “The inherent bias comes from within the Approved 
Products list construction, but even this can be widened with a reasonable alternative and a 
good reason.  In truth, conflicts of interest by association are more about perception than 
reality.” For advisers to practise their craft they “need a licence, that licence is with a bank. 
This does not influence our decisions on our client  outcomes!” Ultimately, for another adviser 
it is “Up to the adviser to accept these 'inducements' or not. Some of us paid the higher fees to 
be licensed so that we were NOT influenced.” Overall most agree, “Adviser must address this 
conflict with integrity of a professional, but until this connection is removed there will always 
be the appearance of conflict of interest.” Unexpectedly, “an aligned licensee will mostly 
recommend the product from the licensee due to BOLR agreement.” Even if it is “Up to the 
adviser to accept these 'inducements' or not”, the overall quantitative results indicate structural 
illegitimacy.  
A solution offered for the structurally corrupt licensing system is for licensee-adviser licensing 
advisers to be “dismantled immediately for the sake of the clients and the profession.”  
6.5.5 Personal illegitimacy 
It also seems the current licensing model does not display personal moral legitimacy given by 
the level of agreement of advisers sitting at 78 per cent with a standardised regression weight 
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effect size of .679 [Table 6.4] and squared multiple correlation of .463 [.335, .669] [Table 25, 
Appendix 5.25] when advisers were asked whether contributions by specific individual leaders 
of aligned licensees to the debate with government surrounding the licensing of advisers have 
a “a vested interest” to protect their product distribution channels. 
“Leaders of aligned licensees will not only protect their distribution channels when discussing 
the topic with the govt, they will also band together to control the information going to the 
government. ie FSC.” Combine these results with the findings consequential illegitimacy, it is 
clear licensees “first obligation is to shareholders or employer,” because they “care about one 
thing, that is their bottom line. Client outcomes is a long way down the list.” A problem again 
is “the continuum of Financial Advice Business models.” Thus, “leaders will do what suits their 
particular business at the time. They are there to make a profit. If they could sell their product 
direct to the public and cut out the adviser, they would do it in a heartbeat. Life Insurance 
Framework is a good indication of that.”  The insurance debate was mentioned several times 
by respondents: “look at the new insurance proposals designed to reduce adviser commissions 
etc but not increae benefits to consumers via better definitions” and the “so called 'Churn 
Debate' in relation to insurance is a case in point.”  
Furthermore, combine the results with structural illegitimacy, albeit “they don't have the 
integrity to admit this. All these institutions also OWN INSURANCE companies who have 
significant 'Direct' distribution - group - through industry funds and elsewhere, and on-line). 
These are also being protected in public debate. There is no proper research on outcomes for 
consumers.” Although the leaders are claimed to “try but their model does not reside on good, 
long term, client outcomes.”  
However, some advisers did not see a problem with licensees leaders lobbying “to protect their 
revenue” with a “focus on retention of FUM” as evidenced by “their Annual Reports and see 
where they are making the massive profits.” “Of course, wouldn't any company want to 
preserve its sales arm?” An additional argument proposed was “business interests have every 
right to protect their ongoing survival and deserve to fail in business, fail their associates and 
fail to protect the interests of their clients if they did not do so.” Thus, some advisers attempted 
to justify leaders protecting product distribution “What do you expect? We live in a capitalist 
country where competition within the market and access to the market rules. The institutions 
have been at it for 100's of years in some cases. Delivering benefits to policy holders and 
superannuants; paying wages to staff and all the supporting infrastructure. Of course they have 
354 
 
a vested interest.” Although, “It is natural for any business to protect it's business model. It is 
up to Govt to decide if the business model is illegal or detrimental to society.”  Yet, commentary 
indicate lobbying by aligned licensees “is true, but can't the same be said about the leaders of 
non aligned groups??? Weaven and Whitely spring readily to mind.” “Every new regulation 
has ended up benefitting the big players and transferred wallet share away from advisers 
directly to the product providers.”  
Thus, Australian policymakers, in the eyes of some advisers, seem somewhat responsible for 
listening to the lobby groups and Federal and State politics seems to play a significant part in 
some of the woes the industry faces. For instance, “The Wallis enquiry could have fixed most 
of the industry problems by banning product manufacturers from owning advice businesses 
(and banning all commissions)…big instos' influence on politicians prevented this. Influence 
comes form industry funds as well of course.” In addition, “government really has not 
considered what happened in the UK and the FSC has pushed their own agenda and this is 
what is being listened to - even the professional associations have caved in to pressure from 
the FSC.”  
6.5.6 Culture-cognitive illegitimacy 
For this test the cum CLF level of agreement was 62 per cent with a moderate standardised 
regression weight effect size of .682 [Table 6.4] and r2 .502 [.322, .752] [Appendix 5.25, Table 
25]. Consequently, advisers indicated the licensing model does not display cultural-cognitive 
legitimacy, whereby clients can clearly distinguish between s923A independent advisers and 
product-conflicted advisers. Respondents indicated “the public has difficulty but not because 
of the existence of third party Licensees.” To them it “is too simplistic. There are other factors,” 
which is confirmed by the r2 of .502 [.322, .752].   
Among the other factors suggested by respondents include, “quality of advice. Bad advice can 
be delivered by any adviser; independent, self licensed; aligned or in the employ of a bank.” 
“Clients value good, solid, professional planning that meets their goals and aspirations no 
matter how licensed.” Plus, “It's the individual advisers ethics, best interest etc. no amount of 
legislation will combat a crook or someone who is unethical.” Additionally, “they just want 
what is clearly good and easy to understand advice from an Adviser with understanding and 
empathy.”  “What we do not know is the level of literacy and comprehension individuals have.”  
Whereas for another, “The reason for confusion includes the rules that govern the use of certain 
banned words (independent, unbiased, etc.).” Allegedly, the “industry can't even work out what 
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independent is. We have advisers who can receive an Independent Financial Adviser Award 
(IFA Magazine) yet who operate businesses as conflicted as a Banks. The AFSL then leverages 
that publicity to appear as something they are not - appalling!! Is it any wonder the public has 
no trust.” The term ‘independent’ remains a controversial matter among some advisers based 
on the comment “we should be able to use the word independent, unlike the banks who 
manufacture and sell their own product. The word independent should be legislated for those 
satisfying a criteria.” Confusion among advisers is apparent around the term ‘independent’, 
because it is alleged “non aligned advisers are independent but don't meet the definition.” 
Furthermore, it seems “having your own AFSL does not mean that you don't have an 
arrangement with a product provider.”  “It's in the private financial planning firms both 3rd 
party aligned and with their own AFSL where independence is foggy.” An interesting comment 
was: “There is no definition of the advice provided in s923A, it is concerned with the use of 
certain words. It relates to remuneration models not the type of advice provided.” “As a non-
aligned adviser of an independently-owned Dealership, the difference is clear. Best interests 
of the client come first. Decisions about product are made towards the end of the process. 
Aligned advisers are (arguably) looking to sell a product to the client. In my experience the 
product was aligned to the dealer group/bank with sales targets to meet.” Thus, the foregoing 
suggests differentiating the services, they offer in practice some advisers base it on ownership, 
product and/or remuneration practices.  
Apparently, there is the perception the “confusion would reduce if there was clarity in relation 
to the legal provider of the advice (i.e. the licensee).” Specifically, the misperception has “to 
do with labelling. People might expect MLC product from a MLC adviser, but Godfrey 
Pembroke is a different matter. A lot of this would be cleared up if product providers did not 
have advice businesses.” Apparent, “the aligned licensees hide behind multiple business names 
- no transparency exists.” Seemingly, “most Australians would not know the difference as it is 
not usually openly disclosed to them.” Allegedly, the problem is not as apparent “if a client 
walks into one of the big 5,” because “then they would expect to get a big 5 product.” 
Furthermore, “It's the old contracts/books that are sold where the majority of the 
"independence" damage is done i.e. protectionist actions by the instos.”  
Arguably, this issue of identifying the nature of the licensee “is covered by disclosure to each 
client.” Thus, to help clients distinguish s923A independent advice from that which is not, “the 
public are given a Financial Services Guide at the first meeting which shows who the Dealer 
Group is aligned to or not. So the public can distinguish the differences.”  Yet, to the contrary, 
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“even though FSGs are provided, consumers don't really understand any conflicts that may 
arise depending on licensing.” “Disclosure has become so complicated that most of the public 
do not understand what they are reading.” Thus, disclosures are not always done effectively. 
Notwithstanding that “most Australians would not know the difference as it is not usually 
openly disclosed to them.” “Most people who seek advice have no idea that there could be a 
possibility of a conflict”.  
Disturbing is the adviser view that “the public are not really interested in the issue.” There is 
the perception that “clients don't care whether their adviser is licensed through a 3rd party or 
independently. I have never had a client walk away because of who my Licensee is.” The reason 
for this outcome in the qualitative data is “the Australian public have a relationship with the 
adviser not the licencee. The trust is with the adviser.” Surprisingly advisers claimed, “Most 
clients don't even ask about independence” and “Clients don't care about independence.” They 
“trust that the best advice will be given.”  Several respondents proposed a solution. For 
instance, “there should not be product providers who also have advice arms to their 
businesses.”      
6.6 INDIVIDUAL LICENSING MODEL VIA A SINGLE BODY 
SUPPORTED 
From the above results, the current licensing model is convincingly illegitimate. Accordingly, 
this illegitimacy strengthens arguments to replace the existing licensing model with individual 
licensing. Advisers reveal with moderate to high regression weights, mean levels of agreement 
and r2, their support for such as model based on the evidence in Table 6.5 below. Advisers also 
strongly agree the most important factor to influence whether a person seeks financial advice, 
namely clients’ trust (Balasubramnian, Brisker & Gradisher 2014) would improve with 
individual licensing. They acknowledged it would provide them with much needed 
independence from product-conflicted licensees. Furthermore, they are in favour of modelling 
adviser licensing on other professions. Interestingly, the preference is individual licensing via 
a “single body.” However, most of them expressed some reservations and concerns about the 
practical implementation of disconnecting them from licensees. Specifically, they were unsure 
what an individual licence would entail. Additionally, they feared the costs involved as well as 
wanting to know where the “subsidised” support services “research, compliance, marketing 
and training support” were going to come from, which “from aligned dealer groups are 
substantial.” 
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6.6.1 Public trust and confidence will improve 
When asked whether client trust and confidence would improve under a single licensing 
regime, advisers agreed at a cum CLF of 64 per cent [60 per cent, 68 per cent] mean level of 
agreement [Table 6.5 below], a high regression weight estimate of .745 and reliability of r2 = 
.754 [.588, .902] [Appendix 5.25, Table 25].  
Qualitative data disclose that at “100% the dealer group model is broken. It has not achieved 
what it was meant to do, give a higher quality of advice to the public.” “Apart from applying 
for your own license” individual licensing “is the only way to remain truly client focussed,” “if 
the regulating body did a good job of monitoring and enforcing.” Besides, “Advisers would 
then also be more PERSONALLY accountable.” Thus, let “individuals actions/service etc. be 
the distinguishing factor.” “This would go a long way to 'level the playing field' and break 
down the current underlying distribution based model.”  
In line with the views of O'Brien and Gilligan (2014), “there is no longer a place for large 
institutions to be able to offer licencing services and to also be product manufacturers. The 
Law should requre they chose to do one but not both.” Another “really like this idea, but…cant 
see it happening,” nor “how this would work in practice.” Although, “consumers would have 
more confidence, this may be based on a perception only.” A sentiment expressed in the survey 
was “the existing vested interests and huge investment in infrastructure by the biggest players 
would stop this in its tracks.” Besides, according to some, a single licensing model was not 
considered a viable solution to “exclude bad advisers from the system” nor prevent those “who 
deliberately sets out to deceive” for the simple reason that “any industry that…make a lot of 
money quickly, someone will ALWAYS try to push the envelope. Also different AR's will have 
different attitudes.” While a respondent, who was once “a senior government bureaucrat,” 
perceived individual licensing via a single body to build trust and confidence would flop “if it 
ended up being ran by bureaucrats.” Because “from experience…most have no understanding 
of the commercial world or private sector. That's why so many government contracts both state 
& federal end up in tears.” He was not the only adviser who feared individual licensing would 
“increase the size of bureaucracy.” 
It was also perceived that a single body “would produce a licensee with to much power…Better 
to have many licensee's for competition and non that issue product.”  
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Table 6.5 Summary of findings for Individual licensing [b4] 
Q4: To what extent do financial advisers agree the current licensee-adviser licensing model of individual financial advisers should be replaced with an 
independent individual licensing system, like other professions? 
H4: Financial advisers on the ASIC Adviser Register significantly agree the current ‘authorised representative’ licensing model of individual financial advisers 
should be replaced with individual licensing. 
PAR LITERATURE REVIEW SUB-HYPOTHESIS EMPIRICAL TEST 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
λ SE [95% CI] CR p-value (ex CLF) 
λ CR p-value (cum CLF) 
M [95% CI] MSE CR p-value 
a16 
Lack of trust & confidence (Hely 2012; 
ASIC 2013a; Morgan & Levine 2015) 
prevents the public from seeking advice 
(Balasubramnian et al. 2014) 
H4 (a): Financial advisers 
significantly agree clients’ trust and 
confidence in financial advisers 
would be restored if the licensing of 
individual financial advisers was via 
a single individual licence with 
professional standards of education, 
appointment, registration, 
regulation, discipline and cessation. 
Clients would have more 
confidence and trust in financial 
advisers if advisers were licensed 
under a single individual licence 
with professional standards of 
education, 
appointment, registration, 
regulation, discipline 
and cessation. 
.858 .035 [.780, .920] marker p = ***                 
.745, marker p = ***                                              
64 [60, 68] 2.327 27.386 p = *** 
a17 
Institutional commercial licensee 
favoured over individual professional 
adviser (Sanders & Roberts 2015, p. 
18) leads to problems (O'Brien & 
Gilligan 2014; Sampson 2010).  
Individual licensing to disconnect 
advisers from product issuers may lead 
to a culture shift (Steen, McGrath and 
Wong 2016; O'Brien & Gilligan 2014; 
PJC on Corps & Fin Sers. 2009) to 
independence (North 2015; ASIC 
2017a; Smith, Clarke & Rogers 2017) 
H4 (b): Financial advisers 
significantly agree a single 
individual licence will promote 
independence from those licensees 
who may be conflicted by product 
bias. 
A single individual licence for 
individual advisers will promote 
independence from those 
licensees who may be conflicted 
by product bias. 
.742 .047 [.653, .831] 12.752 p = ***             
.662, 11.035 p = ***                                             
65 [61, 69] 2.230 29.147 p = *** 
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a18 
Financial advisers have been likened to 
other professionals (Ap 2011; Bruce 
2012; Knutsen & Cameron 2012; Burke 
et al. 2015).  Professional regulation 
evident in law/medicine is critical to the 
proper functioning of financial services 
industry (Omarova 2010) 
H4 (c): Financial advisers 
significantly agree the licensing of 
individual Australian financial 
advisers should be modelled on 
those of other professions, such as 
the accounting, legal and medical. 
It is 'appropriate' to license 
advisers with an individual 
licence in line with other 
professions, such as the 
accounting, legal and medical 
professions. 
.816 .042 [.736, .895] 13.098 p = ***                  
.711, 11.211 p = ***                                              
69 [64, 73] 2.244 30.618 p = *** 
a19 
Individual license (Hoyle 2017; 
Sanders & Roberts 2015; PJC on Corps 
& Fin Servs 2009, 2014; Tuch 2005) 
via single monopoly body = most 
effective way to regulate the future 
financial planning profession 
(Kingsford Smith 2014) 
H4 (d):  Financial advisers 
significantly agree they would 
prefer an individual licence 
regulated through a 
single independent registration, 
competency, education, conduct, 
standards and disciplinary board. 
You would prefer an individual 
licence regulated through a 
single independent registration, 
competency, education, conduct, 
standards and disciplinary board. 
.801 .039 [.719, .872] 13.961 p = ***                  
.695, 12.075 p = ***                                             
68 [63, 72] 2.198 30.969 p = *** 
a21 
Conflict of interest from association 
due to co-habitation, leads to 
institutional- professional conflicts and 
ethical dilemmas (Smith,2009) 
Therefore, disconnecting advisers from 
control by product distributors by 
means of a cultural shift (Steen, 
McGrath and Wong 2016; O'Brien & 
Gilligan 2014). Thus, it should 
eliminate this conflict. 
H4 (e): Financial advisers 
significantly agree Individual 
licensing of advisers through a 
single independent 
professional standards board will 
eliminate conflict of interest from 
association.   
Individual licensing of advisers 
through a single independent 
professional standards board will 
eliminate conflict of interest from 
association 
.629 .051 [.542, .739] 10.374 p = ***                      
.536, 8.625 p = ***                                              
52 [48, 57] 2.167 24.188 p = *** 
Parameter (Par) Question (Q) Hypothesis (H) Standardised regression weight (λ) Standard error (SE) Critical ratio (CR) Mean (M) Mean standard error (MSE)  
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Furthermore, they did not want a professional association involved, “so much would depend 
on the structure, administration and interests of the single licensee. The FPA, for eg, has 
multiple conflicts of interest.”  
Other counter-arguments to this new form of licensing suggested: “Confidence and trust in 
financial advisers is not built on a licensing arrangement but on the integrity of the individual 
financial adviser's ethics and integrity” Therefore, there was the argument suggesting “What 
needs to be pushed is the high level of consumer protection there is under the current rules.” 
The naysayers were not the only ones with hesitations. Those who supported the idea of 
individual licensing reluctantly admitted “big organisation provides more confidence to a 
person than a small local business.” Furthermore, “most Clients actually don't know or care,” 
because “they don't even realise that I'm licenced/Authorised in many cases.” Trust is with the 
individual adviser the client deals with, even though “clients approach and trust a firm or 
company in the initial approach.”  
Concerns expressed by advisers around a single licensing body continued to grow. On the 
evidence participants did not want a professional association involved, because the “FPA, for 
eg, has multiple conflicts of interest. eg. the FPA delivers the 'CFP' designation which it claims 
is he 'pinnacle' of adviser qualifications. However, it is alo the only institution licensed to 
provide the training.”  
For a few, to encourage trust and confidence in financial advisers is “simple...remove all 
remuneration from product, whether that's insurance, platform, investment. income for the 
Adviser can only be sourced through Fee for Service, no volume bonus schemes etc.”  
Interestingly, not everyone was “sure what you mean by "single individual license"”, because 
they asked “Do you mean financial planning as a profession? With all the professional barriers 
to entry?. Then yes,” “just like Accountants and Solicitors.” “Accounting provides a good 
model.”  “Doctors are not licensed by hospitals or clients.” Thus “the model of doctors, lawyers 
and accountants”  “is a real possibility, given the Professional Development education we are 
required to complete to sustain our AR title presently.” “Financial advisers need to be like 
other professionals and charge a fee for service. Then clients will totally trust them. The 
majority of clients are aware that commissions distort advice given.” 
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6.6.2 Independence from conflicted licensee control 
A 66 per cent [61 per cent, 69 per cent] level of agreement with a standardised regression 
weight of .662 cum CLF [Table 6.5] and r2 .541 [.417, .693] [Appendix 5.25, Table 25] 
supported a single individual license for individual advisers to promote independence from 
those licensees who may be conflicted by product bias.  
Those who agree felt: “It would also mean that advisors aren't effectively bonded to an 
employer”, because the “problem is not the adviser - it is the model which allows a Licensee to 
own manufacture AND distribution. The banks & union super funds routinely abuse and exploit 
this.” Yet others believed independence is a myth, because irrespective of the licensing model 
“you cannot have good advice without product recommendations.” Thus, “product bias is 
going to be there for some advisers aligned or not,” especially for those who “work for a bank 
or an industry fund.”  
A consistent theme throughout this chapter was, “an employee of a product provider still 
succumbing to bonuses etc to sell their products.” Therefore, there “will still be the potential 
to be conflicted if product providers are able to reward advisers for product volumes.” Some 
advisers are convinced, “providers will always try to provide incentives for advisors to 
recommend their products.” Alternatively, the “conflicted licencee will always try to bring 
pressure to get the sales and revenue either by coercion or demand.” However, also expressed 
is the viewpoint that “it's not about licensing, it's about the ethics, standards and morals and 
education of the adviser.”  
Adding to the foregoing misgivings, there are problems with the practical application of 
individual licensing to promote independence according to advisers. For instance, “who 
guarantees that the research and monitoring of the products will be maintained” and “who 
would provide the APL or would any promoter have access to advisers.”  Additionally, “who 
will rigorously set out, apply, monitor, administer, and enforce the standards required for those 
who do not do the right thing; and make sure they have IP insurance; and deal appropriately 
with client complaints etc. Put ASIC in charge? A professional body?” “In practice the amount 
of red tape and regulation means that most advisors may still need a 3rd party licensee to 
provide support so conflicts may still occur”. Thus, uncertainty as to “how the compliance 
frame work would operate” exists. Evident was the fear, individual licensing will “place a 
much greater burden on individual advisers and/or practices to review and select appropriated 
investments.”   
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Another major concern expressed was “the cost will be high.” Specifically, “the costs of PI 
Insurance and administration of running a self licensed practice would cause the costs of 
providing a service on a $Flat fee basis too expensive. This would marginalise the majority of 
the public who couldn't afford to pay the fees.”  
However, despite the misgivings, advisers acknowledged like doctors, financial advisers could 
have “multi layered licence to determine specialist from generalists.” Also expressed as 
desirable by many respondents is “A Single individual licensee will need to be independent of 
the regulator, institutions and Govt.”  
6.6.3 Adviser licensing like other accredited professions 
Advisers indicated a moderately high mean level of agreement of 69 per cent [64 per cent, 73 
per cent] with a high standardised regression weight of .711 [Table 6.5] and r2  of .694 [.554, 
.833] reliability [Table 25 in Appendix 5.25] it is ‘appropriate’ to license advisers with an 
individual licence in line with other professions, such as the accounting, legal and medical 
professions.  
“Trouble is the legislation is all wrapped up around product advise, whereas the other 
professions have legislation around professional standards rather than product. The law does 
not seem to envisage the provision of financial advice without use of a product.” Financial 
advisers “want to be considered a profession and yet…are corralled and controlled like sales 
cattle. How many accountants, solicitors and medical professionals do you see being 
'franchised' by banks.” “It would clarify the issues and advisers would be answerable to their 
clients and the regulator.”  
Yet, respondent’s support for separation from licensees is conditional on several aspects, such 
as it is affordable, ensures ongoing independent compliance audits, is self-regulatory, excludes 
AFS licensees, professional associations and government-owned institutions, while remaining 
focused on rigorous professional standards in line with other true professions. Specifically, 
advisers want to be “able to afford the cost incurred as a result of compliance, insurance and 
ongoing education. All of which help to ensure that the client is receiving good advice that is 
in their best interest.” Important is “affordable professional indemnity insurance with a low 
level of policy excess.” A concern for individual advisers is they “don't have easily obtainable 
funds available to them to meet claims, should they arise.” Again, it was expressed, “As long 
as they are independantly audited to maintain standards, it would be ideal.”  
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Additionally, advisers want to be judged “by…peers and reported for misconduct by peers as 
currently happens in the legal and accounting professions.” They want the licensing body to 
be “run by a NON-Government Body like the Law Society, ICA; Board of Surgeons,” without 
interference by “by banks and instos which is currently the case. There is too much fat in 
subscriptions to these groups and sponsorship by instos which then pollutes policy and 
ultimately credibility.”  Individual licensing “needs…a vigorous framework…which doesn't 
currently exist. Allow the advisers to be a part of developing that framework.”  
Once again, concern was uttered about the practical workings of “monitoring and supervision 
of individually licensed advisers” and “whether that system would support advisers enough.”  
In addition, those who strongly disagreed with a new licensing model suggested: “Not on your 
nelly. I pay almost $30,000 per year for the privilege of providing advice to my clients. That is 
the cost of my license. for that, my licensee provides all research, compliance, reporting. I 
provide advice on Super, Insurance, estate planning, budgeting, investing, lending, health and 
wellbeing. There is so much more than "product".” The same misgivings as above, included 
the “compliance burden of this scenario” “Cost to end client would be much greater,” is yet 
again a concern.  
Among those self-licensed they failed see the need for individual licensing, because they were 
“already under those regulations” as in their view “that option exists today - individuals can 
obtain an AFSL.”  
6.6.4 Independent professional financial planning standards board 
The support was moderately strong for an individual license regulated through a 
single independent registration, competency, education, conduct, standards and disciplinary 
board.  Extent of adviser agreement was measured to score a mean level of 68 per cent [63 per 
cent, 72 per cent] with moderately high standardised regression effect size of .695 [Table 6.5] 
and moderate r2 of .623 [.501, .834] [Table 25, Appendix 5.25].  
From these survey results, advisers are coming around to being licensed via a “'single' body.” 
An informant felt “it would put all advisers on the same page and distinguish the aligned ones.” 
However, once again those self-licensed with their “own AFSL,” suggested it was unnecessary 
to pursue any new independent licensing model, because they were “already in that space” 
where they “operate as an independent (as defined by the Act).”   
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A couple of respondents recognised this “has all been tried before”. Particularly the “FPA has 
tried to move down this track but has been largely ignored.”  The reason it has been neglected 
is it is perceived as a “little hard as after 15 years we're heavily invested into the current 
position with commercial property and such.” However, advisers desire such a model, because 
it “takes the conflict of industry bodies away who currently 'own' the designations (eg. CFP 
and FPA).”  
Interestingly, although it was reported above costs were a major concern, to the contrary others 
perceived the “costs could be drastically reduced due to numbers,” and hence “help reduce 
costs to an Adviser's practice.” Once again, advisers who were in favour of individual licensing 
did so conditionally. They expect “the services delivered by current licensee are available at 
reasonable cost” by the new body, because they “are already under extreme pricing pressure 
and compliance complexity.” According to one respondent, if the costs were not kept 
“feasible”, then “the product providers will some how find a way to "reward ' advisers who use 
their product and pay their fee.” Survey participants confirmed, “licensees subsidise the cost 
of services to affiliated advisers.” Furthermore, the question was raised, “will the 
administration burden on advisers reduced under an individual license?” “Economies of scale 
is important,” because “too much compliance work” makes a single license unworkable 
according to some informants.  
Additionally, the expectations of respondents included the licensing body should have “the 
resources required to monitor and manage,” “was run efficiently and fairly” with “no ties union 
or government influences” nor “indirectly controlled by the institutions in the form of 
'corporate sponsorship'” with “vested interest.”  They want to see a new body “decreases red 
tape…and makes doing business easier.” Worrying for one respondent was “no board has 
shown any ability to appear independent - they usually have some vested interest.”  What 
troubled advisers was the potential loss of “the backing of a large financial institution who 
owns the AFS license and appoints authorised representatives and monitors and supervises 
them.”  
Also, the forfeiture of subsidised support services licensees provides, such as “business 
planning and development support”, “Professional Indemnity Ins, Adviser software, practice 
management support training/technical support etc” was seen cannot be provided by a single 
board. However, another made counter claims “back office and other support services can be 
delivered by other parties in competition with each other,” whereby, “advisers can pay a 
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registration fee to a single board and pay for services independently of their license.” This 
latter claim was supported with evidence, such as the likes of “CPA Australia and ICA can 
survive independently and compete.”  
Some respondents added finer details of what they would like to see the board provide. “Degree 
from a recognised university, post degree course administered by professional body, 
registration by governement body.” It should offer “a single set of standards for example, asset 
allocation, standard terminology for clients to understand (and agreed benchmarks with 
narrow deviation) and very strict compliance and disciplinary standards for those who choose 
to not comply.” An added problem highlighted was uncertainty as to “how this would remove 
the bias towards in house products as advisers would still have to work with APL and sales 
targets.” Additionally, there should be “appropriate distinctions for exactly what advice that 
'professional' is licensed to provide. Eg Insurance specialists (no other services offered) are 
designated differently to investment specialist - and variation thereof (no insurance), different 
to those who offer a bit of both.” 
6.6.5 Stamp out conflict of interest from association 
Generally it seems advisers were unsure whether individual licensing of advisers through a 
single independent professional standards board will completely eliminate conflict of interest 
from association based on a mean level of agreement score of 52 per cent [48 per cent, 57 per 
cent] with a moderate effect size of .536 [Table 6.5] and moderately low squared multiple 
correlations of .39 [.311, .555] [Appendix 5.25, Table 25].  
Although it might “not eradicate conflicts,” “it will resolve possibly the biggest issue standing 
in the way of clients' best interest being satisfied (all of the time).” The excuse is “advisers 
can't know all the products in the market so well as to satisfy their know your product 
obligation for all of them, so a close alignment with a product provider is inevitable.” Many 
respondents appeared to sit “mid way with this one.” The difficulty appears,  although they 
“agree with a Professional Standards Board,” they did not “see how this will stop Conflicts of 
Interest.” Those who felt conflicts interest will be eliminated, held it would provide them with 
control to enforce better ethical culture within licensees. “If financial planners hold a licence 
and can choose their association and change at will, more pressure on the institutions to 
comply with legislation and look after clients rather than push profits.” To overcome this 
problem of control by licensees is to ensure “the ability for advisers to get paid by the products 
are removed as well.”  
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However, others argue, product bias will remain a problem despite the licensing regime, 
because there is a “personal bias” together with “other sources of product bias such as business 
efficiency,” as well as “poor sales practices, or simply inexperienced advice or business 
processes lacking in structure.”  “As long as advisers are involved in recommending product 
and implementing product solutions beyond SMSF set up, product providers will continue to 
try and influence advisers.” At risk of the greatest influence by licensees are the employee 
advisers who “still need to work through a company - at least initially to gain experience. These 
companies will have their preferences for products and platforms and will influence the 
services the advisers offer.” It has been reported earlier, “BDMs” of licensees allegedly will 
continue to use “sales incentives like commissions, marketing allowances, white labeled 
products etc.”  
Additionally, it is contended “'white label' products with the product manufacturers” remains 
a problem and “may compromise the independence depending on how it is incorporated into 
the business.” “Commercial reality will simply generate new conflicts”is thus a reason put 
forward why a single body will fail. Mentioned again by advisers, the “problem is conflicted 
remuneration rather than that created by association alone.” For some the conflicted 
association was an issue of ethics: “Advisers are either conflicted or not. Licencing is not the 
issue. Ethics of advisers is the issue.”  
Despite these misgivings above, advisers recognise a solution is to “De-link product and 
advice”, and thus “separate the product owner from the Adviser,” because, while “the two are 
connected, you have conflict.” 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
The quantitative results clearly show the current AFSL-AR licensing model is illegitimate. This 
research answered the four investigative questions highlighted in Chapter 4. Firstly, financial 
advisers perceived a dual-agency role between Licensee-Adviser-Client. They agreed with 
financial planning literature claiming advisers serve the interests of both the licensees and 
clients simultaneously, which they confirmed does lead to a conflict of interest. This conflict 
of interest they confirmed was indeed from association to third-party often commercially 
driven product oriented conflicted licensees. Secondly, advisers empirically confirmed 
licensing advisers through third parties is inconsistent with four objectives of the Act. Thirdly, 
the observed research confirmed in the eyes of financial advisers, the current AR-AFSL 
licensing model fails the legitimacy criteria of Suchman's legitimacy framework applied to 
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financial planning theory. Finally, financial advisers were cautiously in favour of an alternative 
licensing option disconnecting them from third-party licensees based on other professions, such 
as accounting, medical and legal. They were in favour of considering a single independent 
professional financial planning standards board to regulate, not only the education of individual 
advisers, but also their registration, competency, conduct, standards and disciplinary issues, as 
an option to eliminate conflict of interest from association.  
However, observed in the commentary by advisers, licensing advisers is a difficult issue with 
many other variables at play, leading to more complexity and perhaps even confusion. 
Interestingly, best interest duty has changed the perception of whom advisers are working on 
behalf of, even though the legislation does not reflect this. Advisers also find it challenging to 
attend both the licensees’ and clients’ interest simultaneously. Furthermore, the diverse benefits 
licensees gain from authorising advisers is not as transparent as one would expect and seems a 
difficult matter for advisers to reflect on and discuss.  
Misalignment of adviser-client interests may also be a licensee-adviser and/or a licensee-client 
interest misalignment. Licensing advisers via a third party is problematic within the context of 
licensees’ business models, remuneration models and culture. In addition, it seems the 
following may negatively affect the adviser-client relationship in terms of achieving the four 
objectives of the Act: 1) AR employee or self-employment status with the licensee; 2) licensee 
influence over advisers; 3) application of licensee APLs and 4) adviser KPIs or performance 
indicators implemented by licensees.  
Statutory fiduciary duty is the most significant variable driving the illegitimacy of the current 
licensee-adviser representative licensing model. The second most important source of 
illegitimacy is the objective of the Act, aligning adviser-client interests. Interestingly, the 
tension between licensees’ commercial interests and advisers’ fiduciary duty is the third key 
factor delegitimising the current AFSL-AR licensing model. This means these variables, 
together with advisers’ view clients would have more trust in advisers licensed via a single 
licensing model, were significant determinants driving the illegitimacy of the current AFSL-
AR licensing model.  
Consequently, survey respondents, albeit with some misgiving and reservations, support the 
argument to change the current licensee-adviser licensing model to individual professional 
adviser licensing via a monopoly professional independent regulatory body.
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APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 6 
APPENDIX 6.1 
Table 28 Means or Intercepts: [Group number 1 - Default model] Bootstrapped ex and cum CLF  
    
Parameter Survey statement Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Dual [a1] Advisers are dual agents 76.973 1.912 40.266 *** 
Simult [a2] Simultaneously serving licensee and client 61.779 2.188 28.234 *** 
BestRev [a3] Generating revenue for licensees 78.485 1.767 44.416 *** 
Structural [a4] conflict of interest from association 74.519 2.043 36.477 *** 
AlignAct [a5] Aligning adviser-client interests is difficult 60.328 2.363 25.528 *** 
CoIAct [a6] Unavoidable conflicts of interest present  65.137 2.313 28.159 *** 
FiducAct [a7] Greater risk of breaching best interest duty 58.836 2.288 25.717 *** 
CompAct [a8] Advisers limited from competing fairly 51.279 2.305 22.247 *** 
Regulative [a9] Risk of unintentional Act compliance breaches  47.584 2.335 20.375 *** 
Consequential [a10] Licensee commercial interests compromising adviser best interest duty 63.630 2.263 28.112 *** 
Procedural [a11] Sales window dressed to comply with the Act 61.160 2.356 25.956 *** 
Personal [a13] 
Aligned leaders of licensees aim to protect their product distribution channels when 
lobbying 
78.282 1.796 43.594 *** 
Cognitive [a14] Public cannot clearly distinguish s923A independent advisers from those who are not 62.172 2.269 27.401 *** 
Trust [a16] Individual licensing will improve public trust and confidence in advisers 63.733 2.327 27.386 *** 
Independence [a17] Individual licensing will promote independence from product biased licensee 65.000 2.23 29.147 *** 
Professions [a18] Individual licence should be in line with other professions, such as medical 68.718 2.244 30.618 *** 
IPFPSB [a19] Advisers prefer individual licence through a single independent body 68.061 2.198 30.969 *** 
EliminateCoI [a21] Individual licensing will eliminate conflict of interest from association 52.424 2.167 24.188 *** 
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APPENDIX 6.2 
Difference in aligned, non-aligned and s923A independent advice 
The results are tabled in Table 29 below about the question: What is the difference in advice 
provided by aligned advisers, non-aligned advisers and independent advisers as defined by the 
Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001?  
Table 29 Difference between aligned, non-aligned & s923A independent 
Respondents claims Frequency Percent of n = 262 
There is a difference 128 48.85 
There is no difference 40 15.27 
There should not be a difference 32 12.21 
Missing responses 24 9.16 
Not much or very little 12 4.58 
Don’t know 11 4.20 
Not committing an answer 10 3.82 
It depends 5 1.91 
 
From Table 29 above obviously not all advisers agree there is or should be a difference in 
advice provided by aligned, non-aligned and independent advisers. Based on the responses 
surprisingly only 49 per cent agreed there was a difference. On the grounds of the number of 
missing responses (24), don’t know (11) and uncommitted responses (10) numbering 50 (19%) 
in total, it is apparent advisers found this question difficult to answer or did not want to answer 
it or chose not to answer the question. As already alluded to, by combining these findings with 
the findings of cultural-cognitive illegitimacy, it is clear advisers struggle with clearly defining 
their identity, role and performance. Evidence showed advisers differentiated between non-
aligned and s923A independence. How Advisers differentiated between aligned and 
independent licensees was based on APLs, remuneration models, presence of KPIs, product 
and the nature of the adviser-licensee relationship. As already alluded to, by combining these 
findings with the findings of cultural-cognitive illegitimacy, it is clear advisers struggle with 
clearly defining their identity, role and performance. 
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APPENDIX 6.3 
Licensees benefits of appointing, regulating and supervising advisers 
The question asking: What are the benefits to institutional licensees appointing, authorising 
and supervising ‘authorised representatives’? is tabled in Table 30 below. Advisers’ diverse 
responses, which were in some instances unclear, indicated it is necessary to explore this 
question further. For example, although the question asked advisers about what benefits 
licensees derive, six participants explained the benefit ASIC derives, namely “easier for 
regulators to monitor/supervise/regulate” or “Cheaper for ASIC.” It was as if they tried to 
avoid answering the question by deflecting the issue towards ASIC. Empirically proven, 
product distribution is the main reason licensees appoint and regulated authorised 
representatives. Overall, it appeared 102 out of 262 (39%) advisers used the term “control” in 
terms of product distribution; the compliance obligations of advisers; back office management 
of administration; advice process, procedures and outcomes; and management of the APLs.  
Table 30 Licensees benefits derived from advisers   
Respondents claims Frequency Percent of 262 
Control product distribution 49 18.70 
Financial benefits 47 17.94 
Control the compliance obligations of advisers 29 11.07 
Economies of scale benefits 24 9.16 
Lower cost benefits 23 8.78 
Adviser benefits mentioned ignoring licensee benefits 18 6.87 
No benefits to licensees 16 6.11 
Missing responses 15 5.73 
Benefit when clients’ best interests are met 12 4.58 
Benefit from authorised representatives recruiting 
clients for licensees 12 4.58 
Increased legal protection benefits for licensees by 
authorising advisers 12 4.58 
Control back office management of administration, 
advice process, procedures and outcomes 12 4.58 
Control management of the APLs 8 3.05 
ASIC benefits 7 2.67 
Do not know how licensees benefit 7 2.29 
Sharing of compliance risk between licensee and 
adviser benefits 5 1.91 
Increased public "brand" awareness benefits 5 1.91 
Reduced competition benefits 4 1.53 
Unspecified control benefits 4 1.53 
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APPENDIX 6.4 
Statement of advice without product recommendations 
To determine whether advice is SOA are only product related, the question asked: Have you 
ever prepared a SOA [Statement of Advice] without any product recommendations? [Why or 
why not?] Table 31 recorded results of the responses. 
Table 31 Frequency of non-product recommendation SOAs    
SOA with no financial product recommendations? [Yes/No] Frequency Percent 
Yes 204 77.9 
No 58 22.1 
Total 262 100 
 
APPENDIX 6.5 
One-off approvals 
Table 32 records the results of the question: Have you ever applied for one-off approvals 
financial products or investments not on you licensees’ approved product list? Why or why 
not? As was the case with non-product SOAs, most respondents have applied for one-off 
product approvals. The reasons provided by the 21 per cent who have not applied for one-off 
approvals were diverse. The 12 of the 55 [22 per cent] claimed the APL was sufficient to meet 
the clients’ needs, followed by nine out of 55 [16 per cent] who claimed the APL they were 
using was broad, extensive and open. Thirteen per cent of this group were self-licensed and 
managed their own APLs, whereas one participant claimed, “I diont have an approved product 
list”. 
Table 32 Frequency of one-off approval applications 
One-off approval applications? [Yes/No] Frequency Percent 
Yes 206 78.6 
No 55 21.0 
Missing response 1 0.4 
Total 
 
262 100 
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CHAPTER 7: LEGITIMACY OF THE CURRENT LICENSEE-
ADVISER LICENSING MODEL: KEY 
FINDINGS AND POLICY ISSUES 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
From the phenomenological perspective of legislative, agency, financial planning and 
legitimacy theories, as well as empirically judged by financial advisers, the current licensing 
model lacks legitimacy. Therefore, this chapter begins with a discussion of the key findings 
organised around the four key research issues validating licensee-adviser licensing’s 
illegitimacy. Thereafter, an argument follows the implications for practice and policy for all 
the stakeholders.  
7.2 ADVISER DUAL-AGENCY ROLE AMBIGUITY 
During data analysis, albeit with hesitation, advisers concur that under the current licensing 
model, they serve two masters as dual agents simultaneously. They confirmed licensing 
advisers via third-party commercially driven licensees leads to a conflict of interest from 
association. Mainly, because licensees are earning various permutations of technical, and hence 
questionable types of revenue, while advisers serve their clients’ best interests at the same time.  
With some level of uncertainty when reflecting on the licensee-adviser-client agency role, 
advisers sanction their agency relationship is both an adviser-client relationship and a licensee-
adviser relationship. The empirical results, together with agency theory, models and 
propositions produced in personal financial planning courses and their textbooks in Australia 
(Beal & McKeown 2009; Banister et al. 2013; Taylor, Juchau & Houterman 2013) revealed 
the emphasis is the client-adviser relationship.   
In contrast, the licensee-adviser relationship is neglected in financial planning textbooks and 
tertiary education courses. Consequently, some advisers seem to ignore, neglect or mentally 
discard s916A and s916B legislated licensee-adviser agency relationships definition in 
practice, conceptually and empirically. Evidence of a mismatch between advisers’ perception, 
understanding and even practise of the licensee-adviser relationship is present. Evident in the 
data collected, this includes what has been legislated. In practice advisers see the adviser-
licensee relationship as merely an unimportant legal arrangement of compliance, which they 
must live with and accept. Accordingly, they ignore this relationship.  
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Contrary to the terms in s916A and s916B, namely “to provide a specified financial service or 
financial services on behalf of the licensee”, the results revealed advisers no longer perceive 
themselves as operating on behalf of AFS licensees. Since the implementation of statutory best 
interest duty, the legislated adviser-licensee relationship, of agent117 (Den-Toll 2001) and 
principal providing services to the public118 has changed in the eyes of advisers. Instead of 
acting on behalf of licensees, the introduction of statutory fiduciary duty has forced advisers to 
act on behalf of clients (Sitkoff 2014). Therefore, a division exists between how the advisers 
defined their and their licensees’ role in practice, compared to how the Act defines these roles. 
It is unclear whether this viewpoint comes from themselves or through conditioning, training 
or marketing from their licensees, or the financial planning literature. A consistent theme in the 
qualitative data analysed is most advisers consider licensees as merely supervising, monitoring 
and providing support services, such as compliance, software, marketing, professional and 
business development, branding, product, professional indemnity and technical research. For 
advisers, whether rightly or wrongly, licensees serve them, not the other way around. If this is 
how advisers think and operate, then it means (1) the Act is either out of sync with what is 
taking place in practice and/or (2) financial planning practice is out of sync with the terms and 
requirements of the Act.  
Also, evident in the commentary of respondents, are both direct and indirect licensee-client 
relationships affecting the adviser-client and the licensee-adviser relationship. The licensee-
client relationship is not a specific conceptual focus in financial planning scholarly literature 
(for example, Beal & McKeown 2009; Banister et al. 2013; Taylor 2017). This confirmed that 
not only is agency theory hardly presented in many Australian financial planning literature, but 
also the legislation does not represent the dynamics of the relationships between licensee-
adviser-client, which is subsequently mirrored in practice.  
In support of the views of Kingston and Weng (2014, p.294), namely conflicts of interest arise 
when agents serve two principals simultaneously, noticeably a major conflict, ranked in the top 
three is the commercial interests of licensees compromising best interest duty. Problematic, 
generating revenue for licensees is a compulsory part of the process for advisers. Seemingly, 
licensee’s revenues earned from advisers was claimed to complement other services, 
particularly the benefit of having product distribution networks.  
                                                 
117 Section 761A and Section 916A of the Act. 
118 Section 761G of the Act. 
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Some advisers claimed in practice, they were forced to choose between either serving the 
interests of the client and the licensee, especially when their AFS licensees had an internal 
product recommendation bias expectation. Several reasons were proposed by advisers that 
make serving both parties simultaneously difficult. For instance, the inherent conflict of interest 
plays itself out in the restrictive APLs. Advice was also limited to the level of risk the licensee 
was able or prepared to accept. The qualitative data indicated the commercial arrangement 
between the licensee and their advisers determines whether and how licensees earn revenue 
through their advisers.  
Licensees’ remuneration models [flat fee, percentage of revenue, licensee split of fees charge 
for advice, platform fees, product fees or fees they charge advisers to use their services, and/or 
any volume rebates for specific products], including the type of product sold, looks to be a key 
conflict from association. Yet, apparent some advisers claimed licensees aimed to cover costs 
only. Thus, they do not make any profit from authorising financial advisers. This begs the 
question are there not-for-profit licensees also operating within the Financial Services industry 
then. Unexpectedly, were the proclamations by some advisers they never reflected on the 
revenues licensees earned from them. From the qualitative evidence, advisers’ explanation 
points to oblivion, ignorance, conflict, emotionality, myopia, lack of interest, notwithstanding 
even discomfort when they were asked about licensees’ benefits. Remarkably, some advisers 
even presented nonsensical qualitative data to deflect or avoid committing an opinion when 
reflecting on the benefits, especially revenue related benefits licensees receive by authorising 
advisers. A possible reason for this myopia is licensees keep advisers in the dark when it comes 
to the volume rebates or indirect revenue they generate via product for their licensees when 
they recommend products to clients. Advisers admit that serving the interests of licensees and 
clients simultaneously is confusing.  
As was found in an Australian study by Smith (2009) licensees’ threatened their salaried 
representatives with dismissal if they did not achieve product revenue targets. Notwithstanding, 
as evident from the submissions to Government during the Ripoll (Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009b) and Murray Reviews 
(Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2014) the study 
confirmed some advisers feel the lack of structural independence adversely impacts the quality 
of advice. Licensees, advisers claimed, have the power, notwithstanding the authority to control 
the quality of advice, the flow of funds via APLs and the sources of revenue. The power of the 
conflicted licensee to use technology to monitor advisers’ performance in terms of meeting the 
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licensees’ commercial interests and expectations was claimed to overwhelm the best interests 
of the client. The control licensees exercise over remuneration is reinforced by the fact 
licensees are the only party legally permitted to collect revenues from clients. Informants 
alleged licensees are legally authorised to deduct their fees allegedly with or without the 
consent of the advisers. Surprising, there was uncertainty among advisers exactly how much 
they were earning for the licensee as a revenue centre. In contrast, this is not the case when the 
licensee is itself independent, where the clients’ interest comes first, and the relationship is 
completely different.  
7.3 CONTRAVENTIONS OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH CORPORATIONS ACT 2001 
Additionally, at the macro-level institutional [social] illegitimacy (Chen & Roberts 2010) is 
present. The external institutional forces (Soin & Huber 2013), in the form of the legal 
requirement to achieve the objectives of the Act as enforced by ASIC via AFSL licensees, is 
contributing to the illegitimacy (Chelli, Durocher & Richard 2014) of the AFSL-AR licensing 
model. From advisers’ observations and experience, licensing advisers via third parties makes 
it hard to align adviser-client’s interests, eliminate conflicts of interest, comply with the 
statutory best interest duty, and maintain fair competition.  
Best interest duty obligations is the top reason for deligitimising the current AFSL-AR 
licensing model. Whereas, the results indicated misalignment of adviser-client interest is 
empirically proven the second highest contributing factor delegitimising current licensing. The 
claim by Bender (2011) legitimacy was threatened by conflicts of interest, was found true 
empirically. Advisers substantiate, the conflict of interest from association is a significant 
problem for the emerging financial planning profession. More advisers agree than disagree 
licensing advisers via multiple third parties threatens competition within the advisory sector.  
In line with claims in the literature (see for example, Black 2005; Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009b; Bowen 2010; Johnsen 2010; 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2012a; Inderst & Ottaviani 2012d; Kell 
2012; Kingsford Smith 2012; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services 2015) this study confirmed advisers view remuneration practices, ownership 
structures, licensees’ product sales culture, licensees’ incentives and/or lack of professional, 
educational and ethical standards, which are all linked, as subsequent reasons for the failure of 
advisers achieving the four objectives of the Act successfully.  
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Uncontentious on the prevailing evidence, licensing advisers via third parties creates business 
models that place them at greater risk of unintentionally [and in some instances intentionally] 
breaching their best interest duty obligations. Thus, substantiated in this research was the 
suggestion by Degeling and Hudson (2014), limiting advisers’ recommendations to the 
authorisations of their AFSLs leads to unintentional violations of the best interest duty. 
Although, it is well-recorded in the literature review best interest duty should override conflicts 
in theory, the evidence confirms, it is impractical to implement in practice. Specifically, in the 
presence of conflict of interest from association complying with the best interest duty is tricky 
according to the data collected.  
Licensees and their advisers are unsuccessful in achieving the objectives of the Act, because 
the results reveal the presence of a poor product sales culture within aligned licensees 
confirming findings in the literature review (Smith 2009; Steen, McGrath & Wong 2016). 
Furthermore, this culture is facilitated by the ownership structures between licensees and 
advisers as suggested by Goedecke (2001). Closely associated with a poor product sales 
culture, advisers confirmed the findings of Smith (2009, p. 316), namely licensees’ compliance, 
business development, area and/or distribution managers ‘encourage’ them to sell the 
licensees’ in-house financial products. Advisers explained licensees’ control over them made 
them powerless from avoiding contraventions of the best interest duty.  
Although, the results acknowledged some aligned licensees have removed sales or income 
targets for their authorised representatives, their in-house product sales performance is still 
captured under a ‘performance review’ which determines their employment. Therefore, instead 
of obvious product sales targeted KPI’s, some licensees have moved to performance reviews 
in conjunction with the cultural pressure as a method to influence advisers’ recommendations 
to specific product solutions. Furthermore, licensees have the power to manipulate their 
employees with threats of dismissal or forfeiture of remuneration [specifically, bonuses and 
support services] if they fail to follow procedures designed to serve the licensees’ interests. For 
instance, writing the bank’s business to achieve individual KPIs. Strikingly from the results, 
salaried employee advisers are forced into ethical dilemmas they are unable to control. It seems 
if licensees dictate the terms or have influence over the adviser, then the adviser finds it harder 
to effectively manage, control and/or avoid conflicts of interest, in comparison to situations 
where the advisers dictate the terms of their licensee-adviser relationship. 
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Additionally, on the grounds of the evidence, this burden to sell products leads to the 
misalignment of adviser-client interests. This enquiry also validates claims by secondary non-
academic sources, Australian aligned licensees limited their ARs to recommendations of 
mainly products they select and assess for the approved product list (Australian Government 
The Treasury 2014; Sheehan 2016). The qualitative data highlights it was even difficult for the 
most ethical bank advisers facing limited APLs to align their interests with the best interests of 
the client. Advisers agree, it is difficult to manage conflicts, if financial products on APLs are 
linked to professional indemnity insurance (Stewart 2013) to reduce the licensees’ risk.  
Seemingly, the practice to link PI to products on the APLs is questionable, because it limits 
APLs. Limiting APLs to PI approved products, arguably, serve to ‘encourage’ advisers to 
recommend only these products. Debatably, this practice increases the risk of advisers 
breaching the best interest duty. Although secondary evidence suggests PI’s purpose is to 
reduce the licensees’ risk, no mention is made of the potential risks clients of financial advisers 
face by the practice of linking PI to APLs. Seemingly, advisers are unaware they are failing the 
client in this regard.  
Even though aligned licensees apply rigorous standards of compliance within an audit process, 
they tend to default protecting their interests if they believe they can get away with it. This is 
at the expense of their clients, because the large aligned licensees spend money to work out 
ways to argue legally they are satisfying the best interest duty. The statements in their 
standardised Statements of Advice documents is proof of licensees protecting themselves, 
regardless of how different a client’s circumstances are from one another. On the grounds of 
the evidence, and in line with the viewpoint of Tuch (2005, p. 38), there is an inconsistency 
between the regulations of managing, controlling or avoiding conflicts of interest and the 
statutory obligations. 
Although counter claims proposed one-off approvals for products unavailable on the APL is 
the solution, it was clear from the qualitative results not every adviser was permitted to apply 
for or even be granted one-off approvals. Some licensees disallow one-off approvals. Where 
licensees permit one-off approvals, they make the application process a time-consuming, 
unproductive and fruitless endeavour for the adviser to discourage them from applying. By 
implication, licensees do not want advisers to move away from the restricted approved product 
list.  
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While one can argue a truly ethical adviser will leave such an employer, doing so, according 
to respondents, is not always possible for those advisers who are lured to incur high personal 
loan obligations with the licensee. Thus, they accept offers of significant loans, which 
potentially locks them into long-term arrangements with the licensee. It is some strategy 
licensees use to better control the adviser. Some licensees allegedly have even suggested to 
their advisers, selling in-house products ensures the continuation of the licensee. This type of 
licensee ‘pressure’ increases the cultural tolerance by bank employees to mis-sell, and hence 
misalign interests. Therefore, despite licensees obligations by law to monitor their agent’s work 
in accordance with ASIC’s (2007) enforcement requirements to prevent moral hazard, together 
with questionable licensee practices, it seems licensees demand alternative adviser behaviour.   
The qualitative findings support the counter arguments proposed by respondents, namely the 
advisers with greater autonomy from licensees, such as the independents, cannot be 
‘encouraged’ by distribution managers to support the licensees’ products. Thus, empirically, it 
is dubious the current licensing regime has the power to make licensees’ revenue interests 
congruent with clients’ best interests. The findings reveal this additional agency relationship 
between licensees and advisers creates a potential, as well as an actual, incongruence between 
the interests of the authorised representatives and their licensees. In turn, this creates an 
incongruence between the interests of advisers and their clients. Starke (2013b) drew attention 
to the subject of congruency between the interests of clients and individual professional 
advisers as essential to any profession.  
Disturbing was the ever-present licensee and adviser remuneration model problem. This 
subject of conflicted licensee remuneration models, note not adviser remuneration models, was 
continually raised by respondents. The qualitative data suggested, apparently it is all in the way 
licensees frame the remuneration within the context of disclosures to comply with the 
legislation. Seemingly, respondents accuse some licensees of using terminology for various 
types of fees to mask the true nature of the remuneration.  
Advisers reported in the empirical study that the disclosures have not been as transparent as 
they were intended to be in the legislation. Although, this conflict can be managed at licensee 
and adviser level, effective management of this conflict ultimately relies on the integrity of the 
adviser and the culture of the licensee. Surprisingly, parliament members of the 
Commonwealth of Australia (2014a) conceded, although conflicts of interest is morally wrong, 
they are legally permitted as long as they are disclosed and clients consent to them. This view 
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by the government commentators is questionable, because in accordance with ASIC’s 
Regulatory Guide 181119, it is insufficient to just disclose conflicts and obtain consent from 
clients.  The control licensees have over advisers via APLs, together with a culture geared 
towards product distribution contributes to the futility of managing this conflict of interest 
effectively. Therefore, it is counterproductive to permit licensees through their advisers to 
manage conflict of interest from association via disclosures. Although disclosures reduce 
licensees and possibly their advisers’ risks, the evidence declares it does so at the expense of 
increased risks to their clients. Again, advisers confirmed the difficulty of achieving this 
objective of the Act is particularly evident among employees and/or BOLR120 product-aligned 
advisers, who are incentivised, influenced or coerced by their licensees.  
Recall from the literature review, Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) maintained when faced with 
intense competition for retail customers, financial services sales force [advisers] require more 
incentives from their institutions, while complying with specified standards. Some qualitative 
results confirmed this issue.  Also perceived by the non-aligned independent advisers as anti-
competitive behaviour, common among the aligned advisers was the practice of third line 
forcing, which occurs when a loan application is only approved if the client also obtains 
insurance from the same provider. By implication, product-aligned licensees improve their 
product distribution in this way. Furthermore, advisers alleged banks subsidise their advice 
delivery from vertical integration in practice by defraying the costs and support services, of 
running the license onto other parts of the business.  
The findings in this research support the conclusions of Moran (2014) and Kennedy (2012), 
who concluded that the current licensing legislation encourages advisers towards larger 
conflicted product-aligned licensees to protect business value, save cost, obtain subsidisation 
of support services, while managing their uncertainty. Consequently, an independent adviser 
is at a competitive disadvantage by comparison. Survey respondents in this investigation 
further verify the submission in  the Murray (Commonwealth of Australia 2014a) and ASIC 
                                                 
119 Regulatory guide 181. Licensing: Managing conflicts of interest. Chapter 7 - Financial services and 
markets outlines the ASIC’s approach to how conflicts should be controlled, avoided and disclosed. 
120 Recall from Chapter 3 some aligned institutions restrict adviser ownership of the clients introduced to the 
licensee by, for example offering buyer of last resort (BOLR) terms (Independent Financial Adviser News 2016c). 
These agreements require self-employed advisers to leave the clients with the licensee when they transfer to 
another licensee. The abandoned licensee purchases the clients they “own’ indirectly, from the adviser leaving, 
based on some formula or multiple of revenue specified in the BOLR agreement. Unless of course the leaving 
adviser sells these clients to an authorised representative who is already authorised by or approved by the 
abandoned licensee. BOLR is also being used to purchase clients within networks to pass onto the younger up and 
coming ‘authorised representatives’ of the product-aligned licensee when advisers retire (Pokrajac 2013).   
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(Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016i) reviews of the consequences by the 
high concentration of vertical integration in financial services. For example, the licensing 
provisions and regulatory framework potentially limits competition, contributes to conflicts of 
interest, and lowers investor confidence, while it imposes barriers to the entry and growth for 
new entrants. Although, aligned advisers market, to clients, advice backed by large institutions 
is an advantage over small institutions, respondents claim they fail to inform the client large 
institutions have large and expensive legal teams to protect the licensees’ interests.  
Problematic, advisers think the objectives of the Act are not being met. More so, if the 
perspective of the Australian Government and ASIC with FOFA is to address conflicts of 
interest by introducing the principle of putting the priorities of clients first (Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission 2013a, 2014c; Sinodinos 2014). Furthermore, it was 
documented earlier in this thesis, the Australian Financial Systems Inquiry (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2014a) singled out aligning financial institutions [presumably licensees and their 
advisers] and consumers’ interests. Confusingly, past Australian Government commentators 
(Sinodinos 2013c, 2013a) announced at various conferences, the political agenda is about 
eliminating conflicts of interest within financial planning.  
7.4 ILLEGITIMACY OF LICENSEE-ADVISER LICENSING 
In the next part, the strategic [organisational] (Suchman 1995) illegitimacy of the AFSL-AR 
licensing model is discussed, which is an examination at the ‘micro-level’. Simply, when 
regulative, normative [moral] and cultural-cognitive legitimacy of the AFSL-AR licensing 
model was assessed by the internal actors (Tilling 2004b), these criteria indicated this licensing  
model was unsupported by the advisers.  
About regulative illegitimacy, the evidence revealed in practice there were not only 
unintentional compliance transgressions, but also the occurrence of intentional breaches. 
Advisers, not only limited to aligned advisers, perceive compliance violations. Recall North 
(2015) established in her study, the current licensing regulations have disseminated a range of 
business models covering different standards, structures and sizes. Subsequently, this enquiry 
recognized further, these business and remuneration models, encouraging product sales 
volumes, were among several issues blamed for the compliance contraventions. Findings 
revealed, the level of the product ‘sales’ culture licensee leaders encouraged within their 
institutions determined the extent of compliance breaches. Interestingly, the qualitative data 
corroborate the findings in a study by Smith (2009,  p. 326), namely advisers became frustrated 
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when licensees lacked any desire to implement consistent behaviour and adviser conduct 
standards across their financial advisory groups. Furthermore, there were clear differences in 
opinion among respondents as to whether the licensees’ compliance managers and the strict 
controls licensees imposed prevented compliance violations or not. Also unclear among 
respondents, which was highlighted in the literature review as important (Considnine & Ali 
Afzal 2011; Carlin & Gervais 2012), was the issue as to who [advisers, or the licensees or both] 
is ultimately accountable and in what proportions after a compliance breach.  
In terms of normative [moral] illegitimacy, advisers significantly agree that they perceive the 
current licensing model is unable to attain the morals, values or ethics (Chen & Roberts 2010; 
Chua & Rahman 2011) around outcomes, policies, procedures, practice goals, activities, and/or 
structure (Suchman 1995; Bitektine 2011) within the financial advisory sectors’ socially 
accepted (Johnson & Holub 2003) or socially constructed value system (Bitektine 2011). 
Results revealed the model failed the tests for consequential, procedural, structural and 
personal moral legitimacy. Significantly, the third highest contributing factor delegitimising 
the licensee-adviser licensing model is licensees’ commercial interests compromising the 
clients’ best interest duty. 
Convincingly, as explained in the literature (Maclean & Behnam 2010; Perkins & Monahan 
2011), this research shows financial institutions struggle to manage regulatory compliance 
when the legal requirements appear to conflict with or compromise commercial activities. 
Advisers claimed in the empirical study of this project that the profit motive to achieve 
shareholder wealth maximisation is at the forefront of licensees’ goals. When considering 
consequential moral illegitimacy advisers provided strong evidence the presence of tension 
(Maclean & Behnam 2010), and compromises (Perkins & Monahan 2011), between the aligned 
licensees’ commercial interests and clients’ best interest duty obligations. This study validated 
aligned licensees are indeed “commercial businesses using advisers as a sales force” 
(Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2014, p. 24) to support 
shareholder theory121 (Griffiths 2007, p. 231; Lindorff & Peck 2010; Kofman & Murawski 
2015) instead of stakeholders’ interests to develop social capital122 (Lindorff & Peck 2010). As 
was argued in the literature review, this is understandable, because in accordance with the 
Australian Corporate Law, corporate executives of Australian corporations (Jones & Welsh 
2012, p. 373) must advance the interests of the shareholders, including complying with their 
                                                 
121 Shareholder wealth maximisation and/or profit maximisation. 
122 Goodwill, reputation and/or sustainability. 
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fiduciary duty to shareholders. Yet, the same law also expects licensees and their ARs, when 
managing conflicts of interest, to put the client’s best interests first [s961B], even when not in 
the licensees’ or the licensees’ shareholders’ interests (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2016i). Even though the client’s best interest duty should legally trump 
shareholder’s interests in practice, the findings in this research suggest otherwise. This enquiry 
reconfirms the conclusions by Smith (2009), namely when behaving ethically is perceived as 
unprofitable by licensees,  then the question of what licensees influence their advisers to do, as 
opposed to what they should actually do to comply, are two different things. Discovered in the 
qualitative data, the aligned licensees were aware they put their company profits, from 
expressly funds under management, ahead of the clients’ best interest, if they can get away 
with it. This is bad news, because, Griffiths (2007) wrote focusing on immediate shareholders 
profits results in negative social costs to retail clients.  
Furthermore, any incompatibility between the institutions’ values and the professional values 
of the adviser manifests into institutional-professional conflicts, which requires compromise 
(Bamber & Iyer 2002). The data in Chapter 6 adds further evidence to the findings of  Smith 
(2009, p.324) with regards to tension between professional-commercial obligations 
experienced by advisers due to, as mentioned before, cultural ‘sales pressure’ using legal 
control over their representatives (Carruthers 1995) from their licensees to meet their 
obligations around profit. However, it is acknowledged by the advisers, this cultural pressure 
is only prevalent among some licensees, especially without a doubt the case for bank 
employees. Many aligned advisers in the study blamed their licensees for favouring what 
several ASIC shadow shopping (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2003, 
2006, 2010a, 2012c) expeditions and reviews (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2016i) also identified was advice strategies linked to the specific branded 
products. Consequential illegitimacy makes professionalisation of financial advisers illusive, 
because according to Rubin (2015), institutions’ financial interests makes clients’ interests 
secondary in practice to that of the institutions.  
Advisers scored and explained in the empirical survey formal policies, processes and rules for 
legislative compliance differ from actual practice (Carruthers 1995) and behaviour (Scott 
2014). Thus, the quantitative results supported by the qualitative findings showed the current 
licensing model lacks procedural moral legitimacy. Accordingly, it is clear empirically that 
within the advisory sector of Australia, decoupling (Cole & Salimath 2013) by licensing 
advisers via third parties is present.  Although a few advisers see the compliance audits as 
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sufficiently rigorous, others see licensees using it as intentional compliance window dressing. 
From the evidence, it is apparent financial institutions decouple by developing relatively 
elaborate administrative systems (Carruthers 1995), while using compliance to window dress 
product distribution. This primary source back up the allegations licensees implement 
legislated practices, standards and procedures to hide (Sampson 2010) while reinforcing the 
advisers’ product distribution role (Valentine 2013; Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services 2014, p. 24).   
The reasons why Smith (2009, p. 319) found in her research licensee compliance officers failed 
to follow internal documented procedures and policies, as well as avoided encouraging the 
ethical decision making of the financial advisers they supervise, was further explained in 
findings of this research. Specifically, the qualitative results revealed commercial interests is a 
focus for licensees, even though it meant ‘unethical’ advisers were feted, and ethical ones 
ostracised as under-performing. This investigation upheld evidence in ASIC’s Report 515 
(Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2017e; Graham 2017) that, for instance, 
licensees adopted policies designed to appear to meet compliance without adequate 
implementation into their business culture, systems and processes (Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2016i). From the quantitative data collected and supported by the 
qualitative data, visibly achieving procedural legitimacy is not as straight forward as following 
rules and codes (Considnine & Ali Afzal 2011), while having best documented practice 
procedures and processes (Maclean & Behnam 2010) in place as a defence against accusation 
of bias, imprudence or violations of the Act.  
Advisers claim their affiliation to financial product issuers, essentially leads to conflict of 
interest from association. Generally advisers in this study agree with Valentine (2008), the 
underlying structural issue of ownership of advice by product issuers, is the crux of the 
problems in the financial advisory sector. From the available data this is the main reason why 
advisers believe they are being attacked from all political corners. Thus, clearly the current 
licensing model displays structural moral illegitimacy. Conflicts of interest is undesirable, 
because as we saw in the literature review (Goedecke 2001; Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services 2009b; Commonwealth of Australia 2014a) with 
empirical substantiated evidence discussed above, it misaligns adviser-client interests. 
Respondents authenticated, the observed findings of Smith (2009, p. 317) suggesting the 
management of conflicts of interest linked with licensee ownership structures contributed to 
financial advisers’ unethical behaviour. The statements by the Parliamentary Joint Committee 
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on Corporations and Financial Services (2009b) and Valentine (2013) with regards to the 
cohabitation of licensee-advisers being conflicted by ownership and their own products was 
tested and found true. The qualitative data suggests this is not only restricted to aligned 
advisers, but independent advisers too.  
Advisers validate points made in the literature (Collier 2003; Banister et al. 2013), namely they 
do try to observe professional obligations, but it is more difficult while they are affiliated to an 
ASIC licensee who also distributes products. By implication, the Act endorses conflict of 
interest from association, by authorising licensees to exert legal control over advisers. Survey 
respondents claimed that using compliance as a tool to discipline their authorised representative 
could lead to undesirable consequences. For instance, advisers claim in line with the views of 
Bearden (2002) the harmful consequences include financial interests can compromise advisers’ 
professional judgement, damage the adviser-client professional long term relationship of trust, 
notwithstanding the quality in the advisers’ work. The empirical evidence confirms licensees 
do control advisers like quasi-employees (Pokrajac 2014). Advisers generally do not have 
autonomy like other true professionals (Smith, Armstrong & Francis 2009). Furthermore, in 
support of the works of Scott (2013, p. 61), the cost and difficulty of monitoring the regulation 
through third parties, who may not necessarily be neutral, is a significant problem.  
Repeatedly informers mentioned, aligned advisers are encouraged to recommend the in-house 
product due to BOLR agreements. Arguably, it is suggested BOLR agreements could be 
viewed as ‘soft dollar’ incentives if it motivates advisers to support in-house or ‘white-label’ 
products. Therefore, this research supports the view of journalist (Kendell 2017); explicitly 
BOLR is contrary to the best interest of the client, because it results in no continuity for the 
client. NMG Consulting (2014) found in the UK, once client-adviser relationships are 
established, clients are often loath to switch advisers, even for the opportunity of making small 
financial gains, because trusted relationships under pin ongoing service arrangements 
(Financial Conduct Authority 2014c). If this is true for Australia too, then as Sampson (2010) 
reported and proven here empirically, the financial planning industry’s related systems 
combined with its associations, are structurally corrupt. Thus, licensing compliance enforced 
via third parties appears to be counterproductive. 
Mainly the seasoned survey respondents indicated, Federal and State politics seems to play a 
significant part in some of the woes the industry faces at present. Advisers perceived 
individuals of power work in the background and foreground (Carruthers 1995) politically 
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lobbying the government of the day to protect, notwithstanding benefit, their vested interests. 
Thus, the current licensing model does not meet the criteria for personal moral legitimacy. 
The data collected explained advisers felt, predictably, the first obligation of leaders of 
licensees is to shareholders or the employer. Although, a minority were supportive of leaders 
protecting product distribution, these informants fail to recognise the evidence of financial 
harm to the retail customers, notwithstanding the reputational damage to financial advisers and 
the licensees themselves, caused by protecting their distribution channels and business 
survival. Moreover, recall from the literature review, Young and Thyil (2014) proposed 
contemporary financial institutional leaders’ duty and moral obligation are to all stakeholders, 
not only shareholders, to be doing the right thing to obtain their implicit or explicit consent to 
operate. The extent stakeholders provide this consent to operate, they claimed, provides these 
institutions the legitimacy to operate.  
Licensing advisers via third parties results in cultural-cognitive illegitimacy. The findings 
reveal licensing advisers through third-party licensees is one of the reasons why the Australian 
public cannot clearly distinguish advisers who provide s923A independent advice from those 
who provide advice conflicted by product and/or remuneration bias. Secondary sources 
highlighted (Elliott 2006), to protect clients from being misled, fairly restrictive requirements 
of section 923A of the Act123 specifies when financial services providers can describe 
themselves or market their services as ‘independent’ to existing or potential clients.  
Yet, as explained in Chapter 3, media reports (Vickovich 2015; Santacruz 2016c; Plastow 
2017), ASIC action (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2016b) and a white 
paper launched by the Association of Independently Owned Financial Planning Professionals 
(Johnston & Walker 2017a) validated numerous financial advisers market themselves as 
independent without meeting all the requirements of s923A’s definition.  Upon further 
investigation using the qualitative data, like the pilot study findings reported in Chapter 5, 
advisers genuinely mistakenly, yet also intentionally, misunderstand and/or misinterpret the 
requirements of the legislation from a structural, operational and ethical perspective. 
Articulated by respondents, it appears they differentiate the services they offer in practice, 
based purely on ownership, product and/or remuneration practices. Like the findings in the 
pilot study, the data in the extended main study confirm advisers in some instances are defining 
the terms of s923A in their own way. Thus, resulting in the misapplication of this term, while 
                                                 
123 Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017C00328/Html/ 
Volume_1#primary-nav>. 
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arguably misleading the public. The problem is unobvious if a prospective client walks into 
one of the large well-known top five aligned financial institutions. According to respondents, 
in these cases, clients expect to be recommended the in-house product. On the contrary, not all 
self-licensed financial planning firms are 923A independent. Yet some of them present 
themselves as independent, while having some invisible arrangements with third-party 
product-aligned institutions.  
Acknowledged, this conflict of interest can be managed through disclosures (Serpell 2008). 
However, the results verify Sampson’s (2009) view and a Roy Morgan study (Morris 2013) of 
the common practice for licensees to own or have an interest in the financial planning group 
using multiple business names without disclosing its affiliated institutional brand 
conspicuously. Thus, disclosures as was discussed earlier, are proven ineffective as suggested 
in a paper by Bruhn and Miller (2014), because they are complicated, difficult to understand 
by the members of the public and unclear. Consequently, seemingly advisers misunderstand 
their identity [s923A independent or conflicted] and role [providing independent or conflicted 
advice] as financial advisers to achieve the objectives of the Act [performance] adequately.   
7.5 INDIVIDUAL PROFESSIONAL LICENSING LIKE OTHER 
PROFESSIONS 
The evidence is clear, advisers declare clients will have more confidence and trust in financial 
advisers if they were licensed under a single individual license via a single body with the same 
professional standards of education, appointment, registration, regulation, discipline 
and cessation as other professions. However, the data collected also highlights advisers’ 
uncertainty pertaining to what an individual licence would entail.  
Recall from the literatue review chapter, Balasubramnian, Brisker and Gradisher (2014) 
identified, trust is one of two most important determining factors influencing whether a person 
seeks financial advice. Widely publicised is the presence of a climate of instability and lack of 
confidence in financial planning in Australia (Hely 2012; Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2013a; Morgan & Levine 2015). According to the disclosures by most 
respondents, this lack of trust and confidence can be rectified with the implementation of an 
individual professional licensing regime. A minority disagreed; appealing it will depend on the 
adviser's ethics and integrity. Worrying, the minority admitted they accept scandals as 
inevitable, because scandals are evident in all professions. Although there was evidence aligned 
advisers felt the public was better serviced by large institutions, these respondents ignored the 
387 
 
fact that rogue financial advisers easily hide within large institutions (Valentine 2008; Beal & 
McKeown 2009; Cull 2009; Chua & Rahman 2011; Fitzpatrick 2011; Kingsford Smith 2011; 
Taylor 2011; Walton 2012). Furthermore, the disruption by technological advances is arguably 
a threat to large institutions (Greenleaf 2017).  
Although, in the literature review it was stated the public is confused or unsure when confronted 
by financial advisers of various competing financial planning institutions (Beaman 2010b), in 
practice respondents held most clients actually don’t know or care about which institution to 
deal with, because they deal with a trusted individual adviser irrespective of the brand the 
adviser may represent. This adviser view is startling given only a small percentage of the 
Australian public seek advice. In addition, this opinion makes a mockery of disclosure 
obligations and conflicts management obligations discussed in the Financial Services Guide.   
Among the most prevalent adviser fears of an individual licence to build public trust and 
confidence were the costs and complexity of starting out in the advice business. At the time of 
writing, no compelling evidence supported this latter notion of cost and complexity as an issue.  
Trust and confidence between principal and agent is imperative to professionalism (Evetts 
2011, 2014). Therefore, the use of legal rules to create legal trust relationships (Haigh 2006), 
such as the current licensing model, is inferred empirically as a potential source of distrust 
among the public. This finding further supports the discoveries of the  Professional Standards 
Councils (2014), namely licensees confirm improvement in trust and confidence would be one 
of the many benefits of professionalism. 
Essentially, recognized in Chapter 1,  most advisers in Australia are affiliated to financial 
product issuers. This affiliation threatens independence. Under-representation of independent 
advisers is undesirable, because Australians trust independent over conflicted advice more 
(Egan 2008; Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2010b). Empirically verified 
and validated here, most respondent advisers seek independence from licensees, because it 
would remove advisers from being bonded to an employer and/or licensee. Independence will 
provide the power and autonomy required to manage better any undue force from licensees to 
sell products. However, the results revealed advisers acknowledge the problem included 
licensees who manufacture and distribute product were also able to own advice businesses. 
Therefore, the problem is less the adviser, but the system the adviser is forced to operate within.  
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Furthermore, licensing, regulating and authorising individual advisers at the corporate 
commercial institutional licensee level, rather than at the individual professional adviser level 
(Sanders & Roberts 2015, p. 18), is proven to prevent alignment of adviser-client interests. 
Largely problematic is subjecting both the corporation [institutional licensees] (Australian 
Government Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee 2012) and ‘natural persons’ 
[individual financial advisers, including those who self-license] to the same licensing regime 
when clients do not receive personal financial advice recommendations from the institutional 
entities. Instead, retail clients develop a supposedly long-term relationship (Knie-Andersen 
2002; Johnsen 2010; Siddiqui & Sharma 2010; Bruce 2012, p. 86) of trust with ‘natural 
persons’ to provide recommendations supposedly in their best interests. Thus removing the 
connection between product institutions and individual advisers, may lead to a culture shift 
financial adviser sector needs to minimise the ongoing scandals (Steen, McGrath & Wong 
2016).  
From the results, advisers agree they should be licenced in a similar way to other professions, 
such as the accounting, legal and medical professions. Being judged and reported for 
misconduct by your peers, as is the case in the legal and accounting professions is an attractive 
proposition for most advisers responding to the survey. In the discussion so far, advisers 
confirm their individual capacity is being overridden by licensees and is an obstacle to financial 
planning becoming a true profession. Advisers claim licensees, particularly banks, have too 
much control over their advisers, especially employee ARs, who are keen to consider non-APL 
product recommendations, but their hands are tied by processes and procedures. It is 
understandable to some extent licensees control their employee advisers given they are at 
greater risk of legal liability if the employee is exposed to breach compliance. However, if 
advisers are licensed like other professions, then at least they are accountable as individuals 
(Considnine & Ali Afzal 2011). Thus, they are then answerable to their clients and their 
regulator. Advisers want the freedom to set their own standards of registration, education, 
practice, ethical conduct and discipline like other professions as proposed in the literature by 
Frumento and Korenman (2013).  
However, they do fear losing the subsidised support services, economies of scale and cost-
savings offered by licensees to which they have become accustomed. Interestingly, according 
to discussions with Troy Penney, a consultant in platform advice and solutions for Accounting, 
Financial Services and the Mortgage sector, the issue of subsidised costs paid by licensees, is 
a myth he alleges the licensees keep alive to instil ‘fear’ in their authorised representatives 
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advisers to retain them. For instance, Troy also explained, the PI cost is not that much different 
for advisers with an AFS licensee or who is self-licensed. Based on his AFSL cost of self-
licensing, he alleges the PI cost depends on the advisers’ business model [the larger number of 
ARs with a license the greater the cost, because the greater the risk compared to smaller 
licensees]. This claim is yet untested scientifically. 
The support by respondents of an individual professional licensing model modelled on other 
professions depends on several aspects, such as, but not limited to, professional standards, 
professional ethics, affordability, backed by research-based evidence, professional indemnity 
insurance, ongoing education, continuing independent compliance audits and the extent it is 
self-regulatory. Advisers were quite clear that it must exclude control by AFSL licensees, 
existing professional associations and the government, which is the case with other professions.  
Secondary sources declared, the government, Professional Standards Board (Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 2009b; Commonwealth of Australia 
2014b; Professional Standards Councils 2014) and the Australian Financial Planning 
Association (Spits 2013) are open to consider a self-regulatory licensing model for advisers 
like other professions. Thus, this research provides clear empirical evidence advisers are in 
favor of a self-regulatory individual license regulated through a single independent 
professional registration, competency, education, conduct, standards and disciplinary 
board.  By implication and on the grounds of the survey results, advisers are slowly coming 
around to the fact that they need to take control and be involved in professionalizing financial 
planning in Australia as a true profession.  However, it is clear from the overall findings 
advisers no longer want others controlling their conduct. They do not want their 
‘professionalism’ perpetually regulated by government, or licensees and professional 
associations with ties to licensees lobbying for them.  
The primary qualitative data also indicated this support for entering an era of self-regulation 
by a single IPFPSB is conditional.  They demand it is well resourced to enforce compliance, 
ensure efficiency and fairness, while having no ties to union, government and professional 
associations, including the government recognised FPA. They claim professional associations, 
like the FPA, are indirectly controlled by the AFSL institutions in the form of ‘corporate 
sponsorship’ with vested commercial interest. The Chartered Accountants Australia and New 
Zealand, as well as CPA Australia supported the possibility of individual licensing for financial 
advisers, but they were concerned individual compliance costs may discourage individuals 
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from obtaining an individual licence (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services 2014). Likewise, the concern for increased costs was among the greatest 
concerns in most of the commentary in the survey. Yet this opinion is unjustified according to 
commentaries by respondents who contended an opposite view.  For them, the costs could be 
drastically reduced due to economies of scale and decreases in red tape a single body can offer, 
with flow on effects to advisory practices and their clients. Once again, like broken record, 
advisers continued to express their concern for the loss of support services currently offered by 
licensees should an IPFPSB take over.  The fear of change is unfounded, because with any 
change comes new innovative solutions with the help of technological advances. In addition, 
existing or new stakeholders in competition with each other can deliver back office and other 
support services. Alternatively, advisers can pay a registration fee to the single board and pay 
for services independently of their license. If CPA Australia and ICA can survive 
independently and compete, then surely it is more so possible for a monopoly regulatory body 
within the financial advisory sector.  
However, not everyone was pleased with the idea of individual licensing, especially among 
those with their own AFSL, who felt they were already operating in this space, because they 
run an AFSL purely, so they can operate as an independent [as defined by the Act]. The lack 
of support by self-licensed independent advisers of individual licensing via a single body was 
unsurprising, because many have already invested quite a significant amount of time and 
money to apply for their own licence. Notwithstanding the costs they have incurred to ensure 
ongoing compliance. Furthermore, the lack of the finer implementation details, which is yet 
unresolved is possibly leading to these respondents’ uncertainty.  
Interestingly, no mention was made by any advisers as to the use of financial technology to 
make compliance and providing advisory services more inexpensive, efficient and effective 
(Morgan Stanley 2018). However, according to a discussion paper and background discussions 
with Simon Hoyle, Tom Reddacliff and Troy Penney, who all have a respected track records 
within the financial advisory sector, solutions to address these concerns are available (Hoyle 
2017f; Reddacliff 2017).  
By removing the licensee-adviser legislated relationship, advisers agree should reduce conflict 
of interest from association. They claim it will resolve possibly the biggest issue standing in 
the way of clients’ best interest being satisfied [all the time]. Thus, this claim is in line with 
Corones and Galloway’s (2013) perspective, namely conflict of interest from association 
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challenges advisers’ statutory fiduciary duty obligation. However, the commentary of 
respondents indicated an alternative licensing model would eliminate uncertainty as to the 
extent conflict of interest from association. On the available evidence, conflict of interest from 
association will only be eliminated to some extent, because other sources of product bias are 
obtainable. The respondents indicated, in the presence of APLs, disguised remuneration 
incentives [bonuses] and business incentives [marketing allowances, white labeled products], 
irrespective of the licensing model, conflicted association will endure.  Respondents claimed 
asset-based commissions,  as well as the ability for advisers to be paid by the product owners 
is still an issue in Australia. Notwithstanding licensees are rebadging ‘commissions’ as fee-for-
service. Additionally, although AFSL licensees argue their products and platforms allow for 
manager selection, advisers are still tied to those products and platforms.  Seemingly, from the 
statements made by advisers  remuneration earned between licensees, as well as between 
licensees and their advisers remains an issue despite what has been legislated. Plus, the role 
and job descriptions of business development managers is less about business development and 
more about product distribution of in-house, ‘private label’ and ‘white label’ financial products. 
For them, the commercial reality will simply generate new conflicts, because advisers will still 
be subject to incentive choices being made on a commercial basis.  
Practical implementation issues are on the minds of many advisers: for instance timeous audits 
by one body; some advisers who choose to be employees will still have to work for a product 
provider; and initially, advisers will still need to work through a company to gain experience, 
before being completely independent. Nothing stops advisers aligning themselves or in groups 
to a provider if mutually beneficial, which creates the bias. In addition to licensee power and 
lack of adviser autonomy, ethics of advisers are also at play in influencing whether conflict of 
interest from association can be eliminated. If financial advisers are independent they are in a 
better position to choose their association and/or change it at will without encumbrances, such 
as offers of loans licensees put in place to tie their advisers into long-term loyalty. By de-
linking product and advice will give advisers the power and authority to encourage the 
institutions to re-consider using cultural sales pressures to promote profits at the expense of the 
client’s best interest. Advisers acknowledged during this research, being affiliated to 
commercially oriented and/or product biased institutions is a major obstacle to professionalism. 
Despite the minority who oppose any change, change will also drive the advice focus from 
product sales to appropriate advice strategies, which makes the change a worthwhile endeavour 
despite the challenges.  
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7.6 PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
Placing most financial advisers under the regulatory control of licensees who are conflicted by 
product bias using the legislation, threatens independence, notwithstanding it also creates 
conflict of interest from association. From this evidence, it is time for a review of the terms and 
clauses of the Act about how the licensee-adviser-client relationship is defined and 
operationalised to reflect more accurately practice. Alternatively, it is time to review the 
perceptions; hence, practices, processes and procedures of advisers and licensees to reflect 
better the Act in terms of advisers acting on behalf of the licensees to provide services to clients. 
Advisers agree with North (2015), viz. for Australians to receive high quality reasonable priced 
financial advice, the advice industry requires more independent advisers.  
Recall the Australian financial planning emerging profession is likened to other professions in 
the literature (Ap 2011; Bruce 2012; Knutsen & Cameron 2012; Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2014f; Burke et al. 2015). Yet upon closer inspection, the way the 
Act structurally licenses individual advisers makes these claims misleading. As was mentioned 
in earlier chapters, doctors may supply their patients with their preferred pharmaceutical 
products (Everingham 2014). They may also be working for a large medical institution of some 
sort (Breakey & Sampford 2017, p. 262). Yet they are not licensed via these institutions.  
With support from advisers participating in this research, it is contended policymakers should 
no longer set individual licensing aside for another day. Proven illegitimacy in this study 
encourages policymakers, together with all financial planning stakeholders, to draw on the 
experience of other true professions, and hence work together towards disconnecting advisers 
from conflicted institutional licensees. Therefore, it is proposed here, an independent individual 
professional licence should be implemented to disconnect advisers from the control of licensees 
in line with the characteristics of a true professional.  Evidence gleaned from secondary sources 
indicate FOFA reforms, specifically, statutory fiduciary duty together with the recently 
legislated professional, education and ethics standards, may have started the process of 
financial advisers transitioning from acting on behalf of licensees as product sellers to financial 
advisers becoming a true profession.  
Accordingly, it is recommended the legislated FASEA should be tasked with more than just 
professional standards, education and ethics. FASEA should evolve to also appoint, register, 
regulate, discipline and cease individual advisers to practice their craft like true professionals. 
This body can independently authorise or revoke individual financial advisers’ authorisation 
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for violations of ethical or professional standards. A monopoly body will provide advisers 
greater autonomy, power, authority and independence from corporate licensees’ influence.  
Notably, other professions are often accredited via multiple independent professional bodies, 
covering multiple designations resulting in multiple challenges. In contrast, the emerging 
financial planning profession can distinguish themselves, by having a single monopoly body. 
A single entity makes sense, because mentioned in a submission to the Murray Review (Hoyle 
2017d), if government is considering effective ways to regulate the financial planning emerging 
profession, then as proposed by Professor Kingsford Smith (2014,p. 19) it should be done 
through a monopoly. The main reason cited by her is bodies that are either co-regulatory or 
self-regulatory tend to compete. This competition, according to Kingsford Smith (2014, p. 19), 
tends to lead to “a race to the bottom” in terms of conduct standards and enforcement. 
Therefore, licensing advisers via a single entity with monopoly powers will be a distinguishing 
feature of this profession. Expressly, it capitalises on the advantages of monopolies, while 
overcoming some of the shortcomings of co-regulation or self-regulation via multiple entities. 
One specific shortcoming highlighted by several legal scholars (Kingsford Smith 2014; Rogers 
et al. 2016; Rogers, Smith & Chellew 2017), which was also verified in this study, is the 
commercial interests of licensees compromising the best interest duty of advisers.  
Leaving a separate not-for-profit body to enforce professional standards of entry, appointment, 
registration, education, ethics, discipline and cessation of advisers, means it can focus on 
compliance breaches by individual advisers while empowered with the necessary enforcement 
powers to support appropriate behaviour of advisers. As a new body, it can harness 
technological solutions to better appoint, oversee, regulate, train, supervise and discipline 
individual financial advisers with similar standards, governance and structures as other 
professions. There should be significant cost reduction in, for instance, training using online 
resources, instead of incurring the high cost of professional development days at a conference 
facility. Where there are no existing solutions, innovators and researchers will identify the gaps 
to come up with Fintech solutions (Morgan Stanley 2018). 
Although participants expressed some concerns, such as replacing the loss of subsidised 
support services, loss of economies of scale, the costs of compliance and advice, FASEA can 
draw on years of fine-tuning by for example, the medical, legal and accounting professions to 
overcome these perceived problems. However, it is recognised financial planning has its own 
unique characteristics differentiating itself from other professions. Therefore, a unique 
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opportunity exists for FASEA to capitalise on the differences, yet still draw on the history and 
experience of the established professions. It can learn from the mistakes made by these other 
professional bodies with plenty of supporting evidence to assist with this.  
However, this recommendation is proposed with caution, because reinforced by the literature 
(see for example, Rogers 2004; Watts & Murphy 2009; Frumento & Korenman 2013; Rogers, 
Smith & Chellew 2017), it is well recognised contemporary professions are not without their 
problems. If financial advisers are to become true professionals, like in other accredited 
professions, then they will have to evolve constantly. Particularly important ongoing 
considerations are the new challenges profession and professional corporatisation through 
employment of professionals causes (Breakey & Sampford 2017; Rogers, Smith & Chellew 
2017). In addition, technological advances in Fintech and blockchain in this regard influence 
professionals too (Greenleaf 2017; Rogers, Smith & Chellew 2017; Smith, Clarke & Rogers 
2017; Morgan Stanley 2018). Thus, to implement change requires time, a concerted effort with 
active consultation between policymakers, ASIC, Professional Standards Council [and/or their 
regulator Professional Standards Authority], FASEA, professional associations, licensees, 
advisers and perhaps even representative members of the public. The onus is on all to find a 
unified co-ordinated approach to move this industry into the profession it should and could be. 
The use of a consultative decision-making approach is vital. In addition, any decisions made 
by policymakers must include a scientific evidence-based plan to steer the licensing of advisers 
in a certain direction. Especially, to minimise any pitfalls or unintended consequences of say a 
monopoly registration body. Individual licensing will require some fine-tuning, with everyone 
involved to work out the finer details collectively. 
7.7 KEY POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
Recall, the Australian Government is concerned about the detriment of misconduct within 
financial services (Senate Economics References Committee 2014; Ferguson 2015; 
Commonwealth of Australia 2016b; Steen, McGrath & Wong 2016). Within the context of the 
Ripoll and Murray inquiries, as well as senate, parliamentary, media and public debates, this 
study attempted to answer some important policy questions, albeit from a macro-perspective. 
Namely, who should appoint, train, monitor and supervise individual financial advisers? 
Should it be ASIC, professional associations, licensees, or the new self-regulatory independent 
industry professional standards board, such as the recommendation it be FASEA? How should 
financial advisers be appointed, trained, monitored and supervised? Should it be the current 
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AFSL-AR licensing model or a new individual professional licensing model? Finally, why 
should individual financial advisers be licensed in this manner? Is it to achieve the objectives 
of the Act? Will any new body be a legitimate approach to license individual financial advisers? 
What is in the Australian public interests? Thus, this research has policy implications for all 
financial planning stakeholders as financial planning professionalises. 
Given the international licensing trends observed in Chapter 2, the policy implications of the 
findings in this research on regulatory reforms are relevant to other nations. Presently, on the 
grounds of the findings, several issues remain unresolved on this matter in practice, and hence 
should be confronted politically.  The Australian, US and UK regulators face policy 
decisions around: (1) assisting the public to clearly distinguish between conflicted [product 
advisory institutions] and non-conflicted advisers [independent advisory institutions]; (2) the 
relationship between product providers-advisers-clients; (3) conflict of interest from 
association; (4) misalignment of institution-adviser-client interests; (5) fiduciary duty; (6) 
commercial interests of institutions compromising best interest duty.  
Instead of accredited professional individuals, like other professions, common to all these 
countries is their regulators via third-party affiliates regulate all their financial advisers.  If 
personal accountability is what regulators want to promote in the UK, US and Australia 
(Bateman & Kingston 2014; Salka 2015; McDermott 2016), then based on the findings, 
policymakers should pursue a different licensing model.  A different licensing model should 
achieve moving financial planning internationally into a recognised accredited profession. 
Therefore, on the grounds of the findings now, it is perhaps prudent the licensing model of 
these nations should be tested for legitimacy too. This they can achieve by replicating and/or 
adapting the theoretical framework developed for this preliminary study. Thus, applying it 
within the context of their countries. Additionally, this research provides a blueprint for the 
international policymakers to reconsider their current regulatory models of licensing in favour 
of another. This is important, as technology, such as blockchain and financial technology, 
increasingly leads globalisation with subsequent lowering of barriers of flow of people, trade 
and standardisation. 
Significantly, the findings potentially put Australia at the forefront of licensing advisers, 
internationally. Seemingly, conflict of interest from remuneration, best interest duty, as well as 
professional standards, education and ethics was addressed politically and legislatively to 
protect the public. However, from the evidence in this research, the success of this legislation 
396 
 
is questionable. For instance, commission payments between licensees, including commissions 
between licensees and advisers rebadged as fee for service remains a problem. This study 
established the presence of a divergence between government corporate regulation, licensee 
practices and adviser perceptions about the licensing of Australian advisers. If the Australian 
Government is serious about professionalising financial planning, then the empirical evidence 
in this thesis proves the next set of policy efforts should deal with conflict of interest from 
association. However, instead of more complex and costly compliance regulation, the findings 
in this thesis calls for policymakers to intervene with additional FOFA reforms, by building on 
the recommendations of the Ripoll and Murray inquiries with regards to individual licensing 
via a single monopoly independent industry standards board. Subject to higher established 
legislated standards of entry, registration, education, practices and ethics set and administered 
by a monopoly body, individual ‘natural persons’ are then held individually accountable. Thus, 
they are more likely to show commitment to the reputation of a professional model. In this 
way, remove advisers from being licensed by AFS licensees with commercial and/or product 
bias stakes. Besides, although needing some follow up, research in earlier years indicated 
independence was in the top 10 issues clients considered important when searching for a 
suitable financial adviser (Walker 2006). This separation of individual adviser from corporate 
institution should make identifying who is accountable for infringements and in what 
proportions much easier.  
Although, this recommendation is tempered with a word of caution, namely this model’s 
legitimacy must also be tested. Particularly important are policy considerations around 
replacing the control licensees have over advisers with a licensing model in which advisers 
have greater professional powers to thwart licensees from influencing them. Especially 
important to eliminate are licensees’ opportunity to threaten advisers with job dismissals or 
loss of remuneration entitlements if they did not commit to the licensees’ product distribution 
business models and the profit motive at the expense of the adviser’s best interest duty. This 
approach could be key in the protection of the Australian public without more regulation 
governing the various complex relationships within financial planning. 
Although it is documented in Chapter 3, ASIC favoured the co-regulatory model; they 
conceded in media commentary a likely benefit of a self-regulatory model is that employee 
advisers would be more visible to everyone. Therefore, the empirical evidence serves as a clear 
indication the nature of a co-regulatory model, as it has been implemented, is dysfunctional, 
and hence not providing the desired outcomes expressed in this thesis. Advisers facing a dual-
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agency role are placing ASIC at risk of failing to identify compliance transgressions adequately 
or timeously for rectification. Although it is conceded, that more recently, ASIC has made a 
concerted effort to address this shortcoming. Besides the reputational damage to ASIC, they 
are forced to seek constantly costly taxpayer funded legal advice on specific interpretations of 
the Act. Recall the discussion in Chapters 1 and 3, together with the empirical evidence of the 
misunderstanding, misinterpretation and misapplication of s923A of the Act dealing with the 
terms ‘independent’, ‘unbiased’, ‘impartial’ and similar words.   
Visibly, licensees and/or their advisers find creative ways to serve their self-interests within 
the current compliance framework. Perhaps an indication, the current licensing regulation is 
too complicated to understand, open to creative interpretation and application, which calls for 
simplification. By simplifying, the accreditation of advisers should ensure ASIC focusses their 
limited valuable resources and enforcement powers on corporate compliance contraventions 
by licensees by supporting appropriate behaviour of corporations. Leaving another body to 
focus on identifying rogue advisers. Conceding the licensing of individual ‘natural’ advisers to 
alternative body should arguably lower the risk to ASIC facing the legal challenges created 
through inventive interpretations of the law.   
Indeed, if the individual licensing model is pursued by policymakers, it will result in significant 
changes in the existing arrangements ASIC has in place. The benefits that could potentially 
accrue from structurally changing the licensing regime include better resource allocation of 
taxpayers’ money to enforce institutional compliance. Thus, lowering the costs to only 
regulating AFSL, without needing to regulate ARs as well. Especially, if observations by a 
consultant to the financial services sector, Toms Reddacliff (2017) are true, namely ASIC and 
licensees are spending valuable resources to complete their duties when regulating advisers, 
often involving large volumes of complex data processed and collected from licensees on a 
daily basis using manual, ineffective and inefficient systems. Besides, ASIC, with the 
Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001, should focus on compliance by corporations, not 
‘natural persons’. In other words, adviser regulatory requirements should be removed from the 
Corporations Act and inserted in more appropriate legislation legislating professions and 
professionals, such as the professional standards legislation enforced by the Professional 
Standards Council. 
Consequently, the outcomes of this research also hold implications for the Professional 
Standards Council and its regulatory agency, the Professional Standards Authority. It is 
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documented, these bodies are willing to assist policy makers to improve the professional 
standards of advisers by using their powers under the jurisdiction of the requirements specified 
in the professional standards legislation, to approve and work with a financial planning 
professional body to further consumer protection (Professional Standards Councils 2015). 
However, they can only approve a professional standards scheme, if the financial planning 
body can demonstrate a high level of self-regulation by complying with the professional 
standards legislation controlling other professionals (Professional Standards Councils 2015). 
Therefore, if financial planning is to become a true profession then the Professional Standards 
Authority could assist with the development, in addition to the implementation of a plan for 
advisers to move from a co-regulatory environment to one of self-regulation. Specifically, with 
their assistance, a self-regulatory financial planning body, such as FASEA, assisted to comply 
with the professional standards legislation to become accredited, like other recognised 
professions.  
With the inception of the Financial Adviser Standards and Ethics Authority, tasked to 
regulate professional standards, education and ethics since 2017, seemingly the government is 
initiating the development and implementation of new models, institutions and rules for 
regulating professional advisers as financial planning transforms into a profession. As was 
already mentioned, this investigation has implications for the new standard setting body. 
Although some stakeholders in financial services might argue to the contrary, the findings show 
strong support by informants for individual licensing via a single body.  On the grounds of the 
findings of this research, FASEA as an initial “policy nudge” (Ariely, Amir & Lobel 2008, p. 
2098) from government should be viewed as an interim solution, because an opportunity to use 
the prevailing body as a framework to evolve and adapt into an independent accredited 
professional financial planning body is a possibility. Note this idea was put forward and 
reported in the media (Kohler 2017). Therefore, reiterating earlier recommendations, FASEA 
should eventually also be tasked with entry, appointment, registration, supervision, education, 
competence, conduct, regulation and disciplinary standards in line with the National 
Professional Standards Legislation framework.  
According to the white paper by Sanders and Roberts (2015), for a profession to exist requires 
a self-regulatory entity, regulated by the Professional Standards Board as qualified by the 
professional standards regulation. Eventually, when the time is right, FASEA could take over 
the responsibilities from ASIC in licensing individual financial advisers. It could also support 
client complaints and compensation under uniform standards distinct from AFS licensees, like 
399 
 
other professions. By linking into the government regulatory purpose of professionalising 
financial advisers, this professional body would then enforce their own conditions of 
membership, formulate their own rules, carry out their own discipline, while imposing their 
own conditions of dismissal (Black 1996). Accordingly, on behalf of the Australian public, this 
entity is envisaged to oversee and administer professional entry, professional standards of 
educational and ethics, a professional year requirement as well as registration examination 
requirements, notwithstanding the compliance expectations (Sanders & Roberts 2015) like 
other professions. Although unfortunately, it is currently funded by the banks and AMP (Kohler 
2017). Hence, FASEA must eventually become a self-funding independent financial planning 
self-regulatory not-for-profit organisation. This will eliminate any potential for commercial 
interests compromising its purpose of protecting the public. Thus, effectively turning financial 
planning into a recognised profession that operates under the Professional Standards legislation 
in a similar manner as those of other professions. It means advisers licensed at the individual 
level are accountable foremost to their clients without undue influence from commercially 
driven product prejudiced licensees.  
Furthermore, to add to our discussion around policy implications for ASIC in previous 
paragraphs, since the inception of FASEA, seemingly both ASIC and FASEA have overlapping 
responsibilities and duplication of jurisdiction over the conduct of advisers in areas of 
professional standards, education and ethics (Kohler 2017). Consequently, by removing ASIC 
out of the equation of professionalising advisers, leaves them to focus on compliance of 
corporations, while FASEA can focus on compliance of ‘natural persons’. It makes more sense 
to differentiate clearly between the roles and powers of ASIC and FASEA in this way. Thus, 
FASEA is well placed to assist financial advisers become independent of control by licensees, 
not only in name but also in practice, with the purpose to protect the public.   
Although,  for many, it may seem obvious professional associations should take on the role 
of professionalising financial advisers by taking on the role of regulating them, it must be 
recognised most of them would not qualify, because they will struggle to meet the requirements 
of a professional standards scheme pursuant to the professional legislation (Sanders & Roberts 
2015). Particularly when, as upheld in the findings of this research, many are conflicted by 
sponsorships from commercial AFS licensees, who are also often corporate members of the 
association with strong relationships (Power 2016a). Thus, their role cannot include licensing 
individual financial advisers. It requires an entirely independent not-for-profit separate entity 
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who cannot be incentivised commercially and can bar advisers who do accept ‘creative’ soft 
dollar incentives from licensees.  
The findings point to a different role for professional associations, as well as how they 
potentially may be regulated. Professional associations could play a role in influencing and 
supporting their members to adapt to any foreseeable change. For example, if they are to 
participate in the emerging profession, then they can infuse new epistemological beliefs, norms, 
and values (Paulo 2003) into new structures. Documented by  Banister et al. (2013), 
professional financial planning associations support their member licensees and advisers to put 
in place socially desired best practices, standards, procedures, rules and structures such as 
codes of conduct, educational standards and programs. Given one of the key findings was 
advisers’ fear of being disconnected from licensees, because they will lose the subsidised 
support services they have become accustomed to, notwithstanding the loss of economies of 
scale, professional associations may have a key role to play here. Already, many of the financial 
planning professional bodies offer educational services. Therefore, the size of their member 
base achieves economies of scale providing these associations the opportunity to extend their 
services offered to advisers. Thus, it is argued here, professional associations are well 
positioned to take over this role of negotiating the necessary affordable support services on 
behalf of their members in a competitive environment using the magnitude of their membership 
base to achieve economies of scale. This would be in line with other professions, whereby their 
professional bodies and associations, specifically the medical profession, offer affordable 
support services to their members using the economies of scale of their membership base. 
Debatably, it is important that more than one professional association should provide advisers 
a choice and to encourage some competition. It is well known accountants have two main 
competing bodies, CPA, ICAA, and numerous smaller lesser-known bodies, such IPA. 
Consequently, professional associations form a critical part of the process of financial planning 
becoming a profession. If professional associations are to take this support service 
responsibility, then it will require adviser mandatory membership of at least one of the 
recognised professional associations. Furthermore, the professional associations with their 
licensee corporate memberships could be the connection between advisers and licensees 
without advisers being controlled by the licensees. 
This study’s findings are potentially damaging to the reputations of AFS licensees, because the 
overall negative comments from survey respondents indicate how advisers truly feel about 
being appointed via third-party licensees and why they feel this way. Increasingly, it is clear 
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licensees face complex compliance fraught with liability risk of legal action by being 
responsible for authorising and overseeing financial advisers. Thus, licensees who wish to 
continue operating under the current licensing regime can be held vicariously liable for the 
actions of their agents, which when it becomes public knowledge damages their reputation with 
the public. Therefore, licensees are well-advised to consider the findings of this research, 
especially given the potential loss to their “reputational capital”  (Simes, Harper & Green 
2008, p. 34). The implication of advisers being disconnected from licensees implies licensees 
will face greater competition to source agents when their business model is product distribution 
based.  
It is expected, the increased transparency to inform the public their employee representatives 
are selling products, not necessarily providing strategic advice, may impact business models of 
many aligned licensees. Furthermore, some licensees’ business models may become redundant, 
or many may have to reinvent themselves through innovation and entrepreneurship to redefine 
their identity, role and performance. Although not verified and validated, yet, it is expected 
vertical integration within financial services can potentially disappear or evolve into something 
else with the implementation of individual licensing of advisers as proposed above.  
Self-licensed advisers will be significantly disrupted, because they have invested significant 
amounts of time and money to procure their own AFSL, only to find self-licensing redundant 
to practise their craft as ‘independents’. It is not uncommon any transformation, such as 
mergers, acquisitions and other forms of business transformations result in redundancies.   
Under a new model, licensees will face a new type of employee operating within a professional 
group, because based on the writings of  Evetts (2011), explored in Chapter 3, if advisers 
become true professionals employed in financial institutions they will not be as open to being 
controlled through managerial interventions and institutional controls. These professional 
employees will have autonomy over their work practices, when faced with professional ethical 
challenges (Smith, Armstrong & Francis 2009) that accompany the contemporary profession 
within the context of professional corporatisation through employment (Breakey & Sampford 
2017; Rogers, Smith & Chellew 2017).  Accompanied by high status these advisers will have 
greater powers and authority, making it more difficult for licensees to control or influence them 
to distribute product for profit especially if it is to the detriment of the client.  
Fortunately, there are positive implications for licensees too. Under a new licensing regime for 
advisers, licensees and their employed registered sales force could be more transparent. They 
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could advertise their branded products openly to consumers as transactional. This increased 
transparency should also minimise their risk of legal liability. In addition, restricted APLs will 
no longer be an issue, because when a customer walks into a bank with a restricted product list 
of the bank’s branded products, it should be clear to the customer under a new licensing regime, 
they are purchasing a product from a conflicted adviser. This transparency should improve their 
reputations. Simple transparency of product sales should remove the accusations of licensees 
disguising product sales as strategic advice, which is empirically verified in this research as 
current practice.   
Furthermore, as licensees’ business models evolve so too will the relationship between 
licensees and their advisers develop. Already this has happened, for instance, empirically it is 
indicated in this research, since the implementation of best interest duty how licensees and 
advisers relate as opposed to how it is legislated they should relate has changed. No longer do 
advisers see themselves in the role of acting on behalf of licensees. Instead the see themselves 
as acting primarily on behalf of their clients. Licensees are support service providers. Also 
separating advisers from licensees may hold cost benefits for licensees, especially in terms of 
the much-acclaimed high compliance costs, professional indemnity and BOLR agreements, 
which should be confirmed scientifically in future research. Besides, clearly licensees make 
most of their money from product distribution, not from advice fees or authorising advisers. In 
addition, compliance duplication within financial services will be drastically reduced. 
Accordingly, disconnecting advisers from licensees leaves AFS licensees and their employees 
to focus on manufacturing, promoting, distributing or selling financial products, within a 
transparent transactional framework, in a similar manner to pharmaceutical institutions, 
manufacturing, promoting, distributing or selling medical products to medical doctors and 
pharmacists. This is assuming the emerging financial planning profession builds on the models 
of other true professions. Thus, the findings do not imply self-regulation by a single 
independent body means product-aligned licensees are not able to employee individuals as pure 
branded product sales experts. They just will not be considered independent advisers providing 
strategic advice. Ultimately, if done well, a new licensing regime should make it easier for the 
public to clearly distinguish between product experts who are sales representatives restricted 
by a limited licensee approved product list and financial advisers who are financial strategy 
experts that may include or not product recommendations from an open product list. In the 
medical field, it is easy for the public to distinguish between a general practitioner and a 
specialist.  
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To preserve the client-agent relationship, as proposed in financial planning theory, yet remove 
the legalised licensee-agent relationship as defined in the Act, which recall is conspicuously 
neglected in financial planning theory, will have significant implications for professionalising 
the emerging financial planning profession. Since the implementation of best interest duty, as 
well as professional standards of education and ethics, it is clear the risk of providing advice is 
increasingly transferring from institutional licensees to the individual financial advisers. 
Besides advisers clearly indicated empirically why they no longer perceive the right to practise 
their craft should be subject to the political whims of different ruling parties of government, 
professional associations and licensees. Ideally, advisers want to be independent, accredited 
and recognised professionals in demand.  
Based on these results, it is time to license individual advisers in a manner allowing them to 
set and enforce their own standards of entry, appointment, registration, education, practice, 
ethical conduct and discipline like other professions. Therefore, this work provides financial 
advisers the validation to take control besides, taking responsibility for the future direction of 
their profession. Preferably, real change can only be driven by advisers with a little push from 
government, support by ASIC, PSA, FASEA, professional associations and acceptance by AFS 
licensees.  Advisers should then be in a stronger position to place the best interests of their 
clients first without encumbrances accompanying licensing via multiple institutions with 
varying standards, compliance policies, procedures and processes.  
Furthermore, individual licensing where they are foremost accountable to their client, then their 
professionalising body, should provide them with greater leverage to block any ‘pressure’ 
licensees may try to impose on them to the detriment of their clients. Significant benefits should 
occur by clearly separating the institutional licensee product manufacturer, issuer, promoter or 
distributor and the ‘natural person’ responsible for providing the financial recommendations. 
For instance, employees of product-aligned licensees will be accredited differently compared 
to true independent self-employed or employee advisers to make them distinguishable to the 
public. An independent professional body also serves as an avenue for whistleblowing. Rather 
than the need to confront the perpetrators or go to the media and the law first to address the 
wrongdoing, advisers can go directly to their professional body to raise alarms of wrongdoing 
contrary to the public interest. Thus, whistleblowing via the professional body may serve to 
discourage institutions from promoting a culture of unethical behaviour. Advisers will have 
greater professional control and autonomy over the ethical behaviour.  
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Based on the writings of  Evetts (2011) explored in Chapter 3, if advisers become true 
professionals employed in financial institutions they will be less open to being controlled 
through managerial interventions and institutional controls. Thus, it should minimise if not 
eliminate the undue influence licensees impose on advisers to distribute, particularly in-house, 
financial products. Particularly, when licensees use covert or overt ‘influential’ tactics to 
influence adviser behaviour to the detriment of the client. It may also prevent advisers from 
hiding within multiple layers of protective institutional settings to disguise their 
misdemeanours from public scrutiny. Furthermore, with improved ethical behaviour combined 
with clear accountability advisers’ ‘reputations’ should improve.  
With a central enforcement body, like FASEA, financial advisers can move between 
employers, co-operatives, advising companies and partnerships without losing their ability to 
practise their craft of providing financial advice or any encumbrances, which is in line with 
other professions. An individual licence through a recognised single professional body is likely 
to attract more talent from the pool of new graduates entering Financial Services. Mainly for 
the reason, a new model should provide individual advisers professional independence, one of 
the key attributes of a professional (Riaz, Buchanan & Bapuji 2011), professional status, 
autonomy, control, power and privilege to operate as true professionals. With more graduates 
finding financial planning an attractive career option, the shortages in the roles of retiring baby 
boomer advisers will be better filled.  
Presently, although advisers may be highly qualified, competent and ethical, unlike other 
professionals, they cannot practise their craft unless a licensee institution employs them or they 
become self-licensed. By licensing individual advisers via a single body, means qualified 
competent advisers never, lose their accreditation to provide financial advice when they leave 
or resign from any institutional licensee.  
There are also implications for the types of adviser business models that will work with 
individual licensing for advisers. For example, with some evident in practice available, advisers 
can consider partnership models, like other professions (Heath 2017). Whereas others are 
proposing registered advice groups to perhaps, continue providing the support services advisers 
fear they will lose under an individual licensing regime (Hoyle 2017e). Therefore, self-
employed advisers, including self-licensed advisers may have to use innovation and 
entrepreneurship to reinvent business models to work with an individual licence.  
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The research highlights advisers are unclear about the benefits their licensees derived by 
authorising them, nor are they clear about their identity [who they are], role [what they do] and 
performance [achieve the four objectives of the Act]. Therefore, by licensing advisers as 
individuals, may be a significant step forward in clarifying everyone understanding of their 
identity, role and performance when providing professional financial advice, which can only 
improve the quality of advice.   
Policymakers can no longer ignore the potential risks to the Australian public, highlighted in 
the findings. Thus, by removing any potential for conflict of interest from association via a new 
licensing system means the licensee influence over the adviser transfers to the client, as it 
should be. Furthermore, with a single body setting the designations of advisers should make it 
easier for the public to source accurate information about an adviser to identify correctly those 
providers who are conflicted by product from those who are independent. By making, this 
distinction clear to the public, in the manner these individuals are licensed, means the public 
will less likely be misled, while having a greater choice of whom they choose to service their 
financial needs once the new system is implemented and has settled.  
From the foregoing discussion, the illegitimacy of the current licensing model with its 
recommended individual licensing solution poses threats and opportunities for all stakeholders. 
Significantly, change is going to require a redefinition of the identity, role and hence 
performance of every single stakeholder identified above, because of the connections and 
entanglements amongst them. Consequently, every single stakeholder should be involved in 
addressing the structural shortcomings of the current licensing model with a new simpler 
professional licensing model.  
7.8 CONCLUSION 
This provocative research established a lack of support for the legitimacy of the current AFSL-
AR licensing model as perceived and judged by the internal actors, namely practising 
authorised representatives. Specifically confirmed here, the existing licensing system creates a 
dual-agency role; leading to conflict of interest from association. Results reveal this conflict is 
inconsistent with four objectives of the Act. Licensing via multiple third parties is unethical, 
because it leads to ethical dilemmas. Specifically, the top three ethical issues delegitimising 
the licensing model are (1) violations of the statutory best interest duty, (2) misalignment of 
adviser-clients’ interests and (3) licensees’ commercial interests compromising clients’ best 
interests. Thus, the coexistence of competing logics between, specifically (1) adviser statutory 
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fiduciary duty and licensee commercial interests; and (2) misalignment of client-adviser 
interests and conflict of interest from association, is contributing to the illegitimacy of this 
licensing model. The evidence in this research reaffirms investigations by several parties 
(Australian Government Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee 2012; North 2015) 
into the transgressions from narrow sales recommendations, together with licensee culturally-
endorsed unethical adviser behaviour using remuneration models. Clearly on the available 
evidence, licensing advisers via third-party licensees results in regulative, consequential moral, 
procedural moral, structural moral, personal moral and culture-cognitive illegitimacy. 
Inevitably, individual professional licensing is an acceptable solution for advisers to supersede 
the delegitimised AFSL-AR licensing model.  However, those who have contributed to the 
research are clear, the current licensing model as described and assessed, has failed, except to 
lead to licensee and adviser practices undermining the integrity of the financial advisory sector. 
A simpler model is needed, because despite operating within a rigorous complex compliance 
regime under the current system, advisers are still able to produce adverse outcomes for their 
clients. Thus, arguments for an alternative licensing model are empirically strengthened by 
these findings.  
From the discussion in this chapter, the policy implications are far-reaching for international 
policy makers, Australian policy makers, Professional Standards Council and Professional 
Standards Authority, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, Financial Adviser 
Standards and Ethics Board, Professional Associations, AFS licensees, financial advisers, the 
public and the Australian public. Therefore, the empirical data collected using the theoretical 
framework provides financial planning stakeholders concrete evidence to commit to a 
paradigm shift in the current licensing of individual financial advisers. This is important, 
because the prevailing licensing model impedes independence while creating conflict of 
interest from association. The outcome of this study leads to recommend the financial advisory 
industry needs to restructure. By implication, the identity and roles of all stakeholders should 
be redefined to see changes in their performance. FASEA is recommended to be the most 
logical body for this challenging task. Therefore, based on the evidence in this study the 
proposed changes should go a long way to restoring the reputation of financial advisory 
services in Australia. 
Yet caution should be exercised, before launching into any new regime. It is imperative 
stakeholders address the misgivings raised during the discussion above. Specifically, advisers’ 
fear of losing the subsidised support services licensees offer them, such as software, training, 
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professional indemnity, research, compliance, legal and back office support. Furthermore, for 
some advisers, licensing costs are another major concern. However, background discussions 
with influential people in financial services indicated these are not insurmountable obstacles.  
Additionally, given all stakeholders will be impacted by change, means a concerted effort is 
required by all stakeholders to drive change, because any new regime must correspondingly 
prove its legitimacy.  
In closing, the evidence in this thesis serves as a catalyst for the regulators, professional 
associations, licensees and advisers to initiate additional steps to turn Australian financial 
planning into a recognised accredited profession, like other professions. Thus, putting Australia 
at the forefront of adviser professionalism internationally. 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although this research started with troubled negative unconfirmed statements around the 
illegitimacy of the current AFSL-AR licensing model, after collecting and analysing the 
quantitative and qualitative results substantiated scholarly evidence of this topic was the result. 
Thus, using a normative conceptualized theoretical framework to define, model and measure 
this legitimacy, a more balanced view on what is clearly a controversial and sensitive matter is 
now available. The purpose of this chapter is to make concluding remarks about the 
illegitimacy of licensing individual financial advisers via multiple third-party licensees. 
Therefore, a summary of the main findings is presented, highlighting its importance. This is 
followed by recommendations for future work. A brief discussion on the theoretical and 
empirical contributions, together with some of the assumptions and limitations ends this final 
chapter. 
8.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Secondary sources indicated the legitimacy of licensing has been an issue since at least 1996. 
Within the predominantly FOFA legislative framework, Australian financial advisers are 
presently appointed, authorised and regulated through third-party licensees as specified in the 
Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001. Various stakeholders were making allegations about 
licensing advisers via third parties without any compelling scientific-based evidence of what 
is appropriate for financial planning as an emerging profession. This study provides that 
evidence. This research provides initial empirical evidence proving licensing advisers via 
multiple third parties has been a problem since its inception.  
Advisers revealed they are dual agents facing a conflict of interest from association. However, 
on the available evidence reported in previous chapters, the best interest duty has change the 
perceived view and practice of the licensee-adviser-client relationship. Quite an interesting 
finding was advisers refute licensees were the principal in the licensee-adviser relationship in 
practice anymore. Instead of working on behalf of licensees, advisers claimed licensees served 
the purpose of merely legally authorising them, while providing them with subsidised support 
services, such as compliance, legal, software, professional indemnity, professional and 
business development, back office support as well as approved product lists. In other words, 
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advisers advocated they perceived themselves as clients of licensees, while their priority is to 
act in the best interests of clients above all.  
In accordance with the academic focus in the emerging financial planning theory on the 
adviser-client relationship, in practice advisers were taking their relationship with their clients 
seriously. While at the same time, mirrored in financial planning textbooks and tertiary 
education courses, they are disregarding their relationship with their licensees. Thus, s916A 
and s916B of the Act, where advisers are legislated to act on behalf of licensees, is either out 
of sync with practice or vice versa. Additionally, also revealed in the results is the neglected 
licensee-client relationship. Just like ASIC clarified the interpretation of s923A of the Act 
regarding terminology ‘non-aligned’, ‘non-institutionally-owned’ and ‘independently owned’, 
the legal definitions of the licensee-adviser-client relationship should be reviewed for 
clarification within the context of financial planning theory, legislation and practice. 
In support of the dual-agency role findings,  it is empirically clear the current licensing model 
sanctions contraventions of the best interest duty, misalignment of adviser-client interests, 
conflict of interest from association and anti-competitive practices. Importantly, of the four 
legislative objectives, the verdict is advisers take intentional and unintentional contraventions 
of the statutory fiduciary duty the most seriously. Given the pre-eminence accorded the best 
interest duty in the legislation, financial planning theory and practice, this finding is no surprise. 
By implication, the objective of the Act to promote the best interest duty is an important issue. 
Accordingly, its influence on the illegitimacy of the current licensing model in the debate 
around the licensing model should not be under-estimated. In effect, it is argued here, the best 
interest duty legislation has made the current licensing model of individual advisers redundant. 
Moreover, linked to the foregoing, the second most important issue resulting in illegitimacy is 
the AFSL-AR licensing model misaligns adviser-client interests. Therefore, the evidence 
strongly proves the current licensing model is not doing the job it was meant to do, namely 
protect the public as the objectives of the Act defines. As was mentioned earlier in this thesis, 
these potential statutory compliance infringements can encourage class action, while leading 
to damaged reputations of legislators, regulators, licensees and advisers.   
If the contraventions of the objectives of the Act are considered in conjunction with the 
legitimacy tests using the criteria of Suchman’s (1995) theoretical framework, then it is clear, 
licensing advisers via multiple third-parties does not result, in order of rank, consequential 
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moral, procedural moral, regulative, structural moral, personal moral and culture-cognitive 
legitimacy.  
Unsurprisingly, of all Suchman’s (1995) criteria, consequential moral illegitimacy was 
recognized as the third most influential reason why the current licensing model is illegitimate. 
Thus, in accordance with his criteria applied to financial planning theory, without a doubt 
licensees’ commercial interests compromises best interest duty. Surprisingly, advisers were 
apathetic when reflecting on the matter of licensees’ revenues, even though it is clearly a 
significant problem causing difficulties for the current licensee-adviser licensing model. 
Adding insult to injury, licensees window-dress sales policies, procedures and practices to 
appear to comply with the Act. Individual leaders of aligned licensees, according to advisers, 
aim to protect their product distribution channels when lobbying government during FOFA 
reform consultations. Thus, it is questionable private commercially oriented institutions can be 
trusted to regulate their advisers activities in the public interest.  
Despite ASIC’s attempt to use the legislative process, the public cannot clearly distinguish 
between s923A independent advisers from those who are product-conflicted. Seemingly, while 
advisers are connected to licensees, they themselves are unclear of who they are [identity] and 
what they do [role] to achieve the four objectives of the Act [performance].  
The way licensing is structured works against legislators’ efforts to raise financial planning 
standards through the legislative process and regulatory reform to enforce industry compliance 
of the Act. Besides, the existing licensing model threatens independence, a key characteristic 
of a profession. Additionally, conflicted association between particularly product-conflicted 
licensees and their authorised representatives arises due to their ‘co-existence’. Yet, it is well 
documented in this manuscript elimination of conflicts is vital to a true professional. Merely 
concentrating on conflicts from remuneration, professional standards, education and ethical 
standards to improve financial adviser conduct, is thus misguided.  
Accordingly, in the company of minority critics, it is certain, the findings strengthen arguments 
for individual licensing through a single independent professional body, modelled on other 
professionals. Inevitably, a single new body with updated epistemological rules, norms, beliefs 
and scripts for individual professional licensing should supersede the delegitimised existing 
rules, norms & beliefs of the multiple institutional conflicted licensing bodies. Following from 
the foregoing statement, FASEA should evolve to take on this challenging task. The verdict is 
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individual licensing will improve trust and confidence in financial advisers, one of the concerns 
of the Australian Government.  
However, support by a sample of authorised representatives for professional individual 
licensing comes with reservations and concerns. Specifically, advisers fear losing the well-
funded subsidised support services licensees offer. For example, the loss of licensees 
subsidised software, training, research, compliance, business, legal plus back office support is 
a major concern for many. Advisers are also apprehensive about the impact on licensing costs 
and economies of scale should government make a move to individual licensing. Additional 
unresolved issues around licensing comprises: practicality, professional indemnity, approved 
product lists, ‘white’ and ‘private’ label products, plus vertical integration.  
Although, it seems conflicted remuneration has been removed, licensees are using ‘other’ 
forms of incentives to control advisers, such as concealed soft dollar incentives, including the 
subsidised support services and BOLR agreements. These incentives arguably steer some 
advisers to recommend mainly in-house or ‘white’ label products or effectively act as an 
inducement to tie them to a licensee. Thought-provoking, apparently AFS licensees will always 
find ways to incentivise advisers to distribute their products no matter what licensing regime 
is in operation.  
However, these concerns should not demotivate policymakers from pursuing further reforms 
to license advisers as recognised accredited professionals, like doctors, lawyers and 
accountants. Thus, to promote a healthy functioning financial services industry where advisers 
are recognised as true professionals under the same legislative requirements as other 
accreditted professionals, then structural change to licensing individual advisers is required. 
Besides, the undesirable consequences of the AFSL-AR licensing model are detrimental to all 
the stakeholders within Financial Services. If the benefit of improved public trust and 
confidence, is weighed against the costs of independence, conflict of interest from association, 
unintentional contraventions of the statutory fiduciary duty, misalignment of adviser-client 
interests and the matter licensee commercial interests comprise ARs’ best interest duty, then 
for the sake of public interest change is inevitable. Especially given the public backlash to the 
scandals appeared to have outweighed the benefits the public may feel they would receive from 
obtaining financial advice. Notwithstanding the disparaging effect on the reputations of the 
Australian Government, regulators, licensees and advisers. 
412 
 
From the above conversation, the illegitimacy of the examined current licensing model implies 
it should be superseded or revised. Recognised here, implementing change is accompanied by 
practical, political, social and business opportunities and threats for all stakeholders’ interests. 
Each actor in the financial services sector will have different objectives in a future licensing 
model. For the Australian Federal Government, it is to protect the Australian public from 
financial harm. For ASIC, it is to ensure successful law enforcement sufficient to build 
confidence, trust and transparency in the Australian Financial System. For the FASEA, it is 
ensuring financial advisers comply with professional, educational and ethical standards to 
promote professionalism further. For professional associations, it is to continue supporting the 
members of the emerging profession and the public interest, while helping advisers further their 
careers. For AFSLs, it is providing financial products and services to the Australian public 
within a profit model operating within an ethical framework acceptable to society. For advisers, 
it is to make quality recommendations to clients ethically while serving their best interests 
without the encumbrances licensees imposed. For the public, it is receiving professional 
unbiased financial advice they can trust, cost effectively. Finally, for the media it is to continue 
delivering everyone with information around events, issues and characters in the Financial 
Services industry requiring attention. Thus, professional individual licensing is critical to 
ensure the interest of all stakeholders are served.  
If financial planning becomes a recognised accredited true profession, enjoyed by other true 
professions, then a likely benefit is it will incentivise university graduate talent to enter the 
financial advisory sector. It is well known the recognised accredited professions have status. 
Thus, younger financial advisers entering this emerging profession should go a long way to 
reduce any fears of shortages in independent advisers.  
8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
While a great deal more is now known about licensing advisers via third parties in comparison 
to professional individual licensing, this investigation serves to merely lay initial groundwork 
for further future research. The broad scope of the research has left many areas unexplored, 
while raising more questions requiring in-depth detailed investigation.  
For instance, having only collected data from one group of stakeholders, the advisers, valuable 
insights would further contribute to a balanced view by collecting data from policymakers, 
ASIC, FASEA, PSA, professional associations, licensees and clients with regards to their 
perceptions of the legitimacy of current licensee-adviser licensing model.  
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Additional research should delve deeper into the agency roles between adviser-client, and the 
much-neglected licensee-adviser and licensee-client relationships, because the agency role is 
not as simple or clearly defined as seemingly proposed in financial planning literature. The 
results of the study advocate the financial planning theory concerning the principal agent 
relationship is not aligned with the legislation, nor is the legislation aligned with financial 
planning theory. What needs clarification is the inconsistent perceptions of legislative, 
theoretical and actual practices regarding advisers’ agency role. The licensee-adviser 
relationship, advisers felt, is merely a legislated definition, which differs from the practical 
application of this definition in practice. Added to this latter point, it is uncertain whether the 
viewpoint that advisers no longer act on behalf of licensees comes from themselves or through, 
conditioning, training or marketing from their licensees, or the financial planning literature, 
which needs further investigation.  
Moreover, since the best interest duty was implemented, advisers no longer understand their 
agency identity and role in terms of agency theory and as prescribed in law. The apparent 
disconnect between how the advisers defined their and their licensees’ role in practice, 
compared to how the Act defines these roles needs further assessment in future enquiry.   
Within the financial advisory sector, the relationships are not restricted to only licensee-
adviser-client relationships. Other potential relationships exist involving multiple layers of 
advisory services. For example, these relationships include financial advisers and independent 
facilitating agencies. These principals assist them to complete some of the work involved in 
implementing financial plans they prepare for their clients. Facilitating agencies are 
specialists—such as rating agencies, lawyers, accountants, fund managers, research suppliers, 
paraplanners, investment banks or institutions. Given the foregoing explanation submits 
financial planning involves a wide range of relationships, this highlights the need for these 
associations to be reported in the financial planning literature. Therefore, further research into 
all the associations financial advisers develop during providing financial advice, such as, with 
lawyers and accountants, could provide worthwhile information to update the literature and/or 
the legislation.  
Additionally, lacking in financial planning theory are the agency relationships between the 
decision-making management team [agents] and the shareholders [principals] of financial 
services institutions [AFSL holders]. However, a void in the literature on how these 
414 
 
relationships interact with the licensee-adviser-client relationship is prevalent. Thus, this void 
should be addressed.  
In addition, more detailed future investigation should consider the politics, conflicts and power 
play between licensees and advisers; advisers and their clients; and licensees and their clients. 
In addition, employee representatives compared to self-employed authorised representatives 
face the greatest challenge when it came to conflict of interest from association, because their 
licensee uses key performance indicators, sales targets and threats of job loss or loss of 
remuneration to control them. Therefore, an important area of research is to ascertain to what 
extent employee advisers can deal with these control mechanisms and still operate ethically. 
With new legislation on whistleblowing yet to be tested, a gap on the issues of power and 
influence within financial planning literature exists. Especially, the gap relating to the licensee-
adviser relationship requires further enquiry. Consequently, the extent licensees influence 
[control] their authorised representatives, and vice versa should be assessed.  
In addition, what is overlooked in the normative theory and confirmed in this empirical positive 
study is the continued lack of clarity or misinterpretation by some financial advisory sector 
participants in practice of the terms ‘aligned’, ‘non-aligned’ and ‘s923A independent’. Based 
on the backlash from advisers as reported in the media after ASIC provided guidance as to how 
to interpret s923A and the use of these terms, has demonstrated further work is necessary to 
distinguish independent advisers from those who are not clearly. Therefore, it is apparent more 
research is required to understand how practitioners and other stakeholders interpret and 
understand the definition of independence as defined by the Act. Moreover, it is yet to be 
empirically established whether it truly matters and is in the public’s best interest to receive 
‘independent’ advice compared to advice not necessarily independent. Simply, future work 
should assess the legitimacy of the definition of independence as specified in the Act. 
Especially when some stakeholders seems unhappy with the interpretation and recent 
determination of s923A by Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2017b).  
Researchers should also examine topics concerning adviser concerns and unresolved issues 
raised regarding a new licensing regime. For example, the practical applicaton of individual 
licensing caused unease among those in favour of individual licensing. Specifically, more light 
should be shed on the actual, social and opportunity costs of changing to professional individual 
licensing systems, the impact on ongoing compliance costs and perceived loss of subsidised 
support services, notwithstanding the impact on established business models within the 
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advisory sector. For example, the exact cost break down of providing subsidised support 
services per adviser in conjunction with a breakdown of the size of the subsidy licensees offered 
should be empirically verified and validated.  
Additionally for some stakeholders, redundancy is surmised an inevitable outcome if financial 
planning is to become a true profession via an individual licensing model. Consequently, 
further research can be conducted to determine the level of disruption to the various Financial 
Services stakeholders to come up with solutions to mitigate it.   
The lack of consensus on some of the other concerns and unresolved issues raised during this 
research, such as, disclosures, APLs, BOLR agreements, and economies of scale of the current 
licensing model versus professional individual licensing demands further investigation.  
Additionally, further inquiries into the extend licensees may be contributing to the illegitimacy 
at a micro level, would add a richer understanding of the problems confronting the current 
licensing model. Specifically, future research should determine why the commercial interests 
or benefits licensees derive by using ARs are unimportant to advisers to the extent they do not 
think about it, or do not want to think or communicate clearly about it. Another finding was 
licensees, especially those aligned, are mainly concerned with funds under management 
through product distribution, because this is where they make their profits. The inherent bias 
in approved product lists highlighted in the findings, including platform product lists, ‘white’ 
and ‘private’ label products, and the link to one-off approvals need further scrutiny within the 
licensing model’s context.  What should be learnt is to what extent is licensee control of APLs 
a problem? Interestingly, professional indemnity insurance ownership and requirements is also 
seen as some potential means licensees can restrict their APLs. Conflicts of interest from 
remuneration between licensees, and between licensees and their advisers is still an issue that 
needs to be examined.  For instance, if licensees are finding “legal” ways to incentivise 
advisers, obviously or subliminally, to distribute their product, whether by coercion or 
persuasion, then the ethics of these practices needs additional research.  
The business models of licensees linked to the problems of a poor product sales culture that 
has shown to develop by licensing advisers via third-party AFS licensees are also important 
topics for future research. Notwithstanding, examining the benefits and costs AFSL licensees 
derived from appointing, supervising and overseeing advisers, in more depth, will make for 
fascinating findings. 
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If the recommendation of evolving FASEA into a body that not only sets and enforces 
professional education and ethics standards, but also licenses advisers individually, then future 
work should involve empirical verification of its legitimacy to ensure it is and continues to be 
fit for purpose. In addition, recall, the illegitimacy findings and support for individual licensing 
does not only affect the current and future role, including the performance of advisers, but also 
those of other stakeholders. Thus, a worthwhile piece of research would be an examination of 
their current role and performance, as well as their expected future role and performance in the 
event an individual licensing model develops. This research could potentially provide valuable 
insights into how best to implement change given the practical implementation concerns of a 
new licensing regime.   
Financial planning academic scholars have also overlooked risks associated with a specific 
licensing regime. Therefore, additional inquiry into the key risks stakeholders faced will further 
illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of each licensing model considered in this research, 
notwithstanding any other model that was outside the scope of this study. 
Furthermore, information technological advances and online information technology solutions 
could be of value during the implementation of disconnecting advisers from licensees and the 
ongoing management of individual licensing via their professional body. This is another avenue 
of research important to the future of adviser licensing. 
Outside the scope of this study, numerous respondents also blamed industry super fund 
licensees to have a conflict of interest from association. This is interesting, given industry 
superannuation funds allegedly serve to benefit their members, including ploughing any profit 
the fund earns back to their members. Therefore, the extent industry superfund advisers also 
face a conflict of interest from association and whether it is a problem, would make for an 
interesting study. 
Future researchers are encouraged to use, adapt or modify the conceptualised theoretical 
framework to study other complex business-related problems within other disciplines.  
Additionally, this includes replicating this research to confirm the findings; converting it into 
a longitudinal study to see how perceptions of survey participants change over time; or even 
applying the model within the context of other nations’ jurisdictions, such as the US and UK. 
Although, various researchers (see, Suchman 1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002) offered a 
selection of legitimation strategies for responding to a legitimacy crisis (Tilling 2004b; Chelli, 
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Durocher & Richard 2014), these strategies were excluded from this study to be addressed in 
future research.  
To present a more detailed account of this topic, perhaps future research could use other types 
of research paradigms and methodologies, which are yet to be applied, tried, or tested, and 
reported in Australian financial planning literature.  In this way fill other gaps in the study of 
the licensing of individual financial advisers or to further enhance the conceptualised model 
developed during this study, and hence the survey questionnaire. Thereby, this should enrich 
the theory of this infant, emerging, financial planning academic discipline further, especially 
given this is a preliminary study, viewed from a macro- or strategic level, rather than at micro-
level of detail. 
Given the qualitative evidence played a minor role in this research, as well as how sensitive, if 
not emotional about the topic, informants were during this investigation, there is room for more 
extensive qualitative research incorporating all stakeholders’ views on the numerous issues 
raised in this thesis that have been dealt with superficially. For instance, from the findings, a 
large group, 3,391 [84.78 per cent] out of the probability randomly selected total sample of 
4,000 did not respond to the survey, neither declining consent, nor providing a reason for their 
non-participation. Consequently, to advance empirical research methodologies it would be 
valuable to ascertain with supplementary research why these advisers were uninterested to 
complete the survey dealing with such an important topic. 
The recommendations provided in the foregoing are a few preliminary reflections of the void 
in the theory [normative] and empirical research [positive]. From the above discussion, it is 
clear the surface of the underlying issues around licensing individual financial advisers has 
barely been touched. Further room to research this complex phenomenon with research teams 
comprising financial advisory services stakeholders from various disciplines, academic and 
private sector institutions to advance financial planning theory and practice is evident.  
8.4 CONTRIBUTIONS 
Although the different authors cited in this thesis and different authorised representatives have 
put different emphasis about the legitimacy of third-party licensing of advisers, it is clear this 
challengingly delicate topic has finally been given the scholarly attention it deserves. The 
current licensing model is clearly verified by the internal actors as illegitimate. This proof in 
turn have led to both significant theoretical and empirical contributions to the financial 
planning discipline.  
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8.4.1 Theoretical contributions 
Financial planning theory building is in its infancy with plenty of gaps yet unexplored on 
questions that are difficult to define, model and quantify. Consequently, this work addresses 
an issue where no prior theory or research evidence was available.  By relying on the: 
experience of the researcher; literature review of multiple disciplines; and innovative thinking 
to develop the framework for this study, the work may be considered groundbreaking. It is 
groundbreaking in the sense it builds new financial planning theory by developing a 
conceptualised normative model on the back of several theories sourced from other disciplines, 
specifically law, accounting, medicine, and management.  
The critical theoretical analysis, extension and application of agency theory, the legislation, 
legitimacy theory by Suchman (1995,  p. 574) and expected standards of accredited true 
professionals in this study are important theoretical contributions to empirically evaluate and 
verify the legitimacy of the current licensing model for individual financial advisers. The 
framework provided an opportunity to develop a standard instrument for future empirical 
analysis using dimensions such as regulative, consequential, structural, procedural, personal 
and cultural-cognitive as criteria to capture, as was the case in this thesis, the perceptions of 
ARs regarding the desirability, propriety, or appropriateness of the current AR licensing model.   
Furthermore, this enquiry not only considered the legitimacy of the current AR model, but also 
researched a debated alternative solution to the current AR model, namely individual licensing. 
Consequently, providing a preliminary theoretical foundation and framework to not only assess 
the problem of the legitimacy of any licensing model where the source of its legitimacy is 
dependent on public trust and confidence, independence, conflicts of interest and a licensing 
body, but also addresses possible solutions.  
Accordingly, the application of several theories to the main research problem has not only 
advance financial planning theory but has also provided a scholarly platform for future 
empirical research to address complex problems in other social science disciplines.  
Entering unchartered areas within a financial planning context, this research has added to the 
established financial planning body of knowledge with theory to guide future policy on suitable 
financial planning policies, procedures and practices. Thus, theory building has provided 
policymakers, domestically and internationally, with guidelines to collect data and a normative 
analysis tool to assist with policy decisions around the regulation [specifically, licensing] of 
individual advisers. Thus, it has provided a scholarly platform for future empirical research 
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initiatives for interested parties across the globe to obtain data relevant aimed at evidence-based 
decisions around complex topics.  
In closing, this project provides extensive scope to pursue additional valuable research in the 
field of financial planning, specifically matters relating to professionalising financial advisers. 
8.4.2 Empirical contributions 
The empirical contributions are twofold. Firstly, this research has advanced application of 
research methodology for the social sciences, and specifically for the financial planning 
discipline. Secondly, it has contributed to bringing together theory, application of research 
methodology and practice in a novel way. These two contributions will be discussed next. 
8.4.2.1 Research design application 
A fresh approach to Australian financial planning research involved starting with simplifying 
the complex problem by formulating a series of linked questions to develop the hypotheses. 
Then these questions and hypotheses were conceptualised into an a priori measurement 
construct. After deciding on the sampling technique, the legitimacy was evaluated from a 
specific research paradigm and methods approach leading to structural equation modelling 
techniques unseen in financial planning research before. Thus, a notable contribution of this 
enquiry to the financial planning discipline are: (1) the novel integration of several theories to 
formulate linked investigative research questions and hypotheses, (2) application of post-
positivist research paradigm and mixed methodology involving parallel convergent research 
design, (3) combining structural equation modelling [quantitative] with constant comparative 
[qualitative] techniques to generate the findings. In other words, for the first time in Australian 
financial planning research the definition, modelling and quantification of a complex problem 
was reflected in a different research design compared to other studies. In the process a new 
body of knowledge with regards to application of quantitative research methodology and 
methods for financial planning to solve difficult, yet politically, legally and socially important 
problems, was produced. Therefore, with Australian research in financial planning still in 
infancy, this research has contributed to adding to the body of knowledge of acceptable 
standards (Willmott 1993) for financial planning research by providing an empirical conceptual 
and methodogical framework to study complex issues.  
Also new to the Australian academic financial planning discipline is the manner in which this 
study collected data, developed and evaluated their measures, and analysed the data to make 
420 
 
inferences.  In terms of new contributions to the collection of data, this project moved financial 
planning away from convenience sampling to stratified probability random sampling. 
Furthermore, traditional data collection approach commonly used in financial planning 
research and SEM surveys have been Likert scales. However, based on compelling evidence 
provided by Yusoff and Mohd Janor (2012), the Likert-scales were replaced with a new 
continuous scale customised for purposes of this study. Specifically, the ruler-option scale 
developed by Yusoff and Mohd Janor (2012) was applied, because it was proven in previous 
studies to produce more valid measures of attitudes and perceptions when conducting empirical 
SEM research.   
An additional contribution was the way minor modifications were applied to an untested a 
priori conceptualised model during E/CFA and CFA data analyses to produce a valid model 
for accurate interpretation of the estimates. Specifically, the content of the theory in the 
literature review was taken into consideration during the respecification of the model to keep 
the integrity of the theory intact. Therefore, bringing together normative and empirical research 
data. From Chapter 5 importantly this study contributed application of multiple approaches 
suggested in the literature and combined various statistical techniques in structural equation 
modelling during analysis. The researcher relied on multiple tests to test for and confirm 
reliability and validity of the findings, because by doing so ensured the compelling evidence is 
more difficult to question.  
Furthermore, this investigation contributed numerous statistical techniques to financial 
planning research methodology to ensure and measure generalisability of the estimates. These 
included, stratified probability random sampling, invariance tests for generalisability and 
Bayesian Information Criteria.  Stratified probability random sampling, compared to the 
common approach of convenience sampling evident in Australian financial planning research, 
increased the chances of generalisability. The invariance tests and the Bayesian Information 
Criteria goodness of fit measure confirmed the estimates were generalisable. This validated the 
views of Aguinis and Edwards (2014) that a large sample size is unnecessary to ensure 
generalisability, because large samples do not provide guarentees of generalisability.  
Overall, this study resulted in contributions to research methodology previously unseen in 
financial planning research. Additionally, after this project, the handful of Australian financial 
planning researchers skilled in an important statistical technique, namely structural equation 
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modelling, has increased. This is important to fast track the research of financial planning, a 
fairly young academic discipline, forward into the future.  
8.4.2.2 Financial Services industry practice 
A major contribution to practice is replacing the myths and hearsay in popular and professional 
media, and in practice, with substantiated evidence on the difficult topic of licensing. It serves 
as the beginning of a more balanced empirically verified and validated view on the matter, 
rather than in the past, a discussion based on harmful unconfirmed proclamations. Although 
the study did not cover every aspect of licensing because of its complexity, it does provide a 
solid foundation to pursue additional topics surrounding the matter. 
On the grounds of the deficiency in scholarly attention to the matter of licensing and the large 
number of potential respondents in the sample who refrained from participating in the survey, 
it looks like the financial advisory sector appears unenthusiastic to confront this important 
political issue head on. Yet, this thesis shows clearly it is not only important, but also time the 
financial advisory sector considers the future of licensing individual advisers. As the research 
proceeded, it stimulated debate on this topical, emotional, controversial and political subject 
from a more scholarly perspective. Contributing to this debate was a journal publication listed 
in the list of publications at the start of this thesis, email feedback, face-to-face discussions, 
consequences of sending out the survey questionnaire social media reaction and professional 
media impact after the researcher presented on this matter on several occasions at several 
Personal Finance and Investment Symposiums in 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 hosted at various 
universities. Moreover, examining the licensing model scientifically aims to remove emotion 
out of the debate.  
A specific contribution of this enquiry was to offer a scholarly ‘voice’ to financial advisers 
about issues affecting them, namely, their dual-agency role, conflict of interest from 
association, the objectives of the Act, AFSL-AR licensing, public trust and confidence, 
independence and professional individual licensing.  
It also highlights the value to financial planning researchers to take on more difficult and 
complex topics. Most importantly, this research serves to help navigate areas of argument 
around licensing with a framework politicians, academics and practitioners can use as a guide 
to ask additional questions around some of the difficult political and practical financial 
planning topics needing answers. Thus, providing policymakers evidence to make better 
decisions on contentious issues. For example, there is now preliminary evidence for 
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policymakers to commit to individual licensing as financial planning continues the journey to 
true professionalism. Thus, it contributes to shaping the future policy direction of licensing 
individual financial advisers in Australia. Particularly with respect to the professionalising of 
the emerging profession, to make financial advisers truly independent unconflicted 
professionals, with the aim to restore public trust and confidence in them. While politically 
serving the public interest with better protection. Finally, it is hoped this research contributes 
to inform policy about licensing individual advisers as true professionals that reaches further 
than just the Australian borders. 
8.5 ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Despite carefully designing the study at each stage to produce valid results to report and 
describe the extent of the legitimacy of the current licensing model, several limitations became 
evident during theory development, ethics approval, data collection and analysis, which 
influenced the project on several fronts. Therefore, a discussion now follows on several 
theoretical and empirical limitations, together with a few assumptions in the closing stages of 
this thesis. 
8.5.1 Assumptions 
This research is grounded on the assumption, if financial advisers are to become an accredited 
recognised profession, then they should be structurally licensed in a similar manner to other 
professions. This means allowing individual advisers to control their own professional conduct, 
rather than be controlled by multiple conflicted commercial institutions. Consequently, 
included in this general assumption, is if financial planning is to evolve into a true profession, 
then it must comply with the same standards and be subject to the same rules as other accredited 
professions.  
Although, examples of professions referred to in this study were limited to law, accounting and 
medicine, it does not preclude the other numerous accredited professions and professional 
bodies. 
This study assumed the sample and the population distributions have the same shape and 
meaning. The enquiry’s findings are conditional on the assumption the bootstrap sampling 
distribution sourced from the sample is representative of the population, despite the 
multivariate non-normal data. In addition, independence and the distribution of responses were 
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assumed identical, because the data displayed violations of multivariate normality assumptions. 
This is explained further in the empirical limitations section of data analysis, below. 
8.5.2 Theoretical and empirical limitations 
A limitation of this research is applying the Corporations Act, agency theory, with legitimacy 
theory to financial planning theory for the first time, which may have resulted in the exclusion 
of many other relevant theories and variables. However, it is acknowledged, including all 
relevant variables or theories would have made the scope of this already complex and difficult 
study too large to simplify into one study. Furthermore, although most indicators in the 
conceptualised model displayed acceptable reliability, three variables and their hypotheses 
were abandoned during the E/CFA analysis process. This ensured the model makes theoretical 
sense, was parsimonious and fitted the data adequately for reliable interpretation. 
Furthermore, the theoretical construct evaluated legitimacy from a macro-level or strategic 
level, rather than from a narrowly focused micro-level of evaluation. Hence the legitimacy 
criteria are not all inclusive, which Zimmerman’s and Zeitz’s (2002) advised is typical in 
research. Approaching the topic from a broad perspective, rather than narrowly, meant 
neglecting certain areas, which may be relevant to licensing advisers. For example, certain 
matters were ignored, such as the extent to which financial advisers themselves would or do 
invest in the same financial products they recommend to clients. The issues around professional 
indemnity, approved product lists, costs of advice, ‘white’, ‘private’ label products, and vertical 
integration were only mentioned briefly in the literature review, while being excluded from the 
conceptualised theoretical model. From the responses, these issues are important within the 
context of licensing. However, they were excluded, because they are issues at the micro-level 
of examination. Thus, legitimacy criteria could only be applied at a superficial level, because 
the problems of conflict of interest from association is so complex. Further, more in-depth 
analysis of the topic is required using each of the criteria in Suchman’s legitimacy theoretical 
framework. Nonetheless, this project was merely a starting point to explore further the 
problems and solutions around conflict of interest from association. 
Without enough peer reviewed financial planning literature supported by epistemologically 
sound definitions, principles, models, norms and decision rubrics (Paulo 2003), it was difficult 
- as was mentioned several times during this thesis - to find and present a balanced view, 
particularly in  the review phase of the financial planning literature in Chapter 3. Therefore, 
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this research was limited to the negative unsupported arguments in both popular mainstream 
and professional media and the limited financial planning scholarly secondary sources. 
Not all agency relationships within the context of licensing of individual financial advisers 
were included to narrow the scope of the study. Although, these agencies are outside the scope 
of the study, it is acknowledged they may have indirect influences on the licensee-adviser-
client relationship and hence AFSL-AR licensing. 
Of all the legitimacy criteria in this investigation, structural legitimacy theory was the most 
challenging variable to identify and measure within the context of financial planning theory 
and licensing for the first time. However, estimation of structural legitimacy was achieved 
through the substitution of variables using secondary sources that made theoretical and 
quantitative sense (Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002).  
Although industry superannuation funds, such Australian Super, HESTA, Cbus etcetera, may 
be important, they were excluded from this study, because trade unions and industry bodies 
with a not-for-profit motive originally started them, where any profits are returned to their 
members. The project was scoped to include profit-motivated institutions who serve 
shareholders’ interests only.  
8.6 CONCLUSION 
Financial Services continues to be scrutinised for the ongoing contraventions of legislation 
implemented to protect the public. Specifically, serious violations of the Act by AFS licensees 
and their authorised representatives remains in the spotlight. In this damaging environment, the 
legitimacy of the current AFSL-AR licensing model is questioned, and hence formed the 
purpose of this research. Until this enquiry, no academic has attempted to define, model and 
measure the legitimacy of the current licensee-adviser licensing model, because seemingly the 
conceptual construct was difficult to define and quantify. Therefore, the rectification of this 
difficulty involved critically integrating financial planning theory with several other theories 
forming a normative foundation to examine the legitimacy [or what was found to be the 
illegitimacy] of the prevailing licensing model.  
Utilising this conceptualised normative model, results revealed advisers do presume licensing 
advisers via product aligned, commercially oriented institutions, creates a dual-agency role 
between licensee-adviser-client. This produces conflict of interest from association. Since the 
implementation of adviser’s best interest duty, conflict of interest from association can no 
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longer be tolerated. The empirical outcomes verified the main reason for this intolerance is the 
best interest duty had changed the licensee-adviser-client legislated agency relationship in 
practice. It also threatens independence and adviser ethics. Results revealed licensing advisers 
via multiple third parties is inconsistent with four objectives of the Act. Specifically, the top 
three issues delegitimising the licensing model, in order of rank, are (1) contraventions of the 
legislated best interest duty to clients; (2) misalignment of the interests of adviser-client; and 
(3) the commercial interests of AFS licensees compromises the best interest duty to clients. 
Clearly, on the available evidence presented in this thesis, the current licensing does not result, 
in order of rank, in consequential moral, procedural moral, regulative, structural moral, 
personal moral and culture-cognitive legitimacy. Accordingly, arguments for individual 
licensing via a single body was strengthened by the adviser support for such a solution observed 
in the findings.  It is recommended FASEA in its current form should be tasked with more than 
just professional standards, education and ethics. FASEA should evolve to also appoint, 
register, regulate, discipline and cease individual advisers to practice their craft like true 
professionals. Yet, before launching into any new regime, it is imperative further research must 
address the perceived challenges around implementing individual licensing detected in this 
research. Additionally, illegitimacy puts the identity, role and performance of all stakeholders 
on notice. Therefore, this study holds implications for all Australian stakeholders within the 
advisory sector, not to downplay the importance of the findings for the international financial 
advisory sector. Although the conclusions can be challenged, not only are they compelling and 
timely, but important for the advice sector for several obvious reasons. Extending and applying 
several theories for the first time, provides: (1) a more balanced view on an emotive and 
controversial topic; (2) the theoretical foundation to advance financial planning theory and 
empirical research by closing a void; (3) policymakers domestically and internationally with 
credible evidence to make evidence-based policy decisions around licensing advisers; and (4) 
a scholarly platform to raise central topics and additional questions for future empirical 
research. Therefore, with a shared sense of purpose, based on the findings, all stakeholders 
need to work together collaboratively to overcome their differences. Not only with the resolve 
to restore trust and confidence in financial advisers, while boosting growth in the numbers of 
independent advisers by encouraging graduates to pursue a professional career in financial 
planning, but also to find more fitting solutions to protect the public.  Thus, this research and 
its implications potentially puts Australia at the international forefront of licensing advisers 
professionally, like other professions.   
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